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1
1 Introduction to the Topic 
1.1 Problem Definition and Objectives 
Entrepreneurial firms are an important driving power of the economy, inducing growth and 
innovation.1 Due to the high uncertainty that the financing of these firms entails, normally 
they are not funded by traditional banks, but rather by venture capital firms (VC(s)). The 
German venture capital market has experienced a steep upswing in the 1990's, especially 
from 1998 until 2001, and a significant downturn from 2001 until 2004. Remarkably, a 
significant portion of available funds of VCs is not invested and, in addition, this portion 
increased over the recent years.2 One major reason for funds not being invested is the 
challenge for VCs to identify promising investment opportunities they can invest in.3 
Therefore, it is a vital element in the business model of VCs to have a constant stream of 
investment opportunities they can select from.4 This stream of investment opportunities is 
also denoted as the so-called deal flow, for which its quantity and quality can be 
distinguished. While the quantity of deal flow refers to the number of investment 
opportunities a VC can select from, the quality of deal flow relates to the question whether 
the investment opportunities satisfy the investment objectives and criteria of the VC.5 
One of the sources, from which a VC receives information on potential investment 
opportunities, is its contact network.6 The contact network comprises sources of 
information such as other VCs, universities or research centers, banks or investment 
banks, private contacts, and others. In terms of deal flow, contacts to other VCs might be 
                                              
1  In academic and economic literature it is indisputable that a major part of new jobs are created by young 
and innovative companies, rather than by large and well-established firms. For the German market, see 
for example Gerke (1995), p. 11, Drukarczyk (1996), pp. 259-270, or Lessat et al. (1999), pp. 60 ff. For 
the US market also see Bygrave/Timmons (1992), p. 229; Wetzel (1986), pp. 87 f. 
2  See, for example, the development of the venture capital market as described in the yearbooks 1998-
2005 of the German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (BVK). The development of the 
German venture capital market will be described in detail further below. See section 2.1.2. 
3  See Coutarelli (1977), p. 61; Betsch/Groh/Schmidt (2000), p. 118; Lockett/Wright (2001), p. 378. 
4  See Tyebjee/Bruno (1984), p. 1051; Schröder (1992), pp. 155 ff. In a related vein, see also the analysis 
of deal flow of business angels (informal venture capital) by Mason/Harrison (1994) for the UK market, 
and the one of Brettel/Jaugey/Rost (2000) for the German market. See Mason/Harrison (1994), pp. 82 
ff.; Brettel/Jaugey/Rost (2000), p. 129. 
5  The study of Vater (2002) is one of the few that distinguishes between deal flow quantity and quality. 
See Vater (2002), p. 103 and pp. 140 ff. 
6  See Coutarelli (1977), p. 68; Fried/Hisrich (1994), pp. 31 f.; Jugel (2001), p. 39. 
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important due to two reasons: First, VCs are the ones that most likely hear about potential 
investment opportunities in the market and might be willing to share this information. 
And second, VCs might be the ones that best know the investment criteria of their peers, 
so that investment opportunities that are received by referral from another VC can be 
expected to be of comparably high quality. If one VC refers a potential investment 
opportunity to another VC, most often, this happens in the form of an invitation to jointly 
invest in the project.7 Joint investments of two or more VCs are also denoted as 
syndicated investments. Based on syndicated investments, relationships between VCs are 
established, which can be mapped in a network.8 In this study, this network is denoted as 
syndication network. Consequently, the syndication network among VCs can be 
imagined to picture the relationships that exist between the firms.9 
 
As briefly introduced above, in practice, a significant portion of available funds of VCs is 
not invested, one reason for which is the challenge for VCs to identify promising 
investment opportunities (deal flow). While funds available in the German venture capital 
market increased from 7.6 EUR billion in 1997 to 45.0 EUR billion in 2004, the portion 
not invested augmented from 47.4% in 1997 to a peak of 55.1% in 2003, and still 
remained at a significant level of 54.9% in 2004. These numbers clearly indicate that the 
topic of deal flow is major challenge for practitioners, i.e., the management of VCs. 
Given, as briefly sketched above, that the contact network of VCs is important for them 
to generate deal flow, and given that, within that network, the contacts to other VCs 
might be a significant source of deal flow, the logical consequence is to systematically 
analyze the syndication network among VCs and to examine to what extent the network 
can explain differences in the deal flow of VCs. 
However, while the aspects referred to above lead to important challenges for the 
management of VCs, research on VCs and their deal flow seldom addresses these two 
aspects, i.e., the syndication network and the deal flow. Above all, studies that combine 
                                              
7  For now, the term 'project' is used as a synonym for an entrepreneurial firm the VC firm(s) intend to 
invest in. 
8  See, for example, the study of Piskorski (2000).  
9  See Williamson (1979b), p. 44 f. 
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these two areas and quantify the connection between the two topics are sparse.10 In their 
study, Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2007) analyze the syndication network of VCs and 
the connection to their economic performance as well as to the performance of their 
portfolio companies.11 They find that better networked VCs, measured by centrality 
measures, enjoy a better financial performance. Also, the portfolio companies of these 
VCs show a better performance as measured by successful exits and their survival to 
subsequent financing rounds. Regarding the topic of deal flow, the authors of the study 
approximate the general existence of investment opportunities by using book-to-market 
and price-earnings-multiples. Since multiples partially are driven by the specific market 
situation, they also reflect the prevailing market mood. As further research topics the 
authors identify the importance of personal relationships between managers in the 
venture capital market, the costs that have to be incurred to gain favorable market 
positions, or the question how a VC can form relationships with influential VCs in the 
network.12 The paper of Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2007) represents a first important 
step with respect to network research in the area of VCs. 
Since deal flow is a basic prerequisite for the business model of VCs, the present study 
builds on existing literature and extends it by specifically analyzing the connection 
between the syndication network of VCs and their individual deal flow quantity and 
quality. In order to achieve this, the objective of this study is two-fold: In step (a), which 
can be understood as a starting point and justification for the second step, the importance 
of the general contact network and of the syndication network is being measured. Step (b) 
comprises the systematic analysis of the relationship structure of the VCs’ syndication 
network, characterizing their individual positions within the network, and the 
examination of the network positions’ effect on deal flow quantity and quality. 
In order to accomplish goal (a), several measures will be determined that show the extent, 
to which VCs in Germany make use of their general contact network (all sources within 
                                              
10  Examples of studies that partially combine the two areas, are Bygrave (1987) or Piskorski (2000). 
While Piskorski analyzes the syndication network of VCs, he only employs one network measure 
(centrality). However, there are various other measures that capture different aspects of a VC's 
relationship structure, which need to be taken into account. 
11  See Hochberg/Ljungqvist/Lu (2007), pp. 261-263. The study appeared in two earlier versions as 
working paper. See Hochberg/Ljungqvist/Lu (2004) and Hochberg/Ljungqvist/Lu (2005). 
12  See Hochberg/Ljungqvist/Lu (2007), p. 296. 
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the contact network) and of their relationships to other VCs to generate deal flow quantity 
and quality. Goal (a) is to be understood as a verification of what has been found for 
other regions. Since empirical evidence is partially contradictory and not comprehensive 
for the German market with respect to deal flow quantity and quality, the analyses for 
goal (a) only represent the starting point of the empirical part of this study and the 
justification for performing the analyses to achieve goal (b).13 
With goal (a) being the starting point, the main focus of this study is therefore laid on 
achieving goal (b). By applying formal network analysis to the syndication network of 
VCs, in a first step, the structural characteristics of the entire network will be described.14 
In a second step, and more importantly though, the position each VC holds within that 
network will be identified based on a comprehensive set of specific network measures. 
The secondary data on the VCs' network positions will then be linked to primary data on 
the quantity and quality of the deal flow of these firms, and it will be analyzed whether 
differences in network position can explain differences in deal flow quantity and quality. 
In this context, not only the potential benefits for a VC based on its relationship structure 
vis-à-vis other individual VCs will be looked at, but also the potential benefits a VC has 
from representing links between different subgroups of VCs.  
From a theoretical perspective, this study delivers a thorough examination of how VCs in 
the German venture capital market make use of their contact network, their contacts to 
other VCs, and how the relationship structure of VCs within the syndication network 
affects their deal flow quantity and quality. From a practical perspective, it will be 
derived, which network positions are beneficial for receiving a higher deal flow quantity 
and quality. Also, recommendations for VCs are deduced, laying out to whom they need 
to be connected to (through syndicated investments) and how, in turn, these contacts need 
to be connected, in order to increase deal flow quantity and quality. 
 
                                              
13 As will be shown in later chapters, also for analysis (a), hypotheses will be derived in order for this 
study to comprehensively cover the topic. 
14 From a technical perspective, this step is necessary to prepare the network data for further analyses. 
From a practical standpoint, this step makes sense in order to get a feeling for the overall structure of 
the entire network of syndication relationships.  
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1.2 Methodology and Structure of the Study 
This study employs a research approach, which combines analytical deductions and 
theoretical arguments with empirical work: Based on theoretical explanations applied to 
the venture capital market and to the context of the syndication network, hypotheses will 
be derived. In the following, these hypotheses will be verified or falsified empirically. 
The hypotheses contain statements on how certain network properties will affect the 
quantity and quality of the deal flow of VCs. The potential relationship between network 
position and deal flow will be examined by multivariate regression analysis in multiple 
models. Thereby, this study clearly exceeds currently available research for the German 
venture capital market, but also goes beyond of what is available for other regions. 
 
The study is structured into eight chapters. In chapter one, the problem definition and the 
objectives of the study are explained. 
In chapter two, some definitions and basic concepts are introduced. These refer to the 
venture capital market and to the characteristics of VCs, as well as to the topic of deal flow.  
In chapter three, the theoretical foundation for this study is laid out. Theories that are 
commonly applied to financial and capital markets do not sufficiently capture the potential 
effects of network positions for individual actors. Rather, social network analysis will be 
applied. Since social network analysis is a field of research, which is mainly unknown to 
the (economist) reader, some effort has to be spent on introducing this topic. Based on 
these explanations, specific theories from the social capital concept will be derived as 
theoretical foundation to analyze the VCs' network with respect to their deal flow. A 
detailed research design will be developed, building on the theoretical foundations.  
Based on the theoretical explanations, in chapter four, hypotheses are derived with 
respect to two basic questions: First, in order to verify previous research in other regions 
for the German market, hypotheses are derived on the general importance of the contact 
network and of the contacts to other VCs for the generation of deal flow quantity and 
quality. As explained above, this first analysis is to be seen as the starting point and 
justification for the second part. Second, hypotheses are deduced on how certain network 
properties affect deal flow quantity and quality. This second part builds the main focus of 
the study, and again, it looks at how VCs benefit from their contacts to individual other 
VCs as well as at how VCs benefit from linking certain subgroups. 
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Chapter five explains the data collection process and lays out the methodological approach 
employed in this study. The method used to detect the potential connection between 
network position and deal flow quantity and quality is multivariate regression analysis. 
However, as will be explained in detail, in network analysis the standard statistical 
procedures can partially not be applied. Therefore, statistical methods have been developed 
that allow the application of statistical methods to the analysis of network structures. 
While in chapter six the results of the empirical research are reported and described, in 
chapter seven, these results are discussed and practical implications for the management 
of VCs and for research are derived. In chapter eight, the study is summarized. 
 
The structure of this study is presented in the overview below: 
 
Introduction to the Topic 
 
7
Introduction:
Problem definition, objectives, and methodology of the study
Definitions and basic concepts:
Venture capital market, VCs, syndicated investments and the deal flow of VCs
Theoretical foundation:
Exclusion of traditional theories on financial markets, application of social network analysis
and of social capital theory to the syndication network and deal flow of VC firms
Research design
Derivation of hypotheses:
Hypotheses on the importance of the contact/syndication network for deal flow quantity and 
quality, hypotheses on the effect of network positions on deal flow quantity and quality
Data collection and methodological approach:
Data collection process, use of statistics in network analysis, multivariate regression analysis
Empirical research:
Presentation and description of results
Summary of the study
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
Empirical research: Discussion of results, implications for management and research
Importance of contact/syndication network for deal flow (goal (a)),
analysis of VCs' network position within syndication network (goal (b))
7
 
Figure 1.1: Structure of the study15 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
15  Own illustration.  
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2 Definitions and Basic Concepts 
As a foundation for the further discussion, some definitions and basic concepts regarding 
the topics of venture capital (section 2.1) and deal flow (section 2.2) have to be 
explained.  
 
2.1 Venture Capital  
2.1.1 Definition of the Term and Venture Capital as Method of Financing 
The term 'venture capital' is derived from the English word 'venture', which is defined as 
"an undertaking involving chance, risk, or danger".16 This definition explicitly contains 
two meanings: On the one hand, it describes the negative aspect of risk and danger, on 
the other hand it describes the positive aspect of chance.17 Translations of the term 
'venture capital' into German language are not satisfactory, since they either emphasize 
the aspect of risk ('Risikokapital', 'Wagniskapital') or chance ('Chancenkapital'), but they 
do not cover both. Therefore, also in German linguistic usage, the term 'venture capital' is 
well-established.18 
Basically, VCs invest funds of investors in the so-called portfolio companies, which are 
not yet mature enough to be publicly traded at the point in time when being financed by 
the VC. Typical business operations of VCs cover investments ranging from seed-, start-
up-, and expansion-financing as well as buyouts (management buyouts (MBOs), 
management buyins (MBIs), leveraged buyouts (LBOs)) and turnaround-or mezzanine-
financing. In Anglo-American linguistic usage, the expressions 'venture capital', 
'(leveraged) buyouts' and 'mezzanine-financing' are included in the superordinate term 
'private equity'.19 
In German language, nowadays there is neither a uniform definition nor uniform usage of 
these terms. While some German authors use the terms analogously to the Anglo-
                                              
16 w.A. (2005): Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, 
http://www.britannica.com, date of access: September 28, 2005. 
17  See Leopold/Frommann (1998), pp. 4 f.; Nathusius (2001), pp. 53 f. 
18  See Welpe (2004), pp. 17 f. 
19  See Schefczyk (2004), pp. 17 f. 
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American understanding mentioned above,20 both expressions, 'venture capital' and 
'private equity' are often simply used as a synonym for the German word 'Kapital-
beteiligung(sgesellschaft)'.21 However, there seems to be a tendency that the term 'private 
equity' is used besides the term 'venture capital', with 'venture capital' describing 
investments relating to earlier financing stages and 'private equity' referring to later 
financing stages such as buyouts and mezzanine-financing.22 According to this 
understanding, the German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (BVK) 
generally differentiates between venture capital (including seed-, start-up, expansion- and 
turnaround, replacement- and bridge financing) and private equity (buyouts including 
MBOs, MBIs, and LBOs).23 For the purpose of this study, this understanding of the terms 
is adopted. If used otherwise, explicit directions are provided. 
 
In reference to financing methods and according to the classification of the BVK 
explained above, venture capital-financing represents a specific form of financing besides 
private equity-financing, of which further forms are MBOs, MBIs, and LBOs.24 Besides 
venture capital- and private equity-financing, funds can also be raised through the public 
capital market, which is then called public equity. Venture capital, private equity and 
public equity together constitute equity-financing, which is differentiated from debt-
financing.  
 
                                              
20  See Weitnauer (2001), pp. 5 f.; Perridon/Steiner (2003), p. 355. 
21  For example, this understanding is represented in the name of the association of German 
'Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften', which, until 2002, was called 'Bundesverband Deutscher 
Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften – German Venture Capital Association e.V.'. Here, the term 'venture 
capital' is used synonymously for the word 'Kapitalbeteiligung'. Since 2003, it renamed itself into 
'Bundesverband Deutscher Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften – German Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Association e.V.'. Here, the terms 'venture capital' and 'private equity' are used synonymously to 
the word 'Kapitalbeteiligungen'. Authors employing this understanding are among others 
Leopold/Frommann (1998), p. 8; Schefczyk (2004), p. 19. 
22  See Schefczyk (2004), pp. 18 f. The different investment stages will also be explained in detail in 
section 2.1.3.3. 
23  See BVK (2005a), p. 1; BVK (2005b), p. 1. 
24  Another private equity-financing method is the so-called venture leasing. Further information on this 
are topic to be found in Kleiman (2001) or Lerner (2001). 
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Methods of financing
Equity financing Debt financing
Venture capital Private equity Public equity
• Seed
• Start-up
• Expansion
• Turnaround/ 
Replacement
• Bridge
• MBO
• MBI
• LBO
• Public market
for equity
capital
 
Figure 2.1: Overview of financing methods25 
 
Besides the formal classification of venture capital as financing method, the financing 
with venture capital is characterized by typical criteria:26 
 
Equity financing: Since venture capital formally belongs to equity capital, there is no pay 
back or interest liability for the portfolio company, reducing its risk of insolvency. 
Instead of equity capital, venture capitalists27 might also accept bonus shares or 
participation certificates, an investment without voting rights, or subordinated debt. 
Temporarily limited engagement: Due to the fact that, in most cases, venture capitalists 
invest in order to maximize their return on investment,28 their primary goal is not to 
generate recurrent earnings through, for example, dividends. Rather, through disinvesting 
the investment after a certain period of time, they intend to benefit from the increased 
value of the business. 
Minority interest: Typically, venture capital providers acquire minority stakes in their 
portfolio firms. Thereby, the portfolio company remains independent to some extent, and 
the founders retain the necessary power of decision.  
                                              
25  Own illustration derived on the basis of Wöhe/Bilstein (1998), p. 20; Achleitner (2000), p. 723; 
Thommen/Achleitner (2003), p. 506; BVK (2005a), p. 1. Again, the Anglo-American usage of the terms 
views venture capital as form of private equity.  
26  See Schefczyk (2004), pp. 21 f.; Frommann (2001), pp. 1247-1249; Gerke (2001), pp. 2129 f. 
27  In this study, the term 'venture capitalist(s)' is used synonymously to 'VC(s)'.  
28  For further objectives venture capital providers might focus on, see the types of VCs in section 2.1.3.1. 
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Control rights and co-determination rights: While the founder is formally independent in 
his decisions, usually, VCs are granted certain rights to control and co-determine 
important strategic decisions and decisions regarding the use of funds provided. Thereby, 
it is ensured that the portfolio company does not neglect the interest of the VC. 
Management support: In order to secure the appreciation of value of the portfolio 
company, VCs also deliver non-financial support, i.e., they perform an advisory function 
in various areas such as topics concerning content, process, operative support, or 
collaboration in committees or boards. 
 
However, despite the various possible forms of engagement of a venture capitalist vis-à-
vis a portfolio company, the way a venture capital financing works, remains, which is 
illustrated below: 
 
Investor(s)
(Providers of venture capital)
VC
Portfolio companies
(Seekers of venture capital)
PC 1* PC 2 PC 3 … PC n
Capital
- Capital
- Management
support
Payout
Profit through
exit
* PC = Portfolio company  
Figure 2.2: Functional principle of venture capital29 
 
VCs collect funds from (multiple) investors and spread them to multiple portfolio 
companies.30 In addition to financial support, managers of VCs also input their technical 
know-how and management expertise to support the management of the portfolio 
company. After exiting the investment(s), the funds flow back to the investors. Of course, 
                                              
29  According to Schefczyk (2004), p. 26. 
30  In contrast to collecting funds from multiple investors, there can also be only one investor providing the 
entire amount. This is the case with captive VCs. Analogously, a VC might also invest in only one 
portfolio company, which is called a project-oriented investment. See also chapter 2.1.3.1. 
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in the case of successful exits,31 a premium gained through the exit flows back to the 
investors as well. 
 
To better understand the investment behavior of VCs today, it is helpful to examine the 
development of the German venture capital market, and to also put the German market 
into comparison to its international counterparts.32 
 
2.1.2 Development and International Comparison of the German Venture Capital 
Market 
The development of the German venture capital market started in the early 1960s with the 
foundation of relatively small VCs through private investors.33 During that time, a 
difficult fiscal and judicial business environment characterized the German capital 
market, paralleled by an adverse attitude and mentality of financiers vis-à-vis the 
foundation of young and innovative companies. These conditions prohibited a fast 
expansion of VCs as financial intermediaries in a qualitative and quantitative 
dimension.34 Another challenge was the lack of professional and (in high-tech industry) 
knowledgeable portfolio managers.35  
During the 1970s, first success stories of venture capital investments in the United States 
caused German politicians to react. After a long-winded political discussion, 27 banks 
founded the 'Deutsche Wagnisfinanzierungsgesellschaft (WFG)' in 1975. Predominant 
objective of the WFG was to economically promote scientific research findings in 
institutions and companies.36 Although some authors regard the WFG as origin of the 
                                              
31  For an overview of the various exit alternatives used by German VCs, see chapter 2.1.3.4. 
32  As will be shown later on, the focus of this study is on VC investments in the German market. This will 
be explained in detail in section 5.1.1.2. 
33  Examples for these early foundations were the 'Indufina-Frankfurt Industrie- und Finanzbetei-
ligungsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG' or the 'BONA-Kapitalbeteiligungs-GmbH'. For further details, see 
Schefczyk (2004), pp. 113 f; Heynen (1970), pp. 23-25. 
34  See Schauerte (1999), pp. 17-24; Schubert (1982), p. 378. 
35  See Leopold/Frommann (1998), p. 18. Leopold/Frommann also emphasize the importance of practical 
experience in this field of business. 
36  See Mayer/Müller (1991), pp. 20 ff.; Welpe (2004), p. 24; Schefczyk (2004), p. 115. Also see Laub 
(1985) and Pfirrmann/Wupperfeld/Lerner (1997). 
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German venture capital industry, the main focus of investments were medium-sized 
businesses.  
Not until the early 1980's, the real venture capital industry in Germany was born. 
Continuous information on success stories of venture capital investments in the United 
States and predictions of their micro-economic and macro-economic potential initiated a 
boom of VC foundations investing primarily in young and innovative businesses.37 With 
twice as many new foundations in the 1980's compared to the 1970's, the venture capital 
industry has experienced a steep upswing.38 
However, copying the American development to the German capital market proved to be 
difficult. On the one hand, this was due to the safety-oriented mentality and aversion as to 
innovations of managers. On the other hand, one major reason was the absence of the exit 
channel through an initial public offering (IPO).39 During the 1990's until the year 2000, 
one could witness a significant acceleration of the German venture capital market. 
Reasons for this recent development were changes in fiscal conditions, a stimulation of 
the market for equity capital investments through institutional investors as well as 
governmental support programs for innovation.40 Another main driver of the upward 
development of the venture capital industry was the opening of a new stock exchange 
segment in 1997 called the 'Neuer Markt', giving VCs the opportunity to exit investments 
through an IPO.41 While in 1995 only 36 IPOs occurred in all segments of the German 
stock exchange, already in 1999, the 'Neuer Markt' comprised of 147 firms.42  
After the boom period until 2000, from 2001 onwards the capital markets plummeted 
severely and a phase of consolidation began, which was characterized by low investment 
                                              
37  See Beyel (1987), p. 657; Albach/Kokalj (1987), p. 359. 
38  See Lessat et al. (1999), pp. 18 f. 
39  See Wall/Smith (1999), p. 4; Albach (1997), p. 446. 
40  A first governmental support program was the 'TOU' ('Förderung technologieorientierter Unter-
nehmensgründungen'). This pilot project from 1983-1988 provided funding to young technology-
oriented companies. In the 'BJTU' ('Beteiligungskapital für junge Technologieunternehmen'), VCs could 
receive funds from 1989-1994 to invest in young technology-oriented businesses. In 1995, the 'BTU' 
('Beteiligungskapital für kleine Technologieunternehmen') started, providing funds for VCs that invest 
in small technology-oriented companies. See Lessat et al. (1999), p. 16. For a work on the significance 
of venture capital for innovation, see Roling (2001). 
41  See Achleitner (2000), p. 247; Schefczyk (2004), p. 121. 
42  See Sternberg (2000), p. 138. 
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volumes and a difficult fund raising and exit environment.43 From its peak of 
approximately 8,500 points in March 2000, the NEMAX, i.e., the stock exchange index 
for the 'Neuer Markt' segment, came down to 359 points in February 2003, equivalent to 
a 95% decrease. As a consequence, the 'Neuer Markt' was abolished at the end of 2003.  
 
In chapter one, it has been mentioned that one of the challenges for VCs today is to identify 
promising investment opportunities. This study shall help to improve this situation by 
analyzing how more and potentially promising deals can be identified. One of the 
preconditions to improve that situation is, of course, that VCs dispose of the necessary 
funds to invest. Looking at the development of the German venture capital market, it 
becomes obvious that the availability of funds is not the limiting factor. Actually, a large 
portion of available funds is not invested, as presented in figure 2.3 below.  
Funds invested increased from 4.0 EUR billion in 1997 to 20.3 EUR billion in 2004 with 
a compound annual growth rate (CAGR)44 of 26.1%. Total funds available show an 
increase from 7.6 EUR billion in 1997 to 45.0 EUR billion in 2004 with a CAGR of 
28.9%. What is important is that the share of funds not invested (of total funds available) 
increased from 47.4% in 1997 to 54.9% in 2004 (CAGR of 2.1%).  
This development underlines two aspects: First, in line with previous explanations, the 
increase in the share of funds not invested is due to the restricted investment behavior of 
VCs after 2001. Second, and more important in the context of this study, it shows that the 
German venture capital market still has a considerable potential for investments. Reasons 
for this could be that either promising investment opportunities do simply not exist, or 
that they exist but that VCs are not able to identify them. This challenge VCs are facing is 
also reflected in the figures presented in figure 2.4. 
 
 
 
 
                                              
43  See the preface in BVK (2002).  
44  The compound annual growth rate is calculated as the average year-over-year growth rate. 
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Figure 2.3: German venture capital market 1997-200445 
                                              
45  Based on BVK statistics and yearbooks 1998-2005, own additions and calculations. 
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Figure 2.4: Number of inquiries for venture capital and private equity in Germany46 
 
The figures show a steep increase until 2001 (from 16,500 in 1997 to 90,500 in 2001) and 
a severe decrease can be recognized from 2001 until 2004, with the number of inquiries 
declining to 32,700. In contrast to the boom phase until 2001, the time afterwards is 
characterized by fewer inquiries and with increasing funds available, which results in the 
phenomenon of 'too much money chasing too few deals'.47 In such a situation, identifying 
promising investment opportunities (deal flow) becomes even more important for VCs. 
The present study shall contribute to analyzing and developing options to improve the 
way how to think about generating deal flow. 
From a macro-economic perspective, the necessity to improve the VCs' ability to access 
or identify investment opportunities also becomes obvious when considering the 
development of the investments into the various financing stages, as presented in figure 
2.5. Before 1997, investments of German VCs are characterized by a rather conservative 
investment behavior, represented by a considerable share of expansion financing (47.6% 
in 1997). Fueled by the market upswing from 1997 until 2000, the comparatively riskier 
seed- and start-up financing experienced a steep increase from a share of 15.1% in 1997 
to 34.7% in 2000. 
                                              
46  Source: BVK statistics and yearbooks 1998-2005.  
47  This phenomenon has been described by Kaplan/Stein (1993), p. 313; Gompers/Lerner (2000), p. 282. 
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Figure 2.5: Funds invested, based on financing stages48 
 
Even stronger than the increase was the decline after the year 2000, with the share 
dropping to 9.4% in 2004. At the same time, since 2000 the share of MBO/MBI/LBO 
                                              
48  Source: BVK statistics and yearbooks 1998-2005, own additions and calculations. 
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investments rose significantly.49 This evolution nicely reflects the change in investment 
behavior by German VCs, shifting the investment focus to early-stage investments during 
1997 to 2000, and to later-stage investments after 2000. 
Based on these figures and based on the initial statement in this study, i.e., that 
entrepreneurial firms are an important driving power of the economy, it becomes obvious 
that the financing stages 'seed/start-up' and also 'expansion' need to be developed. One 
approach is to help VCs improve the ways to identify promising investment opportunities.  
 
In order to get a feeling for the size of the German venture capital market in an 
international context, in the following it is related to the European and the US market. 
As shown in the following figure, in a European comparison of investments, the UK 
claims 51.7% of total investments of 36,921 EUR millions in 2004, followed by France 
(14.2%), Germany (10.2%), Spain (5.3%), the Netherlands (4.5%), Sweden (4.4%), and 
Italy (4.0%). The rest (5.7%) is represented by other European countries. In terms of the 
total market, i.e., the capital under management (invested funds), nearly the same picture 
is drawn. Of the total invested funds of 156.1 EUR billion, the UK accounts for 59.8 
EUR billion, followed by France (25.5 EUR billion), Germany (20.3 EUR billion), Italy 
(12.4 EUR billion), and the Netherlands (9.0 EUR billion).50 
 
In comparison to the European market, the US market for venture capital and private 
equity is about 1.3 times as large (capital under management in the US of 209.9 EUR 
billion compared to 156.1 EUR billion in Europe). Regarding investments in 2004, 
Europe accounts for 36.9 EUR billion whereas the US accounts for 16.9 EUR billion.51 
With respect to the gross domestic product (GDP), it appears that investments in Europe 
stand for approximately 0.35% of the GDP whereas in the US this value equals 
approximately 0.18%. However, total funds invested in the US account for approximately 
                                              
49  Not shown in the figure, the predominant driver of this development were investments in LBOs. See 
BVK (2001), p.73; BVK (2005c), p. 7. 
50  See BVK (2005d), p. 1. 
51  See BVK (2005e), p. 12. Data is provided in US $ (invested funds of 260.7 US $ billion and 
investments of 20.993 US $ billion) and has been converted by the author with the US $-EUR average 
interbank rate for 2004 (1 US $ = 0.8051 EUR). Source for the interbank rates was www.oanda.com. 
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2.2% of the GDP, while in Europe this value only equals approximately 1.5%, and for 
Germany approximately 0.9%.52 
 
5.7
4.4
4.5
5.3
10.2
14.2
51.7
4.0
United Kingdom
France
Germany
Spain
Netherlands
Sweden
Italy Rest of Europe
*
* Comprising: Denmark (1.1%), Norway (0.8%), Belgium (0.8%),
Switzerland (0.7%), Finland (0.6%), Portugal (0.4%), Austria (0.4%),
Poland (0.4%), Hungary (0.3%), Ireland (0.2%), and Czech Republic
(0.1%)
100 % = 36,921 EUR million
 
Figure 2.6: European venture capital and private equity market, investments 200453 
 
Especially in comparison to the US market, it appears that the venture capital market in 
Germany is underdeveloped. Again, significant funds exists, that need to be activated, 
and one way to help this be done is to find ways how VCs can identify more and 
promising investment opportunities, which is the goal of this study. 
 
To get an understanding of the firms being active in the venture capital market and of 
their investments, i.e., portfolio companies, these will be elaborated on in the next 
section.  
 
                                              
52  The values in comparison to the GDP are own calculations based on the investment volume and the 
volume of invested funds for Germany, Europe, and the US (sources given above). For GDP values see 
World Bank (2005). 
53  Source: EVCA yearbook 2005. 
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2.1.3 Venture Capital Firms and Portfolio Companies 
2.1.3.1 Types of Venture Capital Providers 
As illustrated in figure 2.2, VCs act as intermediaries between capital providers and 
seekers of venture capital. They can be differentiated according to various criteria, such 
as the ownership structure, according to their degree of specialization regarding industries 
or the phases of a company's lifecycle they invest in,54 or the degree of management 
support provided.55 However, while these classifications are partially not free of 
overlaps,56 it can be distinguished whether there exists a direct or indirect investment 
contract between capital providers and capital seekers.57 This systematic is illustrated in 
the figure below:  
 
Providers of venture capital
Direct investment
(informal venture capital)
Indirect investment
(formal venture capital)
„Impure“ intermediaries
Captive VCs
„Pure“ intermediaries
• Business angels
• Corporate VCs
• Institutional captive VCs
• Independent VCs
Semi-captive VCs
• Governmenatally funded VCs
• Other semi-captive VCs  
Figure 2.7: Overview of providers of venture capital58 
 
In the former case, capital provider and capital seeker directly enter an investment 
contract. Capital providers of direct investments are wealthy private investors, which are 
denoted as the so-called business angels.59  
                                              
54  The different investment stages will be explained in section 2.1.3.3. Also in this study, an analysis will 
be performed based on the classification of VCs into a 2x2-matrix with one dimension referring to the 
industry focus, and the other dimension being the focus on investment stages. See sections 3.4.5.3 and 
6.3.5.1. 
55  For detailed discussion on the specialization of VCs, see Sorenson/Stuart (2001), pp. 1562 ff.; 
Norton/Tenenbaum (1993), pp. 431ff. Further information, for example, on management support 
provided, see Zider (1999), p. 46; Fredriksen et al. (1990), pp. 503-505; Gifford (1997), pp. 459 ff. 
56  For example, publicly held VCs may virtually act like a privately held VC. 
57  For further information on details of investment contracts, see Schefczyk (2004), p. 27 and pp. 46-56. 
58  According to Schefczyk (2004), p. 23; Zemke (1995), pp. 82 ff.; Nathusius (2005), p. 23. 
59  For an excellent overview of and study on the informal venture capital market in Germany, see Brettel 
(2004). On a comparison of business angels and VCs and the Scandinavian market, see, for example, 
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In the case of indirect investments, VCs act as intermediaries between the original capital 
providers and portfolio companies. This is also referred to as formal venture capital.60 
These intermediaries can further be segmented according to the underlying ownership 
structure, i.e., independent, captive and semi-captive VCs.61 According to the definition 
of the BVK, in independent VCs, no shareholder owns more than 20% of the shares, in 
semi-captive firms at least one owner holds between 20% and 50% of the shares, and in 
captive firms one owner accounts for more than 50% of the company's shares.62 
Independent VCs actively raise funds from multiple investors such as pension funds, 
industrial firms, insurance companies, or banks. These capital providers regard their 
investment as one of many investment alternatives with the objective to maximize the 
return on investment. However, independent of their investors, these VCs can 
autonomously decide upon their investments, the reason for which they are called 'pure' 
intermediaries.63 Usually, funds raised by independent VCs are temporarily limited and 
the VC normally intends to maximize its financial return, neglecting strategic objectives. 
 
'Impure' intermediaries can be grouped into captive and semi-captive VCs. Captive VCs 
comprise legally independent subsidiaries of industrial firms or of financial institutions. 
Investment decisions are not made independently from the parent company, since this is 
the exclusive provider of funds. Normally, members of the parent company and of the 
                                                                                                                                      
Osnabrugge (1998a), Osnabrugge (1998b), Osnabrugge (2000), or Reitan/Sorheim (2000). Exemplary 
for a study on business angels in the US is, for example, Wetzel (1983). For a review on research of 
business angels, see Freear/Sohl/Wetzel (2002). 
60  See Nathusius (2001), pp. 63 ff.; Zemke (1995), pp. 106 ff.; Christen (1991), pp. 46 ff.; Schröder 
(1992), pp. 72 ff.; Schmidtke (1985), pp. 110 ff.. Furthermore, within formal venture capital it can be 
differentiated between project-oriented investments and funds-oriented investments. In project-oriented 
investments, first the venture capital provider selects a portfolio company, in which to invest and 
afterwards acquires investors to provide the capital needed. Often with the project-oriented, specific 
financing structures are developed for large buyouts or late stage investments. For funds-oriented 
investments, funds are raised from capital providers first, which are then invested into multiple portfolio 
companies. See Klemm (1988), pp. 40 ff. 
61  See Schefczyk (2004), p. 70. 
62  See BVK (2004), p. 150. The BVK also provides the distribution of investments over the categories 
independent, captive, and semi-captive. In 2004, independent VCs accounted for 55.1%, captives for 
27.5%, and semi-captives for 6.2% (the remainder of 11.2% is given as unidentified). See BVK 
(2005c), p. 14. 
63  See Zemke (1995), p. 84. 
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captive VC together come to an investment decision.64 Corporate VCs often invest not 
only to maximize the financial return, but also due to strategic reasons. These include, for 
example, access to new and innovative technologies and resources, access to distribution 
channels, or the chance to win the young company as a future business partner. In 
addition, often the results of scientific research done for and by start-ups are of special 
interest for larger corporations.65  
In contrast to captive VCs, funds raised in semi-captive VCs originally come from 
multiple investors. As in captive VCs, decisions are made by an advisory council, to 
which managers of the VC and of the capital-providing firms belong. However, in most 
cases, the maximization of financial return is the primary objective.66 One particular kind 
of semi-captive firms are governmentally-funded VCs. In most cases, shareholders of 
these firms are governmental authorities that do not primarily invest in order to maximize 
the return on investment but to support and promote the economy, often with a regional 
focus. Therefore, these companies also perform an economic-political mission.67  
 
Besides through indirect investments, venture capital can be directly transferred from a 
wealthy private investor (business angel) to the portfolio company without interposing an 
intermediary from the standardized or formal venture capital market.68 Business Angels 
invest their private capital as equity capital in young, innovative businesses.69 Although 
this type of investments is not new,70 business angels and their investments have received 
                                              
64  See Zemke (1995), p. 85. Sometimes, according to Zemke (1995), the term 'captive VC' solely refers to 
financial institutions. However, since both, VCs of industrial firms and of financial institutions, are 
owned by the parent company by the majority (more than 50% of the company's shares), both forms are 
included into 'Captives' for the purpose of this study. 
65  See Schefczyk (2004), p. 71. For further literature on this topic, see Gompers/Lerner (1999); 
Maula/Autio/Murray (2005); Siegel/Siegel/Macmillan (1988); Hagleitner (2000); Ollig (2001). 
66  See Zemke (1995), p. 86. 
67  See Wöhe/Bilstein (1998), p. 141; Brinkrolf (2002), p. 23; Schefczyk (2004), p. 71. For further 
discussion on governmentally-funded VCs, see Posner (1996); Baier (2000); Nachtkamp (1986). 
68  See Schefczyk (2004), p. 71. 
69  For an excellent overview of the informal venture capital market in Germany, see Brettel (2004). Also 
see Brettel/Jaugey/Rost (2000).  
70  Examples of firms, that have meanwhile developed into large international companies, are Ford and the 
former Mannesmann. Henry Ford and the Mannesmann family have both been supported by business 
angels. Also, Christoph Columbus has been financed by private investors, who participated in the risk 
of a loss as well as in potential goods. See Leopold/Frommann (1998), p. 8; Gaston (1989), p. 2; 
Tschammer-Osten (1996), pp. 718 f. 
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significant attention in academic literature over the last 25 years. Business angels differ 
significantly from formal investors with respect to investment motives, invested volumes, 
stages of investment and expectations regarding the return on investment. They prefer to 
invest in very early stages of a business, especially with a focus on start-ups with 
innovating technologies.71 Often, the primary objective is not to maximize the return on 
their investment but to participate in the founding and development of a business or 
technology, enjoying the fun they gain from helping the founders. Since business angels 
are often wealthy individuals with an entrepreneurial or management background, they 
are able to support the founders with their know-how and expertise.72 However, for the 
purpose of this study, it is abstracted from the group of business angels, so that the focus 
is laid on the formal venture capital market.  
 
2.1.3.2 Characteristics of Portfolio Companies 
In order to get a common understanding of companies qualifying for a financing with 
venture capital, it is necessary to consider both, the needs of the potential portfolio 
company and the requirements of the venture capital provider. 
As to the requirements of the VC, one predominant demand becomes obvious, i.e., the 
growth potential of the young business. VCs typically intend to exit their investments after 
a certain period of time, which is approximately 5-10 years.73 Therefore, a precondition is 
that during this time period, the portfolio company's value needs to increase significantly in 
order for the venture capitalist to be a profitable exit opportunity. In academic literature 
though, there is no general definition of what exactly a growth company is.74 Rather, a 
                                              
71  See Lessat et al. (1999), p. 160. 
72  These business angels are called 'entrepreneurial angels'. Besides these, there are also 'virgin angels', 
'latent angels', 'income-seeking-angels', and 'corporate angels'. For details on this classification of 
business angels, see Stevenson/Coveney (1994), pp. 5 ff. 
73  See Bell (1999), p. 53; Rams/Remmen (1999), p. 690. Wall/Smith (1999) mention an investment 
horizon of 3-6 years, based on their survey of the members of the European Venture Capital 
Association (EVCA). See Wall/Smith (1999), p. 5. 
74  A possible categorization is provided by Bygrave (1997) and Timmons (1999). They group growth 
firms into three categories: Lifestyle ventures characterized by low growth potential, high-potential-
ventures showing very high growth potential, and middle-market-ventures described by a growth 
potential somewhere in the middle between the other two. See Bygrave (1997), pp. 185 f.; Timmons 
(1999), pp. 420 f. In contrast to Bygrave, Timmons calls the third group 'foundation firms'. 
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growth company can be described based on its needs and further aspects characterizing 
them. 
A potential categorization is provided by Bygrave (1997) and Timmons (1999), who 
group young growth firms into three categories: Lifestyle-ventures, high-potential-
ventures, and middle-market-ventures. Lifestyle ventures are characterized by low 
growth potential, high-potential-ventures by very high growth potential, and middle-
market-ventures are assigned somewhere in-between lifestyle ventures and high-
potential-ventures with respect to their growth potential.75 
With respect to the needs of the portfolio company, two aspects are characteristic. First, 
due to the fact that in most cases the possibility of self-financing out of cash-flows is not 
feasible, the young firm requires an external financing. However, neither a financing with 
debt capital nor with equity capital through the public capital market is feasible.76 
Second, the management of the firm is often comprised of the founders of the business, 
who have specific technological knowledge. They (and also their business model) 
frequently do not have a proven track record of management performance and need 
significant support in managing their firm due to a lack of managerial expertise. This can 
be provided by the VC.77 
Besides these two basic characteristics of venture capital-financed firms, potential 
portfolio companies often intend to achieve fulfillment of three further conditions 
regarding their cooperation with a VC: First, if possible, they prefer minority stakes held 
by venture capitalists in order not to lose their independence. In addition, of course, the 
founders would like to benefit most from economic success.78 Second, portfolio 
companies prefer to have the possibility to retain potential profits, primarily in order to 
achieve and secure a solid financial basis.79 Third, potential portfolio companies intend to 
                                              
75  See Bygrave (1997), pp. 185 f.; Timmons (1999), pp. 420 f. In contrast to Bygrave, Timmons calls the 
third group 'foundation firms'. 
76  See Nathusius (2005), p. 14; Just (2000), pp. 18 f. 
77  See Gompers/Lerner (1999), p. 128; Achleitner/Bassen (2001), pp. 9 f. As to the track record, note that, 
for example, companies that were listed at the Neuer Markt in 2000, have existed for approximately 5 
years. See Achleitner (2000), p. 248. 
78  See Klemm (1988), p. 81; Kaminski (1988), p. 70; Arnold (1989), pp. 271-277. 
79  See Schefczyk (2004), p. 37. 
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initially receive temporarily unlimited financing. However, often, founders are also 
interested in certain rights to buy back the shares from the VC.80 
 
As mentioned above, potentially promising young businesses VCs invest in can be in 
various stages of a company's lifecycle. Based on the phase of the lifecycle the portfolio 
company is in, various investment stages can be differentiated. Because this study will 
focus on some of them but not on all,81 the various investment stages are explained in the 
following section to get a common understanding. 
 
2.1.3.3 Investment Stages 
Although there is partially no consistent classification of the investment stages a VC can 
invest in, German literature basically has adopted a differentiation into eight stages:82 
Seed: This first stage is characterized by the promotion of the original product idea or 
proposal of the potential founders of the venture business to-be. Main focus is put on the 
development of the business model and a first prototype. By primarily investing in 
research and development activities, utilizable results are to be achieved.83 Major 
challenges during this phase are the balanced and sustainable evaluation of the product 
idea and of the market environment as well as the extent of the management support 
needed.84 All activities during this stage aim at preparing the venture for its official 
foundation. 
Start-up: This stage refers to financing of venture business' foundation. The required 
capital is employed for initial marketing efforts as well as the preparation of production.85 
At this point in time, the newly-founded firm has not yet started or recently begun to sell 
its products or services on the market. Establishing trust to the involved venture capital 
                                              
80  See Arnold (1989), pp. 211 ff. An early buy back of the shares is often restricted to the existence of 
specific reasons, which have been defined beforehand, or to potentially long cancellation periods. See 
Schefczyk (2004), p. 37. 
81  Which of the investment stages are focused on will be explained in detail in section 5.1.1.2. 
82  This categorization is also used by the BVK. See BVK (2005c), pp. 35-36. 
83  See Rams/Remmen (1999), pp. 687 ff. Also see Wupperfeld (1994). 
84  See Schefczyk (2004), pp. 41-42; Frommann (1991), p. 733. 
85  See Beyel (1987), p. 658. 
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providers and the recruiting of qualified personnel represent major challenges during this 
stage.86 By taking up personal loans, receiving financial support from governmentally-
funded loan programs, or by establishing cooperations to other businesses in related 
industries, entrepreneurs may significantly incite VCs and thereby compensate for 
potential deficiencies, for example regarding the business plan.87 
Expansion: Some authors, for example Rams and Remmen (1999), Leopold (1993), or 
Weitnauer (2001)88 refer to the terms 'first stage', 'second stage', and so on. Due to this 
inconsistency with respect to other literature, the more concrete terminology as given, for 
example, in Schefczyk (2004), Frommann (1991), or the BVK is adopted. During this 
stage, investments are directed to expand the production of the business, which finds 
itself approximately at the break-even-point. Emphasis is put on product modifications 
and product differentiation as well as on the increase of the company's market share. 
Major challenges are the establishment of an image and positioning in the market as well 
as the raising of debt capital. Despite a strong interest of VCs in seed-, start-up-, and 
expansion-financings during the period from 1997 until 2000, the investment focus has 
shifted to later stages in recent years.89  
Bridge: In bridge financings, funds invested are employed to prepare or 'bridge' the time 
period until the disinvestment of the VC. Above all, these financings help to set up the 
venture business to be taken public in an IPO or to promote the growth of the company, 
resulting in an improved positioning vis-à-vis an industrial investor in a trade sale.90 
Challenges regarding the organizational structure and processes as well as a strengthened 
competition on product markets are critical factors during this phase. Often, bridge 
financings are provided by the banks accompanying the IPO in the form of the so-called 
                                              
86  See Schefczyk (2004), pp. 41-42; Frommann (1991), p. 733. 
87  See Nevermann/Falk (1986), p. 74. Sometimes, the terms 'first stage', 'second stage', and so on, are used 
in literature as well. See Leopold (1993), p. 356. However, since these expressions are partially also 
used for the expansion stage (see Weitnauer (2001), pp. 10-11.), they are not applied here. 
88  See Rams/Remmen (1999), pp. 687-691; Leopold (1993), pp. 345 ff.; Weitnauer (2001), pp. 10-11. 
89  Also see the development of the (German) venture capital market in chapter 2.1.2. See also 
Nevermann/Falk (1986), pp. 75-76. 
90  See Nevermann/Falk (1986), pp. 79-80; Schmidtke (1985), pp. 136 ff. 
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mezzanine capital, being an intermediate form of capital in-between equity and debt 
capital.91 
MBO/MBI: The MBO or MBI refer to the takeover of a company by the internal (MBO) 
or external (MBI) management.92 In MBO/MBI transactions, often the lack of financial 
resources and cohesion of the management team represent particular challenges.93 In an 
MBO/MBI the management holds at least 10% of the company's shares.94 
LBO: In an LBO, investors take over the company while the management does not hold 
more than 10% of the company's shares.95 In an LBO, the company takes on a significant 
amount of debt, which should be paid back over a comparably short period of time. 
Replacement Capital: This form of financing refers to the acquisition of company shares 
from an existing shareholder, i.e., from an existing equity capital investor. 
Turnaround: In a turnaround financing, a company receives funds after having overcome 
significant economic difficulties, for example a downturn in sales. At this point in time, 
the investment aims at promoting the economic constitution of the company.96 
 
A condensed illustration of these investment stages is given in table 2.1. 
 
                                              
91  For a discussion of financing with mezzanine capital, see, for example, Gereth/Schulte (1992); Golland 
(1999). 
92  See Frommann (1991), p. 734. 
93  See Frommann (1993), pp. 444-446. 
94  See BVK (2005c), p. 36. 
95  See Schefczyk (2004), p. 41; BVK (2005c), p. 36. 
96  See Schefczyk (2004), p. 41. 
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Early Stage
• Original product
idea
• Market analysis
• Prototype
• Concept
development
Seed Start-up
Investment 
Stages
Stage of 
company
Expansion 
Stage Late Stage
Expansion Bridge MBO/MBI
• Foundation of the
firm
• Initial marketing
efforts
• Readiness for
production
• Expansion of 
production
• Differentiation of 
product(s)
• Image/market
positioning
• Preparation of
- an IPO
- a sale to an
industrial investor
(trade sale)
• Takeover by
internal
management
(MBO) or external
management
(MBI)
Profit/loss 
expectations
of portfolio
company
t
Sources of 
funds
Own capital
Governmentally-funded
support program
Debt capital
Stock exchange
Typical
challenges for
management
• Evaluation of 
product idea and 
market
environment
• Extent of 
management
support needed
• Establishment of 
trust to Venture 
Capital providers
• Recruiting of 
qualified personnel
• Creation of image 
and market
positioning
• Raising of debt
capital for further
growth
• Challenges
regarding
organizational
structure and 
processes
• Strengthened
competition
• Potential lack of 
financial resources
of management
• Potential lack of 
cohesion in 
management
Venture Capital Privat Equity
 
Table 2.1: Overview of investment stages97 
 
While the so-called 'early stage' comprises the seed- and start-up stages, bridge financings 
as well as MBO/MBI transactions are considered to be 'late stage' financings. Expansion 
stage financings are classified to be in-between early stage and late stage investments. 
Although increasingly being offered by VCs, LBOs and replacement capital are, by its 
definition, not strictly allocated to venture capital financings. The comparably large late 
stage financings are also referred to as private equity.98 Turnaround financings represent 
a special case of financings by VCs. However, they cannot be integrated into this 
chronological development of investment stages.99 
So far, a common understanding has been established as to the types of firms being active 
in the venture capital market, the characteristics of the portfolio companies, and the 
                                              
97  According to Schefczyk (2004), p. 42; Schmidtke (1985), p. 50; Klemm (1988), p. 41.; own illustration. 
98  For an explanation of the different uses of the terms 'venture capital' and 'private equity', also see 
chapter 2.1.1. 
99  See Schefczyk (2004), p. 41. 
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various investment stages a VC can invest in. In addition, what is important to 
understand, is the value-generating process of a VC. Since this study will analyze the deal 
flow of VCs, and since deal flow is one part of that value-generating process, it is helpful 
to put that part into the bigger picture of the entire value chain. 
 
2.1.3.4 The Value Chain of Venture Capital Firms 
The value-generating process of a VC can be divided into pre- and post-investment 
activities, comprising six stages as presented in figure 2.8. 
With respect to the first stage of the business model, communicating the investment 
strategy vis-à-vis potential investors and acquiring funds are the main activities. Since 
captive and semi-captive VCs receive the funds from their single or a few investors, this 
stage of the value-added process is mainly performed by independent VCs.100 At the 
beginning of the value-generating process, the venture capitalist aims to convince 
potential capital providers of an investment in the VC. However, this stage of the process 
should simply satisfy the need to acquire funds for investments at a later point in time. 
In the next phase, 'deal flow', the focus of activities is the identification of potential 
investment opportunities and the gaining of access to information about these firms. To 
generate deal flow, there are generally two possible ways a VC can follow. First, the 
venture capitalist can engage in direct marketing activities, for example, participate in 
conferences or seminars, or issue advertisements or articles in industry magazines. 
Secondly, the VC may use its contact network comprising private contacts such as family 
and friends or professional contacts such as other VCs, banks, consultants, investment 
clubs, etc.101 Since the present study focuses on this stage of the value chain, i.e., on the 
analysis of the deal flow of VCs, a more detailed description and analysis will be 
provided in section 2.2. However, looking at the stages of the value chain of VCs, here it 
should already be noted that, besides the acquisition of funds, the generation of deal flow 
constitutes a central prerequisite for the business model to function.102 
                                              
100  See Schröder (1992), pp. 122 ff.; Zemke (1995), p. 125. 
101  See Schefczyk (2004), p. 38. 
102  See Betsch/Groh/Schmidt (2000), p. 118. 
Venture Capital 
 
30 
•C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
of
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
tra
te
gy
•A
cq
ui
si
tio
n
of
 
fu
nd
s
A
cq
ui
si
tio
n
of
 
ca
pi
ta
l
D
ea
l F
lo
w
Sc
re
en
in
g
an
d 
D
ue
D
ili
ge
nc
e
N
eg
ot
ia
tio
n
of
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ta
nd
 
co
nt
ra
ct
in
g
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
su
pp
or
t
Ex
it/
 
D
is
in
ve
st
m
en
t
•I
de
nt
ifi
ca
tio
n
an
d 
co
nt
ac
tin
g
of
 
po
te
nt
ia
l p
or
tfo
lio
co
m
pa
ni
es
•A
cc
es
s t
o 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ab
ou
t
po
te
nt
ia
l p
or
tfo
lio
co
m
pa
ni
es
•E
ve
nt
ua
lly
fir
st
co
nt
ac
t
•F
irs
t c
he
ck
•P
re
-s
cr
ee
ni
ng
to
 
ch
ec
k 
bu
si
ne
ss
co
nc
ep
ta
nd
 k
ey
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
•E
ve
nt
ua
lly
de
ta
ile
d
an
al
ys
is
•E
ve
nt
ua
lly
le
tte
ro
f 
in
te
nt
•N
eg
ot
ia
tio
ns
of
 k
ey
de
te
rm
in
an
ts
of
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t
•E
ve
nt
ua
lly
cl
os
in
g
of
 d
ea
l b
y
co
nt
ra
ct
in
g
•S
up
po
rt 
by
co
ns
ul
tin
g
on
 
op
er
at
iv
e 
an
d 
st
ra
te
gi
c
qu
es
tio
ns
•S
ec
ur
in
g
of
 
in
te
re
st
so
f c
ap
ita
l
pr
ov
id
er
st
hr
ou
gh
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
an
d 
m
on
ito
rin
g
•C
om
pl
et
e
or
pa
rti
al
 
di
si
nv
es
tm
en
t
Po
st
-in
ve
st
m
en
ta
ct
iv
iti
es
Pr
e-
in
ve
st
m
en
ta
ct
iv
iti
es
•C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
of
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
tra
te
gy
•A
cq
ui
si
tio
n
of
 
fu
nd
s
A
cq
ui
si
tio
n
of
 
ca
pi
ta
l
D
ea
l F
lo
w
Sc
re
en
in
g
an
d 
D
ue
D
ili
ge
nc
e
N
eg
ot
ia
tio
n
of
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ta
nd
 
co
nt
ra
ct
in
g
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
su
pp
or
t
Ex
it/
 
D
is
in
ve
st
m
en
t
•I
de
nt
ifi
ca
tio
n
an
d 
co
nt
ac
tin
g
of
 
po
te
nt
ia
l p
or
tfo
lio
co
m
pa
ni
es
•A
cc
es
s t
o 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ab
ou
t
po
te
nt
ia
l p
or
tfo
lio
co
m
pa
ni
es
•E
ve
nt
ua
lly
fir
st
co
nt
ac
t
•F
irs
t c
he
ck
•P
re
-s
cr
ee
ni
ng
to
 
ch
ec
k 
bu
si
ne
ss
co
nc
ep
ta
nd
 k
ey
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
•E
ve
nt
ua
lly
de
ta
ile
d
an
al
ys
is
•E
ve
nt
ua
lly
le
tte
ro
f 
in
te
nt
•N
eg
ot
ia
tio
ns
of
 k
ey
de
te
rm
in
an
ts
of
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t
•E
ve
nt
ua
lly
cl
os
in
g
of
 d
ea
l b
y
co
nt
ra
ct
in
g
•S
up
po
rt 
by
co
ns
ul
tin
g
on
 
op
er
at
iv
e 
an
d 
st
ra
te
gi
c
qu
es
tio
ns
•S
ec
ur
in
g
of
 
in
te
re
st
so
f c
ap
ita
l
pr
ov
id
er
st
hr
ou
gh
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
an
d 
m
on
ito
rin
g
•C
om
pl
et
e
or
pa
rti
al
 
di
si
nv
es
tm
en
t
Po
st
-in
ve
st
m
en
ta
ct
iv
iti
es
Pr
e-
in
ve
st
m
en
ta
ct
iv
iti
es
 
Figure 2.8: Value-generating process of a VC103 
 
                                              
103  According to Schefczyk (2004), p. 39; Schröder (1992), p. 40; Zemke (1995), p. 103. This value 
generating process is derived from Porter's model of a value chain. See Porter (1985), pp. 51 ff. 
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After the deal flow has been generated, the due diligence is mostly organized as a multi-
staged process, which results of two conflicting aspects: On the one hand side, a detailed 
analysis of the potential portfolio company is necessary to comprehensively evaluate the 
investment and to assess the often high uncertainty implicit in newly-founded businesses. 
On the other hand, this detailed analysis is costly and is therefore only feasible and 
reasonable in cases, for which there is also a high probability that an investment will 
actually be made. The multi-staged process is divided into three basic steps:104 In a first 
one, the VC performs a first check upon reception of the investment opportunity, i.e., 
whether the business concept and key parameters of the potential portfolio firm are in line 
with its overall investment strategy and objectives. In case of a positive evaluation, in a 
second step the venture capitalist conducts a preliminary screening.105 Again, in case of a 
positive evaluation, a more detailed due diligence follows, including meetings with the 
entrepreneur, on-site-visits, and an analysis eventually supported by external consultants 
such as lawyers, auditors, etc.106 If the venture capitalist comes to a positive result, a so-
called letter of intent concludes the due diligence phase.107 
In a next phase, key determinants of a potential investment are negotiated between the 
VC(s) and the portfolio company. The key determinants include the investment conditions, 
the prices of the shares, a company valuation, and the final capital requirements of the 
potential portfolio firm. In case of successful negotiations, the deal is closed.108 
Following the closing of the deal, post-investment activities in the form of management 
support begin. Besides providing the necessary capital, VCs also provide non-financial 
support, with which they intend to achieve two basic objectives: First, they try to secure 
and increase the value of the investment (capital gain). Second, they aim at minimizing 
the risk of insolvency by constantly providing management support and by controlling 
                                              
104  See Vater (2002), pp. 105 ff. 
105  Key parameters include an evaluation of the management team, product, market, revenue, profitability, 
etc. Eventually, further documents are requested from the potential portfolio firm. See Stuart/Abetti 
(1990), pp. 151 ff.; Schefczyk (2004), p. 45. At the same time it is checked whether there is a potential 
conflict of interest to other portfolio firms. For a discussion on this aspect, see Bygrave et al. (1998). 
106  See Tyebjee/Bruno (1984), pp. 1053 f. 
107  See Tyebjee/Bruno (1984), pp. 1052 f.; Schröder (1992), p. 40; Zemke (1995), p. 103; Schefczyk 
(2004), p. 39 and p. 45; Kaplan/Strömberg (2001), pp. 426 ff.  
108  For further details and discussions of this stage of the value-generating process, see Wupperfeld (1996), 
pp. 58 ff.; Schröder (1992), pp. 194 ff.; Cimbal (1995), pp. 149 ff. 
Venture Capital 
 
32 
and monitoring the development of the portfolio company. Providing non-financial 
support therefore represents an important means of securing and influencing the success 
of the venture business.109  
The final stage of the value chain of a VC is the exit or disinvestment, for which five 
potential exit options can be differentiated:110 
 
Trade sale: The portfolio company is sold to an industrial investor. Normally, the buyer 
is a well-established, comparably large firm, operating in the same or related industry. 
There are several advantages to trade sales: Firstly, buyers often invest for strategic rather 
than profitability reasons, resulting in the fact that also portfolio firms with moderate 
growth and profitability expectations can be sold. Secondly, transactions can be closed 
fairly quickly due to the low number of involved parties and due to the fact that often, 
portfolio companies are easily identifiable in the market, resulting in low search costs for 
the investor. 
Buy back: The company's shares are bought back by existing shareholders. A commonly 
occurring challenge with buy backs is that existing shareholders often do not dispose of 
the necessary financial resources to finance the deal. Since buy back transactions often 
yield comparably low profits for the VC, the latter do not prefer this exit option. 
However, governmentally-funded VCs frequently use this exit channel.111 
Secondary purchase: In a secondary purchase, the venture business is sold to another VC 
or to a financial institution. For this exit option, usually the agreement of the portfolio 
company is required. However, this exit option is not used very frequently.112 
Going public: The shares of the portfolio company are sold at the stock exchange by 
taking the company public. This exit channel is regarded as the most interesting 
possibility since it may provide the venture business with significant cash funds. Often, 
this channel is simultaneously used to increase the company's share capital. Despite these 
                                              
109  See Wupperfeld (1996), p. 60; Schefczyk (2004), p. 54. For the importance of non-financial support as 
means of influencing the success of the venture, see Fredriksen et al. (1990), pp. 258-261; Cable/Shane 
(1997), pp. 145-156. 
110  See Schefczyk (2004), pp. 57-60. For further detailed descriptions of exit alternatives, see Schröder 
(1992), pp. 251-266; Cimbal (1995), pp. 173-191. 
111  See Schröder (1992), p. 262. 
112  See Schefczyk (2004), pp. 57 f. 
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advantages, taking a company public also means significant reporting and publicity 
requirements regarding, for example, costs and risks of the venture business. While this 
exit option was very lucrative, especially in the time period from 1997 to 2000, since then 
chances for a profitable IPO have reduced significantly.113 
Liquidation: Usually, this exit option refers to a total loss of the investment. Due to an 
unexpected aberration, the liquidation is effected as a depreciation within the VC. 
 
As has been explained, deal flow, i.e., the identification of potentially promising 
investment opportunities, is a fundamental phase in the value chain of VCs. One of the 
sources, from which a VC receives information on potential investment opportunities, is 
its contact network.114 The contact network comprises sources of information such as 
other VCs, universities or research centers, banks or investment banks, private contacts, 
and others. As to the source 'other VCs', most often, if one VC refers a potential 
investment opportunity to another VC, this happens in the form of an invitation to jointly 
invest in the project. Joint investments of two or more VCs are also denoted as 
syndicated investments.  
Because one of the goals of this study is to closely examine the VCs' position within the 
syndication network, several concepts as to the aspect of syndication need to be 
explained. First, the term 'syndication' will be defined. Second, it will be referred to the 
roles of the so-called lead-investor and co-investor within a syndicated investment. And 
third, the general rationales why VCs syndicate at all will be described. 
 
                                              
113  Regarding disinvested investments, the share of IPO peaked in 1999, representing 17.4% of the total 
volume. From then onwards until 2004, this percentage declined to 5.9%. See the BVK statistics and 
yearbooks 1998-2005.  
114  See Coutarelli (1977), p. 68; Fried/Hisrich (1994), pp. 31 f.; Jugel (2001), p. 39. 
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2.1.4 Syndicated Venture Capital Investments 
2.1.4.1 Definition of Syndication 
The term syndication refers to the combination of multiple parties in a syndicate,115 while 
the term syndicate can have different meanings. Firstly, it describes "… a loose 
association of racketeers in control of organized crime."116 Secondly, it denotes a very 
strict form of a price cartel. Thirdly, and in line with the original French term 'syndic', it 
refers to a combination of companies or persons to carry out some commercial 
undertaking117 or, even more precisely, "… a group of persons or concerns who combine 
to carry out a particular transaction."118 
From an economic viewpoint, the concept of syndication is applied in a variety of 
contexts such as in the area of investment banking or in the insurance industry.119 For 
example, Wilson (1968) defines the term as "… a group of individual decision-makers 
who must make a common decision under uncertainty, and who, as a result, will receive 
jointly a payoff to be shared among them."120 According to this definition, in a financing 
context, multiple capital providers may commonly make a decision on an investment or 
financing while sharing potential profits or losses resulting from the undertaking. 
Regarding venture capital investments, the term 'syndication' therefore refers to the 
common investment of multiple venture capitalists in a portfolio company. In literature 
and also in this study the terms 'syndication' and 'co-investment' are used synonymous-
ly.121 Syndication in a venture capital context is therefore to be seen as a common 
                                              
115  The etymologic origin of the word syndicate is a combination of the Greek words 'syn', meaning 
'together', and 'dike', meaning 'judgement' or 'justice'. Together they form the word 'syndikos', 
describing a 'public advocate'. See Harper (2001): Online Etymology Dictionary, date of access: 
October 14, 2005. 
116  w.A. (2005): Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, 
http://www.britannica.com, date of access: October 14, 2005. 
117  See Harper (2001): Online Etymology Dictionary, date of access: October 14, 2005 
118  w.A. (2005): Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, 
http://www.britannica.com, date of access: October 14, 2005. 
119  See Wilson (1968), pp. 119 f. 
120  Wilson (1968), p. 1. 
121  See Fiet (1991), p. 445; Bygrave (1987), p. 139; Bygrave (1988), p. 137; Lerner (1994), p. 16; 
Sorenson/Stuart (2001), p. 1546; Lockett/Wright (2001), p. 375; Wright/Lockett (2002), p. 72; 
Casamatta/Haritchabalet (2003), p. 2. 
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investment in a portfolio company combined with a collaboration during the investment 
period and a sharing of potential profits or losses when disinvesting.122 There are multiple 
ways how the situation of co-investments can develop. For example, it could be that the 
VCs under consideration commonly decide whether to invest or not. In another case, one 
VC may invest alone in an early stage, inviting one or more VCs to join the investment at 
a later stage. However, some authors do not regard the latter case as syndication because 
their very narrow definition of syndication involves that VCs have to make a common 
decision on an investment.123  
Still, with respect to the generation of deal flow, the offer of a VC to join an investment 
of course also represents an investment opportunity (deal flow for the invited VC), even 
if the original VC has already invested at an earlier point in time. Therefore, for the 
purpose of this study, a broader definition of syndication is adopted, also regarding 
investments as syndicated, in which one or more VC(s) invests first, inviting one or more 
further VC(s) at a later point in time. Along these lines goes a more recent definition of 
Brander, Amit and Antweiler (2002), defining syndication as either two or more VCs 
sharing a particular round of financing, or different VCs investing in a portfolio company 
at different points in time.124 
 
2.1.4.2 Lead-Investor and Co-Investor 
In case of syndicated investments, usually one VC acts as the so-called lead investor, the 
others as co-investors. The lead investor plays a vital role in the development of the 
business, especially in the early stages of a company. Weitnauer (2001) distinguishes 
between the formal and the material function of a lead investor.125 Regarding the formal 
role, which is particularly important in cases, in which the young business intends to take 
up a governmentally-funded loan, a lead investor is often required as a condition of the 
governmental support program. In this context, the lead investor is required to invest at 
                                              
122  See Bygrave (1988), pp. 138 ff.; Sorenson/Stuart (2001), pp. 1548 ff. 
123  See for this narrow definition Wilson (1968), p. 1; Wright/Lockett (2002), p. 72; Seppä (2003), p. 6. 
124  See Brander/Amit/Antweiler (2002), p. 424. 
125  See Weitnauer (2001), pp. 251 f. 
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least as much as the provider of public funds. Furthermore, the lead investor has to 
control and report to the public funds provider on a regular basis.126 
As to the material role, the lead investor usually provides a significant share of the capital 
needed and also performs most of the management support.127 In addition, the lead 
investor also represents the young business and, based on the standing of the venture 
capitalist in the capital markets, stands for its creditworthiness.128 
Besides providing a significant part of the necessary capital and besides fulfilling the 
condition for governmental support programs, the lead investor might also make use of 
its contact network, deliver specific know-how, and act as a sparring partner for the 
management of the portfolio firm.129 
Due to these reasons, the choice of an adequate lead investor often is crucial for the 
success of the newly-founded business. 
 
2.1.4.3 General Rationales for Syndication 
The phenomenon of syndication and syndicated venture capital investments has attracted 
growing interest in scientific studies mainly within the past two decades.130 The general 
question is why venture capitalists syndicate investments at all. When deciding whether 
to co-invest with other investors, VCs have to trade off the potential benefits from 
syndicating with the costs incurred through the syndication.131 Costs incurred are two-
fold, i.e., on the one hand, profits gained from the investment have to be shared among 
                                              
126  In this context, Weitnauer (2001) indicates the lead investor to be playing two roles. On the one hand 
side, she invested a significant amount in the portfolio company, on the other hand she has to report to 
the public funds provider about the economic status of the portfolio company. See Weitnauer (2001), p. 
251. 
127  The lead investor usually provides a larger share of equity capital compared to co-investors. See 
Wright/Lockett (2003), p. 2090. Furthermore, the lead investor spends more time supporting the 
portfolio company than the co-investors. for a further discussion, also see Gorman/Sahlman (1989); 
Freear/Sohl/Wetzel (1990); Elango et al. (1995). 
128  See Weitnauer (2001), p. 251. 
129  See Weitnauer (2001), pp. 254-257. 
130  Authors drawing on the concept of syndication include Wilson (1968), Bygrave (1987), Bygrave 
(1988), Lerner (1994), Admati/Pfleiderer (1994), Lockett/Wright (1999), Lockett/Wright (2001), 
Sorenson/Stuart (2001), Seppä/Jääskeläinen (2002), Brander/Amit/Antweiler (2002), Wright/Lockett 
(2002), Wright/Lockett (2003), Jungwirth/Moog (2004). 
131  See, for example, Brander/Amit/Antweiler (2002), pp. 425 ff. 
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the investors involved. On the other hand, syndication also implies costs for coordinating 
the investment effort with other venture capitalists. Consequently, VCs only enter a co-
investment in the case that the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs.  
In literature, there is no generally accepted classification for the rationales of syndication. 
Categorizations include linking the motives to financial theory and the resource exchange 
theory,132 or, whether the positive aspects of syndication occur on the level of the single 
investment or of the entire portfolio.133 Since within this study, not the syndicated 
investments themselves but the potential connection between deal flow and the network 
structure of venture capitalists is analyzed based on syndicated investments, a more 
intuitive and simple categorization of the motives for syndication is helpful. Based on 
this, the rationales for syndication are distinguished based on whether they primarily 
stem from gaining a benefit or from mitigating a risk or hazard. This systematic is 
illustrated in figure 2.9. 
 
Rationales for syndication
Gaining benefits Mitigating hazards
Management 
support
Window-
dressing
Investment
evaluation
Reciprocation
of deal flow
Capital
constraints
Portfolio 
diversification
Prevention of 
competition
 
Figure 2.9: Rationales for syndication134 
 
Rationales for syndication stemming from the primary objective to mitigate risks or 
hazards are the following: 
Portfolio diversification: According to the traditional explanation based on finance 
theory, VCs might syndicate investments to share financial risk and thereby diversify 
their investment portfolio.135 The risk of an investment in a portfolio company is 
comprised of a market component (systematic risk) and a firm-specific component (non-
                                              
132  For a detailed discussion of this categorization, see Lockett/Wright (2001), pp. 376 ff. 
133  See Nathusius (2005), pp. 75 ff. 
134  Own illustration. 
135  See Wilson (1968), pp. 119 ff.; Lerner (1994), pp. 17 f.; Lockett/Wright (2001), pp. 376-378. 
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systematic risk). Since the systematic risk cannot be reduced by the venture capitalist, the 
rationale might be to hold a well-diversified portfolio of investments and thereby reduce 
the non-systematic risk.136  
 
Prevention of competition: Another rationale for syndication is prevention of 
competition, also named collusion. On the one hand, VCs are competitors on the market, 
searching for attractive investment opportunities. On the other hand, they also act as 
providers of information and capital to each other.137 Especially in times, when potential 
investment opportunities are scarce,138 banding together instead of competing represents 
a feasible strategy. By banding together, VCs prevent the situation of competition and 
may also significantly enhance their bargaining power vis-à-vis business founders.139  
 
Rationales for syndication that are primarily based on the objective to gain benefits are 
the following: 
Capital constraints: Syndication might also arise due to capital constraints. There are two 
basic explanations why a VC might offer an (attractive) investment opportunity to other 
VCs. Firstly, in case that the venture capitalist does not have sufficient financial 
resources at hand to exclusively finance the venture business, syndication might be the 
only way how the VC can participate in that deal.140 Secondly, investors of VCs such as 
institutional investors often prescribe that the VC may only invest a certain percentage, 
for example up to 10% or 15%, of the entire investment volume in a single portfolio 
company in order to ensure portfolio diversification. If the capital requirements of the 
venture business exceed this given limit, syndication might again be the only way that the 
VC can invest.141 
 
                                              
136  A precondition for reducing non-systematic risk by diversification is that the investments do not co-
vary. See Brealey/Myers (2000), pp. 166-169. 
137  See Bygrave (1988), p. 137. 
138  See also Lockett/Wright (2001), pp. 378 f. 
139  See Brander/Amit/Antweiler (2002), p. 427; Casamatta/Haritchabalet (2003), p. 2. 
140  See Brander/Amit/Antweiler (2002), pp. 426 f. 
141  See Deloitte&Touche (2002), p. 17; Steier/Greenwood (1995), pp. 337 ff. 
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Reciprocation of deal flow: Deal flow, i.e., the list of potentially promising investment 
opportunities is a highly valued intangible resource for VCs.142 Although also the quality 
of these opportunities is of significant importance,143 a venture capitalist aims to be in a 
position, in which he has access to and competes for a wide supply of potential deals. 
Deal flow becomes even more important to a VC in times when "…'too much money is 
chasing too few deals'",144 i.e., when the availability of funds is high and there is strong 
competition for deals among VCs. Reciprocity generally refers to the mutual exchange of 
resources between at least two parties, i.e., if A offers resources to B, A expects to be 
offered the same or similar resources from B at a later point in time. If B does not 
reciprocate A's offer, a further resource exchange between A and B in future is 
unlikely.145 By syndicating in and out deals with one another, venture capitalists share the 
pool of available investment opportunities. Therefore, the relationship between venture 
capitalists is two-way. When syndicating out a deal, the lead investor creates the 
expectation that this behavior will be reciprocated by the invited VC in the future. 
Reciprocating deals may result in the fact that "…deal flow can be maintained even when 
an individual VC may not be the originator of the deal."146  
 
Investment evaluation (selection hypothesis): Without referring to venture capital 
investments or any other finance-related topics, Sah and Stiglitz (1986) propose a general 
model of organizational design. They argue that in a hierarchical organization, 
investments only proceed if several independent observers agree. Furthermore, decisions 
that are made by many observers are superior to ones made by only one party.147 Lerner 
(1994) applies this selection hypothesis to the decision making process of VCs.148 
                                              
142  See Lockett/Wright (2001), p. 378. 
143  For a detailed discussion on the quantity and quality of deal flow, see section 2.2.2. 
144  Gompers/Lerner (2000), p. 282. See also Kaplan/Stein (1993), pp. 313 f. For a further discussion, see 
also section 2.2.3. 
145  See Piskorski (2000), p. 4. In this context, Bygrave explained that, in the US market, reciprocity is a 
mechanism that is expected to be existent. See Bygrave (1987), p. 141. 
146  Lockett/Wright (2001), p. 379. On the reciprocation of deal flow, see also the studies of Piskorski 
(2000) and Seppä/Jääskeläinen (2002). 
147  See Sah/Stiglitz (1986), p. 717. 
148  See Lerner (1994), p. 16. 
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According to the selection hypothesis, multiple VCs may evaluate investment 
opportunities more effectively than a single VC would do. This is due to the fact that 
"…each learns something from the other's evaluation"149 and that "Venture capitalists 
prefer syndicating most deals for a simple reason – it means that they have a chance to 
check out their thinking against other knowledgeable sources".150 
 
Management support (value-added hypothesis): In contrast to the selection hypothesis 
that applies to the pre-investment stage or ex-ante decision making, the value-added 
hypothesis refers to the post-investment stage or ex-post decision making.151 Deviating 
from the function as a financial intermediary, a VC can also be regarded as a collection of 
resources.152 Resources are "…anything which could be thought of as a strength or 
weakness of a given firm",153 i.e., tangible and intangible assets such as machines or 
specific technological know-how or management skills. Since different VCs have 
different resources and therefore different skills, one venture capitalist might not be able 
to provide all specific skills that are needed for the portfolio company. One possibility to 
solve this problem is to engage external industry experts, another one is to invite other 
VCs to syndicate and bring their skills to the table.154  
 
Window-dressing: One possibility to improve the return at the end of an investment 
period is to 'window dress'. Lakonishok et al. (1991) suggest that pension fund managers 
behave in that way in order to adjust their portfolios at the end of a period, i.e., they buy 
firms whose shares have appreciated and sell the underperforming stocks. The underlying 
objective of this strategy is to impress sponsors to be in a better position for raising funds 
in the future.155 Lerner (1994) claims that venture capital funds act in the same way.156 In 
                                              
149  Brander/Amit/Antweiler (2002), p. 424. 
150  Lerner (1994), p. 17. 
151  See Lockett/Wright (2001), p. 378. 
152  See Manigart et al. (2002), p. 4. The value-added perspective is there also named as resource-based 
perspective. 
153  Wernerfelt (1984), p. 172. 
154  See Lockett/Wright (2001), p. 378. 
155  See Lakonishok et al. (1991), p. 227. 
156  See Lerner (1994), p. 17. 
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order to earn publicity, VCs may make investments in late financing rounds of attractive 
firms, although much of the value appreciation might already have occurred and 
therefore, financial returns are comparably low. Still, this behavior "…allows them to 
represent themselves in marketing documents as investors in these firms".157 Along the 
same lines, young VCs might have incentives to 'grandstand'. That is, they aim to signal 
their ability to potential investors, either by taking a portfolio firm public prematurely, or 
by syndicating with well-known venture capitalists in later financing rounds.158 
 
In this chapter 2.1, a common understanding was established as to the development and 
current state of the German venture capital market. Also, venture capital as method of 
financing has been explained as well as the types of VC and the characteristics of 
portfolio companies. In addition, syndicated investments have been defined and the 
various rationales of VCs to syndicate have been laid out.  
 
Since the deal flow of VCs is an integral part of the analysis within the present study, the 
some basic thoughts on this topic are provided in the following sections. These include 
the definition of the term, explanations regarding the quantity and quality of deal flow, a 
short literature review, as well as aspects regarding the generation of deal flow. 
 
2.2 Deal Flow 
2.2.1 Definition of Deal Flow 
As briefly mentioned in section 2.1.3.4 and besides the acquisition of funds, generating 
deal flow constitutes a basic prerequisite for the business model of a VC to function.159 
This is expressed in the figurative descriptions of deal flow of, for example, Betsch, Groh 
and Schmidt (2000) and Lockett and Wright (2001):  
 
                                              
157  Lerner (1994), p. 17. 
158  See Gompers (1996), p. 133. 
159  See Betsch/Groh/Schmidt (2000), p. 118. 
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• Deal flow is a foundation for the business activities of venture capital firms. (Betsch/ 
Groh/Schmidt (2000))160 
• "Another important intangible resource that is highly valued by venture capitalists is 
deal flow." (Lockett/Wright (2001))161 
 
Although there are other circumscriptions such as the description of deal flow as an 
indicator of the market acceptance of the services provided by the VC,162 more narrow 
definitions of the term are fairly consistent in literature: 
 
• "…finding suitable projects to invest in…" (Coutarelli (1977))163 
• "The process by which deals enter into consideration as investment prospects, …" 
(Tyebjee/Bruno (1984))164 
• Stream of investment opportunities (Brettel/Jaugey/Rost (2000))165 
• Attempt of VCs to identify and contact potential portfolio companies (Vater 2002)166 
 
As becomes obvious, there are only slight differences between these definitions. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, deal flow should be understood according to the 
definitions provided by Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) and Brettel, Jaugey and Rost (2000), 
i.e., as the process by which deals enter into consideration of the VC, resulting in the flow 
of investment opportunities a VC can select from.167 
 
                                              
160  See Betsch/Groh/Schmidt (2000), p. 118. 
161  Lockett/Wright (2001), p. 378. 
162  See Fendel (1986), p. 154. 
163  Coutarelli (1977), p. 61. 
164  Tyebjee/Bruno (1984), p. 1051. 
165  See Brettel/Jaugey/Rost (2000), p. 129. The authors refer to the stream of investment opportunities 
presented to a business angel. Although business angels are not the focus of this study, the definition 
provided for deal flow is adopted also in the context of VCs. 
166  See Vater (2002), p. 102. 
167  See Tyebjee/Bruno (1984), p. 1051; Brettel/Jaugey/Rost (2000), p. 129. 
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2.2.2 Quantity and Quality of Deal Flow 
In the deal flow phase of the value chain, VCs try to identify and contact potential 
portfolio companies. When regarding the deal rate,168 which varies between 1% and 
10%,169 the conflicting area between quantity and quality of deal flow becomes obvious. 
On the one hand, VCs have to try to identify and contact as many potential portfolio 
companies as possible to secure a certain flow of investment opportunities and to be able 
to select those projects that meet their investment objectives best. On the other hand, 
however, searching potential portfolio companies, initiating a contact to them and 
screening their investment proposal represents transaction costs170 and therefore is a 
costly undertaking for the VC. Consequently, the VCs attempt to minimize these costs by 
identifying and contacting only those potential portfolio companies, for which there is a 
high probability of an actual investment. In other words, the lower the quality of 
investment opportunities received, the higher the rejection rate and the more investment 
opportunities have to be identified and potentially contacted to realize a certain deal rate. 
Conversely, the higher the quality of the investment opportunities received, the less need 
exists for a quantitatively high deal flow.171  
 
An important question is how quantity and quality of deal flow can be measured. As 
performed in various studies, the quantity of deal flow is simply measured as the number 
of investment opportunities coming to the attention of a VC in a certain period of time, 
and before any selection is made.172  
In contrast, there are several ways how to measure deal flow quality and it needs to be 
elaborated on this point in more detail to select the appropriate way for the present study. 
In academic literature on the venture capital industry and the deal flow of VCs, there is a 
lack of empirical studies that differentiate between the quantity and especially the quality 
                                              
168  Deal rate is defined as the proportion of investment opportunities actually invested in, of all originally 
received investment opportunities. 
169  See the studies of Poindexter (1976), p. 154., Schröder (1992), pp. 162 f., Vater (2002), p. 153. 
170  For the different forms of transaction costs, see Picot (1982), pp. 270 f. 
171  See Betsch/Groh/Schmidt (2000), p. 121. 
172  See for example the studies of Wells (1974), Tyebjee/Bruno (1984), Schröder (1992), 
Brettel/Jaugey/Rost (2000), Vater (2002). In this context also see Kelly/Hay (2000). 
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of deal flow. Only in a few studies this attempt has been made.173 The measures that have 
been used, measure deal flow quality as the percentage of investment opportunities that 
remain after the various stages of the value chain of VCs.174 That means, it is being 
measured what percentage of the initially received investment opportunities remain after 
the initial screening, after the detailed due diligence, etc. However, the studies of 
Schröder (1992) and Vater (2002), for example, differ regarding at what stage of the 
value chain the deal flow quality is being measured. While Schröder proposes the 
percentage of investment opportunities actually invested in (deal rate),175 Vater argues 
that the deal rate is affected by several other factors such as the detailed due diligence, 
the negotiations on the investment terms, etc. Therefore, as proxy for deal flow quality, 
Vater measures the percentage of investment opportunities remaining after the initial 
screening by the VC.176 Although these ways of measuring deal flow quality are 
conceptually similar (measuring deal flow quality based on the percentage of investment 
opportunities remaining after the various stages of the value chain), from the author's 
perspective they differ significantly and not both ways are regarded suitable for the 
purpose of this study. When measuring deal flow quality as proposed by Vater, a 
relatively high percentage results.177 These high results seem logical in the sense that the 
initial screening of investment opportunities only takes a venture capitalist a few minutes, 
in which he decides whether to look at a business plan in more detail or whether to reject 
it immediately.178 Another reason why this way of measuring deal flow quality does not 
seem suitable is the huge difference between the remaining percentages, i.e., after the 
                                              
173  See the studies of Schröder (1992) and Vater (2002) for the German market, see Fried/Hisrich (1994) 
for the US market. 
174  One could also imagine further measures for deal flow quality, such as the number of successful exits a 
VC has done. However, from the point in time that an investment is entered until the exit, many more 
factors might have influenced the success of the young business. The most 'direct' way of measuring 
deal flow quality is therefore to look at the number of investment opportunities that a VCs invests in. 
175  See Schröder (1992), pp. 161 f. 
176  See Vater (2002), p. 152. 
177  In his study, Vater finds percentages for different segments of VCs ranging from 31.2% to 50.6%. See 
Vater (2002), p. 153. 
178  For example, Hall and Hofer found that VCs very rapidly make a go/no-go decision on business plans. 
See Hall/Hofer (1993), p. 25. This point could also be verified in interviews and conversations with 
venture capitalists that have been performed for this study. Independent from each other, several 
venture capitalists explained that the initial screening of one business plan hardly takes them more than 
5-10 minutes.  
Definitions and Basic Concepts 
 
45
initial screening and after the final investment decision has been made. While after the 
initial screening the percentage ranges between approximately 30-50%, this number 
decreases to approximately 1-10% for the percentage of investment opportunities actually 
invested in.179 Therefore, from the author's perspective, measuring the percentage of 
investment opportunities remaining after the initial screening can only be a very rough 
indicator for deal flow quality.  
In contrast to the argumentation in Vater (2002), in the present study it is argued that 
because other factors can lead to the rejection of business plans, the actual quality of deal 
flow is better reflected in the final deal rate itself. From the author's perspective, this is 
the measure that indicates best, in what percentage of the initially received investment 
opportunities a VC is willing to invest. Therefore, this approach is followed in this study. 
 
2.2.3 Literature Review 
Based on existing academic literature,180 there are several topics that have been analyzed 
with respect to the deal flow of formal and informal venture capital providers. Since there 
is no existing categorization of this body of literature, it has been grouped topic-wise. 
These groups include the competition for deal flow, syndication and deal flow, and the 
sources of deal flow including the importance of networks. Most research relates to the 
latter part of the groups mentioned, i.e., to the sources of deal flow and the importance of 
networks to generate it. However, it will be shown, that there exist significant gaps with 
respect to the systematic analysis of the network and its impact on the deal flow of VCs. 
 
One area that has been analyzed by researchers in the venture capital and private equity 
arena is the competition for deal flow. A key aspect identified and examined is the so-
called 'money chasing deals' phenomenon. It holds that, given that there is a certain 
number of potential investment opportunities available, if too much money is available 
among VCs, this amount has to be distributed across the same number of investment 
                                              
179  In his study, Vater measures a deal rate of between 2.1%-3.3%, while Schröder measures between 1.6% 
and 10%. See Vater (2002), p. 153; Schröder (1992), p. 162. 
180  The topic of deal flow has not been touched intensively in academic research so far. See also 
Mason/Harrison (1999), p. 28.. 
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opportunities. Consequently, the competition for the potential deals gets more 
intensive.181 In a similar vein, the effect of variances in the supply of and in the demand 
for investment opportunities on the behavior of VCs has been analyzed. It could be 
shown that changing size of supply of and demand for investment opportunities have an 
influence on (a) the valuation of investment opportunities by VCs, (b) the time invested 
by VCs to search for and screen investment opportunities, (c) the negotiation power of 
entrepreneurs vis-à-vis VCs, and (d) the cautiousness of venture capital managers to 
invest when competition for deal flow gets intensive.182 
 
Another area that has (so far comparably sparsely) been covered is the connection 
between syndication among VCs and their deal flow. As described in the section on the 
rationales for syndication, one motive to syndicate deals is to increase the deal flow 
through reciprocation of investment offers. A number of studies have analyzed this 
argument, showing that one of the motives for VCs to syndicate is the expectation that 
giving out invitations to other firms to join investments will be reciprocated in the future. 
For example, for the German market, Jungwirth and Moog (2004) find that specialist 
VCs (firms that specialize in certain industries or investment stages) syndicate in order to 
get access to deals, while generalist firms (firms that have standard knowledge in 
financing start-up firms) syndicate to get access to specific know-how.183 For the UK 
market, Lockett and Wright found that, for VCs investing in earlier financing stages, the 
syndication motive to get access to information in terms of deal flow is highly relevant, 
while for firms investing in later stages, the motive of spreading financial risk is more 
important.184 In a study on the European venture capital market, Manigart et al. (2002) 
find that, although the spreading of financial risk is an important motive for VCs, access 
to deal flow is an important motive for young VCs and for specialized firms. Another 
finding in this study is that young VCs seek to build central positions in the syndication 
                                              
181  See for example Gompers/Lerner (2000), p. 282; Kaplan/Stein (1993), p. 313. 
182  See the studies of Inderst/Müller (2004) and Ljungqvist/Richardson (2003). 
183  See Jungwirth/Moog (2004), p. 19. 
184  See Lockett/Wright (2001), p. 375. In this context, also see the related studies of Lockett/Wright (1999), 
Wright/Lockett (2002), and Wright/Lockett (2003). 
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network.185 In the same vein, for the US venture capital market, Bygrave found that 
sharing of information is a more important motive for syndication than the spreading of 
financial risk is. Especially the access to promising investment opportunities is a key 
driver for firms to connect.186  
 
A third area, in which research has been performed, addresses the sources of deal flow 
and the importance of networks. In this regard, several studies have been performed for 
the informal and formal venture capital market. Since the results of these studies are 
described in detail further below,187 it is abstained from elaborating in detail on them at 
this point. To briefly summarize, there are three conclusions based on these studies: First, 
the contact network of VCs seems to be an important source to generate deal flow 
quantity. Second, there is weak empirical evidence for the German market that the 
network might also be important for deal flow quality. Third, the role of the contacts to 
other VCs for deal flow quantity and quality has empirically not been examined 
sufficiently.  
 
Based on previous research in the context of the VCs' contact network and deal flow, 
there is an obvious demand to systematically analyze the contact and syndication network 
of VCs and to try to link these areas to the quantity and quality of deal flow. The present 
study aims at closing these gaps.  
In order to better understand the characteristics of a VC's deal flow, this aspect will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section.  
 
                                              
185  See Manigart et al. (2002), p. 4. This finding is consistent with the findings in the study of Piskorski, 
who shows that centrally positioned firms have access to more investment opportunities. However, the 
study of Piskorski does not further analyze the difference between quantity and quality of investment 
opportunities and also only refers to one measure (centrality) to characterize a network position. See 
Piskorski (2000), p. 4. However, there are several other measures, as will be discussed later, that imply 
benefits in terms of deal flow quantity and quality. 
186  See Bygrave (1987), p. 139; Bygrave (1988), p. 138. Further studies that support this argument are the 
ones of Piskorski (2000), Sorenson/Stuart (2001), and Kuan (2003). 
187  See section 2.2.4.2. 
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2.2.4 Generation of Deal Flow 
2.2.4.1 Search Activities of Venture Capital Firms 
In several empirical studies, researchers have examined the search activities and search 
strategies of VCs in order to generate deal flow.188 Although partially denoted with 
different terms, there is a consistent view of the activities a VC can engage in to generate 
deal flow. 
As presented in figure 2.10, VCs can follow two basic search strategies, a passive one 
and an active one:189  
 
Search
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search
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search
Direct marketing
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Private
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Figure 2.10: Search strategies of VCs to generate deal flow190 
 
                                              
188  See for example Schierenbeck (1973), Wells (1974), Coutarelli (1977), Fendel (1986), Kürten (1990), 
Schröder (1992), Vater (2002). 
189  See Wells (1974), p. 57; Fendel (1986), pp. 154-158; Kürten (1990), pp. 72-74; Vater (2002), pp. 103 f. 
190  Own illustration based on Coutarelli (1977), pp. 67 ff.; Fendel (1986), pp. 154-158; Kürten (1990), pp. 
72-74. 
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With respect to the passive search behavior, the venture capitalist basically waits for the 
entrepreneurs to contact him. However, in this case both, quantity and quality of deal 
flow are left to chance.  
Consequently, it seems intuitively reasonable that VCs actively engage in the search for 
attractive investment opportunities. Coutarelli (1977) argues that, due to three reasons, 
"[it] is incumbent on the venture capitalist to try actively to identify projects he should 
consider investing in."191 Firstly, the classic model of supply and demand only functions 
in perfect market conditions, which is not the case for both, the market for investment 
opportunities and, from the entrepreneur's perspective, for the market for venture capital. 
Secondly, the deal rate of venture capitalists is very low, i.e., the percentage of projects 
invested in of all investment opportunities considered. Thirdly, the funding of innovation 
tends to be cyclical. According to Coutarelli (1977), in a boom phase, entrepreneurs tend 
to regard higher risks as justifiable, the viability and also the quality of investment 
proposals tend to become more questionable. Consequently, the venture capitalist will 
face more difficulties in identifying potentially attractive deals. Conversely, in a 
recession, entrepreneurs may become more conservative and it is up to the VC to identify 
interesting projects to potentially invest in. Due to these reasons, "…it is important to 
develop project flow systematically…"192 in order to actively influence the quantity and 
quality of deal flow. 
Regarding the active search strategies it can further be differentiated between a direct and 
an indirect approach.193 The direct approach includes activities that increase the 
entrepreneur's awareness of the venture capitalist's existence. These activities include 
presentations at conferences or seminars, participation in industry fairs and roundtable 
discussions, advertising or publication of articles in magazines, etc. However, Coutarelli 
(1977) stresses that, although in the long run, direct activities tend to have positive 
effects, the overall quality of investment opportunities generated through this way is 
extremely poor.194 This conclusion appears to be reasonable because, although the above 
                                              
191  Coutarelli (1977), p. 64. 
192  Coutarelli (1977), p. 66. 
193  See for example Schröder (1992), pp. 155 ff.; Vater (2002), pp. 102 f. 
194  See Coutarelli (1977), p. 68. 
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mentioned direct marketing activities increase the entrepreneurs' awareness of the VC 
and also might transport the VC's investment objective into the market, it is still up to the 
potential entrepreneurs to initiate a contact to the venture capitalist. Furthermore, also 
those entrepreneurs will apply for funding, the business plans of whom do not meet the 
investment objectives. This can be due to the fact that either within the direct marketing 
activities the VCs was not able to communicate the objectives clear enough or that 
potential entrepreneurs simply disregard the investment objectives in the hope to still be 
approved for funding. Therefore, direct marketing activities seem to be limited means to 
effectively control for the quantity and quality of deal flow. 
Regarding the indirect approach of active search activities, the venture capitalist uses his 
contact network comprised of personal or private contacts as well as professional 
contacts. Personal or private contacts include family members or friends. Professional 
contacts include connections to other VCs, traditional banks or investment banks, 
consultants, lawyers, auditors, matching services, or for example, technology institutes of 
universities.195 Already at this point it becomes clear that it cannot always be precisely 
differentiated between the roles of single persons in ones network since one person can 
be both, for example, a personal friend and an employee of another VC. Due to the 
significance of the contact network of venture capitalists as a source of deal flow, this 
topic will be examined in detail in the next section. 
 
2.2.4.2 Sources of Deal Flow 
As can be derived from figure 2.10, there are various sources of deal flow. In academic 
literature, there are several studies that examine the sources of deal flow in both market 
segments, for informal and formal venture capital. For both areas, attempts have been 
made to structure the sources of deal flow.  
For the field of informal venture capital, for example Mason and Harrison (1994) and 
Brettel, Jaugey and Rost (2000) group the deal flow sources into informal sources, formal 
sources, and organized sources.196 Informal sources include business associates, active 
                                              
195  See Wells (1974), pp. 44-46; Coutarelli (1977), pp. 68-77; Fendel (1986), p. 156; Schröder (1992), p. 
156; Vater (2002), p. 102. 
196  See Mason/Harrison (1994), p. 85; Brettel/Jaugey/Rost (2000), p. 148. 
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personal search, and entrepreneurs. Formal sources include VCs, consultants, lawyers, 
auditors, etc. Organized sources comprise matching services, business brokers, and 
newspapers. Another structuring provided by Kelly and Hay (2000) differentiates between 
business associates and friends as one source of deal flow, and professional intermediaries 
such as lawyers, consultants, or matching services as a second source of deal flow.197  
In the area of formal venture capital, usually a general structuring differentiates between 
cold calls, active search, and referrals.198 In a further specification, the referrals, i.e., the 
contact network, are usually split up into various groups of potential referrers such as 
other VCs, lawyers, consultants, matching services, etc. Independent of whether it is in 
the area of informal or formal venture capital, a significant result is that an intermediary, 
who is part of the contact network, often refers the deals or investment opportunities to 
the business angel or venture capitalist.199  
To illustrate the importance of the contact network as source of deal flow, the basic 
question to pose is: How does a contact between a potential portfolio company or 
investment opportunity and the VC come about? Or, in other words, how does a VC 
become cognizant of a potential investment opportunity? The structure that is used in this 
study is derived based on this question and is illustrated in figure 2.11. The figure looks 
similar to the previous one. This, of course, is due to the fact that both, the search 
activities and the initiation of a contact between a VC and a portfolio company are based 
on the same sources of information. Still, thinking about how the contact comes about 
helps to recognize the importance of the contact network:  
 
                                              
197  See Kelly/Hay (2000), p. 185. 
198  See for example the studies of Tyebjee/Bruno (1984), Steier/Greenwood (1995), Betsch/Groh/Schmidt 
(2000). 
199  See further below for a detailed description of the results of several empirical studies in the area of 
informal and formal venture capital.  
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Figure 2.11: Initiation of contact between VC and portfolio company200 
 
A contact can either be initiated directly or indirectly through an intermediary, also called 
referrer. In the case of direct initiation, the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur either 
already know each other personally or they do not. In the latter case, either the potential 
entrepreneur or the venture capitalist has gathered information201 and decides to address the 
other party, also known as cold call. In the case of an indirect initiation of the contact, the 
referrer can either be a private or a professional contact of the venture capitalist. The 
important aspect to notice is that, except for the situation of a cold call, all other options fall 
into what is called the contact network of the VC. In a next step it is therefore important to 
clearly differentiate between the various potential referrers within the contact network.  
In contrast to business angels, for whom business associates and friends are a major 
source of deal flow,202 for VCs most investment opportunities come from referrers out of 
                                              
200  Own illustration. 
201  For example based on visits at conferences, roundtable discussions, publications from the VC, etc. 
202 For the US market, Freear/Sohl/Wetzel (1994) found that approximately 50% of the investment 
opportunities received were referred to the business angel by either a business associate or a friend. For 
the US market, see also Fiet (1995a) and Fiet (1995b). For the UK market, Mason/Harrison (1994) 
basically confirm the results, finding that approximately 60% of the business angels participating in the 
survey named business associates as deal flow source and 49% of the business angels also named 
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the professional contact network. For the US market, for example, Wells (1974) found 
that 61% of the proposals the VCs received were generated through professional contacts. 
More than half of these referrers were other VCs.203 Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) found that 
65% of the investment opportunities received stemmed from referrals and more than half 
of them come from professional contacts such as other VCs,204 banks, or investment 
brokers.205 Fried and Hisrich (1994) confirmed these findings showing that, although 
VCs receive many cold calls, they seldom invest in them. In their study, 18 venture 
capitalists provided information on investments, and most of the projects that were 
funded come by referral.206 For the German venture capital market, Jugel (2001) found 
that, for generating deal flow, the contact network is most important, delivering 
approximately 46% of the investment opportunities.207 Vater (2002) analyzed German 
VCs and PEs and found that 54% of the investment opportunities come by referral.208 As 
regards the importance of other VCs as source of deal flow quantity, Vater comes to 
contradictory results. On the one hand, he finds that, on average, only approximately 7% 
of the investment opportunities received came from another VC. On the other hand, he 
found that, when asked, VCs answered that they regard other VCs as an important source 
for deal flow quantity.209 As regards deal flow quality, Vater finds that the source 'other 
VCs' also supports deal flow quality. However, there are several reasons why this result 
cannot be applied to the context of this study, i.e., to the VCs syndication network 
considered in this study: First, the measure for deal flow quality that is used by Vater (as 
presented above), is different from the one used in the present study and is considered not 
                                                                                                                                      
friends as a source. Also for the UK market, Kelly/Hay (2000) confirm a high percentage for referrals, 
finding that 86% of the business angels named friends as a source. For the German market, 
Brettel/Jaugey/Rost (2000) found that 92% of the business angels, who participated in the survey, 
named business associates as a general source of deal flow. 
203  See Wells (1974), p. 57. 
204  In most of the cases, in which the investment opportunity came from another VC, it was an offer to 
syndicate an investment. See Tyebjee/Bruno (1984), p. 1055. See also the preliminary results of the 
study in Tyebjee/Bruno (1981), p. 310. 
205  Tyebjee/Bruno (1984), p. 1055. 
206  See Fried/Hisrich (1994), pp. 31 f. 
207  In his study, Jugel (2001) does not further differentiate between single types of referrers. Still, the high 
significance of the network as source of deal flow becomes obvious. See Jugel (2001), p. 39. 
208  See Vater (2002), p. 144. 
209  See Vater (2002), p. 144 and p. 146. 
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to be suitable to appropriately reflect the deal flow quality for the VCs under consideration. 
Second, quite a large part of the firms analyzed by Vater were PEs that focus on the buyout 
segment of the market for private equity, for which the process to generate deal flow is 
different from the one for VCs focusing on the earlier financing stages.210 Anticipating later 
explanations, since buyout investments will be excluded in the present study, the Vater's 
result regarding deal flow quality cannot be applied to the present study. Third, the study of 
Vater is based on data gathered in interviews before 1998, while this study (anticipating 
later explanations) is based on data gathered from 1998-2005.211  
Therefore, in the present study it is vital to analyze the importance of other VCs as source 
of deal flow quantity and quality and thereby significantly enhance the understanding of 
the importance of contacts among VCs to generate deal flow quantity and quality. 
The rationales of a venture capitalist for cultivating his contact network are two-fold. 
Firstly, "…referred deals are more likely to pass through the generic screen, if the VC has 
confidence in the referrer's judgment."212 Secondly, deals, which have been referred to 
the VC via a referrer, tend to be of comparably higher quality, i.e., these investment 
opportunities have a greater chance to successfully make it through the due diligence 
process. This is due to the fact that contacts of the VCs usually have knowledge about 
their investment preferences and therefore tend to refer to the venture capitalist only 
those deals that have a high chance of meeting the VC's requirements.213 This is also the 
reason why venture capitalists invest a considerable amount of their resources into the 
establishment and the maintenance of their contact network.214  
 
Due to the high significance of the contact network as a source of deal flow and with the 
VCs' syndication network (contacts only among VCs) potentially playing an important 
                                              
210  One-third of the firms analyzed are buyout-focused firms. PEs focusing on the buyout segment receive 
a large part of their deal flow from investment banks, accounting for nearly half of the investment 
opportunities received. See Vater (2002), pp. 82 ff. and p. 144. See also Deloitte&Touche (2002), p. 6. 
211  Which investment stages and which time period will be looked at will be explained in section 5.1.1.2. 
212  Fried/Hisrich (1994), p. 32. 
213  See Coutarelli (1977), p. 68; Schröder (1992), p. 155; Vater (2002), p. 144 and p. 148.  
214  Wells (1974) already showed that VCs dedicate approximately 40% of their time to the maintenance of 
their network contacts. See Wells (1974), p. 44. 
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role within this network, one goal of this study is to analyze their importance regarding 
the generation of deal flow quantity and quality.  
As explained in section one, the second goal of the present study is to analyze each VC's 
position within the syndication network and to link this analysis to the VC's deal flow 
quantity and quality. In order to perform this second analysis, methods from the rapidly 
emerging field of network analysis will be used. Because the (economist) reader is 
normally not deeply familiar with this topic, a thorough introduction is required, 
following in the next section.  
 
2.3 Summary 
Venture capital has been presented as a method of financing for entrepreneurial firms. 
While the venture capital market in Germany215 experienced a steep upswing from 1998 
until 2001, it experienced a significant downturn from 2001 until 2004. During the phase 
of the sharp increase, the volume invested in entrepreneurial firms as well as the number 
of portfolio companies financed inclined significantly. In the period after 2001 then, VCs 
became more reluctant to invest and nowadays, a significant portion of available funds is 
not invested but still waiting to be. For example, in 2004, of the available funds of 45.0 
EUR billion in the German venture capital market, a portion of 54.9% is not invested. 
However, since it is above all the small firms that induce growth and innovation in the 
nation's economy, their financing is crucial, not only on a micro-economic level but also 
from a macro-economic perspective. One of the challenges for VCs to alleviate that 
situation is to identify promising investment opportunities, i.e., to generate deal flow. Deal 
flow has been explained to have two dimensions, described as deal flow quantity and deal 
flow quality. While VCs receive investment opportunities from many sources, it has been 
shown that their contact network is vital for the generation of deal flow. Among the 
sources within the contact network, the source 'other VCs' might play a significant role, 
also relating to the rationale for syndication deals denoted as deal flow reciprocation.  
                                              
215  Also, of course, on a worldwide scale. 
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However, in academic research, the link between the VCs’ contact network and 
syndication network and their deal flow has not yet been analyzed sufficiently and 
systematically. Therefore, this significant gap shall be addressed with this study. 
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3 Theoretical Foundation 
In this chapter, the theoretical foundation for this study will be developed. The approach 
to the selection of an appropriate theory is first to examine which theories are commonly 
applied to financial markets (section 3.1.1). Next, it will be explained why these 
theoretical concepts do not properly suit the purpose of this study (section 3.1.2). 
Following, the requirements for a theoretical foundation for the present study will be 
derived (3.1.3). The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to highlight in a detailed way 
the methods of social network analysis (section 3.2) and the concept and theories of 
social capital (section 3.3). Furthermore, an appropriate research design will be 
developed (section 3.4). The chapter closes with a summary (section 3.5). 
 
3.1 Approach to Theory Selection 
3.1.1 Theories Commonly Applied to Financial Markets 
In academic literature, there are many theoretical concepts that are frequently applied to 
financial markets. It would certainly go beyond the scope of this study to explain all of 
them in a detailed way. Still, within this section, three major fields of financial theories 
are highlighted, including the neo-classical perspective on financial markets, a behavioral 
approach, as well as the theories of the so-called new institutional economics. Each of 
these areas will be sketched briefly in the following. 
 
In a traditional view, financial or capital markets are theoretically analyzed based on neo-
classical theories of finance, in which future cash flows of equity or fixed income 
securities are valued to derive a present value.216 The underlying assumptions refer to 
perfect or efficient capital markets:217 
 
                                              
216  See Brealey/Myers (2000), pp. 16 ff. For a detailed review on the valuation of fixed income securities, 
see also Bodie/Kane/Marcus (1999), pp. 399 ff. 
217  See Drukarczyk (1993), p. 125; Swoboda (1994), p. 93; Brealey/Myers (2000), pp. 24-25. 
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• Market participants are rational and they are utility maximizers.218 
• All securities on the market are arbitrarily divisible.219 
• There are no transaction costs, i.e., transaction costs are zero. 
• Market participants have all and the same information, i.e., information is immediately 
accessible for all market participants.220 
 
Theories that evolved based on these basic assumptions are the theory of Modigliani and 
Miller regarding the value additivity and the irrelevance of the choice of capital 
structure,221 the theory on informational efficiency by Grossmann and Stiglitz,222 the 
separation theorem by Tobin,223 and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).224 
 
A younger field of research on financial markets, mainly developed in the US, is 
represented by the so-called behavioral finance.225 This line of research emerged due to 
the fact that several phenomena observed in financial markets cannot be explained by the 
neo-classical perspective alone. These phenomena refer to anomalies that are contradictory 
to, for example, the neo-classical argument of information efficiency. The anomalies 
include, for example, the observation that companies that are to be included in a stock 
index, experience an incline in its share price shortly before being included in the index.226 
                                              
218 In neo-classical theories of finance, investors seek to maximize their return given varying risk 
preferences. Non-monetary measures are not incorporated into the utility maximization. See 
Brealey/Myers (2000), pp. 187 ff. 
219  See Modigliani/Miller (1958), p. 266. 
220 There are various forms of market efficiency or informational efficiency. The most common 
differentiation was pioneered by Fama (1970), referring to a weak form, semi-strong form, and strong 
form of information. See Fama (1970), pp. 389 ff. 
221  See Modigliani/Miller (1958), pp. 266 ff. The fundamental statement holds that the value of a company 
is unaffected by its capital structure, i.e., the debt-equity-ratio. 
222  See Grossman/Stiglitz (1976), pp. 246 ff. 
223  See Tobin (1958), pp. 65 ff. 
224 For the development of the CAPM, see the seminal works of Treynor (1961), Sharpe (1964), and 
Lintner (1965). 
225 For this area, see for example the works of Kahneman/Tversky (1979), Kahneman/Slovic/Tversky 
(1982), De Long et al. (1990), Shleifer/Vishny (1997b), Rabin (1998), Kahneman/Tversky (2000), 
Shleifer (2000), Barberis/Thaler (2003). 
226 See for example Harris/Gurel (1986), Shleifer (1986), Wurgler/Zhuravskaya (2002). 
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In contrast to the neo-classical approach, behavioral finance incorporates psychological 
and sociological aspects to explain the partially irrational behavior of market participants. 
The concept is based on two major building blocks, i.e., limits to arbitrage and 
psychology.227 Limits to arbitrage refers to the argument “…that it can be difficult for 
rational traders to undo the dislocations caused by less rational traders…”.228 Psychology 
relates to experimental evidence from the field of cognitive psychology, stating that 
traders act irrationally based on their beliefs and their preferences. 
Abstaining from going into too much detail on this field of research,229 in essence, 
behavioral finance does not assume market participants to always act in a rational way. 
Rather, due to imperfect capital markets and due to limited cognitive capacity, humans 
act irrationally. In consequence, this leads to market participants making mistakes in 
perceiving and processing information, and in making decisions based on the information 
perceived. These irrational behavior is based on mental mechanisms also referred to as 
heuristics, i.e., behavioral patterns.230 For example, one of these heuristics is denoted as 
the so-called anchoring: When people are asked to form an estimate on a certain number, 
they often start with an initial, possibly arbitrary, value and then adjust it. However, 
empirical evidence shows that people heavily ‘anchor’ on this initial value and thereby 
form estimates in an irrational way.231 
 
Another well-established field of theory refers to the so-called new institutional 
economics.232 New institutional economics is a broader framework basically comprised of 
three theoretical concepts: Property rights theory, principal agent theory, and transaction 
cost theory.233 The principal agent theory is a core framework in information economics. It 
                                              
227 For further literature on the topic of limits of arbitrage, see for example De Long et al. (1990) or 
Shleifer/Vishny (1997b). For further literature on psychological aspects, see for example 
Kahneman/Slovic/Tversky (1982), Camerer (1995), or Rabin (1998). 
228  Barberis/Thaler (2003), p. 1052. 
229  Further below it will be shown that the approach of behavioral finance is not well suited to be applied in 
the context of this study. 
230  See for example Goldberg/von Nitzsch (1999), pp. 49 ff. 
231  See Barberis/Thaler (2003), p. 1066. 
232  See for example Williamson (1979b), p. 233. 
233  See for example Picot/Bortenlänger/Röhrl (1997), p. 108. 
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builds on the property rights theory since it refers to the delegation of decision rights from 
the principal to the agent and can be defined as “[…] a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf, which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.”234 
The separation of ownership and control as well as the fact that both parties are assumed 
to be utility maximizers generate the agency problem.235 Instead of acting in the best 
interest of the principal, the agent may prefer to maximize his private wealth.236 
While the principal agent theory focuses on conflicts arising from asymmetric 
information between the principal and the agent, the transaction cost theory elaborates on 
institutions, which aim at rationalizing exchange, information, and communication 
processes.237 Since in this study, the syndication network of VCs is intended to be 
analyzed, and since transaction cost theory is a concept that could serve as a basis for 
analyzing networks, it has to be looked at in more detail to decide whether it could also 
serve as theoretical basis for the present study.  
The transaction cost theory has originally been pioneered by Coase (1937)238 and has 
later been refined by Williamson.239 In this approach, specifically, two institutions, 
markets and hierarchies, are examined regarding the question, why specific transactions 
are executed on the market while others are executed within organizations.240 The 
elements under consideration are single transactions, which can either be the physical 
transfer as an "…exchange of goods or services from one party to another"241 or, in a 
                                              
234  Jensen/Meckling (1976), p. 308. 
235 This situation of conflict was first discussed by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in 1932, see 
Berle/Means (1932). For seminal works in this field, see Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973), 
Jensen/Meckling (1976), Rothschild/Stiglitz (1976), Fama/Jensen (1983a), Fama/Jensen (1983b), 
Arrow (1985), Shleifer/Vishny (1997a). For an overview, see Spremann (1990), pp. 561 ff. 
236  See Jensen/Meckling (1976), p. 308; Fama/Jensen (1983a), p. 302; Fama/Jensen (1983b), p. 332. 
237  See Picot/Reichwald/Wigand (1996), pp. 36-38. 
238  See Coase (1937), pp. 386 ff. 
239  In this context, see the seminal works of Williamson (1985). In this context, see also further works of 
Williamson to this topic: Williamson (1975), Williamson (1979a), Williamson (1979b), Williamson 
(1981a), Williamson (1981b), Williamson (1984), Williamson (1989), Williamson (1990). 
240  This refers to the classic 'make-or-buy' decision. 
241  Williamson (1985), p. 1; Jones/Hill (1988), p. 160. 
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juridical context, the transfer of certain rights.242 The efficiency criterion is the sum of the 
production and transaction cost, the basis on which transaction cost theory compares the 
alternative institutional arrangements markets and hierarchies, i.e., organizations. 
Consequently, the institutional arrangement is supposed to be more efficient, for which 
production and transaction costs are lower.243 
Based on the transaction cost theory, an organization has a 'right' to exist if it is able to 
solve the tasks and problems of coordination internally for lower costs than would be 
possible compared to the same transaction if executed involving an external partner on 
the market.244 Influencing factors for transaction costs are the so-called human factors, 
i.e., assumptions on human behavior, and environmental factors. Human factors refer to 
the human's bounded rationality due to imperfect information and limited information 
processing capacity as well as to opportunistic behavior.245 Environmental factors include 
the factor specificity, and the uncertainty and frequency of the transaction.246 Factor 
specificity refers to investments in assets, in human capital, and in the production site. On 
the one hand side, the more specific the investments, the lower the production costs. On 
the other side, specific transactions, which are executed on the market, may lead to a 
situation with significant asymmetric information between the transaction parties, i.e., 
one of the parties can potentially exploit the fact of having more information than the 
other, finally leading to higher transaction costs.247 On the one hand side, uncertainty 
refers to the conditions of the transaction. On the other hand, it refers to uncertainty 
regarding the behavior of the other party, i.e., uncertainty with respect to a potentially 
opportunistic behavior. In both ways, transaction costs increase due to the need to gather 
more information on the transaction partner upfront, and due to ex-post amendments of 
the contracts or conditions of the transaction. Finally, the more frequent a transaction 
                                              
242  See Commons (1931), p. 648. 
243 See Ebers/Gotsch (1999), pp. 225-227. Furthermore, it is differentiated between ex-ante and ex-post 
transaction costs. Ex-ante transaction costs are those that occur prior to closing the contract. Ex-post 
transaction costs are comprised of three categories: Control costs to ensure that contracts are fulfilled, 
costs to solve (legal) conflicts, and costs arising due to ex-post changes of the contract. In this context, 
see Williamson (1985), p. 22. 
244  See Picot/Reichwald/Wigand (1996), p. 41. 
245  See Arrow (1985), pp. 37 ff.; Arrow (1987), p. 201; Picot/Reichwald/Wigand (1996), pp. 41-43. 
246  See Ebers/Gotsch (1999), pp. 227-228; Williamson (1985), p. 281. 
247  See Picot/Reichwald/Wigand (1996), pp. 43-44. 
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occurs, the lower the production and transaction costs, representing reasons to organize a 
transaction within an organization.248 
Based on the above explanations, the economic institution market is characterized by 
independent actors, who spontaneously execute single transactions. These transactions 
are coordinated by the price mechanism and rights and obligations are fixed in contracts. 
Access to the market is open for all actors, and laws of various kinds control for 
situations of conflicts or fraud.249 
In contrast to the market, the economic institution hierarchy refers to organizations or 
companies that are structured into hierarchical levels and departments. Despite modern 
management concepts regarding employee-oriented management styles, the organization 
functions based on formal rules to which the employees adhere when signing the 
employment contract. Situations of conflict can be solved by authoritarian instruction of a 
supervisor.250 
However, in both cases, markets and hierarchies, it is questionable whether these two 
extreme and ideal forms are suitable to describe the relevant situation in reality. In the 
case of real markets, transactions can usually not be executed without being embedded in 
institutions and some form of formal rules.251 This means, that partners to a transaction 
need to show a minimum of cooperative behavior, institutional arrangements such as 
contract law must be in place, and the involved parties need to be willing to adhere to 
these rules.252 
                                              
248  See Williamson (1985), pp. 281 ff. 
249  See Weyer (2000), pp. 5-7. 
250  See Weyer (2000), pp. 8-9. 
251 See Granovetter (1985), pp. 482 ff. In this paper, Granovetter refers to the dispute of the so-called 
undersocialized view and the oversocialized view underlying opposing theories. On the one hand, the 
new institutional economics tend to view actors, i.e., individuals or companies, as undersocialized since 
transactions are executed without any human or social contact between the parties being taken into 
account. In this context, see also Hirschman (1982), p. 1473. On the other hand, the oversocialized 
perspective prefers a point of view in which market participants are seen as human beings that have 
relations and underlie behavioral constraints. In this context, see the early works of Piore (1975) and 
Phelps Brown (1977). On the topic of under-/oversocialized view with respect to VCs and 
entrepreneurs, see Shane/Cable (2002). 
252  See Weyer (2000), p. 8. 
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In the case of hierarchies such as organizations, it is questionable whether a modern 
company can be described as simple hierarchical structure or whether the informal, internal 
relationships and networks are not also a factor that accounts for the success of the firms.253 
 
Transaction cost theory also provides a third form of institutional coordination, which is a 
hybrid one, situated somewhere along the continuum between the endpoints (market and 
hierarchy). This form of coordination is also referred to as network. Some authors view 
networks as being part of the continuum,254 others denote networks as a form of 
coordination having an own quality, excluding the gradual transition to the endpoints of 
the continuum.255  
The essence here is that, although 'market' and 'hierarchy' are used as reference points in 
both perspectives, networks constitute a form of coordination with an own character, 
joining elements of markets and hierarchical structures: Networks combine the flexibility 
of market transactions with the efficiency and security provided by organizational 
structures.256 This leads to two advantages that networks deliver: 
 
• They reduce the uncertainty regarding the behavior of other actors. 
• They enable an organization to produce a higher output. 
 
While the theories explained above are commonly applied in analyses of financial 
markets, for several reasons it is abstained from applying them as theoretical foundation 
in the present study. These reasons are described in detail in the following section. 
 
                                              
253  See Hirsch-Kreinsen (1995), pp. 422 ff. 
254  Authors that represent this line of thought are, for example, Sydow (1992) or Schneider/Kenis (1996). 
255  In this context, for example see the works of Powell (1990) or Willke (1995). 
256 See Weyer (2000), p. 10. 
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3.1.2 Reasons for Abstaining from Frequently Applied Theories 
With respect to the neo-classical perspective, and looking at the venture capital market 
and the market for investment opportunities VCs can invest in, it becomes obvious that 
the assumptions of the neo-classical finance theories are not fulfilled:257 
Information on potential investment opportunities is not freely and immediately available 
to all market participants. Quite the opposite, this information is unequally distributed 
among market participants and, since it is private and potentially valuable information, it 
might not be transmitted deliberately.258 
Although market participants are utility maximizers, the utility function might also 
incorporate non-monetary elements, which is to a large extent not conformable to neo-
classical theories. This becomes obvious based on the discussion on the rationales for 
syndicating venture capital investments. One example in this context is the expected 
reciprocation of deal flow.259 
Often, the VCs engage in early stage investments, i.e., they invest in a financing phase, in 
which the risk of the investments theoretically can hardly be assessed.260 Taking this 
thought one step further, not only for the case of early stage investments but also in later 
financing stages, the risk profiles of portfolio companies are difficult to evaluate. 
The value of equity and especially the question why the search for equity capital 
frequently constitutes a challenge for potential portfolio companies, cannot be explained 
based on the neo-classical finance theory.261 
                                              
257  In his work on the informal venture capital market, i.e., on business angels, Brettel (2004) also shows 
that the neo-classical assumptions do not hold. Although in his work applied to the case of business 
angels, parts of the line of argumentation are also valid for the formal venture capital market, finally 
leading to the same result, namely that the neo-classical theories provide an insufficient basis in the 
context of the study. 
258  On the topic of the sharing and the transmission of knowledge, see also Hansen (1999), Cross et al. (2001), 
Tsai (2001), Borgatti/Cross (2003), Maula/Autio/Murray (2003), Aalbers/Dolfsma/Koppius (2004). 
259  See section 2.1.4.3. 
260  See Copeland/Weston (1992), p. 145. 
261  See Schefczyk (2004), p. 134. In his work on informal venture capital providers, Brettel (2004) adds 
two further arguments why the neo-classical perspective is not a useful theoretical foundation for the 
analysis of the market under consideration. First, securities in the informal venture capital industry are 
only theoretically divisible. In practice, however, high costs have to be incurred to achieve separation. 
Here, the author refers to the costs that have to be incurred for notaries. For the purpose of this study, 
i.e., the formal venture capital market, this argument might not weigh as much as it does in the informal 
counterpart. This is assumed because in the formal venture capital market, investments are frequently 
syndicated, i.e., securities are separated. Second, Brettel (2004) argues that the separation theorem does 
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Based on these arguments it could be shown that, for the formal venture capital market, 
the underlying assumptions of neo-classical finance theories are not fulfilled. Therefore, 
this traditional perspective on financial markets is not employed as a theoretical basis 
within this study.  
 
In contrast to the neo-classical theories of finance, the behavioral approach is able to 
incorporate psychological and sociological aspects into explaining phenomena observed in 
financial markets. However, for one simple reason, also the behavioral finance perspective 
does not seem to provide a solid theoretical foundation in the context of this study: The 
focus of this work is to examine the VCs’ syndication network by characterizing the 
individual VC’s network position and drawing conclusions on their deal flow. Behavioral 
finance, however, is more tailored to explain phenomena occurring on the stock market 
(stock price movements, behavior of traders), rather than explaining network structures in 
general, apart from the specific case under consideration (structure of the syndication 
network). Moreover, based on the approach of behavioral finance it would not be possible 
to draw conclusions with respect to the deal flow of VCs. Therefore, it is abstained from 
applying this approach as theoretical foundation to the present study. 
 
With respect to the framework of the new institutional economics, the transaction cost 
approach is the concept that could theoretically be employed as basis for a study on 
networks. Although representatives of the transaction cost approach would place the 
syndication network of VCs on the continuum between markets and hierarchies, the 
question arises whether transaction cost theory is a suitable approach for the purpose of 
this study. In the following it will be explained what exactly needs to be analyzed 
regarding the VCs' syndication network, and it will be checked whether the transaction 
cost approach is a suitable theoretical foundation to achieve this goal. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
not hold, i.e., investment plans and financing are not separated in early stage investments. Instead, 
single and specific investments are financed. Again, for the formal venture capital market this argument 
might not apply to the full extent, since venture capital firms also invest in later stage companies that 
have been in business for several years. Here, it is assumed, that not only single and specific 
investments are being financed but that portfolio companies also receive funds that they then can invest 
in several projects. For the original arguments, see Brettel (2004), pp. 100-101. 
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In industrial or market systems, firms are in contact with each other to exchange goods or 
services.262 These systems can be viewed as relationship networks, i.e., relationships the 
firms have among each other.263 To establish and further develop these relationships, firms 
have to invest time and effort.264 Furthermore, based on these relationships, firms are 
dependent on each other and possibilities to change counterparts are to some extent 
constrained. Therefore, although it is a market system the firms are active in, it is not solely 
the price mechanism that coordinates the firms' activities. Rather, coordination is either 
achieved through joint planning activities or through power one firm exerts over another.265  
 
At this point, a concept is briefly introduced (social network analysis), that will later be 
explained in detail and from which the theoretical foundation (social capital theory) will 
be derived. This is being done to show that the transaction cost approach does not seem 
to be a suitable theory as basis for this study.  
An important idea in order to assess the potential benefits and constraints for a single 
firm is the network position that the focal firm occupies.266 The position of a firm within 
a network provides information on the potential ability of that firm to access external 
resources, i.e., resources the firm itself does not possess.267 In the context of this study, an 
example of such resources is information on potential investment opportunities.268 This is 
exactly one goal of this study, i.e., to analyze the VCs' network position within the 
syndication network and to derive statements about the benefits (in terms of deal flow 
quantity and quality) the VCs have due to their network position.269 
Based on these explanations it becomes obvious that the transaction cost theory is not a 
suitable concept to achieve this goal. Although, as stated above, the network of VCs can 
                                              
262 For the network in the venture capital market, see also the works and analyses of Lerner (1994), 
Gorman/Sahlman (1989), Sahlman (1990), and Hsu (2004).  
263  See Owen-Smith/Powell (2004), p. 5. 
264  See Walker/Kogut/Shan (1997), p. 109. 
265  See Johanson/Mattsson (1987), p. 35. 
266  Besides the network position of the single firms, also the structure of the entire network is important. 
This will be explained in detail further below. See also Owen-Smith/Powell (2004), p. 5. 
267  See Walker/Kogut/Shan (1997), pp. 110-111. 
268  See Sorenson/Stuart (2001), p. 1552. 
269  The goal referred to is goal (b), as explained in chapter one. 
Theoretical Foundation 
 
67
probably be allocated on the continuum between the endpoints 'market' and 'hierarchy', 
the transaction cost approach does not deliver adequate methods, with which a network of 
relationships can be analyzed and that explain the benefits of single network positions. 
Besides this, another reason for not applying transaction cost theory is that it reverses the 
logic of social network analysis. Social network analysis holds that network structures 
and the embeddedness of actors within a network structure (at least co-) determine the 
actors' economic performance. However, transaction cost theory states quite the opposite, 
i.e., that economic performance is the driver of individual behavior.270 Furthermore, 
transaction cost theory is criticized regarding the quantification of transaction costs. 
Although attempts have been made in a general context,271 especially in the context of 
venture capital investments it appears impossible to accurately quantify the transaction 
costs.272 Due to these reasons, the transaction cost approach is not further pursued as a 
theoretical foundation for this study. 
 
3.1.3 Requirements for the Theoretical Foundation for this Study 
Given the arguments above and based on the characteristics of the market for venture 
capital investments, a theoretical framework needs to be found that accepts bounded 
rationality and imperfect capital markets or imperfect information as underlying conditions.  
Furthermore, in order to be able to analyze the network of VCs and particularly their 
position within the network with regard to their deal flow, a theoretical foundation 
accounting for the concept of networks seems desirable.  
In addition, the theory needs to be able to deliver methods and theoretical concepts 
capable of examining the relationships among individual actors while at the same time 
being able to explain the benefits of networks as a whole. 
Therefore, the concept of social network analysis and the theories of social capital are 
applied, which will be elaborated on in detail in the following sections. 
 
                                              
270  See Borgatti/Foster (2003), p. 995. 
271  See Ebers/Gotsch (1999), pp. 243 ff.; Albach (1989), p. 42. 
272  See Brettel (2004), p. 103. 
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3.2 Social Network Analysis 
In this section (3.2), first, two different perspectives on social networks are explained, of 
which one will be adopted in this study (section 3.2.1). Second, it will be shown that 
social network analysis is the appropriate method to examine relationships among actors 
(section 3.2.2). Third, some necessary vocabulary of social network analysis and 
information on the measurement and collection of network data are provided (section 
3.2.3). Fourth, in order to better understand the today's discussion on social network 
analysis, a section on the history and background follows (section 3.2.4). These steps are 
necessary in order to have a common understanding of the basics of social network 
analysis. Then, in section 3.2.5, it will be explained to which research areas social 
network analysis has been applied, and a typology of network studies will be used to 
derive that social capital is the appropriate theoretical foundation for this study. 
 
3.2.1 Economic Perspectives on Social Networks 
There are two perspectives how social networks are looked at in economic research.  
One perspective is to classify social networks as form of coordination, i.e., in the sense of 
inter-organizational networks.273 Inter-organizational networks view social networks as a 
target-oriented form of coordination among actors, i.e., it focuses on the faithful 
cooperation of actors. This perspective is also denoted as sociological institutionalism, 
and its underlyings root in the allocation of networks on the continuum between market 
and hierarchy.274 In this approach, it is not the position of actors within the network or the 
structure of the network that is analyzed. Instead, qualitative methods are used to 
examine for example, strategic networks, regional networks, policy networks, or 
innovation networks.275  
                                              
273  Examples of studies, in which this perspective has been applied are the works of Powell (1990), Sydow 
(1992), or Willke (1995). 
274  See Sabel (1994), pp. 137 ff.; Powell/Smith-Doerr (1994), pp. 368 ff.; Powell (1990), pp. 295 ff. 
275 For discussions on strategic and regional networks, see Piore/Sabel (1985), Nohria/Eccles (1992) or 
Sydow (1992); for policy networks see Atkinson/Coleman (1989) or Dunn/Perl (1994); for innovation 
networks see also the debate on open versus closed networks, since innovation networks are closely 
related to the topics of knowledge sharing, see Coleman (1988), Putnam (1995) and Granovetter (1973), 
Burt (1992). 
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From the second perspective, social networks can be understood as networks of 
relationships. This perspective does not compete with the previous one explained. Rather, 
it should be regarded as a complementary one, i.e., both perspectives look at the same 
phenomenon but focus on different aspects.276 In this approach, the structure of the entire 
network, the positions of the individual actors within the network, or the content of the 
relationships between actors are examined based on quantitative methods.277 An example 
for this approach would be to characterize the structural position of actor(s) in a 
network.278 In addition, social network analysis offers theoretical concepts that serve as 
basis for the derivation of hypotheses on the actors' abilities to benefit from their 
structural position in the network.279 An example would be that actors being centrally 
positioned within the network or actors building a bridge between otherwise disconnected 
subgroups might have more influence on others, compared to actors that hold positions in 
the periphery of the network.280  
These thoughts are summarized in an overview presented in table 3.1: 
 
                                              
276  See Weyer (2000), p. 17. 
277  In this context, see also the works of Schenk (1984), Pappi (1987), Scott (1988), Trezzini (1988). 
278  See Wasserman/Faust (1994), pp. 167 ff. Examples for the analysis of entire networks are to be found in 
Powell et al. (2005), Podolny/Stuart/Hannan (1996), Baum/Calabrese/Silverman (2000), or Podolny 
(2001). 
279  A significant part of the theoretical discussion in the field of social networks refers to the benefits and 
constraints of closed or cohesive network structures versus open network structures. For seminal works 
in the context of closed networks, see Coleman (1988) or Putnam (1995); for works in the context of 
open networks, see Granovetter (1973) or Burt (1992). At this point of the study, this representation is 
deliberately simplified in order to present a short overview. Further below, these opposing views and 
theories are discussed in detail. 
280 See Wasserman/Faust (1994), pp. 169 ff. and pp. 198 ff. These thoughts refer to the structural hole 
theory, which will be explained further below. See for example Burt (1992). 
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Social networks
• Social network analysis • (Inter-) Organizational networks
• Method of analysis • Form of coordination
• Quantitative analysis of network structure • Qualitative description of type of network
and form of cooperation
• Position of actors within the network
• Structure and sub-structures of entire
network
• Resulting opportunities and constraints for
actors
• Form of cooperation within the network
• Types of networks
• Description of purpose of cooperation
• Relationship networks (individual persons, 
companies, states, etc.)
• Strategic networks
• Regional networks
• Policy networks
• Innovation networks
Dimension
Nature of 
measurement
Objects of 
analysis
Examples
Perspective
 
Table 3.1: Overview of perspectives on social networks281 
 
In these two perspectives, the difference between sociological institutionalism and 
sociological network analysis becomes obvious: Sociological institutionalism views 
networks as a form of efficient coordination of action, which is in place if transactions are 
not effectuated on the market or within an organization.282 In contrast, the sociological 
network analysis perspective does not necessarily regard markets, organizations, or 
networks as an efficient form of coordination. Also, the stringent assumption that humans 
behave in an opportunistic manner, as is assumed within the institutional perspective, 
does not exist in formal network analysis.283 Actually, it is not the form of coordination 
or opportunistic behavior that formal network analysis is interested in. Rather, a network 
is defined in a formal or neutral way, describing it as set of nodes (actors) that are 
connected by lines (relationships).284 The striking advantage of social (formal) network 
analysis is that the social structure, which is to be analyzed, is not classified ex-ante as 
form of coordination, i.e., market, hierarchy, or network. Rather, by the instruments of 
formal network analysis, competitive social structures such as markets as well as 
hierarchies or networks can be examined. What is of interest in social network analysis, is 
                                              
281  According to Weyer (2000), p. 15 with own additions and amendments. 
282 This, of course, also relates to the field of new institutional economics, therefore the term sociological 
institutionalism exists. 
283  See Jansen (2003), p. 12. 
284  An explanation of basic terms used in social network analysis follows in section 3.2.3. 
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the underlying structure of relationships and the resulting positive or negative 
implications for the actors.285  
Since one goal of this study is to analyze the individual VCs' position within the 
syndication network, the perspective presented first will be adopted, which views social 
networks as networks of relationships.  
 
3.2.2 Social Network Analysis as Method to Examine Relationships 
In general, the term 'network' denotes social structures or systems, which can be 
illustrated as a graph. Simplistically, a graph consists of points, and edges connecting the 
points. Just some examples for networks from practice are road networks, computer 
networks, or social networks.286 In social networks, the points within a graph can 
correspond to individual persons, groups of persons, institutions, organizations, or even 
countries.287 In this case, the connections between the points represent the relations or ties 
between the persons, groups, or organizations. These relations or ties can take various 
forms, for example, friendship, kinship, or the exchange of resources such as information.  
When analyzing the social network among actors such as the syndication network of 
VCs, it is decisive, which kind of data is to be looked at. In social sciences, there are 
basically three types of data, i.e., attribute data, relational data, and ideational data.288 
Attribute data refers to the behavior, opinions, and attitudes of persons or the unit of 
analysis. Attributes are measured as the values of particular variables such as education, 
income, or occupation. The methods that are appropriate to analyze attribute data are 
those of variable analysis. Ideational data describes, for example motives, meanings, or 
definitions. This kind of data is analyzed by typological analysis. Relational data refers to 
the contacts, ties, and connections, which relate one point in the graph with other points. 
This kind of data therefore does not describe the properties of the points, i.e., persons, 
groups, or organizations, but of systems of points. As Scott (2000) explains, "…these 
                                              
285  See Wasserman/Faust (1994), pp. 5-8 and p. 17. 
286  See Witt/Rosenkranz (2002), p. 87. For a most general description also see w.A. (2005): Encyclopaedia 
Britannica Online. Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, http://www.britannica.com, date of access: 
November 3, 2005. 
287  See Wasserman/Faust (1994), pp. 17 f. 
288  See Scott (2000), pp. 2 f. 
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relations connect pairs of agents into larger relational systems."289 The methods that are 
appropriate to analyze relational data are those of social network analysis. 
An overview of the before-mentioned types of social science data and types of 
corresponding analyses is presented in figure 3.1. 
 
Type of data Examples Type of analysis
Attribute data Behavior, opinions, attitudes Variable analysis
Ideational data Motives, meanings, definitions Typological analysis
Relational data Contacts, ties, connections Social network analysis
 
Figure 3.1: Types of social science data and types of analysis290 
 
Social network analysis is a fairly complex scientific area, with a very extensive and 
partially confusing profusion of methods and models provided in social sciences and 
economic literature. The reason for this is that social network analysis developed based 
on research in diverse scientific strands or disciplines such as sociology, psychology, 
anthropology, and mathematics. Strands of research of these areas "…intersected with 
one another in a complex and fascinating history, sometimes fusing and other times 
diverging on to their separate paths."291 
 
In order for the reader to get a better understanding of this extensive research field, a 
view on the history and background of social network analysis will follow (section 3.2.4). 
Before though, some fundamental vocabulary and concepts need to be explained. 
 
                                              
289  Scott (2000), p. 3. 
290  Own illustration according to Scott (2000), p. 3. 
291  Scott (2000), p. 7. 
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3.2.3 Fundamental Concepts of Social Network Analysis 
3.2.3.1 Basic Terms 
The following explanations on basic terms used in social network analysis are taken from 
the textbook of Wasserman and Faust, which is on the methods and applications of social 
network analysis and which is frequently referred to in academic research.292 
 
Actor: As introduced above, social network analysis focuses on the connections or 
linkages among social entities and on the implications these connections have. In social 
network terminology, these social entities are referred to as actors. Generally, actors can 
be individual people, groups of people, subgroups, organizations, or collectives such as 
communities or even nations. In network analysis, the actor, whose network connections 
are analyzed, is denoted as 'ego', while the actors, ego is directly connected to, are 
denoted as 'alters'.  
 
Relational tie: The connections between the actors are called 'social ties' or 'relational ties'. 
Relational ties can be of various types, however, the defining criterion is that it establishes 
a connection between a pair of actors. Examples for types of social ties are friendship or 
liking among people, transfer of resources as is the case with business interactions, 
affiliation such as jointly attending social events, behavioral interactions such as talking to 
each other or sending messages, or biological connections such as kinship. 
 
Dyad, triad: A dyad refers to a pair of actors and the possible tie or ties between them. 
Most frequently being the unit for statistical analysis of networks, dyadic analysis 
concentrates on the properties of the relational tie(s) between two actors, such as 
reciprocity or strength. In contrast to dyads, triads refer to a subset of three actors and the 
tie(s) among them. Many social network analyses focused on triads, especially the ones 
referring to balance theory or transitivity.293 
                                              
292  See Wasserman/Faust (1994). 
293  Explanations on balance theory will follow in section 3.2.4.1. Transitivity describes the situation that if 
actor A likes actor B, and if actor B likes actor C, then, in the long run, actor A also tends to like actor 
C. For an early discussion of the idea of transitivity, see also Rapoport (1953a), Rapoport (1953b), 
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Ego-network and total network: The term ego-network, also denoted as neighborhood, 
refers to the network a focal actor has. That means, included in the ego-network are the 
ties of ego to his direct alters as well as the ties among these alters. Therefore, when 
calculating network measures based on the ego-network, only the above mentioned 
relationships are included. In contrast, the term total or entire network refers to all actors 
and their relationships in the network. Measures, which are calculated based on the total 
network, therefore include all actors and all relationships.294 
 
Subgroup and group: Subgroups are defined as any subset of actors such as dyads, triads, 
or larger subsets and the existing ties among them. Although identifying and studying 
subgroups of social networks has been an important aspect, the specification of the group 
of actors itself, which should be analyzed, is at the heart of social network analysis. A 
group can be defined as "…the collection of all actors on which ties are to be 
measured".295 Based on conceptual, theoretical, or empirical criteria, the boundaries of 
the group under consideration have to be drawn, resulting in a finite set of actors of 
whom the ties are analyzed. 
 
Structural and composition variables: It can be differentiated between two types of 
variables that occur in network data, i.e., structural and composition variables. Structural 
variables are measured on dyads, i.e., pairs of actors. Examples are business transactions, 
trade between nations, or friendship relations. In contrast, composition variables are 
measured on the level of individual actors. Examples are geographical location, gender, 
race, etc.296 
 
Mode: The term 'mode' refers to a specific set of entities, on which structural variables 
are measured. One-mode networks therefore refer to a single set of actors, on which 
                                                                                                                                      
Rapoport (1954). For a further discussion of this concept, also see the works of Heider (1944), Heider 
(1946), Holland/Leinhardt (1970), Mazur (1971), Davis/Holland/Leinhardt (1971), Frank/Harary 
(1980), Frank/Harary (1982).  
294  See Jansen (2003), p. 108. 
295  Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 19. 
296  See Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 29.  
Theoretical Foundation 
 
75
structural variables are measured. In case of two-mode networks, there are two sets of 
actors, on which structural variables are measured. An example could be the 
measurement of transactions between one set of actors consisting of corporations, and 
another set of actors consisting of non-profit corporations.297 
 
Social network: Based on the explanations above, a social network shall be defined as a 
"…finite set or sets of actors and the relation or relations defined on them".298 
 
3.2.3.2 Measurement and Collection of Network Data 
Measurement: In terms of measurement of network data, three aspects require attention, 
which are the unit of observation, the modeling unit, and the quantification of the 
relations. The unit of observation refers to the entity, on which measurements are 
collected, i.e., the individual actor, a pair of actors, the relational tie(s), or events.299 For 
the purpose of this study, the unit of observation is the individual VC and the ties to other 
VCs within the network. 
The so-called modeling unit refers to the level, at which network data is presented. This 
can be the actor, the dyad or triad, a subgroup, the set of actors, or the entire network.300 
The choice of the modeling unit depends on the kind of analysis intended. If, for 
example, it should be studied, whether there are subsets of actors, in which the actors 
interact more frequently with each other, the relevant modeling unit would be the 
subgroup. Therefore, which modeling unit is the relevant one, is dependent upon the 
network measure or network property under consideration.  
Regarding the quantification of the relations, it is important to understand two basic 
dimensions, which are the directionality and the numeration.301 Relational data can either 
                                              
297 See Marsden (2005), pp. 8 f.; Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 29. In addition to the types of networks 
explained above, Wasserman/Faust (1994) also mention another type, the so-called 'affiliation network'. 
These networks are two-mode although they only have one set of actors. The second mode within this 
network is a set of events, which actors attend (for example a club or organization). For a further 
discussion of these types of networks, see Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 30. 
298  Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 20. See also Weyer (2000), p. 11 and p. 36. 
299  See Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 43. 
300  See Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 44. 
301  See Scott (2000), pp. 47 f. 
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be directed or undirected. In the case of a directional relation, the "…tie between a pair of 
actors has an origin and a destination; that is, the tie is directed from one actor in the pair 
to the other actor in a pair".302 In the case of  an undirected relation, the tie does not have 
an origin and a destination, which means that the two actors of the pair are just 
connected. In the case of syndicated  venture capital investments, an undirected relation 
exists if two or more VCs jointly invest in a portfolio company. If, in addition to this, 
information existed on which VC invited the other firms to join an investment, a 
directionality of the relation could also be shown. 
The second important dimension regarding the quantification of relational data is its 
numeration, which can either be binary, i.e., dichotomous, or valued. If it is binary, 
information only exists on whether a relation between two actors is present or absent. In the 
case of syndicated venture capital investments this means that either two firms have or 
have not jointly invested in a deal. With valued relations, statements can also be made 
about the strength, frequency, or intensity of the relation.303 For example, if two VCs 
frequently invest in projects together, the relation between these two actors is supposed to 
be stronger or more intense compared to the case, in which they have only invested once. 
 
Collection: The collection of social network data can be performed in many ways. The 
most commonly used are questionnaires, interviews, experiments, observations, and 
archival records.304 To collect information on the relations between actors, who are 
individual people, most often questionnaires, interviews, observations, and experiments 
are applied.305 To collect data on syndicated venture capital investments and thereby on 
relational ties between VCs, a database, i.e., archival records containing information on 
joint investments, is most appropriate and will be used. In addition, as is common in 
                                              
302  Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 44. 
303  See Scott (2000), p. 47; Wasserman/Faust (1994), pp. 44 f. 
304  There are also several other techniques to gather information on relations between actors such as the 
small world technique or the ego-centered technique. However, since these techniques are used for very 
specific social study designs, which are not relevant for the purpose of this study, they are just 
mentioned but not explained in further detail. For a further discussion, see for example Burt (1984) for 
ego-centered, Milgram (1967) and Korte/Milgram (1970) for the small world technique. 
305  For a detailed discussion of these techniques, see Wasserman/Faust (1994), pp. 45-54. 
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social science studies,306 a questionnaire will be used to gather further information on 
composition variables, for example, such as the quantity and quality of the deal flow of 
the VCs under consideration. 
 
3.2.4 History and Background of Social Network Analysis 
Present-day social network analysis has its roots in basically three main traditions: 
Firstly, sociometric analysts working on small groups from the middle of the 1920's 
onwards, developing and employing the concept of graph theory; secondly, researchers 
from Harvard University, who, in the 1930's, explored the formation of cliques and 
patterns of interpersonal relations; thirdly, anthropologists from the University of 
Manchester, who, while building on results from the sociometric analysts and the 
Harvard researchers, examined the structure of community relations, and village and 
tribal communities from the 1950's onwards. Later, during the 1960's and 1970's, again 
Harvard researchers (mainly Harrison White and his associates, who continued his work), 
brought together these three main traditions and forged contemporary social network 
analysis.307 These four steps in the historic development towards social network analysis 
are described in the following.308 
 
3.2.4.1 Sociometric Analysis and Graph Theory 
Sociometric analysis dates back to a tradition in psychology, called 'Gestalt theory', 
which is mainly associated with the work of Köhler (1925).309 Gestalt theory basically 
deals with organized patterns or conceptual schemes of the human mind, through which 
thoughts and perceptions are structured. Also, Gestalt theory "…emphasizes the influence 
of group organization and its associated social climate on individual perceptions."310 
                                              
306  See Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 51. 
307  See Scott (2000), pp. 7-8. 
308 For a nice overview of the development of social network analysis, see also Freeman (2004). For an 
early review of the approaches and methods in social network analysis, see Alba (1982). 
309  See Köhler (1925).  
310  Scott (2000), p. 9. 
Social Network Analysis 
 
78 
Jacob Moreno, one of the leading Gestalt theorists, examined the psychological well-
being of individuals, which is related to the structural features of the group, the individual 
is part of.311 Moreno named this 'social configuration', being the result of the relations 
people are involved in.312 Moreno displayed the formal properties of these social 
configurations in a so-called sociogram, which is a systematic way to illustrate a network 
of relations. An example of one of Moreno's sociograms is given in figure 3.2: 
 
A
F
E
D
B
C
 
Figure 3.2:  Sociogram: The sociometric star313 
 
The sociogram allowed researchers to identify for example leaders or isolated individuals 
in a social network, to show the channels through which individuals could influence each 
other, or through which information could flow, or even to examine asymmetry or 
reciprocity of relations. For example, in the sociogram illustrated, person A receives 
choices from all other persons, but only gives choices to persons B and C. A is therefore 
a person of comparably great popularity and leadership.314 
Approximately at the same time, Lewin examined the structural properties of groups, 
which are described as elements within a field of relations. The focus of the so-called 
'field theory' was therefore to investigate the group and its environment in a system of 
relations based on mathematical techniques.315 As in a sociogram and from a topological 
point of view, the social field consists of points that are connected by lines, which create 
                                              
311  See the famous work of Moreno (1934). 
312  See Scott (2000), p. 9. 
313  According to Scott (2000), p. 10. 
314  See Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 171; Scott (2000), pp. 9 f. 
315  See the work of Lewin (1936), and later also Lewin (1951). 
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paths. These paths not only connect the points, but patterns of paths may also divide the 
social field into separate regions, i.e., into a social structure, in which paths run within 
specific regions of the social structure but not between these regions. The boundaries 
imposed by the course of the paths also have implications on the opportunities people 
have, for example, to communicate or move through the social field.316  
Later, in the 1950's, Cartwright and the mathematician Harary, built on Lewin's strand of 
research of mathematical models of group relations. They were the first to apply graph 
theory to group behavior.317 Graph theory was pioneered by König in 1936 in Germany, 
however, due to the political situation in Germany at that time, only through a 
republishing of the book in 1953 in the US, the concept found its way into a broader 
scientific usage.318 Using Lewin's and Moreno's insights on group structure and group 
behavior, Cartwright and Harary (1956) illustrated groups as a collection of points that 
are connected by lines, which was the fundamental insight of Moreno.319 Graph theory 
also refers to a collection of points connected by lines. Due to several reasons, graph 
theory is a useful tool to analyze social networks. Firstly, structured properties of social 
networks can be defined by a set of useful vocabulary.320 Secondly, graph theory is based 
on mathematical concepts to measure these structural properties. Thirdly, based on the 
vocabulary and the mathematics, graph theory allows researchers to deduce testable 
statements about the social structure and its implications for the actors.321 Based on the 
sociometric and graph theoretic findings, Cartwright and Harary were working on 
concepts to decompose a social structure into subgroups. They made use of a theory first 
developed by Fritz Heider in 1946, called the cognitive balance theory.322 This theory 
refers to cognitive psychology and to attitudes and perceptions of individuals. The theory 
basically states that, if a person's beliefs are unbalanced, a state of psychological stress 
will cause internal pressure, resulting in the fact that the person will change some of the 
                                              
316  See Scott (2000), p. 13. 
317  See the works of Harary/Norman (1953), Bavelas (1950), or Cartwright/Zander (1953). 
318  See Scott (2000), p. 12. 
319  See Cartwright/Harary (1956), pp. 277 ff. See also Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 15. 
320  How the structural properties can be measured will be explained in sections 3.4.4 and 3.4.5. 
321  See Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 93. 
322  See Heider (1946), pp. 107 ff. 
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sentiments (liking, disliking) or the relationship (proximity, membership). In the case that 
a set of beliefs is equally positive or negative, cognitive balance exists. Unbalanced 
beliefs produce imbalances that are not sustainable. As Heider formulates, "[a] balanced 
configuration exists if the attitudes […] are similar."323 For example, if person A likes 
person B, and person B likes person C, a balance can only be reached if person A also 
likes person C.  
Cartwright and Harary picked up this concept, applying it to triadic structures, i.e., to 
groups of three individuals.324 The researchers proposed that complex social structures 
are built from simple structures, and more precisely, complex social structures are built 
from overlapping triads.325 By analyzing these triads, or threesomes, they argued, also 
complex social structures can be analyzed. One of the most important findings, for 
example, was that any balanced graph, whether complex or not, can be dissected into two 
subgroups. Within each subgroup, relations are positive, i.e., individuals like each other, 
however, the relation between the subgroups is negative.326 Based on these findings, a lot 
of work has been done to identify techniques to decompose any balanced or unbalanced 
graph or social structure since the identification of subgroups might bring significant 
features of the social network to daylight.327 
3.2.4.2 Interpersonal Relations and Cliques 
Parallel to the work being done in the sociometric and graph theoretic field, Harvard 
researchers investigated interpersonal relations and subgroups of social networks, called 
cliques, during the 1930's and 1940's. These researchers were concerned with techniques 
to decompose the social structure of any social system into subgroups. Major proponents 
in this area were W. Lloyd Warner and Elton Mayo.328  
                                              
323  Heider (1946), p. 107. 
324  The analysis of dyads, i.e., two individuals, and triads, dates back to Simmel (1908). 
325  See Scott (2000), pp. 14 f. 
326  For this, also see the studies of Davis (1967) and Holland/Leinhardt (1978). 
327 See Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 15. For a further discussion of the discovery of decomposition 
techniques, also see the study of Davis (1966). 
328 Predecessors or academic mentors of Warner and Mayo were Radcliffe-Brown and Durkheim, who 
worked in Australia and whose thoughts were picked up developed further by Warner and Mayo. See 
Scott (2000), p. 16. 
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During the 1930's, Mayo performed an anthropological study of workers in a bank wiring 
room of the Hawthorne electrical factory in Chicago, observing the workgroup behavior, 
recording the relationships in the form of a sociogram.329 Although the Hawthorne study 
was the first to use a sociogram to describe the relations between people in a real setting, 
the researchers did not use their records for sociometric analysis.330 
Also during the 1930's, Warner, whose work strongly built on thoughts of Radcliffe-Brown 
and Durkheim, emphasized aspects such as cohesion, reciprocity, stability, and integration 
in his study of social structures. Closely related to the vocabulary Moreno used, Warner 
argued that social groups consist of subgroups or, how he termed them, 'cliques'.331 
Although there were other studies also referring to cliques or subgroups during that time, it 
was not until the early 1950's that Homans picked up the work of Mayo, Warner, and also 
of other researchers.332 While also Warner used simple matrices to display social 
interaction, Homans was the first to make use of matrix rearrangements to decompose 
subgroups in social structures.333 Although matrices will also be described in a later 
section, it is useful to present the basic idea at this point. Until that point in time, relations 
between individuals have been illustrated in a sociogram, however, they can also be 
displayed in matrix form. In a so-called sociomatrix or adjacency matrix, the rows and 
columns represent the individual persons in identical order. Basically, if a relation exists 
between two individuals, a '1' is noted as the respective element in the matrix, a '0' in case 
that no relation exists.334 One can easily imagine that a sociomatrix for many individuals 
and their relations presents a confusing picture of 1's and 0's and it might be difficult to 
recognize any pattern. Homans, however, had the idea to rearrange the sequence of the 
inviduals within the rows and columns until a pattern of relations becomes visible through 
blocks of 1's and 0's. This development, i.e., the attempt to decompose a social network into 
its subgroups, was an important step in social network analysis. 
                                              
329  The researchers used the form of a sociogram without actually being aware of the development made by 
Jacob Moreno. See also the report of the Hawthorne studies by Roethlisberger/Dickson (1939), pp. 500 ff. 
330  See Scott (2000), pp. 17 f. 
331  See Warner/Lunt (1941), p. 32. 
332 For example, one of the studies, Homans also made use of, was the one of Davis/Gardner/Gardner (1941). 
333  See Homans (1951), p. 83. 
334  This is a very simplifying description but sufficient for the purpose of the study at this point. See also 
Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 80 and pp. 150 ff. 
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3.2.4.3 The Manchester Anthropologists 
The third main tradition of social network analysis were the Manchester anthropologists, 
mainly John Barnes, Clyde Mitchell, and Elizabeth Bott. Influenced even stronger by 
Radcliffe-Brown than the Harvard researchers, the leading scientist in Manchester, Max 
Gluckman, instructed his associates not to emphasize cohesion and integration, but to 
emphasize conflict and change in their studies of small interpersonal communities. The 
researchers regarded social structures as networks of relations and successfully combined 
techniques of network analysis with sociological concepts in the early 1950's.335  
Focusing on the work that had been done in the sociometric field, Barnes and Bott more 
rigorously and analytically applied the idea of a social network, which, until then, had 
more been used in a metaphorical sense. However, inspired by a work of Nadel in 
1957,336 Mitchell referred to graph theory, which is, as stated above, a basic mathematical 
concept in sociometric analysis of social structures. More precisely, he described a social 
network as "…personal links individuals have with a set of people and the links these 
people have in turn among themselves."337 According to Mitchell, actions between the 
individuals incorporate both, the transfer of information and the transfer of goods or 
services. Furthermore, and also of special importance for this study, Mitchell argues that, 
in order to do actual research on social networks, it is necessary to select a particular 
aspect, i.e., a certain part, of the social network under consideration. This is due to the 
fact that the entire network with all its relations, is, in most cases, simply too large.338 For 
the network analysis in this study, therefore, of all kinds of relationships a VC and its 
employees have, the selected part of the network is the syndication network, representing 
the contacts that VCs have among each other.339  
Mitchell applied two basic forms of concepts to interpersonal relations. On the one hand, 
there are concepts that describe the quality of relations such as reciprocity, intensity, or 
                                              
335  See Scott (2000), p. 26. 
336  See the work of Nadel (1957). Nadel was influenced by the previously mentioned researchers Köhler 
and Lewin. 
337  Mitchell (1969), p. 10. 
338  See Mitchell (1969), p. 12. Mitchell denotes the selected network as partial network. 
339  The entire network of a VC would incorporate all contacts the employees have, i.e., private contacts to 
friends or family members as well as professional contacts to consultants, lawyers, and others. 
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durability of the relations. On the other hand, there are concepts taken from graph theory 
that describe interpersonal relations such as density or reachability.340  
In their work, Mitchell, Barnes, Bott, and most of the other Manchester researchers 
focused on so-called ego-centered networks, i.e., the social network relations of all kinds 
of one individual. These informal, interpersonal relations included friendship ties, work 
relations, political relations, etc. of one individual. However, what was not the focus of 
attention was to analyze "…the global properties of social networks in all fields of social 
life…".341 This strand of analysis was picked up by Harrison White and his associates at 
Harvard University, who, mainly in the 1960's and 1970's, brought together the three 
main traditions of social network analysis. This fourth step in the development towards 
contemporary social network analysis will be described in the following.  
 
3.2.4.4 Synthesizing the Developments at Harvard University 
Through their work, Harrison White and his associates have made significant progress in 
social network analysis as a method of structural analysis of social networks. The 
researchers mainly focused on two mathematical strands. One was the development of a 
scaling technique, which allows to illustrate social relations as social distances. The 
other, and even more important, was the focus on algebraic models to express the notion 
of social role or position of individuals in a social network.342 Many researchers in 
subsequent years have centered their attention on the concepts of position or role.343  
A milestone that made social network analysis popular in American sociology was an 
article of Mark Granovetter in 1973 called 'The strength of weak ties'.344 It inspired 
researchers also of other scientific areas to apply social network analysis to all kinds of 
phenomena, one of which are, for example, corporate interlocks. Granovetter studied the 
channels through which individuals receive information on job opportunities. He found 
                                              
340  See Mitchell (1969), pp. 24 ff. 
341  Scott (2000), p. 33. 
342  See, for exmaple, the work of Lorrain/White (1971). 
343  For the concept of position, see, for example, Burt (1976), Faust (1988), or Borgatti/Everett (1992). For 
the concept of role, see, for example, White/Reitz (1983), White/Reitz (1989), Winship/Mandel (1983), 
or Breiger/Pattison (1986). 
344  See Granovetter (1973). 
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that people did very little active search for job opportunities, but that most of the latter 
were communicated to them through work related contacts. More precisely, it were those 
contacts that were not close friends or people in the same occupation as the person 
looking for a job, but it were mostly just acquaintances.345 Granovetter made his 
conclusions based on an information diffusion model: People, who have information on 
job opportunities, pass it on to their direct contacts, who, in turn, pass it on to their direct 
contacts, and so on. That way, information flows through the social network, attenuating 
at each step as it flows through the various links within the network. Therefore, people in 
the network, who are positioned in a great social distance from the source, are unlikely to 
receive accurate information on the job opportunity or they do not receive the 
information at all.346 Therefore, Granovetter concluded that the position of a person's 
contacts within the network structure is highly important in order to receive information 
that flows through the network.347  
Based on these findings, Granovetter derived his famous argument about the 'strength of 
weak ties'. Strong ties are relations to people one knows well or with whom one interacts 
frequently. However, due to the frequent interaction, these contacts show the tendency to 
have the same information, i.e., there is very little novel information coming from strong 
ties. In contrast, weak ties are relations to people, who are not close friends but rather 
acquaintances, i.e., people in different work situations or people to whom one has less 
frequent contact. Granovetter found that it were the weak ties that are most important for 
the reception of novel information.348 
Some researchers argue that social network analysis also represents a basis for the 
development of a formal theory, instead of just formal concepts or methods.349 Some 
                                              
345  See Granovetter (1973), pp. 1371 f. 
346 See Granovetter (1973), pp. 1364 f. In this context, Granovetter also draws on the same idea of 
Harary/Norman/Cartwright (1965). See Harary/Norman/Cartwright (1965), p. 159. 
347  See Granovetter (1973), p. 1366; Granovetter (1974), p. 52. 
348  See Granovetter (1973), pp. 1369 f. and pp. 1371-1373. 
349  See, for example, the work of Barnes/Harary (1983). 
Theoretical Foundation 
 
85
authors promote, for example, an exchange theoretical view,350 others focus on the 
sociological perspective based on just the relational aspects.351 
Despite these advances, social network analysis "…is not a specific body of formal or 
substantive social theory"352 in itself, but rather provides a set of very useful concepts and 
methods, based on mathematical and graph theoretic techniques, to analyze the structural 
properties of social networks.  
 
In the following section, it will be shown, first, to which research areas social network 
analysis has been applied (section 3.2.5.1). Since this field is very extensive, second, 
network studies will be categorized and based on this categorization, the theoretical 
foundation for this study will be derived (section 3.2.5.2). 
 
3.2.5 Research Areas and Typology of Network Studies 
3.2.5.1 Research Areas 
Since the beginning of the 1970's, the number of research studies in the field of social 
network analysis has grown tremendously. Therefore, in academic literature, it is 
commonly described as challenging to get an overview of the methods, applications, and 
theories behind social network analysis.353 However, in order to better understand the 
research of this study, it is helpful to structure this section as follows: First, a literature 
review provides an overview of the main research areas, in which social network analysis 
has been applied.354 Although these areas are partially overlapping and intertwined, from 
the author's perspective this step is helpful in order to better understand the methods and 
                                              
350  See, for example, Cook (1977), Cook (1982), Emerson (1962), Emerson (1964), or Cook/Whitmeyer (1992). 
351  See, for example, Emirbayer/Goodwin (1994) or Emirbayer (1997). 
352  See Scott (2000), p. 37. 
353  See Borgatti/Foster (2003), pp. 991 f.; Durlauf/Fafchamps (2004), p. 1.  
354 From the author's experience with user and discussion forums in the social network research arena, 
topics range from the analysis of economic outcomes for firms in a network, to the analysis of terrorist 
networks, to the analysis of relationships between countries, to the analysis of the passes between 
players in a basketball game. Although the latter is certainly not the mostly used area, however, it 
demonstrates the wide range of topics social network analysis is applied to. See, for example, the 
analysis of relations among countries including the US, Europe, and the countries in the mideast region, 
under http://www.orgnet.com/mideast.html. 
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theories applied in this study. Second, it is explained in what dimensions network studies 
differ and how they can be categorized. Based on this categorization, the focus on social 
capital theory will be derived. Third, the concept of social capital including its underlying 
theories is specified as theoretical foundation of this study.  
 
One area that has experienced the most significant growth in network research is the topic 
of social capital. Social capital can, very generally, be described as referring to the value 
of relationships. The concept of social capital builds on explaining benefits for individual 
actors based on their network position. Studies in this area relate an actor's ties to a wide 
range of outcomes such as mobility,355 individual performance,356 entrepreneurship,357 
power,358 individual creativity,359 or many others.360 Seminal works in this area are the 
ones of Granovetter (1973), Burt (1992), Coleman (1990), and Putnam (1995), which 
reflect two theoretical strands in the social capital arena. Granovetter and Burt propose 
that weak ties and the lack of ties of others361 are the characteristics that determine 
positive outcomes for actors.362 In contrast, Coleman and Putnam propose that it is the 
strong ties and dense networks that determine positive outcomes.363 Besides these 
seminal works that shaped this main research stream in social network analysis, there is a 
vast body of literature in this area, the mentioning of which would go beyond the scope 
of this study.364 
                                              
355  See the studies of Burt (1997), Seidel/Polzer/Stewart (2000), or Seibert/Kraimer/Liden (2001). 
356 See the studies of Baldwin/Bedell/Johnson (1997), Mehra/Kilduff/Brass (2001), or Cross/Cummings 
(2004). A study focusing on social networks and individual performance in the sense of loss of capital is 
Baker/Faulkner (2004). 
357 See the studies of Renzulli/Aldrich/Moody (2000), Ostgaard/Birley (1994), Ostgaard/Birley (1996), 
Shane/Stuart (2002), or Florin/Lubatkin/Schulze (2003). On the relevance of networks from the 
perspective of entrepreneurs, see Witt/Rosenkranz (2002) or Aldrich/Zimmer (1986). 
358  See the studies of Brass (1984) or Kilduff/Krackhardt (1994). 
359  See the study of Perry-Smith/Shalley (2003). 
360  These are just some examples. For good overviews, see Portes (1998) or Lin (2001). 
361  Which Burt denotes as the so-called structural holes. See, for example, Burt (1992), pp. 18 ff. 
362 Granovetter developed the so-called 'strength of weak ties' theory, see Granovetter (1973). Burt 
developed the so-called 'structural hole theory', see Burt (1992).  
363  See the works of Coleman (1988), Coleman (1990), and Putnam (1995). 
364 Further characteristic studies include, for example, the ones of Portes/Sensenbrenner (1993), 
Gulati/Westphal (1999), or Gargiulo/Benassi (2000).  
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Another area that experienced significant growth is the topic of embeddedness. Again 
induced by a seminal work of Granovetter,365 in this field, economic actions are described 
as necessarily embedded in a larger social context.366 The argument here is that ties, 
which are well embedded in the larger social system of relationships yield performance 
benefits, for example, that close and exclusive relationships drive economic outcomes.367 
Applications include a wide range of topics such as the analysis of the effect of 
embeddedness in the field of client relationships,368 purchasing decisions of 
individuals,369 cost of capital,370 market entry in foreign markets by international 
consulting firms, or economic geography.371 As becomes obvious, the areas of social 
capital and embeddedness are closely intertwined because they both look at relationships 
and their potential effect on economic outcomes for individual actors. 
In a somewhat different vein, social network research has also been applied to areas such 
as board interlocks, joint ventures and strategic alliances, or social cognition. Board 
interlocks describe the situation that companies are connected in the sense that the same 
person(s) sit(s) on the boards of both firms.372 In this context, especially the causes of 
board interlocks373 as well as the informational aspects of board interlocks374 have been 
focused on. Network research on joint ventures and strategic alliances375 refer to topics 
                                              
365 See Granovetter (1985). See also Granovetter's review on how social structure impacts economic 
outcomes, see Granovetter (2005). 
366 See Granovetter (1985), pp. 481 f. For an overview on conceptions for embeddedness, see also 
Dacin/Ventresca/Beal (1999). 
367  In this field see, for example, the works of Uzzi (1996), Uzzi (1997), Uzzi (1999), or Gulati/Gargiulo 
(1999). On economic outcomes in the form of occupational status of individuals, see De Graaf/Flap 
(1988). 
368  See the study of Baker/Faulkner/Fisher (1998). 
369  See the study of DiMaggio/Louch (1998). 
370  See the study of Uzzi (1999). 
371  See Glückler (2001); Glückler (2005); Glückler (2006). 
372 See the review of Mizruchi (1996). 
373 See the studies of Pfeffer (1972), Palmer (1983), or Zajac (1988). 
374 See the studies of Davis (1991), Haunschild (1993), or Gulati/Westphal (1999). 
375 An overview of network studies in inter-organizational network research is to be found in 
Aldrich/Whetten (1981). For a network study on strategic alliances in high-technology industries, see 
Stuart (1998). 
Social Network Analysis 
 
88 
such as firm valuation,376 innovation,377 or organizational learning.378 Social cognition 
refers to how actors perceive their network. This strand of research is concerned with the 
implications (for research) of actors not being able to accurately report on their network 
contacts.379 This topic also includes the notion of how actors develop the perception they 
have of the network.380 
Another area of network research relates to the question how, for example, proximity, 
amount of interaction, or similarity in the beliefs among actors is interrelated with affective 
ties.381 An important case within this strand of research is the so-called homophily theory, 
which relates to the tendency of actors to interact with those that are of their kind.382 The 
saying 'birds of a feather flock together' probably best describes this phenomenon. 
 
As becomes obvious, there is a manifold body of academic literature that uses the 
models, methods, and theories of social network analysis. A categorization of network 
research helps to get a better understanding in what dimensions network studies differ. 
Based on this categorization, the theoretical foundation (social capital) will be derived. 
 
3.2.5.2 Typology of Network Studies 
Studies that appear in network research can be examined along four dimensions, which 
include the direction of causality, the levels of analysis, the explanatory goals, and the 
explanatory mechanisms.383 The first two are more methodological, the latter two are 
more substantive and will be used to derive a typology to classify network studies. 
 
                                              
376  See Das/Sen/Sengupta (1998) or Gulati (1999). 
377  See Powell/Koput/Smith-Doerr (1996) and Owen-Smith/Powell (2004). 
378  See Kraatz (1998) or Anand/Khanna (2000). 
379 This area of reasearch goes back to the discussion on informant accuracy. See, for example, Bernard et 
al. (1984). 
380  See Kenny (1994) or Casciaro (1998). 
381  For an overview on this area, see Kilduff/Corley (2000). 
382  For this strand of research, see, for example, McPherson/Smith-Lovin/Cook (2001). 
383 In network literature, little effort has been done to systematically categorize existing research. 
Approaches include, for example, those of Lin (1999a) or Borgatti/Foster (2003). For the purpose of 
this study, the approach of Borgatti/Foster is adopted. 
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Direction of causality basically refers to the question whether studies are about the causes 
or consequences of network structures, or, in other terms, whether network measures 
serve as dependent or independent variables in the analysis. The levels of analysis refer to 
the aspect whether network measures are calculated for individual actors or pairs of them, 
for subgroups, or for the entire network.384 More important for the development of a 
typology of network studies are the latter two dimensions, i.e., explanatory goals and 
explanatory mechanisms, which relate to the consequences of network structures. Both 
dimensions contain two characteristics each, so that a 2x2-table can be established.385  
 
Explanatory goals include the two characteristics 'performance' and 'homogeneity'. 
Basically, the goal of a network study can either be to explain the benefits of a network 
position and opportunities for the actor that result from his network position. Or, the goal 
can be to explain how certain things such as practices or attitudes diffuse through a social 
system and how the network structure changes the attitudes of actors. To make this point 
more explicit, there are basically two kinds of network studies with respect to the goals of 
studies: One kind focuses on social capital and strives to explain differences in outcome 
based on network positions. Examples are the studies of Burt (1992) on promotions based 
on network positions or the study of Gargiulo and Benassi (2000), who show that managers 
with cohesive networks are less flexible than managers with networks rich in structural 
holes.386 The other kind focuses on diffusion, social influence, and social attitudes, and 
seeks to explain homogeneity among actor beliefs or attitudes as function of the actors' 
network ties. Examples are the studies of Erickson (1988) on attribute formation, Friedkin 
and Johnsen (1999) on social influence, and Davis (1991) on diffusion.387 
                                              
384  This aspect relates to the so-called 'micro-vs.-macro' debate in social network research. Many network 
analysts argue that social network analysis is a method that holds the potential to bridge the gap 
between analysis on the micro-level (individual actors) and analysis on the macro-level (entire social 
systems such as companies, states, etc.). For early discussions on this topic, see for example Parsons 
(1937) for the macro-perspective, and Homans (1972) or Hummel/Opp (1972) for the micro-
perspective. See also the works on micro-macro-models of Coleman (1986) and Burt (1982). 
385  See Borgatti/Foster (2003), pp. 1001-1004, and see further below. 
386  See Burt (1992), pp. 115 ff.; Gargiulo/Benassi (2000), p. 183. 
387 The notion of diffusion has attracted a large number of researchers. For example, for a model of 
diffusion in heterogeneous social networks, see Buskens/Yamaguchi (1999). 
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Explanatory mechanisms refer to the difference (in network studies), how the function of 
ties are viewed. The so-called structuralist view focuses on the structure or configuration 
of an actor's network ties (topology) and on the benefits that the actors have due to their 
network position. In contrast, the so-called connectionist view focuses on the resources 
controlled by others, and thereby on the question, whom one has to contact to get access 
to specific resources.388 Examples for the structuralist view are the works of Burt (1992) 
and Coleman (1988), examples for the connectionist view are the works of Lin (2001) 
and De Graaf and Flap (1988).  
However, that these two seemingly opposing views are intertwined, becomes obvious in 
the following debate in academic research: Burt explains in his seminal work that the 
debate is about the 'who' (connectionist) and the 'how' (structuralist).389 That is, the 
connectionist view focuses on whom one reaches to get specific resources, while the 
structuralist view is about how (structure) one reaches another actor. The reason why Burt 
favors the structuralist over the connectionist view is that, as he argues, the network 
position and structure of the ego-network of an actor implicitly "…indicates the volume 
of resources held by the player and the volume to which the player is connected."390 
However, Borgatti and Foster (2003) argue that, although Burt puts himself into the 
structuralist camp, his network measures combine both arguments, structuralist and 
connectionist.391 This is due to the fact that an actor's relationship structure also 
determines to whom this actor is connected to.392 
Neglecting this debate, a 2x2-table can be derived to categorize network studies, which is 
presented below: 
 
                                              
388  See Borgatti/Foster (2003), p. 1002. 
389  See Burt (1992), pp. 11-13. 
390  Burt (1992), p. 13.  
391  Burt has developed network measures such as 'effective size' or 'constraint'. Without elaborating on 
them at this point in the study, they are explained in detail in section 3.4.5.1.2. 
392  See Borgatti/Foster (2003), p. 1003. 
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Explanatory goals
Social capital
(performance variation)
Diffusion
(social homogeneity)
Ex
pl
an
at
or
y 
m
ec
ha
ni
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s
Structuralist
(topology)
Connectionist
(content, flows)
Structural capital
(= how actors benefit from 
network position)
Social access to resources
(= whom actors need to 
contact to access resources)
Environmental shaping
(= how similar network structures 
explain common beliefs)
Contagion
(= whom one connects to 
determines common beliefs)
 
Table 3.2: Typology of network studies393 
 
The two axes of the table reflect the two dimensions, i.e., explanatory goals and 
explanatory mechanisms. The goal of a network study (horizontal axis) can either be to 
explain performance or to explain diffusion in terms of social homogeneity. The 
explanatory mechanisms (vertical axis) can either be the structuralist view, i.e., referring 
to benefits for actors based on network position, or it can be the connectionist view, 
under which the focus is on the resources that flows through the ties. 
The resulting four quadrants, reflecting different types of network studies, are denoted as 
structural capital, social access to resources, environmental shaping, and contagion. 
Network studies of the type 'structural capital' explain the benefits of actors based on 
their network positions.394 Actors are seen as agents who are able to extract gains based 
on their network position. Studies of the type 'social access to resources' focus on the 
success of actors as a function of resources controlled by other actors.395 Studies of the 
types 'environmental shaping' and 'contagion' explain how, for example, actors' attitudes, 
beliefs, or culture become similar (homogenous) based on network structure 
(structuralist) or based on whom they are in contact with (connectionist). 
 
                                              
393  According to Borgatti/Foster (2003), p. 1004. 
394  See, for example, the studies of Brass/Burkhardt (1993), Powell/Koput/Smith-Doerr (1996), Burt 
(1992), Burt (2004), or Coleman (1988). 
395  Although Burt sees himself as structuralist, the argument explained is strongly related to Burt's 
argument regarding the constraint of actors. The measure of constraint will be explained in section 
3.4.5.1.2. 
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Based on this typology, it directly becomes obvious that the explanatory goal of this 
study, i.e., explaining the quantity and quality of deal flow based on the VCs' network 
position, is clearly in the social capital area of network research. However, as explained 
above, some network measures combine the structuralist and the connectionist 
arguments. Applied to the VCs' syndication network, while both perspectives are 
important, i.e., the network position itself as well as the resources controlled by others (in 
the form of information on potential investment opportunities), it is not vital to formally 
delineate the two perspectives. What is more important though, are the single network 
measures used that capture different aspects of an actor's position in the network.396 
These measures will be explained in sections 3.4.4 and 3.4.5. In a next step, however, the 
concept of social capital needs to be explained because from this concept, single theories 
will be derived as theoretical foundation of this study.  
3.3 The Concept of Social Capital 
An important concept to grasp the connection between social structures or systems and 
the action or behavior of individuals is the concept of social capital.397 With the help of 
this concept, qualities in the sense of opportunities and constraints for single actors, for 
groups of actors, or for the entire social structure can be detected. Therefore, this concept 
is also an instrument to analyze the embeddedness of actors and the social structures that 
actors are embedded in.398 To begin with, some fundamental thoughts of the concept will 
be described, and social capital as form of capital will be delineated to other forms of 
capital (section 3.3.1). Then, the dimensions of social capital are explained and the term 
will be defined (section 3.3.2). Following, the underlying theories of social capital are 
explained (section 3.3.3). Next, the theoretical concepts will be applied to the VCs' 
                                              
396  The delineation between the two perspectives will implicitly be made by the selection of the network 
measures. 'Effective size', for example, is a measure that also draws on connectionist arguments, while 
the measure 'constraint' refers to the structuralist argument. However, for the purpose of this study it is 
not important to delineate between structuralist or connectionist. Important is, what aspect of an actor's 
network position the single network measures capture. For example: 'Effective size' captures the extent 
to which an actor has non-redundant contacts. 
397  This view is consistent with many works of scientists that have contributed to the discussion on social 
capital. See among others Bourdieu (1983); Bourdieu (1986); Coleman (1986); Coleman (1988); 
Coleman (1990); Lin (1982); Lin/Dumin (1986); Lin (1999a); Lin (1999b); Portes (1998); Putnam 
(1993a); Putnam (1993b); Putnam (1995). 
398  See Lin (1999a), p. 28; Jansen (2003), pp. 26-27. 
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syndication network and specific theories from the social capital concept will be selected 
that help in achieving the goals of the study (section 3.3.4). 
 
3.3.1 Description of Social Capital and Delineation to Other Forms of Capital 
In modern sociology, the term 'social capital' has first been coined by Bourdieu (1983), 
who compares social capital to cultural and economic capital.399 While Bourdieu mainly 
focused on cultural capital,400 a number of scientists highlighted the concept of social 
capital in more detail and developed this approach over time.401 One of the first of these 
scientists was Coleman, who sees two aspects at the core of the social capital concept: 
First, social capital is inherent in the structure of relations between and among actors and 
thereby, social capital is determined by the social structure. Second, just like other forms 
of capital such as physical capital or human capital,402 social capital is productive because 
it facilitates the actions of certain actors, "…making possible the achievement of certain 
ends that in its absence [i.e., the absence of social capital] would not be possible"403. 
Based on these thoughts, Coleman argues that social capital is defined by its function. To 
make this point more comprehensible, Coleman compares the concept social capital to 
the physical object, or concept 'chair': Just like the concept 'chair' identifies physical 
objects by their function, social capital identifies aspects inherent in the social structure 
                                              
399 See Bourdieu (1983), pp. 183 ff. The term social capital initially appeared in community studies, 
highlighting the importance of strong personal relationships or ties as basis for trust and cooperation in 
the communities. In this context, see also Jacobs (1965). The focus was not only laid on communities or 
societies as a whole, but also on the benefit of individuals. See Loury (1977) on the resources inherent 
in family relations and their benefits for the young child. 
400  See Bourdieu (1983), pp. 183 ff.; Bourdieu (1986), pp. 243-248. Bourdieu describes cultural capital as 
set of symbols, values, and meanings that the dominating class recognizes and internalizes as their own. 
Through education, these artifacts are indoctrinated in society, i.e., to the dominated class. While mostly 
captured by the dominant class through transmission over generations, also the dominated class can 
invest in acquiring cultural capital, which may enable them to generate returns from this investment. 
See Bourdieu (1986), pp. 243 ff. 
401  See Coleman (1988); Coleman (1990); Portes/Sensenbrenner (1993); Portes (1998); Putnam (1993a); 
Putnam (1993b); Putnam (1995); Lin (1999a). 
402  For the early works on human capital theory, see Johnson (1960), Schultz (1961), Becker ((1964)1993). 
403  Coleman (1988), p. S98. 
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by their function. That is, what social capital identifies "…is the value of these aspects 
[…] to actors as resources that they can use to achieve their interests".404 
As mentioned above, in contrast to physical and human capital, which are located either in 
physical objects such as tools and machines or in individuals, social capital is inherent in 
social structures of relations. Therefore, ownership of social capital is limited for the 
individual actors. Consequently, social capital is not fungible and can also not be 
transferred from one actor to another.405 In addition, physical capital and human capital are 
created by investments in either tools or machines in the case of physical capital, or, as in 
the case of human capital, by investments in education, i.e., the acquisition of certain 
technical skills, abilities, or knowledge. In contrast, the production of social capital comes 
about through the development and changes in relations among actors.406 Therefore, the 
production of social capital happens unconsciously. Nevertheless can actors try to optimize 
their social capital in a strategic sense by establishing and developing relations within the 
social structure.407 The above thoughts are summarized in table 3.3: 
 
Physical capital
• Tools, machines, 
productive equipment
• ...use of tools and 
machines for production
process
• Owned by individual
Productivity of 
capital achieved
through…
Description
Ownership
Transferability/
fungibility
Tangibility
• Transferrable, fungible
• Tangible
• Technical skills and 
knowledge of 
individuals
• …application of 
technical skills and 
knowledge in working
context
• Owned by individual
• Transferrable, fungible
• Less tangible
• Aspects inherent in 
social structure
(relations among actors)
• …aspects inherent in 
social structure enabling
actions otherwise not 
possible (access to 
resources, solidarity in 
groups, etc.)
• Ownership limited for
individual
• Limited transferrability
and fungibility
• Intangible
Human capital Social capital
 
Table 3.3: Overview of forms of capital408 
                                              
404  Coleman (1988), p. S101. 
405  See Coleman (1988), p. S98. 
406  See Coleman (1988), pp. S100-S101. 
407  See Jansen (2000), p. 37. 
408  According to Coleman (1988), pp. S95 ff.; Lin (1999a), p. 30. Own amendments. 
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In order to further understand of what dimensions the concept of social capital is 
comprised of, these will be explained next, and social capital will be defined in a way that 
helps in achieving the goals of the study.  
 
3.3.2 Dimensions and Definition of Social Capital 
Although in the previous chapters a focus has been laid on the formal part of network 
analysis and on the structure of social networks, it is also important to understand the 
various dimensions of the concept of social capital. As Putnam (1995) highlights in his 
seminal work on the supposedly declining stock of social capital in the US, social capital 
is not a uni-dimensional concept. Rather, Putnam suggests to clarify the dimensions of 
this concept.409 Social capital can be clustered along three dimensions: A structural 
dimension, a relational dimension, and a cognitive dimension.410  
The structural dimension refers to the embeddedness of actors in a social system, an idea 
that has been mentioned in previous sections already. Again, this dimension looks at the 
properties of the network of single actors as well as of groups of actors, or at the structure 
of the entire network. In other words, the structure of links between and among actors is 
examined.411  
The relational dimension of social capital refers to the type of relationship actors have 
developed with each other. Granovetter (1992) denotes this aspect of social capital as 
relational embeddedness.412 In contrast to the structural dimension, it is not the structure 
of the relationships or of connections between actors that is focused on. Rather, it is an 
attempt to grasp the underlying basis of the relations. Key aspects that have been 
                                              
409  See Putnam (1995), p. 76. 
410 See Nahapiet/Ghoshal (1998), pp. 243-244. Nahapiet/Ghoshal describe that, although the dimensions 
can be separated analytically, many of the features are interrelated to some extent. For the purpose of 
this study and to provide an overview of social capital to the reader, at this point the interrelations are 
neglected. 
411 Compared to the following two dimensions (relational, cognitive), the aforementioned connectionist 
view soonest would fall into this dimension (structural), because it examines to whom an actor would 
have to be connected to, in order to access specific resources. Thereby, this perspective also looks at the 
structure of the relationships. Refer back to section 3.2.5.2. 
412  See Granovetter (1992), pp. 25 ff. 
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considered in this context are trust and trustworthiness, norms and sanctions, obligations 
and expectations, and identity and identification.413  
The third cluster of social capital relates to a dimension Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) 
denote as cognitive. Examples for facets of the cognitive dimension are shared languages, 
codes, and narratives. This cognitive dimension therefore "…refers to those resources 
providing shared representations, interpretations, and systems of meaning among 
parties".414  
An overview of the dimensions of social capital is presented in table 3.4: 
 
• Properties of social 
structure
• Embeddedness of 
actors within social 
structure
Social capital
Structural Relational CognitiveDimension
Focus
Measures/
Elements
• Size/degree, density, 
centrality, constraint, 
closeness, 
betweenness, etc.
• Kind of relationships
people have
developed with each
other
• Trust, trustworthiness, 
norms, sanctions, 
expectations, 
obligations
• Resources providing
shared
representations, 
interpretations, and 
systems of meanings
• Shared languages, 
codes, and narratives
 
Table 3.4: Overview of dimensions of social capital415 
 
Based on these forms or dimensions of social capital and based on the fact that in 
scientific literature the various dimensions have been examined in various contexts, it is 
understandable that many definitions for the term 'social capital' have appeared. In 
definitions used, scientists put a focus on one of the dimensions explained above, 
depending on the context of their study. Although it is not possible to provide all 
definitions that have appeared, some examples are provided below: 
                                              
413 For trust and trustworthiness, see the works of Putnam (1993b) or Fukuyama (1995); for norms and 
sanctions, see Coleman (1990) or Putnam (1995); for obligations and expectations, see Granovetter 
(1985), Coleman (1990), or Burt (1992); for identity and identification, see Hakansson/Snehota (1995). 
On the topic of measuring trust, see Glaeser et al. (2000) 
414  Nahapiet/Ghoshal (1998), p. 244. 
415  Own illustration based on Nahapiet/Ghoshal (1998), pp. 243-244. 
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• Coleman (1988) focuses on the structural dimension defining social capital as inherent 
in the social structure, enabling the actors to access resources and to achieve goals that 
otherwise would not be possible.416 
• Bowles and Gintis (2002) draw on the relational dimension, defining social capital as 
referring "…to trust, concern for one's associates, a willingness to live by the norms of 
one's community and to punish those who do not."417 
• Fukuyama (1995) and Ostrom (2000) refer to both, the relational dimension and the 
cognitive dimension by defining social capital as "…the existence of a certain set of 
informal rules or norms shared among members of a group that permits cooperation 
among them"418 or as "…shared knowledge, understandings, norms, rules and 
expectations about patterns of interactions that groups of individuals bring to a recurrent 
activity."419 
 
In order to derive a definition for social capital that suits the purpose of this study, recall 
that the objective of this study is two-fold: (a) Evaluation of the importance of the contact 
network and of the contacts to other VCs as source of deal flow quantity and quality and 
(b) analysis of the effect of the VCs' network position within the syndication network on 
deal flow quantity and quality.  
For the analysis of the network position (b), certainly the focus is laid on the structural 
dimension of social capital. However, with respect to (a), the relevant dimension of social 
capital is more in the field of the relational dimension, because social capital can explain 
why VCs make use of their contact network (all deal flow sources within the contact 
network) and syndication network (contacts to other VCs). 
 
For the purpose of this study, it can be followed that social capital should therefore be 
defined in two ways: On the one hand side, it is regarded as inherent in the social 
                                              
416 See Coleman (1988), p. S98. In his article, Coleman also mentions trustworthiness, expectations, 
obligations, norms and sanctions, see Coleman (1988), pp. S102-S105. However, his main point, as 
presented earlier in this study, is that social capital is inherent in the social structure.  
417  Bowles/Gintis (2002), p. F419. 
418  Fukuyama (1995), p. 378. 
419  Ostrom (2000), p. 176. 
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structure of relationships among and between actors, enabling actors to access resources 
and, due to and determined by the structure of relationships, to achieve goals that 
otherwise would not be possible.420 On the other hand, social capital is also represented 
in the norms to which actors in a network adhere to.  
 
Social capital is a concept that is comprised of several theoretical strands, each of which 
describing the benefits of different aspects of a network structure. In the following 
sections, these theories are explained and it will be derived, which of them will be 
applied in the context of syndicated investments by VCs. 
 
3.3.3 Social Capital Theories 
Theoretical approaches regarding the structural analysis of social networks and also 
regarding the concept of social capital are based on two major controversies:  
 
The first one refers to the question, whether social capital is to be seen as individual good 
or as collective good.421 The individual good-perspective focuses on the use of social 
capital by individual actors, i.e., "…how individuals access and use resources embedded 
in social networks to gain returns…".422 Here, the focal aspects are the investments of 
individuals in social relations and the question how they generate returns from capturing 
the embedded resources. This usage of the theoretical concept therefore identifies social 
capital as the value of an individual's social connections. Under this approach, the 
network position of an actor and his relationships to others are seen as source of various 
resources such as material, information, or emotional aid,423 and the configuration of 
relationships among actors comprises significant information and control benefits.424 
Analysis on the level of single actors in a network focuses on questions such as how 
                                              
420 As becomes obvious from this and previous chapters, this definition refers to definitions applied by 
Coleman (1988), Burt (1992), Burt (1997) or Lin (1999a). 
421  See Putnam (1993b), pp. 35-36; Lin (1999a), pp. 33-34; Portes (1998), pp. 18-21. 
422  Lin (1999a), p. 31. 
423  See also Lin (1999a), pp. 30-31. 
424  See Burt (1992), pp. 26-30. 
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central the actor is positioned in the network, to what extent the actor has non-redundant 
contacts, or whether the actor is dependent on other actors.425 Exemplary for this kind of 
analysis are the studies of Burt, in which he examines the causal relationship between the 
structural autonomy of companies and their profit, or between the number of structural 
holes in the network of managers and their career paths.426 
 
In contrast, the collective good-perspective focuses on the concept of social capital at the 
level of groups. Important questions are, how groups develop and maintain more or less 
social capital and how the stock of social capital within a group helps the individual 
group members. In this perspective, social capital as collective asset of groups is 
emphasized.427 The analysis on the level of groups can relate to subgroups or to the entire 
group of a network.  
With respect to the subgroups within a network, the analysis focuses on three aspects: 
One aspect is to examine the so-called cliques. A clique is formally defined as a subset of 
actors within a network, in which all actors are adjacent (connected) to each other, but in 
which there are no other actors in the network that are also connected to all of the 
members of the clique.428 A second aspect is to employ the concept of structural 
equivalence.429 Actors are said to be structurally equivalent if they have the same pattern 
of ties, i.e., if they have the same ties to all other actors within the network.430 A third 
aspect focuses on the identification of hierarchies among the subgroups and to allocate a 
role to each of the subgroups within this hierarchy. With this kind of analysis, for 
                                              
425  See Jansen (2003), p. 32. 
426  See Burt (1983) and Burt (1992). 
427  See Bourdieu (1986), pp. 248-249; Coleman (1988), pp. S105-S109; Putnam (1995), pp. 73-75. 
428  See Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 254. 
429  Originally, the concept of structural equivalence goes back to the work of Lorrain/White (1971). See for 
example Lorrain/White (1971), p. 50. 
430  See Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 356. 
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example, the assertiveness of subgroups can be quantified.431 Exemplary for the analysis 
on the level of subgroups are the works of Putnam (1995) or Fukuyama (1995).432 
Another pool of measures and methods of analysis focuses on the examination of entire 
networks and all ties within a network.433 There are two important implications regarding 
this level of analysis: The first one is that, when examining entire networks, comparisons 
are necessary. For example, one could analyze why one society is able to produce 
innovations while another society is not. The second implication is that analyses on the 
level of individual actors and on the level of subgroups can be compared or related to the 
analysis on the level of the entire group. For example, the entire network might be 
described regarding centrality by drawing on the results of the centrality measures for 
individual actors, i.e., the entire network is described by showing that individual actors 
are extremely high in centrality compared to the rest of the network.434  
 
The second controversy relates to the question whether it is the weak ties between actors, 
the existence of structural holes, or open network structures that lead to benefits for the 
actors, or, whether it is the strong ties, dense and cohesive networks characterized by 
network closure that actors or groups of actors benefit from.435 In his seminal article on 
the strength of weak ties in the context of job search,436 Granovetter found that it is not 
the strong connections to other actors that deliver new information on potential job 
opportunities. Rather, it is the so-called weak ties that yield new information, i.e., 
                                              
431  The graph theoretic mechanics of this analysis also draw on the concept of structural equivalence. See 
Lorrain/White (1971). 
432  Although the study of Putnam, for example, also applies to the whole society (USA), the concepts also 
apply to parts of a social network.  
433  See Wasserman/Faust (1994), pp. 25-26. 
434  See Jansen (2003), p. 33. The same could be done, for example, for density measures by comparing the 
density in the local network structures of individual actors and comparing it to the overall network 
density. This, however, depends on the individual network structure, because, for example, in very large 
networks, density will be lower by definition (due to size).  
435  See the work of Granovetter (1973) on the strength of weak ties, and the theory of Burt (1992) on 
structural holes. For the importance of strong ties, see for example the works of Coleman (1988) or of 
Portes/Sensenbrenner (1993). 
436  See Granovetter (1973); Granovetter (1974). In the context of job contact networks, see also Calvó-
Armengol (2004). 
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connections of ego's direct contacts to other actors that are not tied to ego.437 In a similar 
vein, and on the basis of the weak tie argument, Burt (1992) developed the so-called 
structural hole theory. In this approach, it is not the weakness of the ties that delivers social 
capital, but it is the structurally autonomous network position of an actor, i.e., having non-
redundant contacts or building the bridge between otherwise disconnected actors.438  
 
To better understand the difference regarding the two controversies mentioned above, it 
is helpful to look at the five potential benefits social capital can produce, which follows 
in the next sections. In these sections, several theories that the social capital concept 
comprises of will be explained. In section 3.3.4 then, single theories out of the overall 
social capital concept will be selected, which are used at a later point in the study to 
derive hypotheses on the connection between a VC's network position and its deal flow 
quantity and quality. 
 
3.3.3.1 Information or the Theory on the Strength of Weak Ties 
One benefit social capital can deliver is information. This aspect has been especially 
emphasized in the seminal work of Granovetter (1973) regarding the strength of weak 
ties.439 Granovetter intuitively defines ties regarding their strength based on a 
combination of the intimacy, the emotional intensity, the amount of time, and the 
reciprocal services.440 The theory states that, "[if] one tells a rumor to all his close 
friends, and they do likewise, many will hear the rumor a second and third time, since 
those linked by strong ties tend to share friends. If the motivation to spread the rumor is 
dampened a bit on each wave of retelling, then the rumor moving through strong ties is 
much more likely to be limited to a few cliques that that [rumor] going via weak ones; 
bridges will not be crossed."441  
 
                                              
437  See Granovetter (1973), pp. 1370-1371. 
438  See Burt (1992), pp. 1-3 and pp. 27-30. 
439  See Granovetter (1973) and Granovetter (1974). 
440  See Granovetter (1973), p. 1361. 
441  Granovetter (1973), p. 1366. 
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An underlying thought behind this argument is that, if strong ties (for example friendship 
ties) connect actors A and B and also actors A and C, likelihood for a strong tie between 
B and C increases once they meet. As explained in section 3.2.4.1, this argument refers to 
the cognitive balance theory.442 Consequently, Granovetter assumes that a triad, in which 
A is connected to B and C by strong ties, but B and C are not connected, cannot exist, 
i.e., is a 'forbidden triad', as presented in figure 3.3. 
 
C
B
A
 
Figure 3.3:  Forbidden triad443 
 
These triads are 'forbidden' due to the fact that processes of cognitive balance tend to 
eliminate them. Rather, three strong ties will develop if people know each other for a 
long enough period of time.444 
The implications of these thoughts are significant and Granovetter uses the concept of a 
bridge to illuminate his argument: A bridge is a connection in a network providing the 
only path between two actors.445 This means that, if actors A and B are connected by a 
bridge, the only way information or other resources can flow from any contact of A to 
any contact of B, is through the connection between A and B. Now, back to the forbidden 
triad explained above: If the forbidden triad is absent, Granovetter follows that, due the 
processes of cognitive balance, no strong tie can be a bridge, since otherwise the strong 
ties of A would, in the long run, be strong ties of B as well. That means that no strong tie 
                                              
442  See Heider (1946), pp. 107 ff.; Newcomb (1961), pp. 4 ff. 
443  See Granovetter (1973), p. 1363. 
444  See Newcomb (1961), pp. 160-165. 
445  See Harary/Norman/Cartwright (1965), p. 198. 
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can be a bridge.446 What is important, however, is that consequently all bridges are weak 
ties, but logically, not all weak ties are bridges. 
With his work on the strength of weak ties, Granovetter explained that these weak ties are 
the important element in order for an actor to receive more and newer information. 
 
3.3.3.2 Power through Structural Autonomy or the Structural Hole Theory 
Another value social capital comprises of, are benefits gained by an actor due to his 
structurally autonomous position in a network. This so-called theory of structural holes 
was mainly developed by Ronald Burt.447 In his seminal work, Burt (1992) built on the 
weak tie argument set forth by Granovetter. However, the major difference in Burt's 
theory is that, it is not the weakness of ties that puts an actor in a beneficial position. 
Rather, it is the existence of the so-called structural holes.448 Based on the following 
figure, the functioning of structural holes shall be explained. 
 
B
A
C
D Ego
 
Figure 3.4: Structural holes and weak ties449 
 
                                              
446  See Granovetter (1973), p. 1364. There is only one exception: A strong tie can only be a bridge in a 
case if neither party to the bridge has any strong ties, which is highly unlikely in networks of any size. 
447  See Burt (1982); Burt (1992). 
448  See Burt (1992), p. 27. 
449  According to Burt (1992), p. 27. 
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There are three clusters of actors: The cluster of actors around Ego, the cluster around 
actor A, and the cluster around actor B. The pattern of ties of Ego is unique, with Ego 
having two strong ties (solid line) to the own cluster and one weak tie (dashed line) to 
each of the other clusters. In addition, one can observe three clusters of structural holes in 
this system, i.e., the structural holes between every actor (except Ego) in Ego's cluster 
and every actor in A's cluster; the holes between every actor (except Ego) in Ego's cluster 
and every actor in B's cluster; and the holes between actors in A's cluster and actors in B's 
cluster. Now, on a first view, the weak tie argument delivers the same results as the 
structural hole theory: Ego is in the best position to receive new information, followed by 
actors A and B, followed by everyone else in the network. This is because Ego has two 
weak ties, A and B have one each, the other actors have none. Equivalently, Ego has the 
most structural holes he spans, followed by actors A and B, followed by the other actors, 
who have fewer. So why need a theory on structural holes? Burt provides two answers:450 
First, the cause for Ego being in a beneficial position to receive information is not the 
weakness of the ties itself. Independent of whether the tie between Ego and actor A and 
Ego and actor B is strong or weak, the existence of a structural hole that Ego spans with 
his ties to either A or B is the cause for the information benefits. Second, however, it is 
not only an informational advantage Ego can benefit from. In addition, and maybe even 
more important, structural holes deliver control benefits to Ego (and of course to actors A 
and B, since they span one structural hole each, as well): If, for example, actor A intends 
to do a transaction or intends to cooperate with one actor from Ego's cluster, the 
coordination of this transaction or cooperation can only be made possible through Ego. 
Therefore, Ego could play actor A off against the actor in the own cluster, potentially 
gaining a benefit from being in a kind of brokerage position.451 
 
Another aspect is important regarding the structural hole theory, that needs highlighting. 
There are basically two ways in which the structural hole theory can be applied in 
analyses: One way is to take all actors of a network and see which actors span more 
                                              
450  See Burt (1992), pp. 27-28. 
451  See Jansen (2003), pp. 29-30. Of course, the downside of structurally autonomous actors might be that 
they are excluded by actors within the clusters due to the fact that the structurally autonomous actor 
might only have weak ties to the members within the clusters.  
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structural holes than others. A second way is to classify the actors of a network into 
subgroups based on certain criteria. For example, in the case of the VCs, one could 
categorize them based on the dimension 'industry focus' (whether they focus on one/a few 
certain industries or whether they do not). In the above figure, that would mean that the 
actors in Ego's cluster, for example, all are VCs that specialize in certain industries, 
actors in A's cluster do not specialize in industries but they specialize on specific 
investment stages, and actors in B's cluster do both, they focus on certain industries and 
on investment stage(s). Then, structural hole theory can be applied by analyzing, whether 
actors benefit from more often spanning structural holes between these subgroups. 
Because actors can play different roles when representing a link between subgroups, this 
kind of analysis is also denoted as role analysis.452 
 
3.3.3.3 Power through Social Influence or the Significance of Strong Ties for 
Different Types of Actors 
In his study on structural holes, Burt (1992) analyzed, which type of ties are beneficial 
for different types of managers within an organization.453 He found that most managers, 
especially high-ranking men, benefited most from flat network structures and 
entrepreneurial-like networks. Specifically, it was beneficial for them to have many 
contacts to other managers that were themselves not connected or weakly connected. 
However, there are two groups of managers, for which this was not the case: Women and 
entry-rank men. For them, hierarchical networks were most beneficial, with strong ties to 
high-ranking and influential managers.454 The reason behind this empirical finding is that 
women and entry-rank men did not gain benefits from many structural holes in their 
contact network, that might provide them with entrepreneurial opportunities and a 
widespread network. Rather, they needed contacts to colleagues, who were socially 
                                              
452  The different roles refer to the possibilities that, in the example above, Ego, A, and B could belong to 
the same group, or, Ego and B belong to the same group but A belongs to a different group, and so on. 
A detailed description of the various roles will be provided in section 3.4.5.3. An example for role 
analyses is to be found in Fernandez/Gould (1994).  
453  For a detailed description of the population of the study, see Burt (1992), pp. 115 ff. 
454  See Burt (1992), pp. 157-158. 
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influential and who could protect them. The main challenge that these two groups of 
managers were facing was to legitimize their capabilities.455  
 
3.3.3.4 Solidarity in Groups or the Strength of Strong Ties 
As discussed earlier, one form or dimension of social capital comprises values such as 
trust, norms, and sanctions.456 Norms and sanctions have the effect that opportunistic 
behavior of actors is sanctioned by other actors in groups that are characterized by strong 
ties and a dense and cohesive structure.457 The mechanism underlying this phenomenon is 
the so-called closure of social networks. A proponent of this theory is Coleman, who uses 
the example of the wholesale diamond market in New York to illustrate this point: 
Several Jewish merchants, who are tied to each other by ethnic and family ties, and who 
frequently interact in other private environments such as visiting the synagogue, 
exchange valuable bags of diamonds without any formal insurance. The insurance against 
opportunistic behavior is the potential loss of all relationships for the merchant who 
cheats, i.e., this merchant would lose religious, community, and family ties.458 Therefore, 
the strong ties and the closure and cohesiveness of the social network are the mechanisms 
that lead to solidarity in the group. 
 
3.3.3.5 Trust in the Prevalence of Norms 
Another form of values that social capital comprises or delivers are norms, manners of 
behavior, or morals, which are valid for everyone in the social system.459 According to 
Putnam (1995), the root for trust in norms and morals is to be found in the socio-
structural context: He showed that memberships in clubs promote the development of 
                                              
455  This finding is also supported to some extent by the research of Uzzi. He found that it is beneficial for 
firms operating in the New York apparel industry to build strong ties with other firms in the market to 
be able to do valuable transactions. However, there is also a threshold, i.e., a point at which strong ties 
are not beneficial anymore. See Uzzi (1996); Uzzi (1997). 
456  See section 3.3.2. 
457  See Coleman (1988), pp. S104-S105. 
458  See Coleman (1988), pp. S98 f. 
459  Studies on this form of social capital have been done, for example, by Coleman (1988), Putnam 
(1993a), Putnam (1993b), and Putnam (1995). 
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weak ties, which are able to span a bridge across differences in ethnic and status 
backgrounds.460 Equivalently, Coleman (1988) presents the case of families that moved 
to a city, in which norms and moral behavior are prevailing. This form of social capital 
enables the parents to let their children go to school alone, because other (structurally) 
unrelated adults will look after the children.461 The value of social capital therefore lies in 
the fact that, based on the structure of relationships and through the prevalence of certain 
norms, cooperative action is made possible, i.e., actions that would have been rejected in 
absence of these norms due to high uncertainty.462  
 
In the following section, it will be derived which of the theoretical concepts described 
above are suitable to be applied to the context of this study.   
 
3.3.4 Application of Social Capital Theories to the Deal Flow of Venture Capital 
Firms 
As becomes obvious, social network analysis and social capital theories cover a variety of 
approaches and concepts to analyze networks on the level of individuals (persons, firms, 
etc.) or on the level of groups. These approaches either focus on the benefits of open 
networks and structural holes or on the benefits of dense networks and group closure. To 
apply these theories to the context of this study, and to determine, which of the 
theoretical strands serves the purpose of this study, the above mentioned theoretical 
approaches have been summarized and categorized in a matrix, which is structured based 
on the two major controversies explained earlier and presented below. 
Based on the analysis on the level of individual actors, the goal of this study is to 
determine to what extent the individual actors, i.e., VCs, are different with respect to their 
deal flow, and whether the position of the firms within the syndication network is able to 
explain the differences in deal flow. Since network analysis offers a broad spectrum of 
network measures, for the derivation of hypotheses it has to be deduced, which of the 
theories serves best as explanatory basis for the differences in deal flow. 
                                              
460  See Putnam (1995), pp. 67-69. 
461  See Coleman (1988), pp. S99 f. 
462  See Sandefur/Laumann (1998), pp. 494 f. 
The Concept of Social Capital 
 
108 
• Information or the strength of weak ties
(Granovetter 1973)
• Power through structural autonomy or the
structural hole theory (Burt 1992)
• Power through social influence or the
significance of strong ties for differenct
types of actors (additional finding of Burt 
1992)
• Trust in the prevalence of norms
(Coleman 1988, Putnam 1995)
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Openness vs. closure
• Solidarity in groups or the strength of 
strong ties (Coleman 1988)
Weak ties and structural holes as key to 
access new and different resources such as 
information
Strong ties to socially influential actors to 
legitimize own capabilities
Trust and norms as underlying basis that
makes exchange in a network possible
Cohesive groups and strong ties as basis for
solidarity in groups
 
Figure 3.5: Categorization of social capital theories463 
 
There are two basic argumentative ways that can be followed: One theoretical strand 
explains that it is the weak ties and the existence of structural holes that offer competitive 
advantages for individual actors. The other strand argues that it might rather be dense 
networks and strong ties among the actors that contain a competitive advantage. Relating 
this to the syndication network and deal flow of VCs, the question is, whether firms that 
hold positions characterized by weak ties or structural holes have a quantitatively or 
qualitatively higher deal flow. Or, whether firms have deal flow advantages that hold 
positions, which are characterized by dense network structures and strong ties. 
Drawing on the theoretical explanations and on previous research, it can be derived that, 
in the context of deal flow for VCs, the first theoretical strand is likely to play a 
significant role. That means, it can be argued that, above all, weak ties and structural 
holes will have a significant influence on the deal flow quantity and quality of VCs 
within the syndication network. The general logic for this argumentation is three-fold: 
                                              
463  Own illustration. 
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First, in order for VCs to generate a steady stream of investment opportunities they can 
select from, the access to information on investment opportunities is vital.464 As 
explained above, in cohesive or dense networks, the information flow is limited due to 
the fact that actors tend to receive the same information from different sources again and 
again. Therefore, according to the theory on the strength of weak ties, being in network 
positions that expose the actors to new information should yield a competitive advantage 
in terms of information on potential investment opportunities. 
In terms of the structural hole theory, having information and control benefits, i.e., for 
example, being in a brokerage position, should also provide a competitive advantage to 
VCs. Having non-redundant ties to other VCs in the network can therefore be expected to 
play a crucial role. In the same vein, being constrained by other VCs based on the 
network structure might have a significant negative impact on the ability of VCs to access 
new information.465 
Second, since establishing and maintaining relationships costs time and energy, VCs only 
engage in them if they expect that the effort is worth it, i.e., not only in terms of 
economic success of the portfolio company but also in terms of future benefits through 
the reciprocation of deal flow.466 Therefore, it can be expected that VCs engage in 
syndication relationships very selectively in order not to invest time and effort in a 
relationship, which is not worth it in the sense of deal flow reciprocation. Also, in order 
to maximize deal flow reciprocation it is beneficial to selectively invest in multiple 
contacts rather than in only a few.467 However, given that a VC has a fixed amount of 
time to be spent on relationships, having multiple contacts means less effort spent on 
every single one of them. Consequently, it might not be strong ties that yield an 
advantage in terms of deal flow, but rather the weak ones. 
                                              
464  See Bygrave (1987), p. 140; Bygrave (1988), p. 140. 
465  See Burt (1992), pp. 52 ff.; Sorenson/Stuart (2001), pp. 1548 f. 
466  This argument also refers to a key rationale for syndication, i.e., the reciprocation of deal flow. See also 
section 2.1.4.3. See also Lerner (1994), pp. 17 f. 
467  Of course, the author is aware that this is a trade-off decision. Taking it to the extreme, if a VC only had 
one contact that frequently delivers many offers to join investments, that might be better than having 
many contacts delivering only few offers to join investments. However, due to the fact that it can be 
assumed that only one firm will not have an infinite number of investments to offer, multiple contacts 
might be beneficial. 
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Third, strong ties and cohesive network structures can harm VCs in financial terms 
because strong ties might lead to dependency on others. In that case, this kind of 
relationships tend to limit the options to engage in investments with other VCs that might 
offer interesting investment opportunities.468  
 
This being said, when analyzing the individual VC's network position, the theories on the 
strength of weak ties and on the benefits of structural holes represent the theoretical 
foundation, on the basis of which hypotheses on the connection between the VCs' 
network position and their deal flow quantity and quality will be derived.  
As has been explained in the section on structural hole theory, and as can already be noted 
at this point, an analysis based on structural hole theory will also be applied to VCs by 
classifying them into certain subgroups. By doing this, a role analysis will be performed. 
This kind of analysis is, to some extent a mixture of subgroup analysis and analysis on the 
level of individual actors, because, although the VCs will be categorized, the goal of the 
analysis is still to examine, whether individual actors benefit from their structural position. 
 
Again, recall that the objective of this study is two-fold: In a first step, it will be analyzed 
to what extent VCs make use of their general contact network (all deal flow sources 
within the contact network) and of their contacts to other VCs as sources of deal flow 
quantity and quality. If VCs make heavy use of their network, and also of their contacts 
to other VCs, then this analysis basically justifies the second step: The analysis of the 
VCs' network position and its impact on deal flow quantity and quality. The theoretical 
foundation for the second step (analysis of network position) has been explained above. 
 
However, when analyzing the importance of the contact network and of the syndication 
network for the deal flow generation of VCs, it is drawn on the benefits that social capital 
delivers on the level of the entire group. That is, social capital theory holds that, 
especially in situations with high uncertainty, cooperation is made possible based on the 
general prevalence of norms among actors.469 Since venture capital investments are often 
                                              
468  See Uzzi (1996), pp. 690 ff.; Uzzi (1997), pp. 57 ff. 
469  See Coleman (1988), pp. S99 f.; Sandefur/Laumann (1998), pp. 494 f. 
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characterized by high uncertainty, the trust in certain behavioral norms among actors can 
be expected to be important. That means that the level of social capital inherent in a 
group makes it possible that actors of that group exchange resources such as information 
on potential investment opportunities. In the case of the VCs' contact (and syndication) 
network, this level of social capital is expressed, for example, by a functioning 
mechanism of deal flow reciprocation. Offering (high-quality) deals to other VCs is 
based on the trust in the expectation that this behavior will be reciprocated in the future. 
If offers to join investments are not reciprocated, the level of social capital also makes 
possible to sanction actors by excluding them from future investments. This is where the 
level of social capital inherent in a group or in a network can be observed. 
 
Overall, the theoretical foundation for this study is represented by the left column in 
figure 3.5. In order to proceed, an appropriate research design has to be specified that 
reflects the two-fold objective. This design will be developed in the following sections. 
 
3.4 Research Design 
3.4.1 Description of the Basic Structure of the Research Model 
In this section, the aspects regarding the deal flow generation of VCs are brought together 
with the theoretical foundations on social capital and on formal network analysis. The 
goal is to develop a basic model that serves as basis for the empirical study. To do this, it 
is necessary to briefly recall some of the content that has been discussed earlier. 
 
Regarding the value generating stages of VCs, it has been shown that the stage of deal flow 
generation constitutes a basic prerequisite for the business model of VCs to function.470 
Vater (2002) could show that the generation of deal flow is, except for the due diligence 
phase, the stage within the value chain of VCs that is most important.471 Given the high 
importance of deal flow generation, it is worthwhile to look at this stage in more detail. 
                                              
470 See the detailed explanations in section 2.1.3.4. See also Betsch/Groh/Schmidt (2000), p. 118; 
Lockett/Wright (2001), p. 378. 
471  See Vater (2002), p. 99. 
Research Design 
 
112 
In the section on how the contact between a VC and a potential portfolio company comes 
about,472 it has been shown that the contact network of VCs plays an important role in 
generating deal flow. A few empirical studies exist that look at the network of VCs and 
partially also at their deal flow. However, there are three main shortcomings that need to 
be addressed: First, most studies do not differentiate between deal flow quantity and 
quality.473 Second, the few existing studies on network positions do not differentiate 
between the embeddedness of the firms in the local network (ego-network) and their 
embeddedness in the entire network structure (total network). Third, in terms of network 
position, only the measure of centrality has been looked at so far. However, although 
centrality is an important aspect, there are several other measures characterizing a VC's 
network position in the syndication network, that are even more suitable to deliver 
valuable insights with respect to the generation of deal flow. 
 
Based on the theoretical explanations presented earlier and based on previous research 
discussed, the research design needs to reflect the two-fold objective of the study: In a 
first step, the general importance of the contact network of VCs with respect to their deal 
flow quantity and deal flow quality will be analyzed. In addition, the role that other VCs 
play as source of deal flow will be evaluated. In a second step, a detailed analysis of the 
VCs' network position will be performed and it will be tested whether differences in 
network positions can explain the variance in deal flow quantity and quality. In this 
context, ego-network measures and total network measures are differentiated. In addition, 
it will be analyzed whether actors that more often represent a link between subgroups 
benefit from their structural position. This second step will be split up into two sub-steps: 
The first sub-step is to check to what extent firm attributes alone are able to explain the 
difference in deal flow quantity and quality. The second sub-step then is to individually 
add network measures to the firm attributes in order to see the differential effects and the 
gain in explanatory power of the model based on the specific network measures. 
According to this process, the following research model can be derived: 
                                              
472  See sections 2.2.4.1 and 2.2.4.2 on the search activities and on the sources of deal flow. 
473 Studies that make that differentiation are the one of Fried/Hisrich (1994) and the one of Vater (2002). 
However, the former is on the US market and based on a fairly small sample size (18 VCs), and the latter 
can partially not be compared to this study. Reasons have been explained above. See section 2.2.4.2. 
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General importance of …
- contact network
- other VCs
…as sources of deal flow
Analysis of network position*
Ego-network measures
Total network measures
Deal Flow
Quantity
Quality
Deal Flow
Quantity
Quality
* In comparison to a model with firm attributes only
Role analysis
Goal (a)
Goal (b)
 
Figure 3.6: Basic structure of the research design474 
 
The remainder of chapter three is organized as follows: 
First, it is explained in detail how deal flow quantity and quality are measured in this 
study (section 3.4.2). Second, it will be shown, how the importance of the general contact 
network and of the contacts to other VCs as source of deal flow quantity and quality will 
be evaluated (section 3.4.3). Third, before explaining the individual network measures 
that serve as independent variables, it needs to be described, how an entire network 
structure can be characterized (section 3.4.4). This step is partially necessary to later 
perform the analyses on the level of individual VCs,475 but it also delivers valuable 
insights, for example, whether benefits are distributed equally or unequally among the 
VCs. Fourth, the network measures that will be employed, are explained in detail 
(sections 3.4.5 and 3.4.6). Finally, the chapter is summarized and the detailed research 
design is presented (section 3.5). 
 
                                              
474  Own illustration. 
475  That is, the algorithms of many network measures require that a network structure is dissected into its 
so-called components, which will be explained in the relevant section.  
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3.4.2 Measurement of Deal Flow as Dependent Variables 
Regarding the measures for deal flow quantity and quality, it is important to distinguish 
between the two goals of this study. In the following two sections (3.4.2.1 and 3.4.2.2), 
the measures for deal flow quantity and quality are described which are used for the 
analyses to achieve goal (b). That is, they are used as dependent variables for examining 
the effect of the VCs' network position on deal flow quantity and quality. Then, in section 
3.4.3, it is referred to goal (a), i.e., the measurement of the importance of the general 
contact network and of other VCs as source of deal flow. For this analysis, the letters A, 
B, C, A', B', and C' are used, as will be seen in the following figures. 
 
3.4.2.1 Deal Flow Quantity 
As explained before, one important aspect regarding the deal flow of VCs is its quantity. 
Deal flow quantity simply relates to the average number of investment opportunities a 
VC receives.476 The VCs can either receive business plans sent to them unsolicited by the 
capital seeking firm, or they receive the business plans through some contact in their 
contact network. When received through a contact out of the network of the VC, this can 
be of various kinds, i.e., the referral can come from a bank, university or research centers, 
private or other contacts, or from other VCs. Now, when analyzing whether the network 
position of VCs within the syndication network has an effect on deal flow quantity, it 
should only be taken into account what part of all investment opportunities received 
actually stem from other VCs. Therefore, in this study, not the total average number of 
investment opportunities that come from all sources is the relevant number, but this part 
of the investment opportunities that stem from other VCs. This logical selection is 
necessary since this study refers to the analysis of the syndication network among VCs. 
Therefore, the dependent variable 'deal flow quantity' is the product of the average 
number of investment opportunities received per year, the percentage share of investment 
opportunities received from network contacts, and the percentage share of investment 
opportunities received from other VCs.477 Consequently, the dependent variable is an 
                                              
476  As operationalized, for example, in Wells (1974), Tyebjee/Bruno (1984), Schröder (1992), Vater (2002). 
477 Also, as explained before, since buyout investments are excluded from this analysis, only those 
investment opportunities are considered that can be allocated to venture capital investments according 
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absolute number reflecting a VCs ability to generate deal flow quantity through contacts 
to other VCs. The simple logic can be illustrated as follows. In this figure, for now, 
ignore the labels A, B, and C, which will be needed for explanations further below. 
 
Deal Flow Quantity
(Number of initially received
investment opportunities)
Investment opportunities received
through network contact
Investment opportunities
received unsolicited
Other VCs Universities/ 
Research 
centers
Banks/ 
Investment 
banks
Private 
contacts
* These include for example lawyers, consultants, and others.
Other 
sources*
A
C
B
 
Figure 3.7: Logic to measure deal flow quantity478 
 
3.4.2.2 Deal Flow Quality 
The ways in which deal flow quality can be measured have been presented in section 
2.2.2. It has been explained that, for the purpose of this study, the relevant indicator for 
deal flow quality is the final deal rate of VCs, i.e., the percentage of investment 
opportunities finally invested in (of all investment opportunities received). However, the 
percentage of investment opportunities invested in is multiplied with the investment 
opportunities received, and, analog to the measure for deal flow quantity, with the share 
coming from network contacts, and with the share stemming from other VCs.479 
                                                                                                                                      
to the definition set forth in section 2.1.1. See also section 5.1.1.2 for the boundary definition of the 
network. 
478  Own illustration. 
479  Alternatively to the measures explained, it can be thought of measuring deal flow quality on a project-
by-project basis. That means, it could theoretically be tracked, which investment opportunities actually 
have been financed by VCs and whether these investment opportunities are economically successful, 
thereby indicating the quality of the deal flow. However, due to two reasons this way is only a 
theoretical exercise and cannot be followed in practice: First, data on the economic success of the 
portfolio companies is not available in a database and even with a questionnaire the data could probably 
not be retrieved. This is due to the fact that venture capitalists would probably not disclose such data, 
or, if at all, primarily for the successful portfolio companies. Second, since the data is not available in a 
database, a questionnaire would have to be used. But due to the vivid personnel turnover and the market 
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Graphically, the logic is the same as presented in the figure above, with the exception that 
the box at the top of the tree refers to the deal flow quality (not deal flow quantity), i.e., 
to the deal rate multiplied with the investment opportunities received. For the deal flow 
quality measure, the labels are recoded into A', B', and C', while the apostrophe indicates 
that it is referred to deal flow quality. 
 
3.4.3 Measurement of the General Importance of the Contact Network and of Other 
Venture Capital Firms as Source of Deal Flow 
Relating to the idea of social capital, the measurement of the importance of the contact 
network and of the syndication network indicates whether social capital in the form of 
values and norms serve as the underlying basis that makes exchange and cooperation in a 
network possible. The trust in the prevalence of norms then is to be seen as a form of 
social capital. 
 
Based on the logics to measure deal flow quantity and deal flow quality as presented 
above, the rationale to assess the general importance of the contact network and of other 
VCs as source of deal flow is the following. In order to refer to specific elements in these 
logics, the labels A, B, C, A', B', and C' have been assigned.480 For deal flow quantity, A 
equals the percentage of the average number of investment opportunities received per 
year, which stem from a network contact. B is the remainder to 100%, i.e., the percentage 
of the average number of investment opportunities received per year, which a VC 
received unsolicited. C is the percentage of the average number of investment 
opportunities received per year, which (out of the network contacts) comes from other 
VCs. Analogously, the denotations A', B', and C' correspond to the equivalent 
percentages, but for those investment opportunities that VCs finally invest in.  
The general importance of the contact network as source of deal flow for VCs can now be 
measured by the comparison of the values for A and for B (and A' and B' analogously). If 
A (A') is larger than B (B'), then network contacts deliver more investment opportunities 
                                                                                                                                      
development of the venture capital industry, those employees who have decided on investments several 
years ago are often not reachable anymore to answer the questionnaire. Therefore, this way of 
measuring deal flow quality cannot be followed. 
480  Refer to figure 3.7. 
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to the VC as compared to unsolicited proposals.481 In order to test the general importance 
of the contact network with respect to the difference between deal flow quantity and deal 
flow quality, the shares A' and A need to be compared. If A' is larger than A, i.e., if the 
share of investment opportunities that network contacts deliver, is higher for those 
investments, in which a VC finally invests in, then the contact network is of high 
importance for generating deal flow quality. 
With respect to the importance of 'Other VCs' as source of deal flow, the share C (C') needs 
to be compared to the shares for the other sources within the contact network (universities, 
banks, private contacts, other). If C (C') is larger than any of the other sources, then the 
source 'Other VCs' is obviously the most significant in delivering investment opportunities. 
As regards the difference of the importance of 'Other VCs' as deal flow source for deal flow 
quantity and quality, the shares C' and C need to be compared. If C' is larger than C, it 
means that a larger part of the high-quality investment opportunities (in which the VCs 
have finally invested in) come from the source 'Other VCs'.  
 
3.4.4 Measures to Characterize the Entire Network Structure 
As to the structural characteristics of entire networks, there are several measures, by 
which a network can be described on a macro-level. These include the necessary 
dissection of the network into its so-called components,482 an analysis of the overall 
density prevalent in the network, and an analysis regarding the transitivity, clustering, 
and centrality of the entire network. Thereby, an understanding of the network structure 
on an overall level is gained. It helps to assess whether potential benefits inherent in the 
network structure are distributed equally or unequally and also whether potential benefits 
are more due to local network structure (in the actors' neighborhood) or due to the overall 
network structure. Relating this to the idea of social capital, these measures indicate, to 
what extent also the amount of social capital is distributed equally or unequally among 
the actors.  
 
                                              
481  Either in terms of deal flow quantity, or in terms of deal flow quality. 
482 The dissection of a network into its components is a necessary step because many network measures 
can only be derived for the components of a network. Details follow below. 
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3.4.4.1 Components of a Network 
Dissecting an entire network into its components refers to an important property of a graph, 
i.e., its connectedness. A graph is connected, if all pairs of nodes are connected, which 
means that each actor can reach any of the other actors by some path length. The actors in a 
connected graph need not be connected by direct links, i.e., for a graph to be connected it is 
sufficient that each actor can reach all of the other actors by either direct or indirect links. 
Thus, in a connected graph, no node is disconnected, and all the nodes together are denoted 
as a component. In contrast, in a disconnected graph, there are one or more nodes, which 
are not connected to the component.483 This or these disconnected node or nodes are, by 
definition, also components. An example is illustrated in the figure 3.8. 
Many methods within formal network analysis require that the graph under consideration 
is connected. Therefore, the syndication network of the VCs has to be dissected into its 
components before the analyses on the level of individual actors are performed. 
While the dissection of a network into its components is a necessary step, the following 
measures are used to get a feeling for the overall network structure, which is useful to 
evaluate, whether the amount of social capital in the network is distributed equally or 
unequally among actors. 
 
Connected graph Disconnected graph
 
Figure 3.8: Example of connected and disconnected graph484 
 
                                              
483  See Wasserman/Faust (1994), pp. 109-110. 
484  Own illustration. 
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3.4.4.2 Density 
Another important characteristic of the overall network structure is its density. Density 
refers to the actual number of connections or lines between nodes, compared to the 
maximum possible number. The maximum possible number of lines or connections in a 
network is determined by the number of nodes or actors, denoted by n, in that network. 
Since a network is represented by a square actor-by-actor matrix, showing which actors 
are connected to each other, the maximum possible number of lines is equal to n x n. 
However, since ties of actors with themselves (the main diagonal in the actor-by-actor 
matrix) are ignored, the maximum number of ties is equal to n x (n-1). Now, this is the 
maximum number of ties in a directed graph, i.e., in a graph, in which the directionality 
of relations is observable. In this case, the relationship of actor A to actor B can be 
present, but the relationship from actor B to actor A might be absent.485 In the case of 
undirected ties, however, it is only noted, whether a relationship between two actors 
exists or whether it does not. In this case, the relationship from actor A to actor B is the 
same as the one from actor B to actor A. More formally, let each element in the actor-by-
actor matrix be denoted as x, i.e., the binary value for the relation between actors A and B 
is denoted as xij. In the case of directed data, it holds that xij ≠ xji, and in the case of 
undirected data, it holds that xij = xji. Since in an undirected network, the relations are 
symmetric, the maximum possible number of ties is equal to n x (n-1)/2. The density 
algorithm in network analysis software packages counts the number of ties that actually 
exists and divides it by the number of maximum possible number of ties for that network. 
In other words, for binary data, density is calculated as the ratio of adjacencies that are 
present compared to the number of pairs of actors, i.e., what proportion of all possible 
dyadic ties are actually present. Now, this is the case for binary data.  
In the case that the data of the network is valued, i.e., if some form of the strength of ties 
is provided, the density algorithm sums up the values of all relations and divides it by the 
                                              
485  This can be the case, for example, if each member in a group of actors is asked, whom of the other 
actors of that group they consider to be a friend. In that case, actor A might call actor B a friend, while 
actor B does not call actor A a friend. The direction of the relation between actors A and B would 
therefore go from actor A to actor B but not in the opposite direction. 
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number of possible ties. That means, density for valued data is defined as the average tie 
strength of ties across all possible ties.486  
The network under consideration in this study is based on data, which is undirected and 
valued. However, for some methods and algorithms in formal network analysis it is 
necessary to dichotomize the data, i.e., to transform the valued into binary data. 
Therefore, density, for example, can be calculated for the valued matrix as well as for the 
binary matrix. 
 
3.4.4.3 Transitivity 
As briefly explained earlier, transitivity refers to triadic structures within a network. A 
triad is a network of three actors, which is called transitive, if all three actors are 
connected to each other. Transitivity originally refers back to balance theory and relates 
to the situation that, if actor A is connected to actor B, and actor B is connected to actor 
C, chances are high that actors A and C are also connected.487 
When considering undirected data, as is the case with the data in this study, there are four 
possible types of triadic relations, i.e., no ties are present, one tie, two ties, or all three ties 
are present.488 Analyzing triadic structures might provide insight on the extent to which a 
network is comprised of 'isolation' (no tie is present), 'couples' (one tie is present), 
'structural holes' (two of three ties are present), or 'clusters' (all three ties are present).489 
In the context of this study, above all an understanding of the existence of structural holes 
might give a good sense of the overall potential of actors to benefit from them. Although 
this analysis on the macro-level (entire network) does not yield precise insight on the 
access of individual actors to opportunities, it still draws picture of the overall potential 
how actors in the network, in general, can benefit from the existence of structural holes. 
Specifically, the higher the percentage of triads (of all possible triads) that contain two of 
three connections, and in which the connections AB and BC exist but not AC, the higher 
                                              
486  See Hanneman/Riddle (2005), chapter 8, pp. 2-3. 
487  See, for example, the discussion of balance theory as proposed by Heider (1946). See Heider (1946), p. 
107. See also section 3.2.4.1 for an explanation of balance theory. 
488  In directed graphs, there are 16 possible types of triads. For a further discussion, see Wasserman/Faust 
(1994), p. 244. 
489  See Hanneman/Riddle (2005), chapter 8, p. 8. 
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the percentage of structural holes and, consequently, the higher the potential for actors to 
exploit those opportunities.  
 
3.4.4.4 Clustering 
Many researchers have noted that, in large real-world networks, often a paradoxical 
structural pattern can be found: On the one hand side, it is the case that most of the 
people someone knows also know each other. This implies that in most large networks, a 
significant proportion of all existing ties are 'clustered' into local neighborhoods, meaning 
that actors often are embedded in fairly dense local structures.490 On the other hand, in 
many large networks, the geodesic distance491 between any two actors is surprisingly 
short. That is, in most empirical networks, any two nodes can reach each other at very 
short path lengths, a phenomenon also known as 'small world phenomenon'.492  
There are two parts to this paradoxical finding. One is to measure the distance between 
nodes, and the other is to measure the extent to which actors are embedded in dense local 
neighborhoods. Measuring this extent is exactly what the so-called clustering coefficient 
does. The overall clustering coefficient for a graph is basically the average value of all 
densities in each actor's local neighborhood. That means, the algorithm calculates the 
density in the neighborhood for each actor493 and then averages it across all actors. A 
                                              
490  See Hanneman/Riddle (2005), chapter 8, pp. 10-11. 
491  Geodesic distance: Given two actors in a network, there might be several paths that connect these 
actors. The shortest path that exists is called the 'geodesic'. The 'geodesic distance' is defined as the 
length of the shortest path between two actors. If, for example, actors A and B are directly connected 
(adjacent), then the geodesic distance is one. If the shortest path between A and B went through actors 
C and D, then the geodesic distance would be three. See Wasserman/Faust (1994), pp. 110-111. 
492  See Watts (1999), p. 493. The small world phenomenon goes back to the psychologist Milgram (1967) 
and refers to the fact that, in large networks, the distance between any two nodes is relatively short. 
Milgram (1967) presented this idea, illustrating that any two individuals on the planet are connected via 
a chain of no more than six acquaintances. See Milgram (1967), pp. 60 ff. These large networks are 
characterized by low overall density and a high average density in local neighborhoods. The small 
world phenomenon can also be observed when examining, for example, internet networking platforms 
such as Open BC. When selecting any member from the Open BC network, the system shows via whom 
one is connected to that selected person. In can be observed, in most cases, the connection is established 
with no more than five to six intermediate acquaintances. For sure, this quick experiment would in no 
way prove the point of small worlds in a scientific sense, however, it is interesting to experience that the 
theoretical concept seems holds in practice. 
493  Measures on the local networks of each actors will also be explained in more detail further below. 
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weighted version of this number assigns weights based on the size of the actors' 
neighborhoods.  
What the clustering coefficient highlights, is, to what extent the actors in the network are 
embedded in dense local structures. What makes most sense, is to compare the average 
density of local neighborhoods (clustering coefficient) to the overall density of the 
network. If they are basically equal, then the density in the overall network is not much 
different from the local structures actors are embedded in. However, if, for example, local 
structures are characterized by much higher density than is the overall network, then the 
network is probably characterized by very dense local neighborhoods or structures while 
at the same time showing gaps between these local structures. This could be another hint, 
which would suggest the existence of structural holes that exist between the local 
neighborhoods.  
 
3.4.4.5 Centrality 
Of primary concern of many network researchers is the question which actor(s) in a 
network are the most important or most powerful. Although most sociologists would 
probably agree that power is a fundamental element of social structures, it is much less 
clear what exactly power is.494 Nonetheless, several concepts and measures have been 
developed that intend to grasp various notions of power and importance, often also referred 
to as prominence.495 These measures, which all belong to the so-called measures of 
centrality, include the definitions on degree centrality, closeness centrality, and 
betweenness centrality. Although the basic concepts of centrality measures go back to 
works of other earlier researchers,496 a major proponent in developing the more modern 
forms and concepts of centrality as they are often used today was Linton C. Freeman. 
Centrality measures can be calculated for individual actors, for subgroups, or for entire 
networks. Although the focus of this section is to explain centrality for the entire network, 
                                              
494  See Hanneman/Riddle (2005), chapter 10, p. 1. 
495  See Wasserman/Faust (1994). 
496  See for example the early works of Shaw (1954), Mackenzie (1966), Nieminen (1973), Nieminen 
(1974), or Rogers (1974). 
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it first has to be explained how the various measures are calculated for individual actors, 
since this is the basis for the aggregation to a network index of centralization.  
The centrality or centralization of a network shows whether the amount of power that 
exists in a network is equally distributed or whether it is centralized on some of the 
actors. More explicitly, power can be understood as a consequence of the pattern of the 
relations, and the question is, whether power is equally distributed or whether it shows a 
certain degree of concentration or centralization.497 This is exactly what the analysis of 
centrality aims at. Before applying the concept of centrality to describe the entire 
network, some preliminary explanations have to be made, referring to the three basic 
versions how centrality is measured, i.e., based on degree, closeness, and betweenness.498 
To better understand these approaches, the following simple graphs shall be used, which 
are referred to in this text as star, circle, and line graph: 
 
Star graph
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
Circle graph
A
B
C
D
EF
G
Line graph
C
D
E
F
GA
B
 
Figure 3.9: Star graph, circle graph, and line graph499 
 
The analysis of centrality aims at differentiating between actors that are in favored or in 
disadvantaged structural positions within the network. The extent to which actors hold 
advantageous positions, can basically be determined in three different ways, i.e., based on 
degree, closeness, and betweenness.500 All operationalizations of these centrality 
measures have as results that, in the star graph, the actor in the center of the star (actor A) 
is the most central and that the star graph shows the highest degree of centralization. In 
                                              
497  See Hanneman/Riddle (2005), chapter 10, pp. 1-2. 
498  See Freeman (1978), p. 219. 
499  According to Freeman (1978), p. 219 and pp. 233-234. 
500  These are the measures the three centrality concepts are based on. See also Freeman (1978), p. 219. 
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addition, in the circle graph there are no differences regarding the centrality of actors, and 
the circle shows the lowest possible degree of centralization.501  
 
Degree centrality: The degree of an actor i is simply the count of the number of other 
actors that are adjacent to actor i, in other words, the degree is equal to the number of 
direct contacts of an actor.502 Examining the three types of graphs, we note that, in the 
star network, actor A has the highest degree, i.e., number of direct contacts. While all 
other actors in this network have a degree of one, actor A has a degree of six. The 
question is, why actors in the networks are more (or less) important or powerful and what 
exactly it is that makes them more (or less) important or powerful. Assume, for example, 
that the actors in the star network intend to exchange resources. If actor D does not 
provide resources to actor A, A will have various other opportunities to get access to the 
resource.503 However, if the opposite situation is the case, i.e., if actor A does not provide 
a resource to actor D, D is constrained and will not be able to take part in an exchange at 
all. That makes A more powerful, while the other actors are, to some extent, dependent 
on him. Considering the circle graph, one easily notes that each actor is equally 
connected as regards the degree. Therefore, no actor is in an advantageous position. As to 
the line network, the situation is different: Actors A and G are at a disadvantage, since 
they have a degree of one compared to a degree of two for all other actors.504 Formally, 
degree centrality for individual actors is given simply by 
 
Formula 3.1: ∑ ∑ ≠==
j j
jiijD jiforxxC i  
 
                                              
501  See Jansen (2003), pp. 129-130. 
502  This is, of course, only the case for binary data. If the data of a network is valued, the degree will be the 
sum of the strengths of the ties. 
503  Of course, this is true under the condition that one of the other actors A is connected to also has the 
resource and is willing to exchange the resource that A desires. 
504  In the case of the line network it seems that all actors except A and G are in equal positions. In 
centrality concepts explained further below it will be shown that this is actually not true. However, for 
now and based on the calculation of centrality based on degree, it is correct. 
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with i and j denoting the actors, and x denoting the value of the elements in the actor-by-
actor adjacency matrix.505 
 
Closeness centrality: Besides degree, the so-called closeness of an actor is another reason 
for him to be more powerful. Closeness is defined as the inverse of distance. Therefore, 
actors that are at shorter distances to all other actors are closer and therefore have favored 
positions. If applied to the star network, actor A is at the geodesic distance of one from 
each other actor, while all other actors are at a geodesic distance of one to actor A and of 
two to all other actors. Therefore, actor A is more central in the sense that he is closer to 
all other actors and therefore potentially is more important or powerful. In the circle 
graph, all actors have identical distributions regarding closeness.506 In the line network, 
the middle actor D is closer to all others than all other actors. Following in closeness 
scores are actors C and E, then B and F, then A and G. Based on this way of 
measurement, closeness is also an approach to differentiate important or prominent from 
less important or prominent actors. Actor closeness can be regarded as an indicator for 
potential independence of actors or for the efficiency of actors in a network.507 That is, 
since actors with high closeness centrality have a low geodesic distance to all other actors 
in the network, they can access other actors at more easily than actors that are more apart 
from others. Formally, closeness centrality for individual actors is calculated by 
Formula 3.2: ( ) jifornndC n
j
jiCi
≠⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
−
=
∑
1
1
,  
 
 
                                              
505  Based on the basic form of degree centrality, an alternative concept exists that has been developed by 
Phillip Bonacich. This measure takes into account not only the direct connections an actor has but all 
connections, and assigns an attenuation factor of <1 to weight connections that are more than one step 
away from ego. Thereby, indirect contacts are included with decreasing importance. See, for example, 
Bonacich (1972a), pp. 113 ff.; Bonacich (1972b), pp. 176 ff. 
506  See Hanneman/Riddle (2005), chapter 10, p. 5. 
507  See Jansen (2003), p. 140. 
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More simply, closeness centrality is the reciprocal of the sum of the distances of all actors 
to all other actors (except from each actor to himself).508 
 
Betweenness centrality: The third concept, besides degree and closeness, asks, to what 
extent an actor sits between other actors. In other words, betweenness centrality measures 
the extent to which the geodesic paths between two other actors go through the focal 
actor.509 The more often the focal actor is on the geodesic path that links two other actors, 
the higher is his score on betweenness centrality. The potential of actors with high scores 
on betweenness centrality lies in the fact that they can broker contacts between the actors 
on the connecting paths of which they lie.510 In the star network, actor A shows the 
highest score on betweenness, because A lies between all other pairs of actors and no 
other actor lies between actor A and another actor. More simply spoken, if A intends to 
contact F, A can do so. If F wants to contact C, F can only do so via A. A therefore holds 
the most advantaged position. In the circle network, each actor is positioned between one 
other pair of actors. Therefore, again, no actor is in an advantaged position. In the line 
network, actors that lie closer to the middle, have higher betweenness scores, and are 
therefore in an advantaged position. Betweenness centrality for individual actors is 
calculated by 
 
Formula 3.3: ∑∑
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Formula 3.4: )(1)( ijk
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508  Based on the basic form of closeness centrality, several alternative concepts of closeness have been 
developed, which do not support the focus of this study and are therefore not explained in detail. For the 
so-called eigenvector centrality, see for example Jansen (2003), p. 150. For the so-called reach 
centrality, see Hanneman/Riddle (2005), chapter 10, p. 18. For further closeness measures, see the 
works of Hubbell (1965), Katz (1953), Taylor (1969), and Stephenson/Zelen (1989). 
509  The concept of betweenness centrality goes back to an even earlier work of Freeman. See Freeman 
(1977), p. 39. 
510  See Freeman (1977), pp. 39-40. 
511  The expression j<k below the sigma signs means that, for example, only the pair (j,k) is being regarded 
and not, in addition, the pair (k,j). 
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where bjk denotes the probability that a connection (geodesic path) occurs between actors 
j and k. bjk is the relation of the number of geodesics g between j and k that go through i, 
divided by the total number of geodesics between j and k.512 However, since the 
betweenness score also depends on the size of the network, and simply increases with an 
increasing number of nodes, a measure has to be applied that normalizes for the size of 
the network. Therefore, the measure presented above is normalized based on the 
maximum betweenness possible in a graph. Freeman (1977) showed that the maximum 
possible betweenness is equal to  
 
Formula 3.5: 
2
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and the relative betweenness centrality of a point in a graph can then be expressed 
as 
 
Formula 3.6: 
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This measure shows, on a normalized basis, to what extent relative to the size of the 
network, an actor occurs on the geodesic path that links two other actors.  
 
Both, degree centrality and closeness centrality measure the independence of actors from 
others as intermediaries. In contrast, betweenness centrality measures the dependence of 
other actors on the focal actor and also the ability of the focal actor to broker contacts and 
extract profits from his structural position. Since degree centrality and closeness 
centrality to some extent measure the same characteristics, and since a measure based on 
degree will be included in the analysis through another network measure,514 the focus will 
                                              
512  Based on the basic form of betweenness centrality, an alternative measure is to not only incorporate the 
geodesic paths into the calculation, but all paths. This measure has been developed by 
Freeman/Borgatti/White (1991). See Freeman/Borgatti/White (1991), pp. 141 ff. 
513  See Freeman (1977), p. 38. 
514  A measure based on the average degree of actors, i.e., the average strength of ties, will be included as 
independent variable. See section 3.4.5.1.1. 
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be laid on the betweenness centrality measure. When applying betweenness centrality to 
the context of the syndication network of VCs, high betweenness scores indicate that 
firms often lie on the shortest path between two other firms. This could mean that the 
focal firm might be able to extract profits in terms of information on potential investment 
opportunities and that it can broker the contacts between other firms.  
 
After having explained how centrality is measured for individual actors, it is now turned 
to show how betweenness centrality is measured on the level of the entire network. 
To do this, Freeman refers to two requirements for a measure of betweenness centrality 
that have to be satisfied: First, the measure needs to show to what extent the most central 
actor is more central than the others. And second, it ought to be based on the maximal 
possible value given the network size. More formally, let 
 
• n denote the number of nodes in a network, 
• ni denote actor i, 
• n* denote the most central actor, 
• CB denote the value for betweenness centrality. 
 
The formula looks as follows: 
Formula 3.7: 
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In this formula, the numerator represents the sum of differences in centrality of all actors 
from the most central actor in a network of size n. The denominator is the maximum 
possible sum of differences in centrality, or, in other words, the maximum possible 
centralization of a network, which is given in the star network.515 The value for CB, or 
betweenness centrality for entire networks, therefore ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 meaning 
that there are no inequalities in the centrality of actors (like in the circle graph), and 1 
                                              
515  See Freeman (1978), pp. 227-228. 
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meaning that inequalities regarding centrality among actors are at their maximum (like in 
the star graph). Therefore, what the centrality measure does is that it shows the extent of 
inequality in the observed network as a percentage of the inequality in a star network of 
the same size.516  
 
3.4.5 Network Measures as Independent Variables 
The measures that characterize an actor's network position relates to the idea of social 
capital in the sense that social capital is to be seen as a value inherent in the network 
position or in the relationship structure that an actor has. Therefore, actors will differ 
regarding the amount of social capital based on varying network positions. Measures that 
characterize a network position help to capture the different amounts of social capital that 
lies in the network position of actors. 
 
Social network analysis offers a wide range of measures to characterize a network and the 
position of an actor within the network. Since the goal of this study is to explain 
differences in the quantity and quality of deal flow of individual VCs, it is necessary to 
select those measures that reflect the theoretical basis presented earlier. That means, the 
independent variables used in this study need to relate to the general theoretical 
arguments conveyed by the theory on the strength of weak ties and by the structural hole 
theory. Therefore, several independent variables that meet these requirements and that 
capture different aspects of an actor's network position have been selected. In the 
following sections it will become obvious that the present study extends existing research 
by incorporating a comprehensive set of network measures comprised of various 
important dimensions of an actor’s network structure. 
These network measures can be categorized into two groups, i.e., ego-network measures, 
and measures that are calculated based on all relationships in the network structure 
(denoted as total network measures). Recall that the ego-network of an actor is defined as 
the neighborhood of a focal actor, the ego. The ego-network or neighborhood comprises 
all nodes or actors that are adjacent to ego (termed alters) and the connections among 
                                              
516  See Freeman (1978), p. 228. 
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them.517 Network measures that are calculated based on the ego-network of actors only 
take into account the local environment of relationships of each actor. Thereby, the local 
structure of the network surrounding ego is analyzed. In contrast, there are measures that 
are calculated for individual actor as well, but that take the relationships of the entire 
network into account. These kind of measures refer to the embeddedness of actors in the 
overall network structure. 
The independent variables used in this study comprise both, ego-network measures 
(average strength of ties, structural hole measures) as well as measures that are based on 
the entire network structure (betweenness centrality, multiconnectivity). 
 
3.4.5.1 Ego-Network Measures 
3.4.5.1.1 Average Strength of Ties 
One element of the theoretical argumentation is that it is the weak ties (instead of strong 
ones) that might have an influence on deal flow. Therefore, a measure for the strength of 
ties is needed, that characterizes how frequent or intense the relationships between VCs 
are. As presented in section 3.2.3.2, relationships can be measured in two ways, i.e., 
either on a binary level (relationship is present or absent, indicated in an actor-by-actor 
matrix518 by a '0' for absence, or by a '1' for presence) or on a valued level (strength of 
relationship is measured, indicated in an actor-by-actor matrix with, for example, the 
frequency of interactions). The strength of ties in the case of the syndication network of 
VCs is the frequency of joint investments of two firms. In the terminology of social 
network analysis, the number of ties an actor has (or its strength) is also denoted as the 
so-called degree of an actor. The formula to calculate the degree looks as follows, where 
d denotes degree, i and j denote actors, and x is the element in the actor-by-actor matrix. 
The point in the index where normally j would appear, indicates that the sum is taken 
across all j. 
                                              
517  Refer back to section 3.2.3.1. 
518  A network can be represented as a matrix, in which the rows and the columns are the same (actors), and 
in which the cells (elements) of the matrix indicate whether a relationship between two actors exists 
and, eventually, how strong the relationship is.  
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That is, in a binary network (a matrix that only shows whether the relationship between 
two actors is present or absent), the degree indicates the number of direct ties an actor has 
to other actors. In the case of the syndication network this measure indicates with how 
many different other VCs the focal VCs has invested. Obviously, in order to verify the 
theoretical argumentation in the prevailing case, a measurement on the valued level is 
necessary. However, when strength of ties is measured in network analysis tools, the 
algorithm that measures the degree sums the frequencies of interactions, and results in the 
sum of strengths of all relationships an actor has with other actors in the network. What is 
needed though for this study is a measure that indicates the average strength of the 
syndication relationships a VC has. Therefore, in order to derive a measure that indicates 
the average strength, the degree as calculated for the valued syndication network is to be 
divided by the degree as calculated for the binary network.519 This logic amends the 
above formula to 
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where d_val indicates degree measured based on valued data, and d_bin indicates degree 
measured based on binary data. Thereby, the sum of the strengths of all relationships is 
divided by the number of relationships to different actors, resulting in the average 
strength of the syndication relationships for each VC. 
 
                                              
519  Although the syndication network of VCs has been measured based on valued data, this valued actor-
by-actor matrix can easily be transformed into a binary actor-by actor matrix with simple matrix 
operations. Thereby, the new binary matrix only shows whether a relationship between two VCs exists 
or whether it is absent. 
520  This measure is not provided by common network analysis software packages, but has been developed 
and calculated by the author to serve as appropriate measure for the average strength of existing ties of 
the VCs in the syndication network. 
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3.4.5.1.2 Structural Hole Measures: Effective Size and Constraint 
Another element of the theoretical argumentation presented above is that actors, who hold 
network positions characterized by structural holes, might have advantages in accessing 
new information and thereby might have a competitive advantage. However, as Burt (1992) 
explains, "[there] is no certain indicator that a structural hole is present. The hole itself is an 
invisible seam of non-redundancy waiting to be discovered by the able entrepreneur."521 
With the term 'structural hole', Burt refers to network measures that indicate to what extent 
individual actors have non-redundant contacts and to what extent individual actors are 
constrained by the structure of relationships of their direct contacts.522  
Regarding the redundancy aspect, Burt developed a measure, which basically calculates 
the number of non-redundant contacts an actor has in his ego-network. The measure is 
called effective size. The size of an ego-network is the number of direct contacts ego 
has.523 Burt's measure now takes the size of an actor's ego-network and deducts a 
redundancy factor to result in the effective size.  
Assume that actor i has direct relationships with actors j and q, and that actors j and q 
also have a direct relationship. The argumentation is that the time and effort i invests in 
the relationship with j is redundant in the sense that the information or resources that j has 
to offer might also pass to i through the connection between i and q. Abstaining from the 
derivation of the formula, the effective size of i's network is calculated by: 
 
Formula 3.10: jiqformp
j q
jqiq ,1 ≠⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −∑ ∑  
 
where piq is the proportion of i's time and effort invested in the relationship with q 
(interaction with q divided by the sum of i's relations; let z denote the strength of 
relationships),  
                                              
521  Burt (1992), p. 51. 
522  Besides the two mentioned structural hole measures, there are two other standard measures developed 
by Burt, which are frequently used in social network analysis. However, since they strongly relate to the 
measures used in this study it is abstained from using and explaining them in detail. One is the so-called 
efficiency, which is the effective size normalized with the network size of the actor. The second is the 
so-called hierarchy, which is a measure that describes the nature of the constraint on an actor, i.e., to 
what extent the constraint is concentrated on one other actor. See also Burt (1992), p. 53 and pp. 140 ff. 
523  Which is equal to the degree measure calculated for a network with binary data. 
Theoretical Foundation 
 
133
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and where mjq is the marginal strength of j's relation with contact q (interaction between j 
and q divided by the strongest of j's relationships), 
 
Formula 3.12: .)max(/)( kjforzzzz kjjkqjjq ≠++ 524  
 
When aggregating the simple product piqmjq across all contacts q, what is measured is the 
portion of i's relationship with j that is redundant to i's relations with other direct contacts 
i has. Subtracting this expression piqmjq from 1 (as in formula 3.10) then gives the non-
redundant portion of the relationship. Consequently, formula 3.10 is the aggregate of all 
non-redundant portions of relationships between i and possible contacts j.  
Essentially, what effective size measures is the number of alters of ego minus the average 
degree of the alters within the ego-network, while the ties to ego are not counted. 
Interpreting this measure, one could say that effective size measures how many different 
or non-redundant other actors (potential sources of information or other resources) the 
focal actor can access in his ego-network. Relating this to the syndication network of 
VCs, it means that VCs, which have more non-redundant syndication contacts might be 
in a favorable position to receive information on investment opportunities. This can be 
illustrated in a hypothetical example: Assume that VC A has, in the past, syndicated one 
time each with firms B, C, D, and E. Also, VCs B and D have jointly invested once, as 
well as C together with E, and D together with E. Putting this simple structure into a 
graph, it looks as presented in figure 3.10. 
The effective size of the ego-network of VC A is its degree minus the average degree of 
the direct contacts of A, i.e., the effective size for A is equal to 4-1.5 = 2.5. Assume that 
A has found an investment opportunity and he intends to invite another VC F to join this 
                                              
524  The proportion is equal to the interaction of i with q divided by the sum of i's relations. The marginal 
strength is equal to the interaction of j with q divided by the strongest of j's relationships with anyone of 
i's ego-network. See Burt (1992), p. 51. For a further discussion of this measure see also Borgatti 
(1997), who amends Burt's original formula. Burt's original formula is correct for the focal node in an 
ego-network. Borgatti amended the formula so that it can also be used to calculate the effective size for 
the other actors in a focal actor's ego-network. See Borgatti (1997), pp. 35 ff. 
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investment.525 Whether the effective size of A's ego-network increases depends on 
whether F is also syndicating with A's other direct contacts B, C, D, and E. 
 
B
A
C
D
E Average degree*
B = 1
C = 1
D = 2
E = 2
*   Not counting ties to A
** Represents the average degree of A's direct contacts
Σ = 6 / 4 = 1.5**
 
Figure 3.10: Example on effective size526 
 
There is one case, in which the size of A's ego-network decreases: That is, if F is also 
connected to all of A's other syndication partners B, C, D, and E. In that case, the average 
degree of A's contacts (including F) is 2.8, resulting in an effective size of A's ego-
network of 5-2.8 = 2.2. If F has syndicated before with three out of A's syndication 
partners, A's effective size would increase to 2.6; if F has syndicated with two out of the 
four, it would increase to 3.0; if F has syndicated with one, effective size would incline to 
3.4; and if F had not invested before with anyone of B, C, D, or E, the effective size of 
A's ego-network would increase to 3.8. Therefore, the effective size of A's ego-network 
will increase more, the fewer of A's direct contacts F is also syndicating with. The idea of 
effective size is to measure the extent to which a contact has the potential to deliver new 
information on investment opportunities. The more F is involved in A's ego-network 
structure, the less is F's potential to deliver new information to A. 
 
Another structural hole measure Burt developed is the so-called constraint. In contrast to 
the notion of redundancy, constraint measures the extent to which the structure of the 
                                              
525  Based on a binary network (it is only shown, whether ties exist or not, but not the strength of ties is 
shown), and in the case that A invests again with one of B, C, D, or E, the effective size of A's ego-
network would not change. Therefore, in this example, it is explained to what extent a new contact 
changes the effective size of A's ego-network. 
526  Own example and illustration. 
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relationships of ego's direct alters constrain ego. Assume the following situation: If actor 
i intends to exchange resources or enter a transaction with actor j, but actor j also has 
other alternatives to do the transaction, the structure of actor j's network constrains i's 
opportunities. To lead this to a more formal description, assume the following situation: 
Actor i is directly connected to actors j and q, and q is directly connected to j as well. If 
piq denotes the proportional strength of i's relationship with q, and pqj denotes the 
proportional strength of q's relationship with j, then, if the product piq pqj is high, time and 
effort that i invests in the relationship with q leads back to j. That, however, makes it 
difficult for i to develop a structural hole between the two contacts because they have a 
direct relationship themselves. If the product piq pqj is aggregated across all contacts q and 
the relationship of i to j is added, this results in  
 
Formula 3.13: jiqforppp
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which defines constraint. By multiplying the strength of connection of i to q by the lack of 
structural holes around j, the measure defines the constraint on i due to the lack of 
structural holes around contact j. The opportunities i has, are constrained in the sense that i 
has invested much of his time in relationships that lead back to a single contact. The 
measure ranges from a minimum of (pij)2 for the case that j is disconnected from all other 
actors, to a maximum of 1 for the case that j is i's only contact. If measured for all contacts j 
of actor i, the measure gives the aggregate constraint on i's opportunities within the 
network.527 In other words, if i puts much effort in the relationship to j, and if i also devotes 
much effort to q, and q on his side devotes much effort to j, then the constraint of j on i is 
high. The following example, graphically presented in figure 3.11 illustrates this point: 
The constraint that j exerts on i depends on three elements, which are the effort i puts into 
the relationship with j (pij), the effort i puts into the relationship with q (piq), and the 
effort q puts into the relationship with j (pqj). Given that the effort that i can spend is 
fixed, this means, that the constraint that j exerts on i depends on the extent to which j is 
also 'used' from i's other contacts q.  
                                              
527  See Burt (1992), p. 55. 
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i
q
j
piq=1/3 pqj=1/2
pij=1/3
k
 
Figure 3.11: Example for constraint528 
 
While commonly not interpreted by network analysts in this way, when dissecting the 
formula for constraint, notice that the varying element in this game is the effort that q 
spends on the relationship with j: If q had more contacts than in this simple example 
(contacts to which i is not connected to), then the value for pqj would decrease and the 
constraint of j on i would decrease as well because the element pqj is part of the product 
in the second part of the formula for constraint (see above). That is, the more q is 
connected to others that are not part of i's contacts, the less the constraint that j exerts on 
i. An example illustrates this point: 
 
i
q
j
piq=1/3 pqj=1/6
pij=1/3
k
 
Figure 3.12: Extended example for constraint529 
 
As is obvious, the effort that q can spend on j has declined to 1/6, meaning that the product 
piq pqj in the formula decreases, resulting in an overall lower constraint of j on i.530 
                                              
528  Own calculation and illustration. 
529  Own calculation and illustration. 
530  Of course, to calculate the overall constraint that j exerts on i, also the contact to k would have to be 
taken into account. For reasons of explanation and simplicity though, this is abstained from at this point. 
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For the case of the syndication network of VCs, a VC A is constrained by a firm B, if A 
devotes much effort in the relationship to B, and VC B is also 'used' as a syndication 
partner by A's other syndication partners (in whom A also invests time). VC A, by 
investing in B, with B being 'used' by A's other contacts, makes A dependent on B. The 
extent to which A is dependent on B, is a function of the extent to which A's other 
contacts 'use' B as a contact.  
However, in the context of the VCs' syndication network, the constraint measure can also 
be interpreted in a different way: Although Burt's measure can be understood with the 
notion of constraint, what the measure in the context of the VCs' syndication network 
also could mean is that VCs that are connected to well-connected other VCs will benefit 
from them. To explain this, refer to the above two figures and assume that the actors i, j, 
and q are VCs. As explained with the above examples, VCj exerts less constraint on VCi 
in the second example, which is due to the fact that VCq is also connected to other actors 
besides VCi and VCj (the points without labels in the extended example). Strictly 
following Burt's interpretation, this higher connectedness of VCq just means that VCj 
exerts less constraint on VCi. In the context of the syndication network this could also be 
interpreted in the way that, besides the fact that the formula leads to a lower value for 
constraint, VCi is connected to another VCq that on his side is very well-connected to 
other VCs. As it will be shown later on, based on these explanations, the important 
research question posed by Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2007) can be addressed, i.e., 
how VCs may form relationships with influential VCs in the network.531 Thereby, the 
present study contributes to the academic discussion in the field of syndicated venture 
capital investments and with respect to the access of individual actors to specific 
influential others. 
 
3.4.5.2 Total Network Measures 
The level of social capital that an actor has can also be characterized based on total 
network measures. The extent to which an actor is embedded in the overall relationship 
                                              
531  See Hochberg/Ljungqvist/Lu (2007), p. 296. 
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structure of the entire network indicates this level of social capital. The embeddedness of 
an actor in the network structure will be characterized based on the following measures. 
 
3.4.5.2.1 Betweenness Centrality 
In contrast to the previously explained ego-network measures, centrality is a measure 
which is calculated based on the entire network structure. As has been explained above, 
there are three main forms of centrality measures, i.e., degree centrality, closeness 
centrality, and betweenness centrality. In the earlier section on tie strength, it has been 
shown that the average tie strength (based on the valued and binary degree of actors) will 
be included as independent variable. Since degree centrality is identical to the degree 
measure532 and since closeness centrality measures similar characteristics as degree 
centrality, the centrality measure that will be calculated for individual actors in this study 
is betweenness centrality. Recall that betweenness centrality measures the number of 
times an actors lies on the geodesic (shortest) path between two other actors. Since the 
graph considered is fairly large,533 a relative betweenness centrality measure is taken, 
which is the betweenness centrality of an actor normalized with the maximum 
betweenness possible in the graph of a given size. It is given by 
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with C'B denoting the index for an actor's betweenness centrality, iBC  denoting the score 
for the non-normalized betweenness centrality and n denoting the number of nodes in the 
network.534 That is, the normalized betweenness centrality shows the extent to which an 
actor occurs on the geodesic path between two other actors. 
 
                                              
532  Based on the binary data matrix. 
533  As will be seen later, there are 172 VCs included in the calculation of network measures. 
534 Refer back to section 3.4.4.5 for more details. 
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In the context of the VCs' syndication network, higher betweenness means that a VC 
more often represents the shortest link between two other firms, and thereby might be in 
an advantaged position.  
 
3.4.5.2.2 Multiconnectivity 
Another measure included as independent variable is the so-called multiconnectivity. 
Multiconnectivity, also referred to as point connectivity, is calculated for each actor but 
the calculations are based on the entire network structure.535 The algorithm for point 
connectivity calculates for each actor, how many nodes would have to be removed for 
this actor to not be able to reach another (specific) actor by any path length. This 
procedure is repeated for this actor vis-à-vis each actor in the network. The result is an 
actor-by-actor matrix with the cells of the matrix showing the number of nodes that 
would have to be removed in order for the focal actor to become disconnected from the 
respective other actor (for that element in the matrix). More formally, the result is an n x 
n - matrix, which shows in row i column j the local point connectivity from node i to j, 
with i ≠ j. This is equal to the number of different paths from node i to j.536 If, for each 
actor in this matrix, the average across all other actors is taken, this measure can serve as 
an indicator for the connectedness of an actor in the network. Put differently, point 
connectivity conveys the notion of dependency and vulnerability of an actor's network by 
showing whether he is dependent on the contact to specific others or whether he has 
multiple alternative paths to reach other actors.537 Applied to the syndication network of 
VCs, the measure indicates the potential for a firm, even if one or multiple other firms 
were removed from the network, to still be able to reach another firm or to retrieve 
information from it. Therefore, the higher the score on multiconnectivity, the less 
dependent on specific VCs is the focal VC and the less vulnerable is the network of the 
focal VC. 
                                              
535  The measure of connectivity originally goes back to the idea to characterize the connectedness of an 
entire graph. It shows how vulnerable an entire network (graph) is to the removal of single or multiple 
ties. In this context, see also the works of Harary/Norman/Cartwright (1965), Frank (1971), or Peay 
(1974). 
536  See Hanneman/Riddle (2005), chapter 7, pp. 12 f.; Borgatti/Everett/Freeman (2002). 
537  See Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 115. 
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The network measures explained above refer to benefits that VCs have based on their 
network position vis-à-vis other individual VCs. However, as has been introduced with 
respect to the structural hole theory, in a role analysis it can also be analyzed, whether 
individual VCs have benefits from being in network positions that link different 
subgroups of VCs within the network. This will be explained in the following section. 
 
3.4.5.3 Role Analysis 
A role analysis proceeds in two steps: First, the actors of a network are categorized into 
subgroups based on certain criteria. These criteria are selected by the researcher and they, 
of course, should correspond to the context of the network under consideration.538 
Second, based on this categorization, it is examined, to what extent the actors play certain 
roles with respect to the subgroups.539  
There are five different roles that an actor can play, which are denoted as coordinator, 
gatekeeper, representative, consultant, and liaison.540 The following figure illustrates 
these roles, which are also denoted as roles of brokerage: 
 
A
B
C
Coordinator
A
B
C
Gatekeeper
A
B
C
Representative
A
B
C
Consultant
A
B
C
Liaison
 
Figure 3.13: Positional roles of brokerage541 
 
                                              
538  In the present study, as will be seen later, a categorization of the VCs will be made based on a two-
dimensional matrix: One dimension refers to the fact whether the VCs have an industry focus, the other 
dimension refers to the fact whether they have a focus on investment stages. See section 6.3.5.1. 
539  See Fernandez/Gould (1994), p. 1457. 
540  Although Fernandez and Gould use a different expression for the role 'consultant' (they use the term 
'itinerant broker'), in this study 'consultant' will be used because it more intuitively hits the point. See 
also Hanneman/Riddle (2005), chapter 9, p. 15; Fernandez/Gould (1994), p. 1459. 
541  According to Fernandez/Gould (1994), p. 1459. 
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The actor playing the different roles in these examples is actor B. The ellipses around the 
actors indicate whether they belong to the same subgroup or to different ones. The roles 
are characterized as follows: 
 
• Coordinator: A, B, and C belong to the same subgroup, B coordinates the interaction 
between A and C. 
• Gatekeeper: B is at the boundary of its own subgroup and controls the access of 
outsiders (A). 
• Representative: B is in the same subgroup as A and acts as the contact point to 
outsiders. 
• Consultant: A and C are in the same subgroup, and B acts as an external consultant 
being in a different subgroup. 
• Liaison: A, B, and C all are in different subgroups and B is coordinating or mediating 
the contact between A and C. 
 
Important to note is that the direction of the flow of information is given in these 
examples, indicated by the arrow heads. As will be explained in section 5.1 (data 
collection), for this study the directionality of the syndication relationships between VCs 
cannot be seen. That is, it can be seen whether relationships exist but not their 
directionality. Based on this limitation, not all of the roles described above can be 
analyzed in this study: With undirected data (directionality of relationship not visible), 
the roles 'gatekeeper' and 'representative' yield the same result. Because they deliver the 
same results, only one of them will be included in the analysis, arbitrarily chosen it is the 
role of the 'gatekeeper'. Since the role 'coordinator' refers to analyzing whether B is 
between A and C (all are in the same subgroup), this aspect of B's network is already 
captured in the betweenness centrality measure being included (see above). The roles 
'consultant' and 'liaison' both make sense to be analyzed, also for undirected data. 
Therefore, actors will be analyzed with respect to playing three roles: Gatekeeper, 
consultant, and liaison. 
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The categorization of the VCs is two-dimensional and will be based on whether they 
focus on certain industries and whether they focus on certain investment stages,542 so that 
they will be allocated into a 2x2-matrix: 
 
Industry
specialist
Industry-
stage-
specialist
General
VC
Stage
specialist
Yes
No
YesNo
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Figure 3.14: Matrix for the segmentation of VCs543 
 
Firms in each quadrant are assigned a certain name as indicated in the figure. Based on 
this categorization and based on the role analysis, it will be examined whether VCs that 
more often play one of the roles explained above, benefit in terms of deal flow quantity 
and/or quality. 
 
In the sections above, it has been explained, which network measures are included in the 
analysis. These measures capture the amount of social capital inherent in a VC's network 
position. However, in order to assess whether including network measures helps in 
explaining the quantity and quality of deal flow, these network measures will individually 
be added to a set of firm attributes that might affect the deal flow of VCs. These firm 
attributes are explained in the following section.  
 
                                              
542 In his study, Vater (2002) showed that the classification based on industry focus and focus on 
investment stages is a relevant approach to segmentation. See Vater (2002), p. 96. See also Norton 
(1995), p. 21. 
543  Own illustration. 
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3.4.6 Firm Attributes 
In deal flow literature, there is no existing categorization, which shows the determinants 
of deal flow. Therefore, four dimensions that might influence a firm's capabilities to 
influence deal flow quantity and quality have been determined based on discussions with 
experts in the venture capital market.544 These include the dimensions of size, time, 
geography, and corporate routines, which are applied to both, deal flow quantity and deal 
flow quality.  
The dimension of firm size with respect to the potential to generate deal flow is 
operationalized by the number of employees. Intuitively appealing, with more employees 
it seems logical, that a larger number of investment opportunities can be identified and 
successfully screened.545  
The dimension of time is included as the age of the firm in years. The logic behind this 
variable is that it takes time to build up and maintain relationships to other firms within 
the network. Intuitively, older firms might have an advantage with respect to their 
network position, i.e., they might have been able, over the years, to put themselves into a 
position within the network that yields benefits in terms of receiving information on 
potential investment opportunities.  
A geographic component is included in order to detect, whether being in multiple regions 
in Germany has an influence on identifying (high-quality) investment opportunities. 
Therefore, the number of offices is selected as further variable.546  
In addition, another variable is included, which refers to corporate routines and their 
potential benefits. The logic is that a standardized and systematic measurement of deal 
flow might have an influence on the firms' awareness of their own deal flow properties 
(quantity and quality). Furthermore, only by systematically measuring deal flow, a 
                                              
544  These information have been collected by a questionnaire, as will be explained in section 5.1. The 
questions have been discussed with VCs previous to sending out the questionnaire, so that those 
elements could be covered that, from the perspective of the VCs, are likely to influence the deal flow of 
their firms. 
545  Of course, this holds under the assumption that firms devote the same share of time and effort of their 
employees into the generation and screening of deal flow. 
546  Here, of course, the assumption has to hold that multiple offices in Germany are not located close to 
each other but that they are spread geographically throughout the country. However, this is only a 
rhetorical discussion since it only makes sense to have multiple offices if the cover multiple sub-regions 
in a larger region.  
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management of deal flow is possible in order to successfully make use of for example 
those sources, that generate the most or the best investment opportunities. In this context, 
the firms have been asked whether they (a) track the number of investment opportunities 
received per year, (b) trace back all received investment opportunities to the sources the 
firm received them from, (c) trace back those investment opportunities to the original 
sources, in which they finally invest in.  
 
3.5 Summary and Detailed Structure of the Research Design 
Due to the characteristics of the venture capital market and of venture capital as financing 
method, traditional theories on financial and capital markets as well as the transaction 
cost approach has been shown to not be able to serve as theoretical basis in the context of 
this study. Rather, a theoretical concept is used that serves the purpose to explain the 
general benefits of networks and to also explain the benefits that actors have based on 
their structural position within a network. Based on the methods of social network 
analysis, this theoretical concept has been found in social capital theory, including the 
general theory on the trust in the prevalence of norms, the theory on the strength of weak 
ties, and the theory of structural holes.  
Trust in the prevalence of norms has been shown to be the underlying basis that makes 
the exchange of resources among actors in a network possible. One example for those 
norms in the VCs' syndication network could be the expected reciprocation of deal flow. 
The strength of weak ties lies in the fact that weak ties can be 'bridges' to actors that 
deliver new information. In contrast, in the structural hole theory it is argued that it is not 
the weakness of ties that yields informational benefits. Rather, it is the non-redundancy of 
contacts in the network, and the lack of constraint in an actor's network that deliver 
informational and control benefits.  
Based on these theoretical concepts, a research design has been developed that proceeds 
in two steps: First, the general contact network (including all sources of deal flow) and 
the VCs' syndication network (relationships of VCs among each other) are evaluated with 
respect to their importance for the generation of deal flow quantity and quality. Second, 
the VCs' syndication network is analyzed by the methods of formal network analysis. 
Several network measures, grouped into ego-network measures and total network 
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measures, are calculated. According to the goals of the study, their individual effect on 
the VCs' deal flow quantity and quality will be analyzed. To do this, several firm 
attributes are included in a model, and then, successively, network measures will be 
added individually. However, before the second step is performed, the entire network will 
be examined in order to get an understanding of the overall characteristics of the network 
structure, and in order to asses whether the potential benefits are distributed equally or 
unequally among the VCs. 
The research design including based on the single measures explained in the previous 
sections is illustrated below: 
 
General importance of …
- contact network
- other VCs
…as sources of deal flow
Firm attributes
Deal Flow
Quantity
Quality
Deal Flow
Quantity
Quality
*Individual addition of network measures to set of firm
attributes
- Employees
- Age
- Offices
- Deal flow measurement
Network position*
- Tie strength
- Effective size
- ConstraintEg
o-
ne
tw
or
k
To
ta
l 
ne
tw
or
k - Betweenness centrality
- Multiconnectivity
+
R
ol
e
an
al
ys
is - Gatekeeper
- Consultant
- Liaison
Goal (a)
Goal (b)
 
Figure 3.15: Detailed structure of the research model547 
                                              
547  Own illustration. 
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4 Derivation of Hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical explanations and the research model developed, in this section, 
hypotheses will be derived for the two parts of the research model. Hypotheses regarding 
goal (a), i.e., the general importance of the contact network and of other VCs as source of 
deal flow, will be derived in section 4.1. Hypotheses for goal (b), i.e., the effect of the 
network position on deal flow quantity and quality, follow in section 4.2. As explained 
before, the hypotheses regarding goal (a) and their testing shall be perceived as the 
starting point and as the justification for performing the analyses regarding goal (b), on 
which the focus of this study is laid. The hypotheses for goal (a) are still being derived 
and later tested in order to present a comprehensive picture of the VCs under 
consideration. Finally, in section 4.3, the derived hypotheses are summarized. 
 
4.1 Hypotheses on the General Importance of the Contact Network and of 
Other Venture Capital Firms as Source of Deal Flow 
Based on social capital theories explained, previous empirical research, and the logics to 
measure deal flow quantity and quality, several hypotheses on the general importance of 
the contact network and of other VCs as source of deal flow for the generation of deal 
flow can be derived. In the hypotheses, the letters A, B, C, A', B', and C' relate to those 
used in figure 3.7. 
 
In social capital theories, it has been explained that, in general, for the exchange of 
information, trusted norms and reciprocity serve as the basic underlying mechanisms.548 
Especially in environments characterized by high uncertainty, such as in the venture 
capital industry, these mechanisms imply that the contact network of VCs can be 
expected to play an important role with respect to deal flow generation.549 That is, the 
level of social capital in the form of values and norms, can be seen as the lubricant that 
makes the exchange of resources possible. In the context of this study, resources are 
information on potential investment opportunities. 
                                              
548  See the explanations in section 3.3.3 and 3.3.4. 
549  See Bygrave (1988), p. 137. 
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The first hypothesis refers to the question, whether VCs in the German market receive 
more investment opportunities from their network contacts or whether they receive more 
unsolicited. For the US market it could be shown that more than half of the investment 
opportunities received, come by referral.550 For the German market it was found that 
approximately 50% of the investment opportunities received, come by referral.551 While 
there already is data for the German market on the question, which is also addressed by 
the first hypothesis, the latter will still be set up in order to be able to draw a consistent 
picture for the VCs under consideration in the present study. The first hypothesis 
consequently refers to deal flow quantity and the argumentation is as follows.  
Based on the fact, that VCs spend the largest amount of time on the identification and on 
the evaluation of investment opportunities,552 it can be assumed that they also intend to 
optimize the output of that process.553 In terms of deal flow quantity, the output of that 
process is a sufficiently large number of investment opportunities the VC can select from. 
At the same time, the VCs try to optimize the quality of their deal flow, which means, 
that they try to identify as many investment opportunities as possible that meet their 
investment criteria. Because VCs assume that investment opportunities, which come by 
referral, potentially meet these criteria better, the VCs can be assumed to put a larger 
amount of time into the establishment and maintaining of their general contact network 
than they put into marketing activities, which might increase the number of investment 
opportunities received unsolicited. The reasons why a VC can be assumed to spend more 
time on its network than on other activities are therefore two-fold: One aspect is 
certainly, that the referrers potentially better know the investment criteria of the VC. 
However, the second aspect is that referrers cannot afford to refer bad deals to the VC, 
which is due to the fact that such behavior will be punished by the VC by, for example, 
excluding the referrer from future business. This mechanism can be understood as social 
capital inherent in the relationship network. Now, if a VC knows that this mechanism is 
                                              
550  Wells found that 61% of the investment opportunities came from referrals, Tyebjee/Bruno found a 
value of 65%. See Wells (1974), p. 57; Tyebjee/Bruno (1984), p. 1055. 
551  Jugel found a value of 46%, Vater an equivalent value of 54%. See Jugel (2001), p. 39; Vater (2002),  
p. 144. 
552  See Vater (2002), p. 99. 
553  Also refer back to the value chain of VCs, i.e., see section 2.1.3.4. 
Hypotheses on the General Importance of the Contact Network and of Other 
Venture Capital Firms as Source of Deal Flow 
 
148 
in place, and if the VC therefore expects to receive high-quality deals from its referrers, 
then it can be assumed that VCs spend more time on establishing and maintaining its 
network than it spends on other activities (such as marketing) to generate deal flow 
quantity. If one can also assume that the sources (either contact network or unsolicited) 
yield a number of investment opportunities as output that corresponds to the effort that 
the VC spends on that source, then the number of investment opportunities received from 
network contacts can be expected to be higher than the number received unsolicited.554 A 
verification of HI 1 would lead to the conclusion that the contact network of VCs is 
important because it delivers many investment opportunities. It follows: 
 
HI 1: Of all investment opportunities received (irrespective of their quality), the 
percentage of investment opportunities received from a network contact (A) is higher 
than the percentage received unsolicited (B), so that A>B. 
 
The second hypothesis refers to the same question as the first, this time though relating to 
deal flow quality, i.e., to those investment opportunities that actually get funded by the 
VCs. For the US, it has been found that most deals that are funded, came by referral.555 
For the German market, there is no such data. The argumentation is similar to the one 
developed for HI 1: Based on social capital theory, that trust in norms of behavior is the 
basic underlying mechanism that makes collaboration possible,556 it should follow for 
VCs and their general contact network, that only those deals get referred, which probably 
meet the quality criteria of the VC. This is due to the fact, that, if a source out of the 
contact network frequently refers bad quality deals to a VC, the VC will probably lose 
interest in the relationship it has to that specific referrer and sanction him by exclusion 
from future transactions.557 Therefore, two assumptions can be made: The VC has trust in 
                                              
554  If HI 1 will be confirmed, this would be in line with the findings for the US market, however, it would 
go against the findings for the German market.  
555  However, the study was based on a fairly small sample size of 18 VCs. See Fried/Hisrich (1994), pp. 31 f. 
556  Refer back to section 3.3.3.5. 
557  Although, for example, referrers such as lawyers or consultants do not directly invest with VCs, it 
would still be negative for their reputation if they were known for frequently referring bad deals. If they 
frequently did so, the VC could sanction them by not collaborating with them in the future. 
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the norms of behavior, i.e., trust in the referrers' judgment and trust in that no bad deals 
are referred.558 And, the referrers can be assumed to know well the investment criteria of 
the VCs. 
If confirmed, the result would be in line with the empirical finding of Fried and Hisrich 
(1994) for the US market, and would lead to the conclusion that the contact network of 
VCs in Germany is important because it delivers high-quality investment opportunities. It 
follows: 
 
HI 2: Of those investment opportunities that get funded, the percentage of investment 
opportunities received from a network contact (A') is higher than the percentage received 
unsolicited (B'), so that A'>B'. 
 
Hypothesis HI 3 is set up to evaluate, whether the contact network is more important for 
the generation of deal flow quantity, or for the generation of deal flow quality. It will 
therefore be examined, whether the percentage of referrals is higher for those investment 
opportunities that get funded (deal flow quality) compared to all investment opportunities 
received (deal flow quantity). The argumentation is analog to the one for HI 2: Since the 
referrers probably know the investment criteria of the VC and since underlying norms of 
behavior prevents the VCs' contacts to refer bad deals, the 'referred' portion of those 
investment opportunities that get funded should be higher than the 'referred' portion of all 
investment opportunities. If confirmed, the conclusion would be, that the contact network 
of VCs in Germany is important because, above all, it delivers high-quality investment 
opportunities. Therefore, it can be hypothesized: 
 
HI 3: The percentage of funded investment opportunities received from a network contact 
(A') is higher compared to the percentage of all investment opportunities received from a 
network contact (A), so that A'>A. 
Hypotheses HI 4 - HI 6 address the importance of other VCs as a source of deal flow. 
That is, the importance of the source 'Other VCs' within the contact network is compared 
to the importance of the other sources within the network (universities/research centers, 
                                              
558  See Fried/Hisrich (1994), pp. 31 f. 
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banks/investment banks, private contacts, other). Wells (1974) and Tyebjee and Bruno 
(1984) could show for the US that approximately 30% of the investment opportunities 
received, stemmed from other VCs or other professional sources.559 For the German 
market, Vater (2002) found a value of approximately 7%,560 while, at the same time, the 
respondents regarded the source 'Other VCs' as very important.561 Since these results are 
contradictory, hypothesis HI 4 relates to the question, how important the source 'Other 
VCs' is with respect to all investment opportunities received (deal flow quantity). HI 5 is 
analog to HI 4 but refers to deal flow quality, i.e., the funded investment opportunities. 
HI 6 then, again, compares deal flow quantity with deal flow quality by examining, 
whether the percentage referred by other VCs is higher for deals that get funded 
compared to all deals received. 
As derived above, most of the effort that a VC spends on generating deal flow, he will 
put into that source from which it expects to receive the highest quality of deals. If it can 
be assumed, based on the norms of behavior among VCs, that other VCs only refer those 
deals that meet the investment criteria of the VC the deal is referred to, then the highest 
quality of deals can be expected to come from the source 'Other VCs'. This, in turn, 
implies that VCs, on average, put most of their effort for deal flow generation into 
contacts to other VCs. If one can assume that the 'output' of a network source (investment 
opportunities received) depends on the effort spent on that source, then the source 'Other 
VCs' should not only deliver the most investment opportunities compared to the other 
sources, but it should also deliver deals with the highest quality.  
Note that a central aspect underlying this argumentation is based on the norms of 
behavior, i.e., that a VC only refers those deals that meet the investment criteria of the 
VC the deal is referred to. That is, the amount of social capital (prevalence of norms and 
trust) in the network VCs have among each other, enables the exchange of information on 
investment opportunities.  
                                              
559  See Wells (1974), p. 57; Tyebjee/Bruno (1984), p. 1055. 
560  In his study, Vater differentiates between several types of VCs. The one that is relevant for the present 
study ('Venture-Capital-Gesellschaften'), showed a value of approximately 13%. However, in the 
relevant group, only 7 firms are included (in addition, the other groups even show lower values). 
Therefore, it is questionable, whether the result can be used as reliable comparison for the results of the 
present study. See Vater (2002), p. 144. 
561  See Vater (2002), p. 146. 
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It can therefore be derived that, not only for deal flow quantity but also for deal flow 
quality, the source 'Other VCs' should account for the largest portion. A confirmation of 
HI 4 would lead to the conclusion, that 'Other VCs' as source of deal flow is important 
because it delivers many investment opportunities. A confirmation of HI 5 would imply 
that 'Other VCs' as source of deal flow is important because it delivers high-quality 
investment opportunities. It therefore follows: 
 
HI 4: Based on deal flow quantity and based on the deal flow sources within the contact 
network, other VCs (C) represent the largest single source, so that C > any other single 
source. 
 
HI 5: Based on deal flow quality and based on the deal flow sources within the contact 
network, other VCs (C') represent the largest single source, so that C' > any other single 
source. 
 
The final hypothesis HI 6 is set up to examine, whether the benefit of 'Other VCs' as 
source of deal flow is larger for the generation of deal flow quantity, or, for the 
generation of deal flow quality. Therefore, the percentages C' and C have to be compared. 
If C' is higher than C, consequently, above all the high-quality investment opportunities 
come from other VCs. Again, the theoretical reasoning why this can be expected is that 
the amount of social capital in the form of norms of behavior allows VCs to trust the 
referrers' judgment. This is the case because the referrer knows that if he refers bad deals, 
he will be sanctioned by being excluded from future transactions. In addition, other VCs 
probably know best the investment criteria of their peers A confirmation of HI 6 would 
lead to the conclusion that 'Other VCs' as source of deal flow is important because, above 
all, it delivers high-quality investment opportunities. Therefore, it follows:  
 
HI 6: The percentage of investment opportunities referred to by other VCs is higher 
based on deal flow quality (C') than it is based on deal flow quantity (C), so that C'>C. 
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4.2 Hypotheses on the Connection between Network Measures and Deal 
Flow 
The hypotheses on the connection between network measures and the deal flow of VCs 
aim at analyzing whether differences in the amount of social capital in the form of 
structural embeddedness in the network leads to differences in deal flow quantity or 
quality.  
This section is structured according to the independent variables used, i.e., ego-network 
measures (average strength of ties, effective size, constraint), total network measures 
(betweenness centrality, multiconnectivity), and network measures regarding the role 
analysis (gatekeeper, consultant, liaison). Hypotheses will be derived on the expected 
impact of these variables with respect to deal flow quantity and quality.562 Consequently, 
16 hypotheses will be set up, deduced on the basis of the theoretical explanations 
presented earlier. 
 
4.2.1 Ego-Network Measures 
4.2.1.1 Average Strength of Ties 
While Granovetter verified his theory based on an empirical study in an area that is 
unrelated to venture capital or financial investments, the fundamental characteristic of 
that situation was similar to the one prevailing in the syndication network of VCs: 
Basically, it is about receiving novel information. In the case Granovetter studied, it was 
information on potential job opportunities that people receive.563 In the case of the 
prevailing study, it is about information on potential investment opportunities that VCs 
receive. Recall, the findings of Granovetter hold that people that were weakly tied 
benefited from these weak ties because they delivered new information on potential job 
opportunities. This, from a theoretical perspective, is due to the fact that a triad with 
                                              
562  Recall that deal flow quantity as dependent variable is measured as the average number of investment 
opportunities received per year, multiplied with the percentage that comes out of the contact network 
and with the percentage that stems from the source 'Other VCs'. Equivalently, deal flow quality is 
measured as the average number of investment opportunities received per year, multiplied with the 
respective deal rate of the VC and with the percentage that comes out of the contact network and with 
the percentage that stems from the source 'Other VCs'. See also section 3.4.2. 
563  See Granovetter (1973), pp. 1370-1371. 
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strong ties between A and B, A and C, but not between B and C, cannot exist. Due to the 
processes of cognitive balance, in the long run, BC would occur as well.564 If this triad 
(AB, AC, but not BC) is absent, then no strong tie can be a bridge, or, consequently, all 
bridges are weak ties.565 Since these bridges are important for receiving new information, 
which is also vital for VCs with respect to information on potential investment 
opportunities, it should be followed that weakly tied VCs will have a competitive 
advantage in terms of deal flow quantity. Therefore, the argument regarding the VCs' 
syndication network holds that weak ties are beneficial because they deliver many 
investment opportunities. The amount of social capital is then inherent in the VCs' ability 
to access new information, based on their relationship structure. It follows: 
 
HII 1: A higher average strength of ties will negatively affect deal flow quantity. 
 
Strictly according to the theory on the strength of weak ties, it should also hold that, the 
weaker the average tie strength, the larger the number of investment opportunities 
received from other VCs and finally invested in. Consider the following two situations, 
which are, of course, simplified examples: 
 
A
B C D E
A
F
Case 1 Case 2
 
Figure 4.1: Two cases on tie strength566 
 
 
                                              
564  See Newcomb (1961), pp. 160 ff. Also, refer back to section 3.3.3.1. 
565  See Granovetter (1973), p. 1364. 
566  Own illustration. 
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When drawing on the tie strength argument, several elements in these two situations have 
to be imagined to be constant (or the same) for all actors: 
 
• A has a given amount of time/resources he can spend on the relationships to his 
contacts. 
• Actors B, C, D, E, and F all have a fixed number of contacts to whom A is not 
connected (these contacts all deliver the same quality of information). 
• The level of trust A has in his direct contacts is the same for all (B, C, D, E, and F). 
 
Given these conditions and exclusively looking at the tie strength, it should follow that in 
case 1, A is exposed not only to a wider supply of information. But because it is different 
(newer) information that A receives, he might also be able to extract those that are of 
interest for him. Relatively, in case 1, A does not receive a higher percentage of high-
quality information (because also the quantity of information received increases). But 
absolutely, in case 1, A is in an advantageous position because, bottom-line, the number 
of high-quality pieces of information should be higher than in case 2.567 Transferring this 
to the VCs' syndication network, it should follow: 
 
HII 2: A higher average strength of ties will negatively affect deal flow quality. 
 
4.2.1.2 Effective Size 
Effective size is a structural hole measure that indicates to what extent an actor has non-
redundant contacts in his ego-network. According to the theoretical argumentation, 
information benefits in a network structure are inherent in those network positions (held 
by actors), that are rich in non-redundant contacts.568  
Recall that effective size measures the extent to which an actor has access to different 
sources of information (in terms of other actors). In contrast, if an actor only has 
                                              
567  Of course, with growing firm size, the number of deal finally invested in should increase. In the two 
examples above, it was assumed that actor A, in both cases, has the same size (amount of resources he 
can spend). In order to control for this effect, a variable is included that captures firm size. 
568  See Burt (1992), p. 13 and pp. 51-54. 
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redundant contacts, chances are high that he will hear the same information again and 
again, and, theoretically, he will not become cognizant of any new opportunities arising 
in the network.569 Given that new information on potential investment opportunities is 
critical for VCs, logically, having non-redundant contacts can be assumed to have a 
significant impact on the VCs' ability to access new information on potential investment 
opportunities. That is, in terms of deal flow quantity, theory predicts that having more 
non-redundant contacts will positively affect the number of investment opportunities a 
VC becomes aware of. The amount of social capital is therefore expressed in the non-
redundancy of a VC's syndication contacts. Consequently, it follows: 
 
HII 3: A larger effective size will positively affect deal flow quantity. 
 
Having non-redundant contacts can also be seen as a prerequisite for achieving deal flow 
quality. That is, if a VC only had highly redundant contacts in its ego-network, 
information that flows through this ego-network is highly redundant as well. Assume an 
example of a redundant network, in which three VCs A, B, and C are all strongly 
connected with each other, so that strong ties exist linking A with B, A with C, and B 
with C. Now, of course, there could be the unlikely case that one, two, or all three VCs 
have an unlimited pool of high-quality investment opportunities they can refer to each 
other. In that case, the redundancy of their contacts would not be an issue. However, 
realistically, high-quality investment opportunities are scarce, especially in times when 
'too much money is chasing too few deals', i.e., in times when deal flow becomes even 
more important.570 It becomes obvious that actors A, B, and C would have limited 
exposure to new information on potential investment opportunities (of course, in this 
example, it is assumed that these are the only contacts they have). In contrast, assume VC 
A had another contact to VC D, to whom VCs B and C are not connected. For A, this 
would represent a non-redundant contact, which delivers, in a first sense, more 
                                              
569  Refer back to section 3.4.5.1.2. 
570 See Gompers/Lerner (2000), p. 282; Kaplan/Stein (1993), p. 313. The scarcity of high-quality 
investment opportunities in the German venture capital market has been verified by several venture 
capital managers in telephone conversations performed throughout the course of the research. As can be 
seen in figure 2.3, there is a considerable amount of capital, which has not been invested yet. This 
aspect has also been discussed with VCs and could be confirmed. 
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investment opportunities. However, by being exposed to a wider supply of potential 
deals, also the number of deals received from other VCs and finally invested in (deal flow 
quality) should also increase (in absolute terms).571 Therefore, having non-redundant 
contacts can also be assumed to be a prerequisite to access high-quality investment 
opportunities. The social capital that a VC has is, again, expressed by the non-redundancy 
of his syndication contacts, so that it follows:  
 
HII 4: A larger effective size will positively affect deal flow quality. 
 
4.2.1.3 Constraint 
Constraint is the second structural hole measure included in the analysis, however, it 
captures a different notion of the ego-network (as compared to effective size). Constraint 
measures the extent, to which an actor is dependent on other actors, or, in other words 
constrained by the relationship structure of his direct contacts. As shown in the formal 
description of the measure, constraint on an actor i is high if he invests much effort in a 
relationship to j, who is also 'used' by many others q, or, if q also devotes much effort in 
the relationship to j.572 However, as has also been explained in the examples for the 
measure, in the context of the VCs' syndication network, this measure can also be 
interpreted in a different way: If VC A is connected to VCs B and C, and A devotes much 
effort to the relationships to B and C, then the constraint of B on A will be lower, the 
more C is connected to further VCs D, E, F, etc. If C is well-connected, the measure for 
constraint will be lower. In that case, VC A should benefit from VC C because VC C has 
multiple other relationships. In contrast, if VC C is connected to those others that are also 
connected to VC A, this will slow down the decrease of the constraint measure and A 
will not benefit that much from the contact to C.573 Because being connected to well-
                                              
571  Of course, one would argue that, with growing size of the firm, it is possible to have more syndication 
relationships and that, just based on the firm's size, also deal flow quality (in absolute terms) must 
increase. To account for this effect, a variable measuring firm size (number of employees) will be 
included in the regression models to filter out the differential effect that effective size has on deal flow 
quality. 
572  See Burt (1992), pp. 54-57. 
573  See Burt (1992), p. 57. 
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connected others can be assumed to deliver a higher number of investment opportunities, 
it can be derived: 
 
HII 5: A higher constraint will negatively affect deal flow quantity. 
 
At the same time, if A is highly constrained by B, A seems to not have many other 
alternatives to interact with. Also it would be that A does not have contacts that, on their 
side, are well-connected. Therefore, chances to receive information on high-quality 
investment opportunities should be lower, the higher the constraint on A is because A 
then seems to be dependent on a few others that are not well-connected.574 Therefore, it 
follows:  
 
HII 6: A higher constraint will negatively affect deal flow quality. 
 
4.2.2 Total Network Measures 
4.2.2.1 Betweenness Centrality 
Following the theoretical reasoning on betweenness centrality, an actor is in an 
advantaged structural network position, the more often he sits between two other actors. 
Betweenness centrality measures this extent by examining all geodesic paths from each 
actor to each other actor in the network.575 The advantage for the actor that sits between 
two others lies in the fact that he can broker the contact and that he can potentially 
retrieve information that flows from the one actor to the other.576 Applied to the VCs' 
syndication network, this means that the more often a VC sits between two other VCs, 
the higher should his potential be (a) to retrieve information on potential investment 
opportunities, and (b) to control the information flow and to extract those investment 
                                              
574  Again, as was the case with effective size, the absolute deal flow quality, which is the measure in this 
study, should increase. To account for the effect of firm size on the absolute measure of deal flow 
quality, a variable for firm size will be included. Thereby, the differential effect of constraint on deal 
flow quality can be filtered out. 
575  See also the explanations of this measure in sections 3.4.4.5 and 3.4.5.2.1. 
576  See Freeman (1977), pp. 39 f. 
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opportunities that are of higher interest for him. Therefore, the amount of social capital is 
inherent in a higher betweenness centrality, which should lead to higher deal flow 
quantity, so that it follows:  
 
HII 7: Higher betweenness centrality will positively affect deal flow quantity. 
 
In the same vein, since holding a network position characterized by high betweenness 
centrality brings a VC into the favorable structural position to potentially be able to 
extract the high-quality investment opportunities, higher scores on betweenness centrality 
should also induce higher deal flow quality: 
 
HII 8: Higher betweenness centrality will positively affect deal flow quality. 
 
4.2.2.2 Multiconnectivity 
Recall that multiconnectivity is measured by the point connectivity of an actor.577 In this 
study, the average point connectivity for each actor is calculated, which is equal to the 
average number of nodes that would have to be removed in order for the focal VC not to 
be able to reach another (specific) VC. Point connectivity thereby indicates the 
vulnerability of a VC's network structure.578 The more nodes can be removed for the 
focal VC to become disconnected from another VC, the more invulnerable the network of 
that VC is. Therefore, the more alternatives a VC has to reach another VC within the 
network, or, in other words, the more often a VC has invested with different other VCs, 
the more paths in the network this focal VC will have to receive information on potential 
investment opportunities.579 This VC's network structure is consequently less vulnerable 
(and the VC is less dependent on certain network contacts), so that higher scores on 
                                              
577  Refer back to section 3.4.5.2.2. 
578 The measures of connectivity refer back to the calculation of the connectedness of graphs, i.e., entire 
networks. For early works on this measure, see Harary/Norman/Cartwright (1965), Frank (1971), Peay 
(1974). 
579  See the general argument on the benefits of having multiple paths available in Hanneman/Riddle 
(2005), chapter 7, pp. 12 f.; Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 115. 
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multiconnectivity should lead to higher deal flow quantity. The value of social capital 
therefore lies in the invulnerability of a VC's network structure. It follows: 
 
HII 9: Higher multiconnectivity will positively affect deal flow quantity. 
 
In addition, the more often a firm has invested with different other firms, the more 
exposed the focal firm will be towards a wider supply of deals. Analog to the 
argumentation on effective size and constraint, this wider supply of deals should also 
positively affect the absolute deal flow quality of the VC.580 Therefore, it can be 
assumed, that the higher the score on multiconnectivity, the higher the deal flow quality 
of that focal VC will be, so that it follows: 
 
HII 10: Higher multiconnectivity will positively affect deal flow quality. 
 
4.2.3 Role Analysis 
For the derivation of hypotheses with respect to the three different roles (gatekeeper, 
consultant, liaison), recall that the VCs will be categorized along the two dimensions 
'industry focus' and 'focus on investment stage'. When deriving the hypotheses for the 
different roles, it need not be differentiated between them because the theoretical 
rationale is the same for all three of them: In the case that a VC plays the role of a 
gatekeeper, it can control resources that come from and that flow to another subgroup.581 
Being a consultant, a VC also has a contact to a different subgroup. And playing the role 
'liaison' a VC has contact to two different subgroups. In all cases, and based on the 
structural hole theory, the VC should benefit from playing more often one of these roles 
because it has access to new information and because it has the chance to control the 
information flow. Assume that VC A is a stage specialist, i.e., it focuses on one or a few 
investment stages but it does not focus on specific industries. If that VC becomes 
                                              
580  Analog to the previous explanations on effective size and constraint, a variable for firm size will be 
included to filter out the addition effect that multiconnectivity has on deal flow quality (to exclude the 
possibility that only by growing firm size the absolute deal flow quality measure increases).  
581  Remember that the role 'gatekeeper' yields the same results as the role 'representative' in the case of 
undirected data as is the case in this study. See section 3.4.5.3. 
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cognizant of an investment opportunity that meets its focus on investment stages but 
which is in an industry that VC A is not experienced in, A might refer that deal to another 
VC B with the relevant industry focus. That is, VC B might be in a favorable position the 
more often it plays one of the roles described above because the access to outside 
subgroups might deliver benefits in terms of information on investment opportunities. In 
general, VCs should benefit from being more often in positions that represent a link 
between different subgroups. These VCs should not only benefit in terms of deal flow 
quantity, but because they can also potentially control the information flow between 
subgroups they might be able to extract those deals that are interesting for them, i.e., they 
should also benefit in terms of deal flow quality. In the case of the network considered in 
this study, relationships are equal to syndicated investments. This means that the more 
often a VC syndicates with VCs from other subgroups and thereby has access to 
information from different subgroups, the more this VC should benefit in terms of deal 
flow quantity and quality. For the three different roles and the two dependent variables 
(deal flow quantity and quality), it follows: 
 
HII 11: Being more often in a gatekeeper position will positively affect deal flow 
quantity. 
HII 12: Being more often in a gatekeeper position will positively affect deal flow quality. 
HII 13: Being more often in a consultant position will positively affect deal flow 
quantity. 
HII 14: Being more often in a consultant position will positively affect deal flow quality. 
HII 15: Being more often in a liaison position will positively affect deal flow quantity. 
HII 16: Being more often in a liaison position will positively affect deal flow quality.582 
 
                                              
582  Important to note is that, by the network analysis software, two measures for each role are calculated: The 
algorithm (a) counts the actual number of times that a VC plays a specific role, and (b) provides a 
normalized measure of this count. Because with growing size of a network it necessarily occurs that an 
actor plays one of the roles, the non-normalized counts are being compared to results that would occur if 
relations were distributed randomly. That is, given the number and the size of the subgroups, the software 
calculates many theoretical networks and compares the actually observed results (a) to the theoretical ones. 
The result of that comparison is the normalized score for the specific roles (b). By using the normalized 
measure, the researcher can be confident that the results did not occur randomly. Therefore, in this study, 
the normalized scores are used. See Hanneman/Riddle (2005), chapter 9, pp. 19-21. 
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4.3 Summary of Hypotheses 
The hypotheses derived above, including their expected signs, are summarized in the 
following overviews. In the first table, the hypotheses on the general importance of the 
contact network and of the contacts to other VCs for the generation of deal flow quantity 
and quality are presented. The second table shows the expected connection between 
network position and deal flow quantity and quality. 
 
Hypothesis Expectation
HI 1
HI 2
HI 3
HI 4
HI 5
HI 6
A>B
A'>B'
A'>A
C'>C
C>any other source
C'>any other source
 
Table 4.1: Hypotheses on the importance of the contact network583 
 
Tie strength
Effective size
Constraint
Betweenness
centrality
Multi-
connectivity
Ego-
network
measures
Total 
network
measures
Deal flow quantity Deal flow quality
Expected sign (hypothesis)
- (HII 1) - (HII 2)
+ (HII 3) + (HII 4)
- (HII 5) - (HII 6)
+ (HII 7) + (HII 8)
+ (HII 9) + (HII 10)
Independent variables
Gatekeeper
Consultant
Liaison
Role
analysis
+ (HII 11) + (HII 12)
+ (HII 13) + (HII 14)
+ (HII 15) + (HII 16)
 
Table 4.2: Hypotheses on effects of network position on deal flow quantity/quality584 
                                              
583  Own illustration. 
584  Own illustration. 
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5 Data Collection and Methodological Approach 
In order to perform the analyses as described in the research model,585 data must be 
collected for three areas: First, as basis for the formal network analysis, information 
needs to be collected on the syndication network of VCs. This means that a dataset is 
needed on investments of VCs, for which a database called VentureXpert of Thomson 
Financial has been used. The syndication network has then been analyzed with the help 
of a software package for network analysis called UCINET 6. Second, data must be 
collected on the quantity, quality, and sources of the deal flow of those VCs that are part 
of the network under consideration, i.e., of those firms that are part of the dataset, for 
which the network analysis is performed. Third, further information on certain 
characteristics of the VCs needs to be gathered that cannot be extracted from the dataset 
derived from the VentureXpert database. The information for the second and third area, 
i.e., data on deal flow and information on further characteristics has been collected by a 
questionnaire that has been sent to those VCs, which are part of the syndication network. 
While the data on investments of VCs is secondary data, the information collected on 
deal flow and on further characteristics of VCs is primary data. How the data collection 
has been performed, will be described in detail in the following sections. 
 
5.1 Data Collection 
5.1.1 Data on Investments of Venture Capital Firms 
5.1.1.1 Data Collection and Data Measurement 
As explained in section 3.2.3.2, several aspects regarding the collection and the 
measurement of network data have to be considered before any network analysis is being 
performed. 
 
Data collection: As to the data collection, there are several ways, in which network data 
can be gathered including questionnaires, interviews, experiments, observations, or 
                                              
585  See section 3.5. 
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archival records.586 For the purpose of this study, i.e., in order to collect data on 
investments of VCs,587 the most appropriate way is to use a database that contains this 
information. Of course, certain aspects regarding the validity and reliability of the 
information in the database have to be evaluated, which will be discussed further below. 
In the case of this study, the database VentureXpert from Thomson Financial has been 
used. VentureXpert contains information on investments of VCs and PEs from all over 
the world. Nevertheless, within this database, the user is able to retrieve data, based on 
certain selection criteria. For example, selections can be made regarding the nation of the 
portfolio company, the nation of the VC or PE, the investment date, or the investment 
stages that should be considered. As will be discussed below, these selection criteria will 
be used to determine the network boundaries, a necessary condition for any formal 
network analysis.588 
 
Measurement of network data: As to the measurement of network data, the unit of 
observation, the modeling unit, and the quantification of the relations require attention. 
For the purpose of this study, the unit of observation is the individual VC and its 
investment relations to other VCs. On these entities, measurements are collected.589 The 
modeling unit refers to the level, at which network data is presented, i.e., it can be 
presented on the level of individual actors, of dyads or triads, of subgroups or actor 
subsets, or of the entire network.590 The choice of the modeling unit depends on the 
research question asked. In the case of this study, the impact of network measures on deal 
flow quantity and quality on the level of individual VCs will be focused on. Nevertheless, 
as discussed earlier, also the entire network structure will be looked at as well as the 
benefits that individual VCs have due to their network position with respect to certain 
subgroups. Regarding the quantification of relations, the two dimensions directionality 
                                              
586  See Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 45. 
587  The information on investments will be collected given certain limiting criteria, i.e., information will be 
collected for a certain time period, region, and investment stages. This will be explained in detail in the 
following section. 
588  See Jansen (2003), p. 71. 
589  See Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 43. 
590  See Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 44. 
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and numeration are relevant.591 The data on the investments of VCs that can be retrieved 
from the VentureXpert database does not reveal the directionality of relations in the case 
of syndicated investments. That means, if two or more VCs jointly invested in a portfolio 
company, the data does not reflect, which VC had the role of the lead investor and which 
VC acted as co-investor.592 Neither does the database show, of course, which VC was the 
one, that initially originated the deal, i.e., that identified the investment opportunity. 
However, what the data shows are the individual VC(s) that jointly invested in a portfolio 
company. In addition, the names of the portfolio company as well as of the VCs that 
invested, are shown. That is, the dataset contains the information, in which portfolio 
company has been invested and who the one or more investors were, which are the 
necessary pieces of information for this study. 
The second dimension regarding the quantification of relations refers to the numeration, 
which can either be binary, i.e., dichotomous, or valued. In the case of binary data, 
information only exists on whether a relationship between two actors is present or absent. 
In the case of valued data, information also exists about the strength, intensity, or 
frequency of the relation.593 The original data on investments of VCs retrieved from 
VentureXpert is not valued, i.e., one can only see if a VC invested in a portfolio company 
or if it did not. However, as will be explained in detail in the following sections, the data 
originally retrieved will be prepared and formatted in a way that, with the help of the 
software package UCINET 6, matrices can be generated that transform the basic 
information into a valued matrix. In the case of this study, this valued matrix then 
contains the information, how many times two specific VCs jointly have invested in 
portfolio companies. 
However, as is common and necessary in any formal network analysis, the network 
boundaries have to be defined, being explained in the next section. 
 
                                              
591  See Scott (2000), pp. 47 f. 
592  In their study, Hochberg/Ljungqvist/Lu (2007) for example assume that the VC providing the largest 
amount is the lead investor. See Hochberg/Ljungqvist/Lu (2007), p. 259. However, in this study it is 
abstained from making this assumption because as discussions with managers from the private equity 
and venture capital industry have shown, it cannot be taken for granted that the lead investor always 
contributes the largest amount. 
593  See Scott (2000), p. 47; Wasserman/Faust (1994), pp. 44 f. 
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5.1.1.2 Definition of Network Boundaries 
One of the central challenges in social network analysis is to specify the boundaries of 
the network under consideration, i.e., to specify, which actors and which relationships 
belong to a network and which do not.594 For analyses that include small sets of actors 
such as the employees of a service station or the faculty of an academic department, the 
boundaries of the network are relatively easy to draw. In contrast, in cases with many 
actors, this issue might not be that easy to deal with. 
More specifically, there are two dimensions regarding network boundaries that have to be 
looked at. The first refers to the question, which actors to incorporate, and the second 
refers to the question, which type of relations to incorporate. Both questions can only be 
answered with respect to the research question being asked and with respect to the kind 
of analysis being performed. What that means and how it has been applied to the analysis 
of the syndication network of VCs, will be explained in the following. 
 
5.1.1.2.1 Boundaries to Define the Actors 
As to the first dimension, i.e., potential criteria to set the boundaries to define relevant 
network actors, there are several possibilities such as:595 
 
• Boundaries of organizations or groups 
• Geographic boundaries 
• Boundaries based on participation in certain events 
• Boundaries based on characteristics of actors 
• Boundaries based on the relationships of actors among each other 
 
In most cases, it is reasonable not to define network boundaries based on one criterion but 
on the basis of multiple criteria, since incorporating only one criterion might lead to a 
network, in which the enclosed actor set is defined insufficiently. For example, in an 
analysis of the relationships between start-up companies and banks the existence and also 
                                              
594  See Jansen (2003), p. 71. 
595  See Jansen (2003), pp. 71-72. 
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the absence of relations are of importance. However, if the network boundaries have only 
been set based on existing relationships among actors, the absent relations cannot be 
identified.596 Therefore, it is often advisable to use multiple criteria to specify the network 
boundaries. Laumann, Marsden and Prensky (1989) present two different approaches to 
define network boundaries. One approach, called the realist approach, identifies network 
boundaries and membership as perceived by the actors themselves.597 A second way of 
defining network boundaries is called the nominalist approach. Here, not the actors, but the 
researcher determines the criteria, who belongs to the network and who does not. In this 
case, the actors themselves do not necessarily have to share the feeling that they belong the 
same network. The approach followed in this study is the nominalist approach. 
  
To define the boundaries of the syndication network of VCs, definitions or limitations 
regarding several dimensions had to be made. These dimensions included: 
 
• Geographic focus (nation) of the portfolio companies and of the VCs 
• Type of VCs to be included, i.e., type of venture capital providers to be included 
• Time period to be considered 
• Investment stages to be considered 
 
The decision regarding the geographic focus of this study needed to be made based on 
what kind of data was available from VentureXpert. The decision referred to two 
dimensions, i.e., the nation of the VCs and of the portfolio companies. Criteria to decide 
upon these questions were feasibility and practicability with respect to the goal of this 
study, i.e., to perform a thorough and detailed network analysis while still being able to 
manage the amount of computation implied by extensively large network.598 
                                              
596 See Jansen (2003), p. 72. 
597  See Laumann/Marsden/Prensky (1989), pp. 61 ff. For example, a street corner gang consists of its 
members, however, who is member and who is not a member of the gang, is determined by whom the 
persons in the gang perceive as being members. See Wasserman/Faust (1994), pp. 31-32. 
598  Standard network analysis software packages available on the market, often show limitations when it 
comes to analyzing large networks. Also, more powerful computers would have to be used to perform 
these analyses. By 'large', networks including several thousand actors including their relationships are 
meant.  
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The questions mentioned lead to a 2x2-matrix presented below: 
 
• Investments in German 
portfolio companies
• German VCs
• Investments in German 
portfolio companies
• German VCs and non-
German VCs with
office in Germany 
during 1998-2005
• No allocation of 
investments to VC 
possible
• No allocation of 
investments to VC 
possible
1 2
3 4
VCs
German International
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Figure 5.1: Theoretical options for geographic focus of this study599 
 
There are four theoretical options that could have been chosen, two of which are, 
however, not feasible. The horizontal axis shows that either only German VCs or German 
and foreign VCs can be taken into account. The vertical axis refers to the investments, or 
portfolio companies, that are taken into account, which can also be either German or 
German and foreign ones. In order to decide, which of the four theoretical options to 
follow, it is important to compare what data exactly is needed for the analyses, and what 
data the database is able to provide. What is needed for the analyses is data on 
investments by VCs, subject to the conditions that it is discernible which individual VCs 
have invested jointly. Based on this and based on what VentureXpert is able to deliver, 
two options had to be eliminated, which is due to a reason inherent in the database: 
Although VentureXpert shows the name and nation of both, VCs and portfolio 
companies, it does only indicate, where the headquarter of the specific firm is located. 
For example, investments actually done by the Spanish office of 3i Group is, in 
VentureXpert, recorded as an investment of 3i Group Plc. That is, it is not possible to 
allocate the investments to the regional offices of VCs. Therefore, options three and four 
had to be eliminated. Option one is certainly possible, however it does only take into 
account VCs, the headquarters of which are located in Germany. What would then be 
                                              
599  Own illustration. 
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excluded from the analyses were non-German VCs that still are active in the German 
venture capital market. Since there are several key players, i.e., non-German VCs, that 
are still very active in the German market, missing them would not reflect the actual 
status of syndication relationships in the German venture capital arena. However, in order 
to best reflect the German market, it has been decided to only include those non-German 
VCs that had an office in Germany.600 Therefore, what is included in the analyses then, 
are investments in German portfolio companies, done by German VCs and those non-
German VCs that had an office in Germany during 1998-2005.601 
 
In addition to selecting the geographic focus, decisions had to be made regarding the type 
of the firm, the time period, and the investment stages. 
As to the type of the firm, it has been decided not to exclude any type of equity provider, 
since, if they fulfill the other criteria mentioned above and the further criteria that will be 
discussed below,602 and if they have invested in a German portfolio company, they are 
obviously active in the German venture capital market and should therefore not be 
excluded from the analysis. 
Regarding the time period, for which the network data should be generated, the 
development of the German venture capital market has been taken into account.603 Based 
on this development, a decision had to be made as to when to set the starting point for the 
measurement of the network data. This starting point has been set to the beginning of 
1998, since several indicators such as the funds invested, the number of inquiries of firms 
seeking equity capital, or the exits through IPOs increased significantly during that time. 
Especially the latter, i.e., the number of exits through IPOs might be a reasonable 
indicator for the market mood in the German venture capital market, since it indicates the 
general upswing and boom during that time very clearly. Since the development and 
                                              
600  It has been assumed for this analysis that, if non-German VCs (with an office in Germany) invested in 
German portfolio companies, these investments have been generated by the German office of that VC. 
601  The selection of the time period will be referred to further below. 
602  Also bear in mind that further limiting criteria will be explained below, such as the time period 
considered or the investment stages. For example, only investments will be looked at, which are 
investments in the stages seed/start-up, early stage, expansion, or later stage. Any buyouts or 
acquisitions will be excluded. Thereby it can be ensured that only VCs are taken into account that are 
active in the relevant market segments. See below. 
603  For a description of the development of the German venture capital market, see also section 2.1.2. 
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maintenance of relationships take time, and since relationships in this study are based on 
joint investments, it is advisable to take a time period into account, which is as long as 
possible. Therefore, the ending point for the measurement of the network data has been 
set to the end of 2005. 
With respect to the investment stages, VentureXpert covers a large number of transactions 
historically around the globe, so that the search criteria include a large number of stages, 
which have been and still are used in different markets at different times.604 These 
investment stages, which partially also overlap, have been grouped to six categories, 
namely seed/start-up (including seed and start-up), early stage (including early stage and 
first stage), expansion (including expansion and second stage), later stage (including third 
stage, other later stage, and bridge), buyout/acquisition (including acquisition, acquisition 
for expansion, LBO, and recapitalization/turnaround), and other (including secondary 
purchase, open market purchase, private investment in public company, and VC 
partnership).605 In detail, the investment stages are defined as follows:606 
 
Seed/Start-up: 
Seed: An investment strategy involving portfolio companies, which have not yet fully 
established commercial operations, and may also involve continued research and product 
development. 
Start-up: Financing provided to companies for product development and initial 
marketing. Companies may be in the process of being organized or have been in business 
a short time but have not sold their product commercially. 
 
Early stage: 
Early stage: An investment strategy involving investments in companies for product 
development and initial marketing, manufacturing, and sales activities. The companies 
will not yet be generating a profit. 
                                              
604  See Thomson-Financial (2006): Thomson ONE Banker, http://banker.thomsonib.com/, date of access: 
January 2006. 
605  Although partially deviating from categorizations explained before, here, the expressions and 
denotation as used by VentureXpert has been adopted in order to accurately present the categorization 
in that database. 
606  Source: Thomson-Financial (2006): Thomson ONE Banker, http://banker.thomsonib.com/, date of 
access: January 2006. 
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First stage: The first round of financing following a company's start-up phase that 
involves an institutional venture capital fund. The round is usually a step-up in valuation, 
total size, and per share price for companies whose product(s) are either in development 
or commercially available. 
 
Expansion: 
Expansion: Financing provided for the growth and expansion of an operating company, 
which may or may not be breaking even or trading profitably. Capital may be used to 
finance increased production capacity, market or product development and/or to provide 
additional working capital. 
Second stage: Working capital for the initial expansion of a company, which is producing 
and shipping and has growing accounts receivable and inventories. Although the 
company has clearly made progress, it may not yet be showing a profit. 
Later stage: 
Third stage: Funds provided for the major growth expansion of a company whose sales 
volume is increasing and which is breaking even or profitable. These funds are utilized 
for further expansion, marketing, and working capital or development of an improved 
product. 
Other later stage: A fund investment strategy involving financing for the expansion of a 
company, which is producing, shipping, and increasing its sales volume. 
Bridge: Equity financing for a company expecting to go public within six months to a year. 
 
Buyout/acquisition: 
Acquisition: The obtainment of control, possession, or ownership of a private portfolio 
company by an operating company or conglomerate. 
Acquisition for expansion: Funds provided to a firm to finance the acquisition of 
companies.  
LBO: A fund investment strategy involving the acquisition of a product or business, from 
either a public or private company, utilizing a significant amount of debt and little or no 
equity. 
Recapitalization/turnaround: Strategy involving the debt restructuring of a company in 
order to reduce its level of gearing. Turnaround more specifically refers to financing 
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provided to a company at a time of operational or financial difficulty with the intention of 
improving the company's performance. 
 
Other: 
Secondary purchase: The purchase of stocks or holding from a private investor. 
Open market purchase: This stage involves acquiring securities of companies whose 
common shares trade publicly. 
Private investment in public company: Private venture investment into a publicly traded 
company. 
VC partnership: Fund of fund investment. 
 
Based on expert interviews and based on the findings of Vater (2002) it became obvious 
that the superordinate stage 'buyout/acquisition' implies a deal flow mechanism, which is 
not the same as the one for earlier financing stages. For buyout transactions or 
acquisitions, often investment banks are the ones that generate deal flow and that locate 
investment opportunities.607 However, this is different from the aspect considered in this 
study, i.e., how the network contacts between VCs influence the deal flow for these 
firms. Therefore, only investments have been selected that are either seed/start-up, early 
stage, expansion, or later stage investments, thereby referring to what previously has been 
defined as venture capital investments.608 Also excluded from this study are investments 
falling into the category 'other'. Including this category would dilute the clear focus of 
this study on venture capital providers. 
 
Summarizing, the actors that are being incorporated in the network are defined based on 
the following criteria: 
 
• German VC or PE or non-German VC or PE that had an office in Germany during the 
time period 1998-2005 
                                              
607 See Vater (2002), p. 144. He found that, for buyout fonds, a major part of the deals stem from 
investment banks or M&A consultants. However, this is not the network that is intended to be studied 
within this work. 
608  See section 2.1.1. 
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• Investments in German portfolio companies 
• Time period from January 1, 1998 until December 31, 2005 
• All investment stages, excluding what is denoted in VentureXpert as 'buyout/ 
acquisition' and as 'other' 
• All types of venture capital providers are included, as long as they fulfill the criteria 
above. 
 
 
5.1.1.2.2 Boundaries to Define the Relationships 
In terms of the relationships that are looked at in network studies, it is important to be 
clear about several aspects. First, the type of relationship that is intended to be gathered 
needs to be defined. Second, the numeration, and third, the directionality need to be 
clarified. As discussed above, the data on the investments of the VCs is valued and 
undirected.609 As to the type of the relationships, often in network studies, potential 
relations include:610 
 
• Exchange of non-material resources such as information 
• Exchange of material resources such as lending or borrowing, etc. 
• Kinship ties 
• Friendship ties 
 
In the case of this study, the type of relationship is clearly defined by the type of data 
gathered through the VentureXpert database. Relationships show the syndication of 
investments, i.e., whether two VCs jointly invested in a portfolio company. As explained 
above, also the frequency, i.e., how often two VCs jointly invested, is measured.  
 
                                              
609  For details, see the previous section. 
610  See Jansen (2003), p. 75; Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 37. 
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5.1.1.3 Description of the Network Data Retrieved 
Based on the network boundaries, data has been retrieved from the VentureXpert 
database. What is needed, is a dataset containing investments of German and those non-
German venture capital providers that have an office in Germany or had an office in 
Germany during 1998 until 2005. To get to this point, in a first step, investments of all 
investing firms, German or non-German, have been retrieved. In a second step, this 
dataset had to be adjusted, i.e., some entries had to be eliminated, which will be explained 
below. Finally, by manual research, from all included non-German venture capital 
providers within the dataset, those that had an office in Germany during 1998 until 
2005611 had to be identified. The original dataset retrieved as in a Microsoft Excel table 
from VentureXpert contained 1,691 investments, done by German and non-German 
providers of venture capital, for the time period from January 1, 1998 until December 31, 
2005, for the investment stages seed/start-up, early stage, expansion, and later stage. In 
order to, at a later point in time, import the data into the network analysis software 
package UCINET 6, the data was set up as follows:612 
 
Investment in portfolio 
company Investor No. 1 Investor No. 2 Investor No. 3 … Investor No. 12
Investment 1 Investor 22
Investment 2 Investor 43 Investor 95 Investor 97
Investment 3 Investor 7
… … … … … …
Investment 1,691 Investor 135 Investor 150 Investor 212 … Investor 428
 
Figure 5.2: Format of dataset including investments and investors613 
 
In the original data, of course, the names of the portfolio companies as well as of the 
investors are discernable, so that it is exactly identifiable, which investor(s) invested in 
which portfolio companies. 
                                              
611  Or during any part of the time period from 1998 until 2005. 
612  The data was brought into exactly this format because this is a format that can be used as import format 
for UCINET 6. Obviously, VentureXpert does not provide its data in this format, so that considerable 
effort had to be spent on the preparation of data for the import into UCINET 6. See also further below. 
613  Own illustration. 
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The first column of the table shows the names of the portfolio companies, the further 
columns relate to the investors. Due to confidentiality reasons, an ID number has been 
assigned to both, portfolio companies and investors.  
Several adjustments had to be made to the original data as retrieved from VentureXpert. 
As to the investors, it appeared that, in the data downloaded, investors were denoted as 
'individuals', 'undisclosed investor', 'undisclosed corporate investor', 'undisclosed non-
venture firm', or 'undisclosed venture firm'. In those cases that one of these types of 
investors appeared as single investor for an investment, this entire entry, i.e., the row of 
the table, has been eliminated.614 For the total of 1,691 investments this occurred 79 
times, i.e., 2 times the sole investor was an 'undisclosed non-venture firm', 77 time the 
sole investor was an 'undisclosed venture firm'. Based on the adjustments on the side of 
the investors, 1,691-79 = 1,612 investments remained. 
As to the portfolio companies within the dataset, also some adjustments had to be made. 
In 34 cases, the data entry (row) had to be eliminated because there was no information 
receivable on these firms within VentureXpert. In four cases, although the names of the 
firms were discernable, VentureXpert did not have any further information on these 
firms. 30 cases had to be eliminated, in which the name of the portfolio company was not 
disclosed, i.e., denoted as 'undisclosed portfolio company'. After the elimination of the 34 
entries, a total of 1,612-34 = 1,578 investments remained in the dataset. 
 
                                              
614  In the cases that one of these undefined investors jointly invested in a project together with other 
investors, of whom the names were known, not the entire entry (row) but just the undefined investor 
was eliminated. The investment with the other investors, of whom the names were known, remained in 
the dataset.  
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Figure 5.3: Data adjustments based on original data retrieved615 
 
The original dataset contained 1,111 different portfolio companies. The number of 
different portfolio companies is lower than the number of investments, since one portfolio 
company can appear more than once in the dataset, i.e., those cases when the company 
received more than one round of financing. 
On the side of the investors, the dataset contains 440 different investors, i.e., providers of 
venture capital. This number includes German and non-German investors. In order to find 
out, whether the non-German VCs had an office in Germany during 1998-2005, 
additional information in VentureXpert was scanned manually as well as were the 
internet homepages of the respective firms checked. In addition, the list of VCs has been 
discussed with a representative of the BVK to verify the information. Of the 440 different 
investors, 182 were German. For the 440-182 = 258 remaining firms, 52 were identified 
that had an office in Germany during 1998-2005 or that still have one,616 leaving a list of 
182+52 = 234 investors, that, during the time period from 1998 until 2005, invested in 
                                              
615  Own illustration. 
616  No restriction is being made regarding the number of offices in Germany, i.e., firms are eligible to be 
included in the network if they had at least one office in Germany during the relevant time period. 
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German portfolio companies, and in those investment stages corresponding to what 
previously has been defined as venture capital investments. 
 
206
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* For the time period 1998-2005 or any part of it, and for the investment stages
seed/start-up, early stage, expansion, later stage
Number
of 
different 
investors
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investors
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Office in 
Germany
52
234
182
Number of 
German 
investors
Number of 
non-German
investors
with office
in Germany
Number of 
investors, 
German and 
non-German
(with office in 
Germany)*
 
Figure 5.4: Number of venture capital providers with office(s) in Germany617 
 
When incorporating only those investments, in which at least one investor was either 
German or non-German but had an office in Germany in the relevant time period, from 
the 1,578 investments, 1,448 remain, i.e., 130 investments had to be excluded from the 
analysis. These investments were done by only non-German venture capital providers, 
which did not have an office in Germany during the relevant time period. That means for 
these investors it is assumed that they were not active in the German venture capital 
market on a frequent basis and will therefore not be considered as being part of the 
syndication network among VCs in the German market. 
 
                                              
617  Based on the time period 1998-2005; own calculations and illustration. 
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Figure 5.5: Investments under consideration of geographic location of investors618 
 
The retrieved data on syndicated investments have been checked against other data 
sources.619 These include data from the BVK and another venture capital database called 
VC-facts.620 Comparisons on the basis of volume invested and number of investments led 
to the result that the data retrieved from VentureXpert is a reliable data source. However, 
besides any comparison made, which verified the data used, both other data sources could 
not have been used to perform this study. This is due to the fact that the BVK does not 
publish data on individual investments (confidentiality reasons), and that VC-facts has 
data on that level of detail available from 2003 onwards only. Therefore, VentureXpert 
represents the only source of data at all, to retrieve the data as needed. 
 
                                              
618  Own illustration. 
619  Although not applying to the present study but more to network studies, in which individual persons are 
being asked about their perceptions of network structures, for more details on the topics of measurement 
accuracy, validity, and reliability of social network data, see the studies of Killworth/Bernard (1976); 
Killworth/Bernard (1979); Bernard/Killworth (1977); Freeman/Romney (1987); Lord/Novick (1968); 
Messick (1989); Conrath/Higgins/McClean (1983); Hammer (1985). 
620  The basis for comparisons were the yearbooks of the BVK as well as aggregate data from VC-facts, 
kindly provided by its management. 
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5.1.1.4 Preparation of Data for Network Analysis 
Data downloaded from VentureXpert does not come in a format ready for network 
analysis. After the adjustments explained above have been made, the data has been grouped 
in Microsoft (MS) Excel into three tables, i.e., data on the VCs (investor profiles) , data on 
the portfolio companies (portfolio company profiles), and data on the investments 
(investment profiles including information on relevant investors). Based on these tables, an 
MS Access database has been constructed to be independent from downloads in 
VentureXpert. In addition, ID numbers have been assigned, above all, to ensure 
confidentiality vis-à-vis the VCs.621 Each VC has therefore been assigned a number, 
ranging from VC#001 to VC#440.622 The output of the MS Access database has then been 
used to import the data into UCINET 6 (network analysis software package).623 However, 
in order to import the data into UCINET 6, the so-called DL file format has been applied. A 
DL file is a file format that allows the user to specify in its header section to give certain 
instructions, how UCINET 6 should read the data below the header section.624 For 
example, it has been specified in the header section, how many different investments and 
how many different investors there are in the dataset on of the syndication network. That is, 
the present case the header section shows the information that the dataset contains 1,448 
different rows (investments) and, in total, 234 different investors. 
However, importing the network data into UCINET 6 is not the final step to prepare the 
data for a network analysis. The matrix that is required for this study needs to be a square 
actor-by-actor matrix, i.e., investor-by-investor matrix, with the values of the cells 
representing the number of interactions, i.e., the number of syndicated investments, of 
two actors. To obtain this matrix, the imported two-mode matrix is transformed into a 
one-mode matrix by a data transformation algorithm within UCINET 6. The values of the 
                                              
621  In the questionnaire, as explained later, it has been assured to the VCs that their names will not be 
disclosed. 
622  The reader may wonder why there are 440 investors incorporated in the dataset, although there are only 
234 investors that have offices in Germany or that had one during the time period from 1998-2005. The 
reason for this is that, in order to be independent from downloads from the VentureXpert database, the 
Access database contained more than the used 234 VCs and more than the 1578 investments. 
623  See Borgatti/Everett/Freeman (2002). 
624  For more options to import network data into UCINET 6, see Hanneman/Riddle (2005). 
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diagonal are set to zero, so that the matrix, which is then ready for network analysis, 
looks as follows:625 
 
VC#039 VC#296 VC#391 VC#068 VC#073 VC#029 VC#407
VC#039 0 0 3 0 0 1 1
VC#296 0 0 5 0 0 0 1
VC#391 3 5 0 2 2 1 6
VC#068 0 0 2 0 0 1 1
VC#073 0 0 2 0 0 0 1
VC#029 1 0 1 1 0 0 11
VC#407 1 1 6 1 1 11 0
 
Figure 5.6: One-mode investor-by-investor matrix as basis for the network analyses626 
 
The matrix says that, for example as expressed in row three, the VC with the number 
VC#391 has invested six times with VC#407. The data is now represented in a format, 
i.e., a valued investor-by-investor matrix, which is ready for the formal network analysis. 
 
5.1.2 Data on the Deal Flow of Venture Capital Firms 
5.1.2.1 Questionnaire as Data Collection Method 
In order to match the results from the formal network analysis with the data on deal flow 
of VCs and to examine the potential connection between these two areas, a questionnaire 
has been used to gather data on the quantity and quality of deal flow. In an elaborate 
research on formal VCs, Vater (2002) analyzed the various steps of their value chain. 
Also covered in his study, although only as one element, is the deal flow. Vater also used 
a questionnaire,627 some questions of which served as basis for the questionnaire of the 
present study. 
The foundation for the formulation of the questionnaire used in this study are the 
theoretical considerations that led to the research model explained in previous chapters as 
                                              
625  Presented here is the matrix when exported back into Excel because in the UCINET 6 output log file, 
the width of the columns is limited so that the labels of the columns cannot fully be read. When 
exported back into Excel, this problem does not exist, because the width of the columns can be adjusted. 
626  Own illustration. 
627  See Vater (2002), pp. 320 ff. 
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well as, as mentioned earlier, some of the questions used in the study of Vater (2002). 
Furthermore, the formulation of the questionnaire has been established based on a 
qualitative, preparatory study, which consisted of several conversations with scientists 
from the social network research field on the one hand side, and with managers of VCs 
on the other hand. Result of these conversations was the focusing and a further 
specification of several questions. 
These questions have been arranged in a questionnaire and have been tested in a pretest 
with managers of five different VCs that are part of the network selected. They have been 
asked to complete the questionnaire and provide feedback with regard to various aspects. 
These aspects included the time need to complete the questionnaire, the understanding of 
the questions as well as their comprehensiveness, their clarity, and their 
unambiguousness. Also, they have been asked to give an assessment of the ability and 
willingness of venture capital managers to answer the questions. Result of the pretest 
were a number of adjustments and additions to the questions, for example regarding the 
categorization of the deal flow sources.628 
Based on the qualitative preparatory study as well as based on the pretest, it could have 
been ensured that the formulation of the questions represent the content of the questions 
comprised in the questionnaire.  
The questionnaire is made up of three parts: Part one consists of a short explanation, why 
and with which goal this study is being performed. This serves the purpose to provide the 
VCs with an introduction to the content and the background of the study. Also, some tips 
and details are provided with regard to the completion of the questionnaire. The time 
need has been determined in the pretest to be approximately 15-20 minutes. Also in part 
one, receiving the results of the study has been offered as reward for the participation in 
the study. Part two consists of questions regarding the deal flow of the VC, i.e., here, 
questions are being asked with respect to the quantity and quality of deal flow as well as 
the sources of deal flow. In part three, further, more general questions are being asked, 
                                              
628  The feedback of the VCs was to further group the sources mentioned in the first version of the 
questionnaire. 
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which serve as further variables,629 or to evaluate whether the VCs included in the 
network correspond to the goal of this study.630 
 
5.1.2.2 Data Collection Process 
The basis for the survey are those VCs, for which the selection procedure has been 
described in section 5.1.1.2. As described above, included in the network are 234 firms, 
which either have their headquarters in Germany or which have an office in Germany or 
had one during the time period from 1998-2005. Based on the feedback from the 
qualitative, preparatory study and the pretest, the following procedure for the data 
collection through the questionnaire has been followed: 
In a fist step, relevant contact persons in each VC have been contacted with an email 
invitation to participate in the study. Attached to this email was the questionnaire as pdf 
document. Also in this email, a username and individual password for each person 
contacted were included, in order to offer the possibility to complete the questionnaire in 
an online version.631 The respondents were offered three options to return the 
questionnaire, i.e., by completing it online, by printing out the pdf-version and sending it 
back to the fax number of the author, or by sending it by standard mail to the chair of the 
university in Aachen.632 What had to be ensured was that the author could identify, from 
which VC the questionnaire was returned, in order to match the data from the 
questionnaire with the results from the formal network analysis. To let this not be a 
problem for the respondents to answer, it has been guaranteed in the questionnaire that, of 
course, neither the names of the person that completed the questionnaire is disclosed, nor 
is it discernible, which VC answered the questionnaire. Therefore, as has been explained 
                                              
629  Such as several firm attributes used in the regression models, as will be explained further below. 
630  With the additional data, for example, it was possible to check whether the VCs focus on venture capital 
investments (recall that buyouts have been excluded).  
631  The online version of the questionnaire was generated based on the internet platform provided by the 
services of Globalpark. Globalpark is a professionally managed online survey service that offers 
students, chairs of universities, firms, and private individuals the possibility to generate a questionnaire 
online with the help of a tool provided on the platform. This tool is called 'OPST 4.0', which stands for 
Online Panel Site Tool. It offers comprehensive features for the generation, management, tracking, and 
analysis of online surveys. See www.globalpark.de or www.unipark.de. 
632  The mailing address of the chair was provided in the first part of the questionnaire. 
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above, all VCs that are part of the network, have been assigned an identification number 
(VC#...), which is used consistently throughout the study. 
In a second step, one week after the initial email invitation has been sent, a considerable 
amount of time has been invested to make telephone calls to the contact persons of the 
VCs that have received an email invitation. 
As addressee of the invitation email only those persons have been selected, who seemed 
to be able to answer the questions properly. The selection has been made upon the 
position the persons hold in the respective firm, i.e., CEOs and managers have been 
selected, who hold a leading position within the firm. To identify the relevant contact 
persons, a considerable amount of time has been spent to search through several potential 
sources: One source were private contacts to venture capital managers, who could either 
serve as respondents themselves, or who could name a colleague within their firm that is 
an adequate respondent. A second source were the directories of the European Private 
Equity & Venture Capital Association (EVCA) and the BVK that are publicly available 
on the internet.633 In these directories, the member firms of the associations are listed, 
often together with the names of the leading managers or CEO(s). A third source was the 
VentureXpert database, which also provides contact information on people working in 
the VCs, together with information such as functions, email addresses, and telephone 
numbers. However, this information is only available for part of the firms considered in 
this study. A fourth source to identify the appropriate contact persons was an intensive 
research of the VCs' homepages. Most often, the firms provide the names, functions, 
email addresses, and sometimes also the direct telephone numbers of the managers. 
Based on these sources, a comprehensive list of all 234 VCs with appropriate contact 
persons, telephone numbers, and email addresses has been generated. For a minor part of 
the 234 firms though, no contact person could be identified. In these cases, the email 
invitation has been sent to the general email address of the firm.634 
                                              
633  See www.evca.com and www.bvk-ev.de. 
634  This could be done because part of the data collection process was to make telephone calls to the firms 
if no questionnaire was returned after one week. In the cases, in which the email invitation has been sent 
to the general email address of the firm, in the first telephone call it has been asked for an appropriate 
contact person and an invitation email was sent again directly to this person. 
Data Collection and Methodological Approach 
 
183
As stated above, after the initial email invitation, the contact persons of those firms that 
have not reacted to the email, have been called by telephone in order to check whether 
they are interested in the study and will participate or not.  
 
Data collection via the questionnaire has been performed between March and May 2006. 
Out of the 234 firms, to 23 firms no contact could be established because there was neither 
a reaction to the initial email, nor were multiple telephone calls answered. Consequently, 
211 VCs remained that have been contacted within this empirical research.From these 211 
firms, 127 questionnaires have been returned, of which 84 (66%) were completed online, 
36 (28%) were sent back by telefax, and 7 (6%) were returned by standard mail. The 'gross' 
return rate is therefore 60.2%, which is a remarkable result for an empirical research in the 
field of venture capital. To a large extent, this high return rate could be realized by the 
extensive effort spent on telephone calls to the venture capital managers.635 
Since it was important for the empirical analyses that the questionnaires were filled out as 
completely as possible, 2 out of the 127 received questionnaires had to be eliminated, so 
that 125 questionnaires remained.  
5.2 Statistics in Social Network Analysis 
In this section, first a few introductory comments have to be made on how statistical 
methods are applied to the research field of social network analysis. Then, a brief 
overview of the goals of analysis of these methods is presented. Finally, multivariate 
regression analysis as the method used in this study will be explained in more detail. 
 
5.2.1 Introductory Notes to Using Statistics in Social Network Analysis 
The development and application of statistical methods to social network analysis is a 
cutting-edge topic in network research.636 Some introductory comments have to be made 
                                              
635  Obviously, that the researcher makes the effort to call each potential respondent individually, was 
perceived as a positive signal, which has been rewarded by participation in the research. This has 
actually been stated by several venture capital managers during the numerous telephone calls. 
636  Statistical analysis of network data root back to the application in the research field of geography and 
diffusion of diseases during the 1940's and 1950's. For examples, see the development of the joint count 
statistic of Moran (1948), of the autocorrelation statistic developed by Moran (1950) and Geary (1954), 
or the quadratic statistic measure (today's quadratic assignment procedure) by Mantel (1967). 
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to understand how the methodical approach of inferential statistics in social network 
analysis looks like.  
In standard statistics, society is seen as the aggregate of individuals, which are independent 
from each other. The unit of analysis is the individual, who has certain attributes such as 
age, income, sex, etc. Normally, these attributes are regarded as the cause for certain 
behaviors.637 Therefore, datasets commonly used in standard statistics are two-mode 
matrices with one mode being the individuals and the other mode being the attributes. In 
social network analysis, things are different. As explained before, individuals, neutrally 
denoted as actors, are embedded in systems of social relations or social structures. The 
units of analysis are the actors together with the relationships that exist among them, and 
based on these relationships, actors influence each other. Datasets are one-mode matrices, 
for example actor-by-actor matrices, showing the relationships between them.638 
When it comes to analyze social networks with the help of statistical methods, the 
measures (for example a p-value) that are calculated are basically the same, however, the 
way how these measures are derived, are different from the standard statistical 
procedures. The reason for this is that standard statistical methods are based on, among 
others, the two main conditions, i.e., that (a) the observations that are examined are 
independent of each other and (b) the observations are normally distributed.639 When 
calculating network measures, these conditions are both not satisfied. Since in a network, 
actors are connected to each other by relationships, they are not independent of each 
other anymore.640 Their connectedness is also the reason for the (mostly) non-normal 
distribution of variables measured.641 Therefore, the formulae for standard statistical 
measures cannot be applied, because the above conditions are not met and results would 
therefore be erroneous.642 
                                              
637  See Schwarze (2005), pp. 15 ff. 
638  See Jansen (2003), pp. 99-103. 
639  Here, it is referred to those conditions that are frequently violated in social network datasets. 
640  See Dow/Burton/White (1982), p. 170. 
641  If relationships in a network are distributed unequally among the actors, the network measures that are 
calculated based on the relationships are also distributed unequally. In such a case, the normality 
assumption does not hold. As will be seen later on, the relationships in the VCs' syndication network are 
distributed fairly unequally, so that statistical methods that do not make the normality assumption are 
required. 
642  See Krackhardt (1988), p. 361. 
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Nevertheless, there are two basic possibilities, with which statistical methods can be 
applied to networks. Obviously, one way is, that the networks under consideration are 
simply different networks, and thereby the actors are independent of each other. 
However, it is also possible to apply statistics to only one network: The procedure used is 
that the empirically observed structure of the network is compared to a theoretically 
expected structure. This method reverts to random matrix permutations. That is, the 
empirically observed matrix is being permuted hundreds or thousands of times. Then the 
empirically observed results are compared to those that can be observed in the permuted 
matrices. For example, the probability with which a certain result such as a regression 
coefficient occurs is calculated based on the comparison of the empirical result with the 
theoretical result of the permuted matrices. If 5% or 1% of the results based on the 
permuted matrices are the same or larger (or smaller) than the empirical result, the 
relationship between the variables can be considered statistically significant.643  
 
In order to give an impression, which kinds of statistical analyses exist in social network 
analysis, they are described in the following section. However, since it would go beyond 
the scope of this study to explain all these methods in detail, they are just briefly 
sketched. 
 
5.2.2 Overview of Statistical Methods and Selection of an Appropriate Method for 
this Study 
The basic statistical methods used in social network analysis convey different goals of 
analysis. These methods can be categorized into three groups: Group one contains 
methods used to compare different relations between the same actors. While the methods 
of group two intend to explain relationships among actors based on attributes of actors, 
the methods of group three do exactly the opposite, i.e., they try to explain attributes of 
actors based on the actors' relationships among each other. 
As to the first group, there are three analyses that can be performed. The first refers to a 
comparison between two means based on a t-test or based on the boot-strapping 
                                              
643  See Snijders/Borgatti (1999), pp. 4 f.; Hanneman/Riddle (2005), chapter 18, p. 3. The methodical 
approach is also denoted as direct bootstrap method. 
Statistics in Social Network Analysis 
 
186 
method.644 The second is based on the so-called quadratic assignment procedure (QAP),645 
with which it can be tested whether a correlation exists between two relationships. Assume, 
for example, that there are two matrices, each containing the same set of actors. In matrix 
one, it is shown, whether the actors have a friendship relationship, and in matrix two, it is 
shown whether two actors live in the same village.646 With the help of the QAP correlation 
procedure, it can now be tested whether the relationship 'living in the same village' goes 
along with having a friendship tie. Third, QAP analysis can also be applied in the form of a 
regression between two relations, i.e., between two matrices. 
The second group of methods refers to explaining relationships among actors by attributes 
of the actors. These methods all base on the notion of homophily. Recall that homophily 
expresses that 'birds of a feather flock together', i.e., that actors, who are similar in terms of 
attributes, are likely to share a relation.647 There are three methods in this group: While in 
the so-called joint count analysis, the densities of relationships within the networks of two 
groups of actors (of one network) are compared, in contingency analysis the densities of 
relationships within and between multiple groups are compared.648 With the help of the 
third method, i.e., the Moran/Geary statistic, also denoted as autocorrelation, it can be 
tested whether more similar actors (based on an attribute) are closer to each other in the 
network. This method also draws on the concept of homophily.649 
The methods contained in the third group relate to explaining attributes of actors based on 
relationships. Basically, there are two kinds of analyses, which are commonly applied. 
One is the comparison of means, based on a t-test or based on the boot-strapping method. 
The other one refers to regressions, either bivariate or multivariate. In these regressions, 
network measures serve as independent variables, and actor attributes serve as dependent 
                                              
644  See, for example, Snijders/Borgatti (1999), pp. 3 ff. 
645  In the QAP analysis, first, the Pearson correlation coefficient is calculated, and then, according to the 
previously described procedure, the empirical matrix is permuted to derive test statistics on the 
statistical significance. For the development of this method, see Mantel (1967). 
646  In social network analysis, it is important to understand that attributes of actors as relationships: That 
two actors are living in the same village, for network researchers this means, that they share the 
relationship to live in the same village. That is, in an actor-by-actor matrix, a 1 would indicate that two 
actors live in the same village, a 0 would indicate that they do not. 
647  For homophily theory, see the seminal work of McPherson/Smith-Lovin/Cook (2001). 
648  For these analyses, see for example Cliff/Ord (1973). 
649  For the development of this measure, see Moran (1950) and Geary (1954). 
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variables. Again, as explained before, since the actors and the derived observations are 
not independent of each other and are not normally distributed, the method being used is 
that the empirical vectors of the matrices are permuted randomly and thousands of times. 
The statistics observed in these permuted matrices are then used to be compared against 
the empirical observations to derive statistical measures, for example such as the 
probability for the occurrence of a regression coefficient of certain value.650  
 
5.2.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis for Social Network Data 
As becomes obvious, the appropriate method to be applied in this study is multivariate 
regression analysis, since the goal of this study is to explain two attributes of the actors 
(quantity and quality of deal flow) on the basis of network measures. In this study, a 
linear regression model is applied, which is based on the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
method.651 However, the technique that is used is somewhat different from those used in 
standard statistics, which is due to the non-conformity with the conditions regarding the 
independence of observations and normality of the distribution. How the algorithm 
works, that is used to estimate standard errors and to derive the statistics of interest, is 
explained in the next section. Following this next section, it will be shown, which 
measures are used to specify the model. 
 
5.2.3.1 Estimation Technique and Significance Tests 
In statistical analysis of social network data, the permutation method is used to estimate 
standard errors and derive assessments of significance of the model and the coefficients. 
Instead of using standard statistics formulae and in order to not have to rely on the 
independence of observations and the normal distribution,652 the permutation algorithm 
                                              
650  See Hanneman/Riddle (2005), chapter 18, pp. 3-5. 
651  Standard software for analyzing networks only deliver OLS regressions. OLS normally requires some 
basic conditions to be met, which have been extensively discussed in literature and should therefore not be 
repeated here. These include, for example, that the error terms follow a normal distribution. For a further 
discussion, see for example Hayashi (2000). However, as explained above, the permutation method 
applied in social network statistics makes possible that the OLS conditions do not have to be met. 
652  Also the normality assumption is circumvented by using the method of matrix permutations. 
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proceeds in two steps. First, a (multivariate) regression across the corresponding cells of 
the dependent and the independent variable(s) is performed. In the second step, the 
algorithm randomly permutes the elements of the dependent vector and recomputes the 
regression, storing the derived statistics for each analysis. This step is repeated thousands 
of times. The algorithm is set to permute the matrices 1,000 times by default. The larger 
the number chose, the more reliable the results are (and the longer it takes for the 
computer to calculate). In the case of this study, in order to derive reliable results for the 
standard errors and the significance tests, the number of random permutations has been 
set to 20.000. Although this drove calculation time up, ensuring the reliability of the 
results was felt to be more important. Based on these permutations, the standard errors for 
the statistics of interest are derived. For each coefficient, the algorithm then counts the 
proportion of random permutations that yield a coefficient as large (or as small) as the 
one derived in step 1. Based on this procedure, p-values are calculated that indicate the 
probability with which the derived results occur.653 
 
5.2.3.2 Model Specification 
In this study, an approach has been selected to identify the differential effects that 
network measures have for explaining the dependent variables. Therefore, first, a model 
is being calculated that includes the firm attributes only, then the single network 
measures are being added to identify their additional individual explanatory power.654 
Also, with this procedure it is possible to test the theoretically derived hypotheses, i.e., 
the expected impact of network measures on deal flow quantity and quality.  
Based on multivariate regressions, several statistics are calculated. These include the 
overall model R2 as an indicator for the goodness-of-fit of the models. R2 thereby 
indicates, what percentage of the variance of the dependent variable can be explained by 
the model. Also, an adjusted R2 is derived, which adjusts the unadjusted R2 for the effect 
that the simple addition of independent variables to the model increases the unadjusted 
R2. The significance of these results is evaluated based on an F-test. In addition and, as 
                                              
653  See Borgatti/Everett/Freeman (2002). 
654  This is a common approach in statistical analyses of relationship networks. See for example 
Hochberg/Ljungqvist/Lu (2007), p. 271. 
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explained, based on matrix permutations, the statistical significance or robustness in form 
of a p-value is provided, along with the slope coefficients for each variable. With respect 
to the slope coefficient, also a standardized regression coefficient is calculated, which 
serves as an indicator for the relative explanatory power of each (independent) variable, 
compared to the others. Formally, the standardized regression coefficient for variable i is 
given by 
 
Formula 5.1: 
y
xi
istd s
sbß =  
 
with ßstd representing the standardized regression coefficient, bi denoting the regression 
coefficient of the independent variable i, sxi being the standard deviation of the 
independent variable i, and sy denoting the standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
Also, for each independent variable, the statistical significance in form of a probability is 
calculated, again using permutation tests.655  
Since the independent variables are derived from one network of actors, chances are high 
that there exists some extent of collinearity between the variables. Correlation among 
network measures is usually higher than of variables used in non-network analyses. 
Potential multicollinearity issues among the variables are detected based on the 
examination of the correlation matrix. 
When using the OLS method, the researcher has to be aware that this method is relatively 
sensitive to outliers.656 Therefore, the data needs to be analyzed regarding the presence of 
outliers, which have to be eliminated. To do this, the theorem of Tchebycheff is applied. 
Tchebycheff's theorem of inequalities has been discussed extensively in academic 
literature. Tchebycheff, a Russian mathematician (1821-1894) showed that, for any 
number of observations N, N*(1-1/k2) of the observations are in the range of k standard 
                                              
655  See Hanneman/Riddle (2005), chapter 18, p. 5. These analysis explained above are all provided by the 
social network analysis software package UCINET 6. See Borgatti/Everett/Freeman (2002). 
656  In the field of statistics research, methods also have been developed to cope with problems such as 
outliers. These fairly underused methods relate to the so-called 'robust statistics' or 'robust regression'. 
However, since in the network analysis software, these methods are not provided (as they are not in 
many statistics textbooks), they are not applied. Therefore, the identification of outliers in this analysis 
has been given special attention. 
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deviations from the mean. This holds for any distribution, also non-normal ones.657 Due 
to its applicability to variables, which are not normally distributed, the theorem will be 
applied. Several outliers have been identified and eliminated, as will be seen in the 
sections below.  
 
In order to check for the robustness of the results derived, several alternative regression 
models will be calculated. These models are based on two different time periods, i.e., 
1998-2001 and 2002-2005. The split between the time periods reflects the development 
of the venture capital market in Germany, which experienced an upswing until 2001 and 
a significant downturn from 2002 onwards. Consequently, it will be analyzed, whether 
the results are robust if regressions are performed for the time period characterized by the 
upswing and for the time period characterized by the downturn.658 In addition to 
robustness checks based on different time periods, further regression models will be 
calculated with respect to a subsample of the VCs included in the network in order to 
evaluate whether the results for the subsample are the same as for the full models. 
Therefore, six different robustness checks are being performed: Regression models for 
the time period from 1998-2001 and from 2002-2005 as well as for the subsample for 
deal flow quantity and for deal flow quality. Based on the various variables included, this 
results in 36 different regression models that are used to test the results for the full 
models. 
The empirical design of the multivariate regression analysis is summarized below: 
 
                                              
657  The theorem refers back to the works of Tchebycheff. See, for example, Tchebycheff (1867), pp. 177-
184; Tchebycheff (1874), pp. 157-160. Tchebycheff developed this theorem together with Bienaymé, 
see Bienaymé (1853). See also early discussions of the theorem in Bernstein (1927), Berge (1937), 
Birnbaum/Raymond/Zuckerman (1947), Kendall/Sundrum (1953), Smith (1955), Mallows (1956). For 
its applicability, see Sachs (1978), p. 54 and p. 219. 
658  Using different time periods as a basis for robustness tests also eliminates or at least reduces the 
potential problem of endogeneity of the variables. While the chosen approach represents an appropriate 
solution to minimize the potential endogeneity problem, in addition, the presence of endogeneity is not 
expected. This is due to the fact that the theoretically deduced hypotheses indicate that network 
positions have an effect on deal flow and not vice versa. 
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Estimation Technique Multivariate linear OLS regression analysis, using random permutation method to 
estimate standard errors and derive tests for significance
Modeling approach Calculation of base case (firm attributes), individual addition of network measures 
to detect differential effects on dependent variables
Dependent variables Deal flow quantity and deal flow quality
Independent variables Firm attributes: Average number of employees, age, number of offices, systematic 
measurement of deal flow
Ego-network measures: Average tie strength, effective size, constraint
Total network measures: Betweenness centrality, multiconnectivity
Role analysis measures: Gatekeeper, consultant, liaison
Outliers Detection and elimination of outliers based on Tchebycheff theorem (mean +/- four 
standard deviations for any distribution)
Model specification 
criteria
Overall significance: F-test
Coefficient significance: p -values based on random permutation
Goodness-of-fit: R2 and adjusted R2
Robustness Checks Multivariate regressions for time periods 1998-2001 and 2002-2005; multivariate 
regressions for subsample of VCs
 
Table 5.1: Overview of empirical design of multivariate regression analysis659 
                                              
659  Own illustration. 
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6 Results of the Empirical Study 
In this chapter, the results of the empirical study on the syndication network of VCs are 
reported. The chapter is organized according to the structure of the hypotheses derived: 
First, the results regarding the general importance of the contact network and of the 
source ‘Other VCs’ for the generation of deal flow quantity and quality will be described 
(section 6.1). Second, as explained above, in order to examine the network position of 
individual VCs and the effect on the VCs' ability to generate deal flow, the entire network 
structure needs to be characterized (section 6.2). This includes the necessary step of 
dissecting the network into its components as well as the description of the entire 
network structure to evaluate whether the amount of social capital inherent in the network 
is distributed equally or unequally. Afterwards, the results regarding the potential 
connection between the independent variables (ego-network measures, total network 
measures, and measures derived based on the role analysis) and the quantity and quality 
of deal flow will be reported (section 6.3).  
 
6.1 General Importance of the Contact Network and of Other Venture 
Capital Firms as Source of Deal Flow 
In the following, the descriptive statistics including the mean, median, minimum and 
maximum values will be presented. The measures under consideration are the percentages 
denoted as A, B, C, A', B', and C'.660 The descriptive statistics look as follows:  
 
Measure A B C A' B' C'
Mean 55 45 35 85 15 42
Median 50 50 30 90 10 35
Minimum 5 0 0 10 0 0
Maximum 100 95 100 100 90 100  
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics for measures A, B, C, A', B', C' (N=125)661 
 
                                              
660  Refer back to figure 3.7 in section 3.4.2 and to section 4.1 for the definition of these figures and the 
derived hypotheses. 
661  Own calculations and illustration. 
Results of the Empirical Study 
 
193
Measure A is the percentage of the average number of investment opportunities received 
per year, which stem from a network contact. The mean value is 55%, the median is 50%. 
This shows that, based on deal flow quantity (average number of investment 
opportunities received per year), the percentage received from a contact out of the contact 
network is slightly higher than the percentage received unsolicited. The distribution of 
percentages across the VCs ranges from a minimum value of 5% to a maximum value of 
100%, showing that there are large differences among VCs in terms of what percentage 
of the investment opportunities received come out of the contact network and what 
percentage comes unsolicited. The values for measure B do not need to be explained, 
since they simply are the remainders of the values for measure A (the same applies to B' 
with respect to A'). Measure C shows, to what extent the average number of investment 
opportunities received per year come from other VCs. The mean value is 35%, the 
median is 30%, with a minimum value of 0% and a maximum value of 100%. These 
values show that the source 'Other VCs' accounts for a fairly large percentage of the total 
average number of investment opportunities received per year. The measures A', B', and 
C' refer to the equivalent percentages, but are based on the deal flow quality measure. Of 
those investment opportunities finally invested in, 85% were referred to the VC by a 
network contact. The median value is even higher with 90%. The minimum value is 10% 
and the maximum value is 100%, again showing the large discrepancies among individual 
VCs in the network under consideration. Measure C' refers to the percentage of funded 
investment opportunities, that stem from other VCs. The mean is 42% with a median of 
35%, showing that a significant part of the finally funded investment opportunities 
originally were referred to the firm through another VC. Again, the minimum value of 0% 
and the maximum value of 100% show the large differences among individual firms. 
6.2 Characterization of the Entire Network Structure 
6.2.1 Components of the Network 
At the beginning of a network analysis and as a precondition for many algorithms within 
formal network analysis, the network has to be dissected into its components. Recall that, 
in a component (connected graph), each actor can reach all other actors either directly or 
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indirectly by any path length.662 The syndication network of VCs in Germany (of 234 
firms analyzed) consists of 54 components, as displayed in the following table: 
 
Component Number of VCs within component
1 172 (main component)
2 4
3-8 2
9-54 1 (isolates)  
Table 6.2: Components and number of firms within components (N=234) 663 
 
Component one is comprised of 172 VCs and is called the main component. In this group 
of VCs, each VC can reach each of the other VCs by some path through the network. 
Component two consists of four firms, components three to eight consist of two firms 
each, and components nine to 54 each consist of one VC. The latter are also denoted as 
the so-called isolates because they are not connected to any other node in the network. In 
the context of syndicated investments this does not mean that these firms have not 
invested but it means that these firms only have invested alone, i.e., none of their 
investments was syndicated. For the calculation of many network measures, it is 
necessary to perform the analysis on the basis of a connected graph, i.e., in this case, the 
main component. Therefore, those VCs not belonging to the main component have to be 
excluded from the analysis.  
 
At this point, it is abstained from presenting a picture of the graph of the main 
component. This is due to the fact that the graph would show a very complex network 
structure with many points (VCs) and lines connecting the points (co-investment 
relationships among VCs). It basically looks like a big yarn ball, and just based on this 
picture it would not be possible to quantitatively measure single network measures or to 
capture whether single VCs have positional advantages in terms of deal flow. 
 
In the next sections, the measures explained earlier (density, transitivity, clustering, 
centrality) are used to characterize the entire network structure. Based on these measures 
                                              
662  Refer back to section 3.4.4.1. 
663  Own analysis. 
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(a) one gets an understanding of the network structure in general, and (b) it is possible to 
assess whether the amount of social capital inherent in the entire network is distributed 
equally or unequally among the actors. 
 
An introductory comment has to be made with respect to all following sections: The main 
component consists of 172 VCs. If network measures are calculated (either for the entire 
network or for the individual VCs) these calculations have to be performed on the basis 
of these 172 VCs. Now, the response to the questionnaire survey was 125 usable 
questionnaires. Out of these 125 VCs that returned a questionnaire, 92 belong to the main 
component. Therefore, when characterizing the entire network structure (following 
sections), the results for the main component (172 VCs) will be shown. However, 
afterwards, when bringing together the network measures with deal flow data (which 
were gathered in the questionnaire), these calculations (descriptive statistics, multivariate 
regressions) can be performed for the 92 VCs only,664 because these have returned a 
questionnaire and belong to the main component.  
The following sections on the characteristics of the entire network structure are, as 
explained, based on the 172 VCs of the main component. 
 
6.2.2 Density 
As explained in section 3.4.4.2, density on the level of the entire network can be 
calculated for binary and valued data with different interpretations and implications. For 
binary data, density is interpreted as the proportion of ties present compared to the 
maximum possible number of ties. For valued data, density is the average strength of ties.  
For the main component of the VCs' syndication network, the number of possible ties is n 
x (n-1) / 2, or 172 x 171 / 2 = 14,706. The number of ties actually present is 1,210, and 
since this is a symmetric (undirected) matrix, it has to be divided by two as well, 
resulting in 605 different relations being present. This is equal to a density of 0.041, 
meaning that 4.1% of all possible dyadic ties are actually present. On the first view, 4.1% 
seems like a fairly small percentage. However, when considering the fact that relations 
                                              
664  Excluding outliers to be identified. 
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within this network are constituted based on joint investments, the result makes sense. If 
the density value for binary data in this network was very high, it would mean that 
investment relationships would need to exist between most of the firms, i.e., each VC 
would need to have invested with most of the other VCs. This, of course, is highly 
unlikely. Actually, just the opposite is the case. One would expect, that, on average, each 
VC invested with a fairly small number of the other firms. In light of this argumentation, 
the density value of 4.1% appears to be reasonable. In addition, there are several reasons 
why the density in the network under consideration can be expected to be relatively low: 
First, with increasing size of networks, density decreases. This is due to the limited 
capacity of individual actors to have relationships with other actors. In terms of the VCs, 
this limitation results from time constraints and financial constraints, i.e., the VCs do not 
have the time and the financial resources to join investments with all of the other VCs in 
the German market. Second, in kinship or friendship networks, density is usually higher 
than in professional networks. Third, a general agreement is that contact networks such as 
the syndication network require more time than networks, in which people interact, for 
example, on a sporadic basis.665 As to the second and third point, the VCs' network can 
be classified as professional contact network, i.e., the density in this network is 
supposedly low. Consequently, the density value of 4.1% is not an unexpected result. The 
standard deviation of the density is 0.199 or 19.9%, and measures the lack of 
homogeneity within the network, or the extent to which the results for the actors vary. 
This value implies that the variability among the actors is very high, i.e., the density for 
some actors is very high, while it is very low for others. In the context of the syndication 
network it means that some VCs have ties to (have invested with) many of the other 
firms, while other VCs only have ties to (have invested with) a small number of other 
firms. This already implies that the ties are distributed fairly unequally among the actors, 
which is also a first sign that chances and opportunities among firms based on their 
position in the network might be distributed unequally. This viewpoint is supported 
looking at the descriptive statistics of the density distribution. The mean is equal to the 
average number of times a VC has invested with different other firms and is equal to 7.0. 
That means, on average, each firm in the main component has jointly invested with seven 
                                              
665  See Jansen (2003), p. 95. 
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different firms. The maximum value is 71, the minimum value is 1, meaning that at least 
one firm has invested together with 71 different other firms and at least one firm has 
invested with only one other firm. Again, these numbers show a large variability in the 
distribution of the contacts in the syndication network. 
Density can also be calculated for valued data. In this case the result represents the 
average tie strength across all possible ties (not all actual ties!). The sum of the values of 
all ties, i.e., 1,014, is divided by the number of possible ties, i.e., 14,706, resulting in a 
theoretical average tie strength of 0.069 across all possible ties. Though somewhat 
theoretical, this means that each VC has invested 0.069 times with each other firm of the 
network.666 Although not being a measure normally calculated by network analysts, if 
one divides the density of the valued data by the density of the binary data, the result 
represents the average strength of the actually existing relationship:  
0.069 / 0.041 = 1.68 (or 1,014 / 605 = 1.68). This means that, on average, each tie that 
exists, has a value of 1.68, i.e., the firms that have invested together, have done so 1.68 
times, on average.667 The standard deviation for the density of the valued data is 0.469, 
again implying that there is substantial variability in the number of times that the firms 
have jointly invested. The maximum sum of all ties of one actor is 180, i.e., one firm has 
invested 180 times with other firms (including multiple times with the same ones, i.e., 
these were not 180 different firms!). The minimum sum of all ties of one actor is 1.  
Overall, an analysis of the graph's density shows that the amount of social capital in form 
of ties among VCs is distributed very unequally. This implies that probably there will 
also be substantial differences in the positional advantages of individual VCs. 
 
6.2.3 Transitivity 
As explained in section 3.4.4.3, the analysis of transitivity on the entire network might 
provide insight on the overall potential for actors to make use of structural holes. 
                                              
666  Bear in mind, that all these calculations refer to the main component, i.e., to the network that the 172 
firms have among each other.  
667  Recall that this value is calculated for the main component of 172 VCs. This value will be different 
from the one shown later on, because the descriptive statistics in the regression analyses further below 
represent the 92 firms that have participated in the survey and belong to the main component. 
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UCINET 6 provides an algorithm that examines triadic structures (and thereby 
transitivity).668  
The number of non-vacuous transitive ordered triples669 is 5,940, the number of all kinds 
of triples670 is 5,000,040. Therefore, the percentage of transitive triples of all ordered 
triples equals 0.12%, which is fairly low. However, of interest for this study is the 
percentage of all triples, in which connections AB and BC exist, but in which the 
connection AC is missing. The number of triples, in which AB and BC exist,671 is 22,394. 
Consequently, the number of triples, in which AB and BC exist but not AC, is equal to 
22,394 – 5,940 = 16,454, and the percentage of triples that represent the potential for 
structural holes is 16,454 / 22,394 = 73.5%. Here, it becomes obvious that there is a 
substantial percentage of triples that, if one connection (AC) was added, became 
transitive. This high percentage shows that there is a significant chance for actors to 
benefit from many potential structural holes. However, whether actors actually make use 
of this potential in the sense that they have more or better investment opportunities, 
remains to be seen.  
 
6.2.4 Clustering 
As explained in section 3.4.4.4, the clustering coefficient is a measure to identify the 
extent to which the entire network is characterized by dense local neighborhoods that 
actors are embedded in. There is an unweighted and a weighted version of the clustering 
coefficient. The unweighted version calculates the average of the densities of each actor's 
neighborhood, while in the weighted version, a weight is assigned according to the size of 
each actor's neighborhood. Since larger local neighborhoods are usually less dense, the 
weighted average neighborhood density is usually lower than the unweighted one.  
                                              
668  Other software packages for network analysis, such as PAJEK, provide even more sophisticated options 
to analyze triadic structures. However, for the purpose of this study, the algorithms that UCINET 6 
offers, are sufficient. 
669  A triple is called transitive, when, if connections AB and BC exist, also a connection AC exists. The triple 
is denoted as vacuously transitive, if one of the two conditions is not met, i.e., either the connection AB, 
BC, or AC does not exist. See Wasserman/Faust (1994), p. 243. Note that, in the output presented, the 
5.940 transitive triples are non-vacuous, i.e., these are triples of the form AB, BC, and AC. 
670  In which either no tie, one, two, or all three ties exist. 
671  In the output this is denoted as i ? j and j ? k. 
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In the present case, the weighted clustering coefficient is 26.5%, meaning that 26.5% of 
all possible ties in the local neighborhoods are actually existing. More meaningful in the 
context of this study, however, is the unweighted clustering coefficient, since it depicts 
how all actors, independent of the size of the neighborhood, are embedded in the network 
structure. The results show a clustering coefficient of 0.583, which means that, on 
average, the local neighborhoods of all actors show a density of 58.3%. That is, on 
average, 58.3% of all possible relations in each actor's neighborhood, are actually 
present. By itself, this value appears very high and it shows that the actors in the average 
neighborhood of a VC are very densely connected. The result becomes even more 
meaningful when being compared with the density of the entire network: In the overall 
network, only 4.1% of all possible ties are actually present, while the local neighborhoods 
are characterized by a very high density of 58.3%. This comparison implies that there are 
many dense local neighborhoods, however, probably there also exist gaps between these 
local structures. Analogously to the analysis on transitivity, this might indicate the 
existence of many structural holes and implies a large potential for actors to exploit 
positional advantages.  
 
6.2.5 Centrality 
Based on the explanations on centrality in section 3.4.4.5, betweenness centrality has 
been selected as the measure to characterize the centralization on the level of the entire 
network. The measure is based on Freeman's betweenness centrality approach.672  
The overall network centralization index is 35.68%. Recall that betweenness centrality 
for the entire network is calculated in the way that 100% would indicate the maximal 
betweenness centrality as it would be the case in a star network of the same size (172 
nodes). In order to assess whether 35.68% is a high or low value, a comparison to other 
networks would be necessary. Without any comparisons available, it can only be assumed 
that this represents a fairly significant amount of centralization. What makes more sense 
though is to look at the differences that exist among actors. The minimum betweenness 
centralization is 0 and the maximum is 5,308.87. The mean number of times that actors 
                                              
672  See Freeman (1977), pp. 39-40. 
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lie on the geodesic paths between two other actors is 153.47, however, with a standard 
deviation of 508.19. Looking at the normalized betweenness, each actor, on average, 
accounts for 1.06% of the maximum possible betweenness, which is the mean of 153.47 
divided by the maximum possible betweenness in this network, being equal to ((172)2 – 3 
x 172 + 2) / 2 = 14,535.673 While the normalized mean betweenness centrality is fairly 
low, the standard deviation is high with 3.5%. These variability data once more reveal 
very clearly that there is substantial inequality in the distribution of power among actors, 
indicating that the amount of social capital based on network positions is also distributed 
unequally among actors.  
 
6.3 Connection between Network Position, Firm Attributes, and Deal Flow 
6.3.1 Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables 
Two dependent variables have been defined, i.e., a measure for deal flow quantity and a 
measure for deal flow quality. Deal flow quantity has been operationalized as the product 
of the average number of investment opportunities received per year, the share of 
investment opportunities coming out of the contact network, and the share of investment 
opportunities coming from the source 'Other VCs'. Deal flow quality is equal to the 
product of the average number of investment opportunities received per year, the 
percentage of investment opportunities actually invested in (deal rate), the share coming 
out of the contact network, and the share of investment opportunities coming from the 
source 'Other VCs'.674 Since multivariate regression analysis based on the OLS method is 
relatively sensitive to outliers, they have been eliminated based on the previously defined 
procedure.675 Which observations, i.e., VCs, had to be excluded, will be explained in the 
following sections where relevant.676 
 
                                              
673  See the formula for normalized betweenness centrality in section 3.4.4.5. 
674  See also section 3.4.2. 
675  Refer back to section 5.2.3.2. 
676  Also, if an outlier is taken out which is farer away from the mean than +/- four standard deviations, for 
the same variable, the most extreme value at the opposite side has been taken out. 
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6.3.1.1 Deal Flow Quantity 
In order to describe the deal flow quantity measure, it is helpful to individually examine 
the three elements that are used to derive the measure. The first element is the average 
number of investment opportunities received per year by the VCs, for the time period 
from 1998 to 2005. The second element is the percentage of investment opportunities 
received from a network contact, and the third element is the share of investment 
opportunities received out of the network, which stem from the source 'Other VCs'.677 
The second and third element (percentage of deals coming out of the network and 
percentage of deals coming from other VCs) have already been described above,678 so 
that the focus here will be on the first element and on the product of all three, i.e., the 
measure for deal flow quantity. The descriptive statistics for the first element (average 
number of investment opportunities received per year) are presented below: 
 
Mean 401
Median 200
Minimum 12
Maximum 3,650  
Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics for number of investment opportunities (N=92)679 
 
The mean of the average number of investment opportunities received per year (from all 
sources) is 401. With respect to other empirical studies for the German venture capital 
market, on a first view, this value is comparably high. Schröder (1992) found an average 
number of 193 investment opportunities received,680 while Vater (2002) found an average 
number of 321. Since the study of Schröder has been performed at the beginning of the 
1990's, probably the results of Vater are more relevant as a basis for comparison. In his 
study, Vater also included firms that only invest in buyouts,681 and those firms on average 
only received 176 investment opportunities, which lowers the overall average value to 
                                              
677  As explained before, only those investment opportunities have been included, which do not fall into the 
buyout section.  
678  Refer back to section 6.1. 
679  Own calculation and illustration. 
680  See Schröder (1992), p. 162. 
681  Buyouts include management buyouts, management buyins, and leveraged buyouts. 
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321. In the present study, buyout investments have been excluded. Adapting Vater's 
results for this effect, i.e., taking out the buyout firms, the average number of investment 
opportunities received per year increases to 425. Based on this calculation, the result of 
the present study is in line with the result Vater found. 
The median value for the VCs in this study is 200. Since this value can be interpreted as 
the typical value,682 it shows that the mean of 401 is affected by outliers. However, since 
this is not the final measure for deal flow quantity, outliers are not taken out at this point, 
but, if at all, based on the final deal flow quantity measure. The descriptive statistics for 
the second and third element of the measure for deal flow quantity have been explained 
in the previous section and are therefore not repeated at this point.683 Rather, the 
descriptive statistics for the deal flow quantity measure are presented: 
 
Mean 61
Median 21
Minimum 0
Maximum 420  
Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics for the deal flow quantity measure (N=92)684 
 
Deal flow quantity is measured in absolute terms, i.e., the mean value of 61 means that, 
on average, VCs in Germany receive 61 investment opportunities per year from other 
VCs. Although the data show quite a substantial amount of variation, no outliers based on 
the definition for non-normal distributions needed to be eliminated.685 Due to this large 
1variation, it can be assumed that there might be differences in the firms' ability to access 
information on investment opportunities from other firms.  
 
                                              
682  See Wright (1997), pp. 12 f. 
683  See the descriptive statistics on measures A and C in section 6.1. 
684  Own calculations and illustration. 
685  That the maximum value still falls into this range shows that the standard deviation is fairly high. 
However, the criteria provided by the Tchebycheff theorem are fulfilled, so that the values are included. 
Anticipating the results, it has also been analyzed in separate multivariate regressions (not reported) 
whether eliminating further observations would change results. However, that could not be confirmed.  
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6.3.1.2 Deal Flow Quality 
In order to describe the measure for deal flow quality, again it is helpful to look at the 
three different elements, which are used to calculate the measure. First, this is the 
percentage of investment opportunities VCs finally invest in, i.e., the deal rate. The 
second element is the percentage of investment opportunities finally invested in, which 
come out of the contact network, and the third element is the percentage of investment 
opportunities finally invested in, which, within the contact network, stem from the source 
'Other VCs'. Again, the descriptive statistics for the second and third element will not be 
repeated, since this has already been done before.686 The descriptive statistics for the first 
element (deal rate) look as follows: 
 
Mean 4.8
Median 1.5
Minimum 0.1
Maximum 60.0  
Table 6.5: Descriptive statistics for the deal rate (N=92)687 
 
The values represent percentages, i.e., the mean value of 4.8% indicates that, on average, 
VCs in Germany invest in 4.8% of all investment opportunities they receive per year. 
These results are comparable to those found in previous studies on VCs in Germany. 
While Schröder (1992) found a deal rate of 6.3%,688 Vater (2002) found an average deal 
rate of 2.7%.689 Looking at the minimum and maximum values of 0.1% and 60% 
respectively, again, a very large variation becomes obvious. An analysis of these firms 
shows the following: Above all, governmentally funded VCs show much higher deal 
rates of between approximately 20% to up to 60%. This result, which has also been found 
by Schröder (1992), is not surprising. However, if the results are adjusted for those firms, 
i.e., if those firms are excluded from the analysis, Schröder finds an adjusted deal rate of 
                                              
686  See the descriptive statistics for measures A' and C' in section 6.1.  
687  Own calculations and illustration. 
688  See Schröder (1992), p. 162. 
689  See Vater (2002), p. 153. Again, the results of Vater have been adjusted to reflect the exclusion of firms 
that solely focus on buyout investments. 
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4.9%.690 Adjusting the results of the prevailing study for this effect, the deal rate 
decreases to an average of 2.1% with a median of 1.1%. Again, compared to the study of 
Vater, these results are very similar (2.7% deal rate in Vater's study compared to 2.1% in 
the present study). Interpreting these results, it becomes obvious that it is not only the 
deal flow quantity, but above all the quality of the deal flow that influences the business 
model of VCs. With an average deal rate of 2.1%, VCs are forced to identify and screen 
on average several hundred investment opportunities. This, however, costs time and 
energy, the reason for which it makes sense to put the focus on increasing the quality of 
deal flow, i.e., those investment opportunities that meet the criteria of the VC. Again, 
since this is not the final deal flow quality measure that enters the regression models, 
potential outliers are not taken out at this point but in the next step.  
As stated above, the descriptive statistics of the second and third element for calculating 
the measure for deal flow quality have been explained before. Therefore, the descriptive 
statistics for the deal flow quality measure are presented: 
 
Mean 2.5
Median 0.9
Minimum 0.0
Maximum 48.7  
Table 6.6: Descriptive statistics for the deal flow quality measure (N=92)691 
 
The deal flow quality measure is an index, which indicates the extent to which a firm 
receives high-quality investment opportunities from other VCs. The values are presented 
in absolute terms, which means that, on average per year, each firm receives 2.5 
investment opportunities from other VCs out of the network, in which it also finally 
invests in.692 Within these data, one outlier that significantly influenced the mean, has 
been eliminated (VC#391), together with the lowest value for this variable (VC#124).693  
                                              
690  See Schröder (1992), p. 163. 
691  Own calculations and illustration. 
692  Also, these investment opportunities are not buyout investments, but relate to the stages 'early' to 'later 
stage'.  
693  All other observations fulfill the criteria. Again, additional regressions have been performed to check 
whether the elimination of further observations would affect the results, but this could not be confirmed. 
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6.3.2 Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables 
Following the structure of the research design, the independent variables include the ego-
network measures, the total network measures, and the firm attributes. The descriptive 
statistics for these variables are described in the following. Also, the results of a test for 
multicollinearity are reported. Because the role analysis has a somewhat different 
character (analysis with respect to subgroups), it will be performed and presented in an 
own section further below (section 6.3.5). 
 
6.3.2.1 Ego-Network Measures and Total Network Measures 
The group of ego-network measures includes the average strength of ties and the 
structural hole measures, i.e., effective size and constraint. The group of total network 
measures includes betweenness centrality and multiconnectivity. The descriptive 
statistics for these measures are presented below:  
 
Average tie 
strength Effective size Constraint
Betweenness 
centrality
Multi-
connectivity
Mean 1.3 5.2 0.5 1.2 2.8
Median 1.0 2.0 0.4 0.0 2.3
Minimum 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Maximum 2.5 64.0 1.0 36.5 5.9  
Table 6.7: Descriptive statistics for ego-network/total network measures (N=92)694 
 
The average strength of ties has been defined as the degree of actors as calculated based 
on the valued dataset divided by the degree of actors as calculated based on the binary 
dataset.695 Applied to the syndication network of VCs this means, that the sum of 
syndicated investments of each firm is divided by the number of different firms the focal 
firm has invested with, resulting in the average strength of each tie. This measure 
indicates, how many times, on average, the focal VC invests with other firms, and 
thereby shows the average strength of the relations a firm has.  
                                              
694  Own calculations and illustration. 
695  For the detailed theoretical and formal derivation, see section 3.4.5.1.1.  
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As can be seen, the mean of the average tie strength is equal to 1.3, which means that, on 
average, if VCs have invested with other firms, they have done so 1.3 times. Although at 
a first glance, this number seems fairly low, one has to bear in mind that this is the 
average value of the means for each firm, i.e., an average of all firms' averages. The 
maximum value is 2.5, indicating that this specific firm has invested, on average, 2.5 
times with each of the firms it has ever invested with during the time period considered. 
The median or typical value equals 1.0, showing that, on average, VCs have invested 
once with each firm they have invested with. Again, since this is an average of all 
averages, it not surprising that this value is fairly low. 
Two structural hole measures have been defined, which are the effective size and the 
constraint for each VC. Recall that effective size measures the size of the ego-network 
minus a redundancy factor, so that it indicates the number of non-redundant contacts. In 
other words, effective size measures the number of non-redundant or different sources of 
information for the focal actor.696 In contrast, constraint measures the extent to which the 
structure of the relationships of ego's direct alters constrains ego. More simply, an actor is 
constrained if he has connections only to other actors that have themselves many 
alternatives, or reversely, an actor is in a favorable position, if he has connections to 
others that are surrounded by structural holes, of which the focal actor benefits.  
On average, the VCs of this network have an ego-network with an effective size of 5.2, 
meaning that, on average, the firms have connections to 5.2 firms in their ego-network, 
which are non-redundant. Following the idea behind effective size, this means that in the 
average ego-network there are 5.2 potential different sources of information. However, as 
is obvious from the typical value of 2.0, the mean is affected by outliers. The outlier in 
this case again is VC#391, which has been taken out together with the lowest value for 
that variable, which is VC#266.697 
The second structural hole measure is constraint. The measure ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 
meaning that the focal actor is not constrained by the structure of the relationships in the 
alters network and 1 indicating that the focal actor is maximally constrained by the 
structure of the relationships of his direct contacts. The mean value for the network of 
                                              
696  For the derivation of the measure, see also section 3.4.5.1.2. 
697  VC#391 has been eliminated already as an outlier regarding the deal flow quality measure. Refer back 
to section 6.3.1.2. 
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VCs equals 0.5, with a minimum value of 0.0 and a maximum value of 1.0. These 
statistics show that constraint, as the other independent variables, is distributed very 
unequally among the VCs. Since the median is close to the mean (0.4 compared to 0.5), a 
fairly substantial part of the VCs can be assumed to be constrained by the structure of 
their direct contacts' relationships.  
 
As to the total network measures, the fourth independent variable to be included is the 
measure for betweenness centrality. Remember that betweenness centrality measures the 
prominence of actors in a network in the sense that the algorithm counts the number of 
times that the focal actor lies on the geodesic (shortest) path between two other actors. 
The measure has been normalized to account for the size of the network, so that the 
measure indicates the percentage (of the maximum possible betweenness centrality) an 
actor accounts for.698 As has been explained before, betweenness centrality measures an 
actor's potential to broker contacts between other actors and to control the information 
flow between them.699 In the case of the syndication network of VCs, this would mean 
that firms with high scores in betweenness centrality might have an advantage in 
receiving and controlling information on potential investment opportunities.  
The average percentage (of the maximum possible betweenness) that a VC lies on the 
geodesic path connecting two other firms is 1.2%. In absolute numbers that would mean 
that, on average, a VC is 1.2% x 14,535 ≈ 170 times between two other firms.700 The 
typical value (median) and the minimum value both equal 0.0%, and the maximum value 
is 36.5%. Interpreting the mean and the median, it becomes obvious that most VCs are not 
sitting between two other firms, indicating again, that the amount of social capital in the 
form of potential to extract information is probably distributed very unequally. One outlier 
could be identified (VC#391), which has been eliminated together with the lowest value 
for that variable (VC#266). Since these are the same firms that have been eliminated as 
outliers for the variable 'effective size', no additional outliers were eliminated.  
                                              
698  For the derivation of this measure, also see section 3.4.5.2.1. 
699  See Freeman (1977), pp. 39-40. 
700  The maximum betweenness centrality occurs in a star network of the same size. Here it is ((172)2 – 
3x172) / 2 = 14,535. Actually, the number 1.2% used in the product above has been rounded and the 
actual number that an actor, on average, occurs on the geodesic path between two other firms is 153. 
See also the descriptive statistics on betweenness centrality for the entire network in section 6.2.5. 
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The second total network measure included is multiconnectivity. Recall that 
multiconnectivity, also denoted as point connectivity, is a measure for the dependency of 
the focal actor on specific others, or, in other words, for the vulnerability of the focal 
actor's network. Point connectivity shows the average number of nodes that would have 
to be removed from the network in order for the focal actor to become disconnected from 
another actor.701 The network under study represents the VCs' relationship network based 
on syndicated investments, and since the graph of the main component is connected, each 
actor can reach any other actor by some path length. The question that the point 
connectivity measure answers is, how vulnerable the network of each actor is (on 
average) with respect to the removal of nodes. 
The mean for point connectivity equals 2.8, indicating that, on average, 2.8 nodes would 
have to be removed from the network in order for one VC not to be able to reach another 
specific VC. The median or typical value is 2.3, implying that most firms are not 
connected to only one other firm. That is, if firm A was connected to only one other firm 
B (the paths from A to all other actors D, E, etc. then would go through actor B), the 
average point connectivity for firm A would equal 1.0 because only one node (firm B) 
would have to be removed in order for A not to be able to reach any other firm. 
Therefore, a median value of 2.3 indicates that most firms have multiple alternatives to 
reach other firms. However, as the minimum value of 1.0 shows, there are VCs, for 
which only one node needs to be removed in order for them to become disconnected from 
the other VCs. However, there are also firms that are fairly well-connected, i.e., the 
networks of which are relatively invulnerable with respect to the removal of nodes, 
expressed by the maximum value of 5.9.  
 
6.3.2.2 Firm Attributes 
The descriptive statistics for the firm attributes, i.e., number of employees, age, number 
of offices in Germany, and the value for systematic deal flow measurement, are presented 
below: 
 
                                              
701  For the derivation of this measure, see also section 3.4.5.2.2. 
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Employees Age Offices
Deal flow 
measurement
Mean 8.6 10.3 1.3 2.1
Median 5.0 7.0 1.0 3.0
Minimum 2.0 2.0 1.0 0.0
Maximum 30.0 133.0 5.0 3.0  
Table 6.8: Descriptive statistics for firm attributes (N=92)702 
 
The average number of employees is 8.6, with a median of 5.0. The spread between 
minimum and maximum value is fairly large, with a range of 28. In terms of offices, the 
mean and median values are quite close to each other, indicating that most VCs in the 
German market have one office. Of course, the scores for deal flow measurement range 
from zero to three, indicating that there are firms that do not systematically measure deal 
flow at all and that there are firms that track their deal flow systematically.703 One outlier for 
the firm attributes could be identified, which is the maximum value of age, being 133 
(VC#124). It has been eliminated, together with the lowest value for that variable (VC#309). 
 
Based on the individual firms' data for the dependent variables, the independent 
variables, and the firm attributes, several outliers have been eliminated (VC#124, 
VC#266, VC#309, VC#391). Therefore, from the 92 VCs relevant in the network, 88 
remain, based on which the regression analyses are performed. In several regression 
analyses performed separately and not shown in this thesis, it could be seen that these 
outliers significantly affected the results and therefore their elimination is justified. 
Several further regressions on the data excluding these outliers have been performed to 
check whether further observations had to be eliminated. However, no further 
eliminations of observations led to significantly different results. 
 
6.3.2.3 Test for Multicollinearity 
The test for multicollinearity needs to be performed, above all, for the firm attributes with 
respect to the network variables. As can be seen from table 6.9, there are no 
multicollinearity issues among these variables, highlighted in the area shaded in grey. 
                                              
702  Own calculations and illustration. 
703  Refer back to section 3.4.6 for a description of this variable. 
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The network measures (among each other) show a fairly high amount of collinearity 
(ranging between 0.459 and 0.880 in absolute values). However, two aspects are 
important in this regard: First, the results are not surprising because network measures are 
calculated based on one network, i.e., one set of actors and their relationships. All 
network measures, in some form, are calculated based on these relationships and then focus 
on different aspects regarding the relationship structure. An example explains this point: 
The correlation between tie strength and effective size is 0.613. Thus, average tie strength 
is positively associated with effective size. This is obvious because the number of direct 
contacts (degree) are used for both calculations. Nevertheless, both measures adhere to 
different arguments and capture different aspects of an actor's ego-network. While the 
average tie strength refers to the average number of times on VC invests with another firm, 
effective size captures the notion of redundancy or, better, non-redundant contacts. 
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Table 6.9: Correlation matrix for firm attributes and network measures704 
 
The second aspect, which is important regarding the correlation among the network 
measures is that collinearity among the network measures is not an issue, because they do 
not enter the same regression equation. The models used include the firm attributes and 
                                              
704  Own calculation and illustration. Already included in this table are the results for the test for 
multicollinearity for the variables gatekeeper, consultant, and liaison, referring to the role analysis. 
They will be referred to in section 6.3.5. 
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then, successively, each network measure on its own, in order to see the differential 
effects the network measures add to explaining the dependent variables.705  
 
Having explained and interpreted the descriptive statistics for the various independent 
variables, in the following sections the results of the multivariate regression analyses are 
reported. These results are the basis for answering the question, to what extent the VCs' 
differences in these variables (firm attributes and network measures) are able to explain 
the variance in the VCs' deal flow quantity and quality.  
 
6.3.3 Connection between Independent Variables and Deal Flow Quantity 
6.3.3.1 Effect of Firm Attributes and Ego-Network Measures on Deal Flow Quantity 
The independent variables used in this section include the average tie strength, the 
effective size, and the constraint, which have been calculated for each VC in the network. 
The results of multiple regression analyses are presented in the following table. Four 
models have been calculated, model 4 has the best fit. 
 
                                              
705  Although theoretically not allowed (and practically not provided in UCINET 6), another test for the 
existence of potential multicollinearity has been performed using standard regression in SPSS. The so-
called Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is calculated based on the unadjusted R2. Values for the VIF 
higher than 10 indicate beginning multicollinearity issues, largely higher values would indicate severe 
issues. However, none of the tests for the following regressions when performed in the standard way 
showed multicollinearity issues based on the VIF, so that the results can be expected to be robust in this 
dimension.  
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Employees   3.170 (0.270)*   3.303 (0.282)*   2.934 (0.250)*   2.865 (0.244)*
Age  -2.835 (-0.183)*  -2.939 (-0.190)*  -3.064 (-0.198)*  -2.319 (-0.150)
Offices   3.536 (0.040)   2.429 (0.028)   3.561 (0.040)   5.593 (0.063)
Deal flow measurement 16.040 (0.184)* 14.400 (0.165) 12.824 (0.147) 14.501 (0.166)
Tie strength 19.340 (0.090)
Effective size   3.526 (0.220)*
Constraint -69.034 (-0.250)**
Constant 22.780 2.222 17.363 53.320
R2 0.120 0.128 0.166* 0.180*
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.064 0.106* 0.121*
N 88 88 88 88
*      p <0.05; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
**    p <0.01; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
The standardized regression coefficient is presented in brackets  
Table 6.10: Regression models for ego-network measures on deal flow quantity706 
 
Overall, only two of four models are statistically significant at the level of p<0.05 
(models 3 and 4). Models 1 and 2 are statistically not significant overall, although single 
variables are at the level of p<0.05. Model 1 shows that the firm attributes alone do not 
lead to a statistically significant result overall. Nevertheless, the regression coefficients of 
the variables 'employees', 'age', and 'deal flow measurement' are statistically significant 
(p<0.05). Both, 'employees' and 'age' are significant in all models (p<0.05), except for 
'age' in model 4. The variable 'offices' is not significant in any of the models, while 'deal 
flow measurement' is in model 1 (p<0.05). Of the independent variables, i.e., 'tie 
strength', 'effective size', and 'constraint', only 'tie strength' does not show statistical 
significance. While 'effective size' is statistically significant at the p<0.05 level (model 
3), 'constraint' is significant at the level of p<0.01 (model 4). Overall, model 4 has the 
best goodness-of-fit, based on an R2 of 18.0% and an adjusted R2 of 12.1%. That is, 
18.0% (unadjusted) of the variance of deal flow quantity can be explained by the 
explanatory variables. Model 3 shows a slightly lower goodness-of-fit with an R2 of 
16.6% and an adjusted R2 of 10.6%. 
 
                                              
706  Own calculations and illustration. 
Connection between Network Position, Firm Attributes, and Deal Flow 
 
214 
6.3.3.2 Effect of Firm Attributes and Total Network Measures on Deal Flow Quantity 
The independent variables used in this section include the betweenness centrality of the 
VCs and a measure for multiconnectivity, i.e., the point connectivity. The results of 
multiple regression analyses are presented in the following table. Three models have been 
calculated, model 6 has the best goodness-of-fit. 
 
Model 1 Model 5 Model 6
Employees   3.170 (0.270)*   2.980 (0.254)*   2.819 (0.241)*
Age  -2.835 (-0.183)*  -3.067 (-0.198)*  -2.468 (-0.160)
Offices   3.536 (0.040)   3.454 (0.039)   4.740 (0.054)
Deal flow measurement 16.040 (0.184)* 13.219 (0.152) 13.488 (0.155)
Betweenness centrality   9.519 (0.176)
Multiconnectivity 14.986 (0.255)*
Constant 22.780 24.421 -14.561
R2 0.120 0.149 0.183*
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.088 0.124*
N 88 88 88
*      p <0.05; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
**    p <0.01; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
The standardized regression coefficient is presented in brackets  
Table 6.11: Regression models for total network measures on deal flow quantity707 
 
Again, model 1 represents the base case and is the same as in the previous section.708 
Models 5 shows that the variables 'employees' and 'age' are statistically significant at the 
level of p<0.05. However, as in the previous section, 'age' shows a negative regression 
coefficient. The variable 'betweenness centrality' is statistically not significant. Overall, 
models 1 and 5 are statistically not significant. This is different with model 6, in which 
the variable 'multiconnectivity' has been added. In this model, again, 'employees' 
positively affects deal flow quantity (p<0.05). 'Multiconnectivity' shows a positive 
regression coefficient, being statistically significant at the level of p<0.05. Overall, model 
6 is able to explain 18.3% (adjusted 12.4%) of the variability of deal flow quantity. 
 
                                              
707  Own calculations and illustration. 
708  The base case models (including firm attributes only) are repeated where relevant for easier 
comparison. 
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6.3.3.3 Robustness Checks on Deal Flow Quantity 
In order to test for the robustness of the results found, several additional regression 
models have been calculated. For all variables, multivariate regression models have been 
derived for the time period from 1998-2001, for the time period from 2002-2005, as well 
as for a subsample of the VCs included in the network. The subsample has been selected 
based on a segmentation of the VCs according to their foci on industries and investment 
phases.709 The results of the regressions are presented in the tables further below. 
 
As to the firm attributes, the additional models show that the results in the full model for 
the variable 'employees' are robust. In all additional models (1998-2001, 2002-2005, 
subsample), 'employees' is statistically significant at the level of p<0.05. With respect to 
the variable 'age', the robustness checks show similar results compared to the full models. 
In all additional models, the regression coefficients for 'age' are negative, and in many 
models the variable is statistically significant at the level of p<0.05 (except for models 
1b, 4b, 6b, and the ones for the subsample). The results in the full model for the variable 
'offices' are confirmed in the robustness checks: The regression coefficients are positive 
and are largely statistically insignificant in all models (except for models 1c-3c, and 5c, 
which all refer to the models on the subsample). The regression coefficients for the 
variable 'deal flow measurement' are positive as in the ones in the full models. While 
there are only three exceptions (models 2a, 3a, and 5a), the results for this variable are 
statistically insignificant in models when a network measure is included as well. 
 
 
                                              
709  For the segmentation, refer back to section 3.4.5.3 and see section 6.3.5.1 further below. 
Connection between Network Position, Firm Attributes, and Deal Flow 
 
216 
 
Table 6.12: Robustness check for 1998-2001 on deal flow quantity710 
 
 
Table 6.13: Robustness check for 2002-2005 on deal flow quantity711 
 
                                              
710  Own calculations. 
711  Own calculations. 
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a Model 5a Model 6a
Employees   2.451 (0.241)*   2.538 (0.249)*  1.439 (0.141)*      1.570 (0.154)*   1.966 (0.193)*   1.916 (0.188)*
Age -0.784 (-0.128)*  -0.842 (-0.137)* -0.820 (-0.134)*     -0.960 (-0.157)* -0.782 (-0.128)* -0.846 (-0.138)*
Offices   4.070 (0.049)   5.844 (0.071)  3.489 (0.042)      6.536 (0.079)   3.776 (0.046)   4.730 (0.057)
Deal flow measurement 17.000 (0.187)*  18.393 (0.202)* 16.143 (0.177)*     13.659 (0.150) 16.951 (0.186)* 12.554 (0.138)
Tie strength -23.371 (-0.101)
Effective size   2.769 (0.251)*
Constraint -105.493 (-0.374)**
Betweenness centrality   1.541 (0.104)
Multiconnectivity 18.275 (0.264)*
Constant 10.737 34.425 7.695 69.822 12.808 -20.969
R2 0.107 0.117 0.160* 0.235* 0.116 0.171*
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.035 0.082* 0.165* 0.034 0.094*
N 68 68 68 68 68 68
*      p <0.05; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
**    p <0.01; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
The standardized regression coefficient is presented in brackets
Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b Model 5b Model 6b
Employees   4.748 (0.282)*   5.021 (0.298)*   4.453 (0.265)*   5.113 (0.304)*   4.574 (0.272)*   4.813 (0.285)*
Age -3.523 (-0.186) -4.151 (-0.219)* -4.022 (-0.212)* -3.096 (-0.163) -3.895 (-0.205)* -3.139 (-0.165)
Offices 15.605 (0.084) 21.807 (0.118) 19.012 (0.102) 16.442 (0.088) 16.878 (0.090) 20.134 (0.108)
Deal flow measurement 21.381 (0.207)* 14.702 (0.142) 18.303 (0.177) 17.959 (0.174) 19.654 (0.190) 16.937 (0.163)
Tie strength 86.068 (0.261)*
Effective size   4.520 (0.196)*
Constraint -70.041 (-0.212)*
Betweenness centrality   4.098 (0.120)
Multiconnectivity 20.441 (0.232)*
Constant 1.374 -91.477 -6.865 35.021 1.505 -50.546
R2 0.164 0.225* 0.200* 0.206* 0.177 0.214*
Adjusted R2 0.086 0.138* 0.110* 0.116* 0.084 0.125*
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
*      p <0.05; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
**    p <0.01; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
The standardized regression coefficient is presented in brackets
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Table 6.14: Robustness check for subsample of VCs on deal flow quantity712 
 
As regards the ego-network measures included in the models, the robustness checks 
basically confirm the results for the full models. There are only two exceptions, in which 
ego-network measures are statistically significant in the additional models while they 
were not in the full model: 'Tie strength' shows statistically significant results in model 2b 
and 'betweenness centrality' shows statistical significance in model 5c. Otherwise, the 
results for the additional models are similar to the ones for the full models. This applies 
to the direction of the signs as well as to the statistical significance of the variables.  
More concretely, 'tie strength', with the only exception mentioned above, shows positive 
regression coefficients and no statistical significance in all models. 'Effective size' shows 
positive regression coefficients when included, being statistically significant at the level 
of p<0.05. The direction of the sign (negative) and the statistical significance for 
'constraint' is confirmed as well. In the model for the time period 1998-2001, results are 
even statistically significant at the level of p<0.01.  
 
With respect to the total network measures, i.e., betweenness centrality and 
multiconnectivity, the results are largely confirmed by the regression models calculated 
for the robustness checks. The variable 'betweenness centrality' shows positive regression 
coefficients but is statistically insignificant at the conventional levels. The only exception 
is model 5c, in which the variable shows statistical significance at the level of p<0.05. 
                                              
712  Own calculations. 
Model 1c Model 2c Model 3c Model 4c Model 5c Model 6c
Employees   1.818 (0.175)*   1.878 (0.181)*   1.544 (0.148)*      1.380 (0.201)*   1.560 (0.190)*   1.328 (0.198)*
Age -2.256 (-0.163) -2.153 (-0.156) -1.760 (-0.127)    -1.287 (-0.093) -2.015 (-0.146) -1.256 (-0.091)
Offices 44.476 (0.259)* 44.812 (0.261)* 35.935 (0.209)*    34.046 (0.198) 40.167 (0.184)* 31.869 (0.185)
Deal flow measurement   9.743 (0.116)   6.003 (0.071)   6.071 (0.072)      9.587 (0.114)   6.724 (0.080)   7.015 (0.083)
Tie strength 48.033 (0.165)
Effective size   5.436 (0.313)*
Constraint -100.818 (-0.374)**
Betweenness centrality 12.890 (0.227)*
Multiconnectivity 25.355 (0.425)**
Constant -8.942 -62.645 -17.266 49.541 -8.300 -58.047
R2 0.141 0.177 0.233* 0.271* 0.190 0.308**
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.076 0.139* 0.182* 0.091 0.223**
N 54 54 54 54 54 54
*      p <0.05; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
**    p <0.01; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
The standardized regression coefficient is presented in brackets
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'Multiconnectivity' is statistically highly significant in all models, either at the level of 
p<0.05 (models 6a and 6b) or at the level of p<0.01 (model 6c).  
 
Overall, the models calculated as robustness checks are similar in terms of R2 and 
adjusted R2: Models are statistically not significant when either only the firm attributes 
are included, or when 'tie strength' or 'betweenness centrality' are included. Statistically 
significant at the level of p<0.05 are those models when either 'effective size', 'constraint', 
or 'multiconnectivity' is included. The level of the R2 and the adjusted R2 is also 
approximately the same, except for models 4c and 6c (models on the subsample of VCs). 
Here, the R2 and the adjusted R2 is slightly higher as in the other models, increasing to 
27.1% (adjusted 18.2%) in model 4c ('constraint'), and to 30.8% (22.3% adjusted) in 
model 6c ('multiconnectivity').  
 
Summarizing it can be stated that, abstaining from few exceptions, the results for the full 
models on deal flow quantity have largely been confirmed by the models performed as 
robustness checks. Additional regression models as robustness checks on further 
subsamples for VCs have also been calculated (not reported), which do not materially 
alter the conclusions that will be derived in later sections.713 
 
6.3.4 Connection between Independent Variables and Deal Flow Quality 
6.3.4.1 Effect of Firm Attributes and Ego-Network Measures on Deal Flow Quality 
As in the previous sections, the independent variables regarding the ego-network 
measures include the average tie strength, the effective size, and the constraint. The 
results of multiple regression analyses are illustrated below. Four models have been 
calculated, model 9 has the best goodness-of-fit. 
 
                                              
713  Further subsamples include those groups of VCs that have an industry focus, those that have no focus 
on investment phases, and those that do have a focus on investment phases. 
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Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Employees  0.109 (0.296)*  0.117 (0.317)*  0.101 (0.273)*  0.100 (0.271)*
Age  0.019 (0.039)  0.013 (0.026)  0.010 (0.021)  0.034 (0.071)
Offices -0.133 (-0.048) -0.198 (-0.071) -0.132 (-0.048) -0.071 (-0.026)
Deal flow measurement  0.563 (0.205)*  0.467 (0.170)  0.445 (0.162)  0.516 (0.188)*
Tie strength  1.130 (0.167)
Effective size  0.129 (0.257)*
Constraint -2.090 (-0.240)*
Constant -0.102 -1.303 -0.3 0.823
R2 0.155* 0.181* 0.217* 0.210*
Adjusted R2 0.104* 0.122* 0.161* 0.153*
N 88 88 88 88
*      p <0.05; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
**    p <0.01; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
The standardized regression coefficient is presented in brackets  
Table 6.15: Regression models for ego-network measures on deal flow quality714 
 
While model 7 represents the base case for the regressions on the dependent variable 
'deal flow quality', models 8-10 show the results if one additional ego-network measure is 
included in the model. As to the firm attributes, while the variable 'employees' is positive 
and statistically significant (p<0.05), although 'deal flow measurement' is also positive, it 
is only statistically significant in models 7 and 10. 'Age' and 'offices' are both statistically 
not significant in any of the models. With respect to the ego-network measures, again, 'tie 
strength' shows a positive regression coefficient but the result is statistically not 
significant at the conventional levels. Both variables, 'effective size' and 'constraint' are 
statistically significant at the level of p<0.05, with 'effective size' being positively related 
to deal flow quality, and 'constraint' being negatively related to it.  
Overall, all four models show statistically significant results at the level of p<0.05. The 
base case model (model 7) has an R2 of 15.5% (adjusted 10.4%). Of models 8-10, model 
9 has the best goodness-of-fit with an R2 of 21.7% (adjusted 16.1%). Model 10 shows 
slightly lower results with an R2 of 21.0% (adjusted 15.3%).  
 
                                              
714  Own calculations and illustration. 
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6.3.4.2 Effect of Firm Attributes and Total Network Measures on Deal Flow Quality 
As before, the total network measures include the independent variables 'betweenness 
centrality' and 'multiconnectivity'. The results of the multivariate regression models are 
presented below. Three models have been calculated, model 12 has the best fit. 
 
Model 7 Model 11 Model 12
Employees  0.109 (0.296)* 0.101 (0.274)* 0.097 (0.263)*
Age  0.019 (0.039) 0.009 (0.018) 0.032 (0.065)
Offices -0.133 (-0.048) -0.137 (-0.049) -0.091 (-0.033)
Deal flow measurement  0.563 (0.205)* 0.442 (0.161) 0.474 (0.173)
Betweenness centrality 0.408 (0.239)*
Multiconnectivity 0.523 (0.283)**
Constant -0.102 -0.031 -1.406
R2 0.155* '0.209* 0.232**
Adjusted R2 0.104* 0.151* 0.176**
N 88 88 88
*      p <0.05; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
**    p <0.01; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
The standardized regression coefficient is presented in brackets  
Table 6.16: Regression models for total network measures on deal flow quality715 
 
While model 7 represents the base case and, of course, shows the same results as 
presented in the previous section, models 11 and 12 include 'betweenness centrality' and 
'multiconnectivity', respectively. In both models 11 and 12, while again the variable 
'employees' is statistically significant (p<0.05), no other firm attributes are. However, 
'age' shows slightly positive regression coefficients as was the case for the regressions 
including the ego-network measures. While regression coefficients for 'offices' are 
negative, those of 'deal flow measurement' are positive. In models 11 and 12, both 
'betweenness centrality' (model 11) and 'multiconnectivity' (model 12) show high 
statistical significance ('betweenness centrality' at the p<0.05 level, 'multiconnectivity' at 
the p<0.01 level). Overall, while model 11 is able to explain 20.9% (adjusted 15.1%) of 
the variance of deal flow quality, model 12 even can explain 23.2% (adjusted 17.6%). 
 
                                              
715  Own calculations and illustration. 
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6.3.4.3 Robustness Checks on Deal Flow Quality 
As was the case for deal flow quantity, also for deal flow quality several additional 
regression models have been calculated in order to test for the robustness of the results 
found. Again, for all variables, multivariate regressions have been performed for the time 
period from 1998-2001, for the time period from 2002-2005, as well as for a subsample 
of the VCs included in the network. Analogously to the previous procedure, the 
subsample has been selected based on a segmentation of the VCs according to their foci 
on industries and investment phases.716 
 
As regards the firm attributes, 'employees' shows similar results in the additional models 
as compared to the full models. The variable shows positive regression coefficients in all 
models, being statistically significant at the level of p<0.05. In contrast to the results in 
the full models, the variable 'age' still shows slightly negative regression coefficients in 
the models for the time period from 1998-2001. However, for the time period from 2001-
2002 and for the subsample of VCs, the regression coefficients are, just as in the full 
models, slightly positive and statistically insignificant. The general tendency of a sign 
shift from negative to positive for the models on deal flow quantity versus the ones on 
deal flow quality can therefore be observed. The results in the additional models for the 
variable 'offices' confirm the results found for the full models: The regression coefficients 
are negative and statistically insignificant. In the full models, the variable 'deal flow 
measurement' showed positive regression coefficient and was largely statistically 
insignificant. This is different for the additional models: While still showing positive 
regression coefficients, the 'deal flow measurement' often shows statistically significant 
results at the level of p<0.05. 
With respect to the ego-network measures, i.e., tie strength, effective size, and constraint, 
results based on the robustness checks are basically in line with the ones found in the full 
models. 'Tie strength' shows positive but statistically insignificant results. There is only 
one exception to this, which is model 8c (subsample of VCs), in which the variable is 
statistically significant at the level of p<0.05. 'Effective size' shows positive regression 
coefficients and is statistically significant at the level of p<005 in all additional models 
                                              
716  For the segmentation, refer back to section 3.4.5.3 and see section 6.3.5.1 further below. 
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where used. 'Constraint', as in the full models, shows highly negative regression 
coefficients and is statistically significant at the level of p<0.01 in models 10a and 10c, 
and at the level of p<0.05 in model 10b. Based on these results, the directionality of the 
signs as well as the statistical (in)significance of the ego-network measures included has 
largely been confirmed, so that the results of the full models can be considered robust. 
Model 7a Model 8a Model 9a Model 10a Model 11a Model 12a
Employees  0.111 (0.305)*  0.116 (0.317)*  0.104 (0.286)*  0.0946 (0.259)*  0.107 (0.293)*  0.100 (0.274)*
Age -0.052 (-0.093) -0.053 (-0.095) -0.070 (-0.125) -0.051 (-0.091) -0.054 (-0.097) -0.051 (-0.091)
Offices -0.103 (-0.039) -0.172 (-0.065) -0.102 (-0.038) -0.012 (-0.004) -0.111 (-0.042) -0.056 (-0.021)
Deal flow measurement  0.583 (0.200)*  0.516 (0.177)*  0.434 (0.149)  0.513 (0.176)*  0.503 (0.173)*  0.500 (0.172)*
Tie strength  0.953 (0.121)
Effective size  0.249 (0.289)*
Constraint -2.647 (-0.277)**
Betweenness centrality  0.267 (0.146)*
Multiconnectivity  0.711 (0.251)**
Constant 0.496 -0.472 0.229 2.085 0.502 -0.806
R2 0.145* 0.159* 0.224* 0.218* 0.166* 0.206*
Adjusted R2 0.078* 0.079* 0.150* 0.143* 0.086* 0.130*
N 68 68 68 68 68 68
*      p <0.05; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
**    p <0.01; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
The standardized regression coefficient is presented in brackets  
Table 6.17: Robustness check for 1998-2001 on deal flow quality717 
 
Model 7b Model 8b Model 9b Model 10b Model 11b Model 12b
Employees   0.191 (0.315)*  0.191 (0.315)*   0.163 (0.269)*  0.195 (0.322)*  0.173 (0.286)*  0.188 (0.310)*
Age   0.079 (0.149)  0.079 (0.148)   0.062 (0.118)  0.073 (0.139)  0.044 (0.083)  0.064 (0.121)
Offices -0.421 (-0.081) -0.415 (-0.080) -0.321 (-0.062) -0.659 (-0.127) -0.353 (-0.068) -0.518 (-0.100)
Deal flow measurement   0.615 (0.214)*  0.607 (0.212)*   0.538 (0.188)*  0.540 (0.188)*  0.575 (0.201)*  0.468 (0.163)
Tie strength  0.073 (0.008)
Effective size   0.154 (0.235)*
Constraint -2.221 (-0.225)*
Betweenness centrality  0.216 (0.236)*
Multiconnectivity  0.620 (0.267)*
Constant -0.457 -0.530 -0.766 0.942 -0.558 -1.574
R2 0.168* 0.168 0.219* 0.217* 0.218* 0.236*
Adjusted R2 0.091* 0.074 0.131* 0.128 0.129* 0.150*
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
*      p <0.05; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
**    p <0.01; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
The standardized regression coefficient is presented in brackets  
Table 6.18: Robustness check for 2002-2005 on deal flow quality718 
 
                                              
717  Own calculations. 
718  Own calculations. 
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Model 7c Model 8c Model 9c Model 10c Model 11c Model 12c
Employees   0.087 (0.279)*   0.090 (0.287)*   0.079 (0.252)*   0.077 (0.244)*   0.078 (0.250)*   0.073 (0.233)*
Age -0.001 (-0.003)   0.003 (0.007)   0.013 (0.032)   0.023 (0.055)   0.007 (0.017)   0.028 (0.067)
Offices -0.191 (-0.036) -0.177 (-0.034) -0.453 (-0.087) -0.456 (-0.087) -0.346 (-0.066) -0.564 (-0.108)
Deal flow measurement   0.243 (0.096)   0.082 (0.032)   0.131 (0.051)   0.239 (0.094)   0.135 (0.053)   0.162 (0.064)
Tie strength   2.064 (0.277)*
Effective size   0.167 (0.317)*
Constraint -2.561 (-0.313)**
Betweenness centrality   0.462 (0.269)*
Multiconnectivity   0.749 (0.414)**
Constant 0.844 -1.464 0.589 2.330 0.867 -0.607
R2 0.089 0.161 0.183* 0.180* 0.177* 0.248*
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.058 0.083* 0.089* 0.074* 0.156*
N 54 54 54 54 54 54
*      p <0.05; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
**    p <0.01; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
The standardized regression coefficient is presented in brackets  
Table 6.19: Robustness check for subsample of VCs on deal flow quality719 
 
Regarding the total network measures, both variables included, i.e., 'betweenness centrality' 
and 'multiconnectivity', show positive regression coefficients and statistical significance in 
all models. 'Betweenness centrality' is statistically significant at the level of p<0.05 in all 
models where used. 'Multiconnectivity' is statistically significant at the level of p<0.01 in 
models 12a and 12c, and at the level of p<0.05 in model 12b. Therefore, also the results for 
the total network measures based on the full models can be considered robust. 
 
With respect to the overall results for the additional models, the values for the R2 and the 
adjusted R2 are in line with the results for the full models. The maximum R2 reached in 
the additional models is 24.8% (adjusted 15.6%) in model 12c, in which 
'multiconnectivity' is included as network measure.  
 
Based on the robustness checks on deal flow quality, the results for the full models can be 
considered robust. Deviating results for single variables exist, however, they do not 
materially affect the conclusions that will be drawn based on the results for the full 
models. In addition, deviations that exist largely refer to firm attributes, not to the 
network measures included. Therefore, conclusions drawn based on the results for the 
network measures can be regarded robust. Again, additional regression models as 
robustness checks on further subsamples of the VCs have also been calculated (not 
                                              
719  Own calculations. 
Connection between Network Position, Firm Attributes, and Deal Flow 
 
224 
reported), which do not significantly alter the conclusions that will be derived in later 
sections. As stated earlier, the robustness tests based on different time periods also 
minimize the potential problem of the endogeneity of variables.720 
 
6.3.5 Role Analysis 
6.3.5.1 Segmentation of Venture Capital Firms 
In this section it will be shown, how many companies fall into which category based on 
the dimensions 'industry focus' and 'focus on investment stages'. In the questionnaire, the 
VCs have been asked to provide information on which industries and on which 
investment stages they focus (if they have a focus in these dimensions). A cut-off value 
had to be selected to decide whether VCs rather take a generalist or a specialist approach 
in each of the dimensions. The firms were categorized to have no focus in the case that 
they have actually answered to not focus on industries or investment stages, or, if they 
have answered to focus on more industries/investment stages than the median value.721 
The VCs are allocated to the 2x2-matrix presented earlier:722 
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Figure 6.1: Allocation of VCs to industry-investment stage-matrix (N=88)723 
                                              
720  Refer to section 5.2.3.2. 
721  For example, the question regarding the industry focus provided ten different industries the VCs could 
select from. If a VC has answered to focus on eight out of the ten, it was decided to categorize this VC 
as having no focus with respect to the industry. 
722  Since the multivariate regression models are calculated including the firm attributes and also, of course, 
including the dependent variables, the same outliers have been eliminated from this analysis. No further 
outliers could be identified, so that the number of firms analyzed remains 88. 
723  Own calculations and illustration. 
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6.3.5.2 Effect of Roles on Deal Flow Quantity 
As explained, the different roles included are 'gatekeeper', 'consultant', and 'liaison'. The 
results of the multivariate regression models are presented below. Three additional 
models have been calculated, model 13 has the best fit. 
Model 1 is already known and, of course, shows the same results as presented before, 
overall not being statistically significant. Of the new models 13-15, only model 13 is 
statistically significant at the level of p<0.05. In that model, only the variable 'gatekeeper' 
is statistically highly significant at the level of p<0.01. In models 14 and 15, while the 
variables 'employees', 'age', and 'deal flow measurement' show statistical significance 
(p<0.05), the network measures do not. Overall, models 14 and 15 are statistically not 
significant. Therefore, model 13 including the variable 'gatekeeper' has the best 
goodness-of-fit, being able to explain 23.7% (unadjusted, adjusted 18.1%) of the variance 
of deal flow quantity. 
 
Model 1 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
Employees   3.170 (0.270)*   2.405 (0.205)   3.157 (0.269)*   3.157 (0.269)*
Age  -2.835 (-0.183)* -2.015 -(0.130) -2.980 (-0.193)* -2.835 (-0.183)*
Offices   3.536 (0.040) -0.161 (-0.002)   3.203 (0.036)   3.450 (0.039)
Deal flow measurement 16.040 (0.184)*   9.038 (0.104) 15.788 (0.181)* 16.170 (0.186)*
Gatekeeper 46.481 (0.361)**
Consultant 22.098 (0.161)
Liaison -1.547 (-0.014)
Constant 22.780 21.222 16.281 23.528
R2 0.120 0.237* 0.146 0.120
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.181* 0.084 0.056
N 88 88 88 88
*      p <0.05; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
**    p <0.01; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
The standardized regression coefficient is presented in brackets  
Table 6.20: Regression models for role measures on deal flow quantity724 
 
                                              
724  Own calculations and illustration. 
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6.3.5.3 Effect of Roles on Deal Flow Quality 
Analog to the analysis presented in the previous section, it is now tested for the effect of 
role measures on deal flow quality. The regression results are presented below. Three 
further models have been calculated, model 17 has the best fit. 
Model 7 is already known, overall being statistically significant (p<0.05) and showing an 
R2 of 15.5% (10.4% adjusted). While all other models 17-19 are overall statistically 
significant (p<0.05), the increase in R2 in models 18 and 19 is marginal. In contrast, in 
model 17, in which 'gatekeeper' is included, the R2 significantly increases to 21.4% 
(15.7% adjusted). Also, in model 17, 'gatekeeper' shows statistical significance at the 
level of p<0.05. 
 
Model 7 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19
Employees  0.109 (0.296)*   0.092 (0.250)*   0.109 (0.295)*   0.114 (0.308)*
Age  0.019 (0.039)   0.037 (0.076)   0.016 (0.032)   0.019 (0.039)
Offices -0.133 (-0.048) -0.216 (-0.078) -0.140 (-0.051) -0.102 (-0.037)
Deal flow measurement  0.563 (0.205)*   0.406 (0.148)   0.557 (0.203)*   0.517 (0.189)*
Gatekeeper   1.039 (0.256)*
Consultant   0.486 (0.112)
Liaison   0.547 (0.153)
Constant -0.102 -0.137 -0.245 -0.366
R2 0.155* 0.214* 0.167* 0.177*
Adjusted R2 0.104* 0.157* 0.107* 0.118*
N 88 88 88 88
*      p <0.05; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
**    p <0.01; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
The standardized regression coefficient is presented in brackets  
Table 6.21: Regression models for role measures on deal flow quality725 
 
 
 
                                              
725  Own calculations and illustration. 
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7 Discussion of the Results and Implications for Management 
and Research 
In this chapter, the results reported in chapter six are discussed (section 7.1) and 
summarized (section 7.2). Furthermore, implications for the management of VCs (section 
7.3) and implications for research (section 7.4) are derived. 
 
7.1 Discussion of the Results 
7.1.1 General Importance of the Contact Network and of Other Venture Capital 
Firms as Source of Deal Flow 
The statistics explained above are now used to test hypotheses HI 1 through HI 6.  
HI 1 stated that, based on deal flow quantity, the percentage of investment opportunities 
received from a network contact (A) is higher than the percentage received unsolicited 
(B), so that A>B. A verification of HI 1 would mean that the contact network is 
important for the deal flow of VCs because it delivers many investment opportunities 
(more than come unsolicited). Looking at the data, it is obvious that this hypothesis 
cannot be confirmed, because both percentages are approximately the same (mean value 
of 55% for measure A compared to 45% for measure B). To check whether the difference 
is statistically significant, a t-test has been performed with the null hypothesis stating that 
the mean of A is equal to 50%, i.e., H0=μA=50%. Based on the t-test, the null hypothesis 
could not be rejected at a confidence level of 99% (α=0.01). 
This is surprising to some extent, since theory would predict the percentage of investment 
opportunities received out of the contact network to be higher. The result is basically in 
line with previous empirical findings, which range between 50% for the German 
market726 and around 60-65% for the US market.727 However, previous studies did not 
differentiate between deal flow quantity and deal flow quality, or they only took the 
former into account. The implications of the findings are that (a) the results on German 
VCs are corresponding to previous research on German VCs and to results found for 
                                              
726  See Jugel (2001), p. 39; Vater (2002), p. 144. 
727  See for example Wells (1974), p. 57; Tyebjee/Bruno (1984), p. 1055. See also the studies of Bygrave 
(1987); Bygrave (1988). 
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other regions, (b) the contact network of VCs delivers a significant part of the investment 
opportunities the firms can select from, and (c) although being a significant source, 
investment opportunities received unsolicited represent a source nearly equally as large.  
 
Hypothesis HI 2 stated that, based on deal flow quality (funded investment 
opportunities), the percentage of investment opportunities received from a network 
contact (A') is higher than the percentage received unsolicited (B'), so that A'>B'. The 
results strongly support HI 2, with A' being equal to 85% (with the median of 90%) 
versus B' being equal to 15% (median of 10%). A t-test has been performed with the null 
hypothesis stating that the mean of A' is equal to 50%, i.e., H0=μA'=50%. Based on the 
test, the null hypothesis was rejected at a confidence level of 99% (α=0.01). This result 
indicates that 85% of the investment opportunities, which have been funded by VCs, 
were referred to them by some contact out of their network. The results are in line with 
those found for the US market.728 Also, the results show that the contact network of VCs 
is more important for the reception of high-quality investment opportunities, compared to 
those received unsolicited. That, in turn, implies that VCs should put considerably more 
effort in establishing and maintaining network contacts, compared to effort invested in 
marketing activities that might foster the reception of unsolicited deal proposals.  
However, what also is of importance, is the comparison between the results for deal flow 
quantity and quality, which has been operationalized in hypothesis HI 3. 
 
In order to evaluate whether the contact network of VCs is of higher importance for the 
generation of deal flow quantity or for deal flow quality, HI 3 has been set up. HI 3 stated 
that, based on deal flow quality, the percentage of investment opportunities received out 
of the network (A') is higher than the same percentage based on deal flow quantity (A), 
so that A'>A. Looking at the data, HI 3 is strongly supported with A' being equal to 85%, 
and A equaling 55%. A t-test has been performed with the null hypothesis stating that the 
mean of A' is equal to 55%, i.e., H0=μA'=55%. The null hypothesis was rejected at a 
confidence level of 99% (α=0.01). That means, although the contact network of VCs is 
also important because it generates deal flow quantity (55%), above all, the contact 
                                              
728  Fried/Hisrich (1994) found that most funded deals come by referral. See Fried/Hisrich (1994), pp. 31 f. 
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network is important because it delivers the high-quality deals. Even stronger than 
derived based on HI 2, the recommendation for VCs based on HI 3 is that, in order to get 
the 'right' deals (those that meet their investment criteria), they need to focus on their 
network contacts. 
 
In hypothesis HI 4 (and HI 5) it has been formulated that, based on deal flow quantity 
(quality) and based on the various sources within the contact network, other VCs, i.e., 
measure C (C') accounts for the largest percentage, so that C (C') exceeds any other of the 
sources. However, in order to evaluate the percentage of investment opportunities that 
comes from other VCs relative to the other sources, the percentages of the other sources 
need to be described as well. Recall that the percentage of investment opportunities 
received from other VCs (out of the contact network), based on deal flow quantity, is 
35% (measure C), while the one based on deal flow quality is 42% (measure C'). The 
descriptive statistics for the other sources, based on deal flow quantity and deal flow 
quality, look as follows: 
 
Deal flow 
source
Universities/ 
Research 
centers
Banks/ 
Investment 
Banks
Private 
contacts Other sources
Universities/ 
Research 
centers
Banks/ 
Investment 
Banks
Private 
contacts Other sources
Mean 9 28 9 19 5 25 8 21
Median 5 20 5 10 0 10 0 10
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 60 95 80 100 80 100 58 100
Deal flow quantity Deal flow quality
 
Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics for deal flow sources (N=125)729 
 
Looking at the results for the other sources of deal flow within the contact network of 
VCs, it becomes obvious that both hypotheses, HI 4 and HI 5, are strongly supported. For 
both, measures C and C', a t-test has been performed with the null hypotheses stating that 
the mean of C (C') is equal to 20%, i.e., H0=μC=20% and H0=μC'=20%. The null 
hypotheses in both cases were rejected at a confidence level of 99% (α=0.01). With 
respect to deal flow quantity, the mean value of measure C (35%) is larger than any other 
single source of deal flow. On average, universities/research centers account for 9% of 
the investment opportunities, banks/investment banks account for 28%, private contacts 
                                              
729  Own calculations and illustration, excluding the source 'Other VCs'. 
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represent 9%, and other sources represent 19%.730 Comparisons to previous research are 
limited, since most studies did not measure deal flow at all or did not differentiate 
between deal flow quantity and quality. For the US market, Wells (1974) found that 61% 
of the proposals the VCs received come from network contacts and out of those, about 
half of those referrers were other VCs (approximately 30%).731 Tyebjee and Bruno 
(1984) found a similar result with 65% coming from network contacts and more than half 
of them stemming from professional sources such as other VCs.732 Although 
Tyebjee/Bruno include 'other VCs' in a group called 'professional contacts', the results are 
similar to those of Wells. Since in both studies, only deal flow quantity has been 
measured, the corresponding result of the present study is the multiplication of the 
percentage stemming from the network and the percentage stemming from 'other VCs', 
i.e., 55%x35%, equaling approximately 19%. This is a bit lower compared to the studies 
of Wells and Tyebjee/Bruno. One explanation for this difference could be that the studies 
of Wells and Tyebjee/Bruno have been performed in the 1970's and 1980's. Another 
explanation could be the different characteristics and developments of the US and the 
German venture capital markets. It is well-known that in the US, venture capital 
financings are much more established than they are in Europe and especially in Germany. 
For the German market, Vater (2002) found two contradictory results: On the one hand 
side, the source 'Other VCs' delivered only about 13% of the investment opportunities, on 
the other hand, VCs considered this source to be very important to generate deal flow.733 
The results of the present study support the second part of Vater's findings, with other 
VCs being the largest source for deal flow quantity, compared to all other sources within 
the contact network. For VCs this implies that focusing on network contacts to other VCs 
is beneficial because they deliver many investment opportunities. 
                                              
730  The fairly high percentage for the source 'other sources' of 19% is not surprising, since it comprises 
sources such as consultants, lawyers, etc., which are frequently mentioned in studies on the sources of 
deal flow. However, based on the feedback of VCs in the pretest performed and in order to keep the 
analysis focused on the syndication network of VCs, in this study these sources are included in the 
single source 'other sources'.  
731  See Wells (1974), p. 57. 
732  See Tyebjee/Bruno (1984), p. 1055. 
733  See Vater (2002), p. 144 and p. 146. 
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With respect to the quality of investment opportunities, the difference between the source 
'Other VCs' and all other sources is even larger with measure C' being equal to 42% and 
no other source alone accounting for more than 25% (banks/investment banks). 
Universities/research centers represent only 5%, private contacts account for 8%, and 
other sources represent 21%. These results imply that, not only is the source 'Other VCs' 
important to generate deal flow quantity, it also delivers the high-quality investment 
opportunities.  
 
Hypothesis HI 6 holds that the percentage of investment opportunities referred to by 
other VCs is higher based on deal flow quality (measure C') than it is based on deal flow 
quantity (measure C). Seeing the results (C' equaling 42% vs. C equaling 35%), HI 6 is 
supported. A t-test has been performed with the null hypothesis stating that the mean of 
C' is equal to 35%, i.e., H0=μC'=35%. The null hypothesis was rejected at a confidence 
level of 95% (α=0.05). The implication of this result for VCs has been stated in the 
previous paragraph and is therefore not repeated. One more aspect is worth highlighting: 
When comparing the change of the percentages from 'based on deal flow quantity' to 
'based on deal flow quality' for the other sources, one can observe that all sources (except 
'Other sources') experience a decline: The value for universities/research centers declines 
from 9% to 5%, the value for banks/investment banks lowers from 28% to 25%, and the 
value of private contacts decreases from 9% to 8%. Only the category 'Other sources' 
increases from 19% to 21%. This shows that, when it comes to the funding of investment 
opportunities, prospective deals referred to by these sources seem to be perceived as 
being of lower quality. In contrast, VCs in Germany seem to rely on investment 
opportunities that they receive from other VCs. 
 
An overview of the hypotheses and corresponding results is presented below: 
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Hypothesis Expectation Empirical Finding
HI 1
HI 2
HI 3
HI 4
HI 5
HI 6
A>B
A'>B'
A'>A
C'>C
C>any other source
C'>any other source
Not confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
 
Table 7.2: Hypotheses and results on the importance of the contact network734 
 
Summarizing the results on the general importance of the contact network for the deal 
flow generation of VCs in Germany, the following can be stated: First, in terms of deal 
flow quantity, there is only a slight difference as to the number of investment 
opportunities received out of the network and those received unsolicited. However, with 
respect to deal flow quality, more investment opportunities receive funding that come 
from a network contact. Therefore, in order to receive higher deal flow quality, VCs 
should focus on using their network contacts. Second, within the contact network, the 
source 'Other VCs' accounts for a large percentage of investment opportunities received 
(deal flow quantity), but it also accounts for an even larger percentage of those 
investment opportunities that receive funding (deal flow quality).  
Therefore, in order to increase deal flow quality, VCs should not only concentrate on 
establishing contacts to any group within the contact network. The results clearly show 
that, in terms of deal flow quantity and, above all, deal flow quality, contacts to other 
VCs are most rewarding. 
 
Overall, it can be stated that social capital in the form of values and norms inherent in the 
contact network and, above all, among the contacts of VCs serves as underlying basis that 
makes the exchange of information on potential investment opportunities possible. By 
heavily using the contact network and the contacts to other VCs, they put trust in the 
judgment of others, thereby drawing on what has been theoretically described as form of 
social capital.  
                                              
734  Own illustration. 
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The implication for VCs is clear: In order to generate deal flow quantity, the contact 
network but above all the contacts to other VCs are of major importance. This is even 
more the case regarding deal flow quality: The more VCs use other VCs as source of deal 
flow, the higher, on average, will be the quality of the deals they receive.  
 
As mentioned in the introductory section of this study, the analysis regarding goal (a) can 
be seen as the starting point or the justification for performing the network analysis on 
the VCs' syndication network (goal (b)). In this section, it could be shown that the contact 
network and the contacts among VCs are vital to generate deal flow quantity and quality. 
In the following sections, the contacts among VCs (in the form of syndication 
relationships) will therefore be analyzed in more detail. 
 
7.1.2 Connection between Independent Variables and Deal Flow Quantity 
In this section, the effects of the firm attributes, of the ego-network measures, as well as 
of the total network measures on deal flow quantity are discussed. Multiple regression 
models have been used to detect the influences of each variable on the explained variance 
of deal flow quantity. The results of the regression analyses that have been reported in 
chapter six will now be discussed and interpreted in detail. 
 
7.1.2.1 Effect of Firm Attributes and Ego-Network Measures on Deal Flow Quantity 
With respect to models 1-4,735 model 1 can be considered the base case. In this model, 
only the firm attributes are included. Models 2-4 then each contain one ego-network 
measure in addition to the firm attributes in order to identify the additional explanatory 
power of each ego-network measure. It will first be looked at the firm attributes, then the 
ego-network measures are examined. 
Looking at the results for the firm attributes in models 1-4, there are several aspects that 
deserve highlighting. The regression coefficients for the variable 'employees' are positive 
and statistically significant (p<0.05) in all models. This is an expected result, which 
                                              
735  Refer back to section 6.3.3.1. 
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indicates that an increase in the number of employees leads to an increase in the average 
number of investment opportunities received from other VCs. The result makes sense 
because more people can simply identify and screen more investment opportunities than 
fewer people can. While this results could be expected, it has a significant implication for 
VCs: It clearly carries the message that, in order to increase the number of investment 
opportunities received from other VCs, VCs simply need to employ more people. 
A result that also is striking regarding the firm attributes is the result for the variable 'age'. 
Indicating the age of the firm in years, the variable's regression coefficients are negative 
in all models, and they are statistically significant at the p<0.05 level in models 1-3. The 
negative coefficient implies that an increase in age is associated with a decrease in the 
number of investment opportunities received from other VCs in the syndication network. 
This result is counterintuitive because the expectation would be that it takes time and 
effort to establish and maintain relationships in the network, which also yields benefits in 
terms of information on investment opportunities. Also, in their study Hochberg, 
Ljungqvist and Lu (2007) find that a VC’s experience is positively related to its financial 
performance. Although the authors only show the results for experience as measured by 
the total dollar amount invested by the VC until that point in time, they explain that the 
results are similar when using the VCs’ age as variable.736 
In the syndication network analyzed in the present study though, this does not seem to 
hold in the case of deal flow quantity. One potential explanation for this could be that, 
because younger firms might not have established a clear firm profile or because their 
profile is not very widely known (when they are young), they get many referrals from 
other firms that do actually not meet their investment criteria. However, this is only one 
potential explanation and it can finally not be determined for sure, what the exact reasons 
for this negative relationship are. An interesting question for the further course of this 
study will be, whether this negative relationship also occurs in the regressions on deal 
flow quality, or whether it even reverses to a positive relationship (indicating that older 
firms might have a lower deal flow quantity but have a higher deal flow quality).  
                                              
736  See Hochberg/Ljungqvist/Lu (2007), p. 263, p. 268 and p. 271. 
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With respect to 'offices', the positive regression coefficients are statistically not 
significant in any of the models. This implies that the number of offices does not affect a 
firm's ability to generate deal flow quantity from other VCs.  
Nearly the same is the case for 'deal flow measurement'. Except for a statistically 
significant regression coefficient in model 1 (p<0.05), the variable shows statistically 
insignificant results (models 2-4).  
Models 2-4 represent the ones that need to be compared to model 1. In model 2, 'tie 
strength' has been added as explanatory variable. As hypothesized in HII 1, it is expected 
that, based on the theory of weak ties, the relationship between tie strength and deal flow 
quantity should be negative. However, first, the variable does not show statistical 
significance at the level of p<0.05. And second, although statistically not significant, the 
regression coefficient is positive, which goes against theoretical prediction. Therefore, 
hypothesis HII 1 is not supported by the results.737 It seems that (if at all) stronger ties are 
beneficial for a VC to receive more investment opportunities from other VCs in the 
network. Since this result does not seem to support the theory on the strength of weak ties 
in the given context, it might rather be that, just the opposite, it is the stronger ties that 
yield the necessary trust to exchange information on potential investment opportunities. 
Still, it has to be kept in mind, that the regression coefficient, although positive, is 
statistically not significant, so that definite conclusions can actually not be drawn based 
on these results. In their study, Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2007) apply degree 
centrality as one network measure and found a positive connection to the VCs’ financial 
performance. However, the authors used a measure that counts the total absolute number 
of relationships a VC has. Since in this study, the objective is to capture the notion of tie 
strength, the average degree had to be calculated,738 so that the measure used in the 
                                              
737  In order to test for the robustness of the results presented, in addition to the used measure for tie strength, 
an alternative measure has been calculated and applied. Based on the degree calculated on the valued 
dataset, the VCs have been divided into two groups, those with a degree above the median, and those with 
a degree below the median. The means for deal flow quantity for both groups have been compared. 
However, results for the alternative measure of tie strength were not different from those found with the 
originally used measure. This shows that the results found and presented above are robust. 
738  Refer to section 3.4.5.1.1. 
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present study is different from the one applied in the paper of Hochberg, Ljungqvist and 
Lu (2007).739 
The story is different for the other two ego-network measures, i.e., effective size and 
constraint. Recall that effective size captures the notion of having access to non-
redundant contacts and therefore to different sources of information. It has been 
hypothesized in HII 3 that a larger effective size positively affects deal flow quantity. 
This hypothesis is confirmed by the results, with the regression coefficient for 'effective 
size' being positive and statistically significant at the level of p<0.05. The result supports 
the rationale that firms, which are located in network positions characterized by many 
non-redundant syndication contacts, have benefits in terms of access to information. The 
absolute regression coefficient indicates that a one unit increase in effective size is 
associated with an increase in the number of investment opportunities of 3.526, received 
from other VCs in the network. Therefore, the economic significance of a one unit 
increase in effective size is fairly large. 
More concretely applied to the syndication context considered, this result implies that 
VCs should syndicate with those other VCs that represent non-redundant contacts. 
According to the previously explained concept of non-redundancy, for example, VC B is 
a non-redundant contact to VC A, the fewer syndication relationships B has with A's 
other syndication partners. Therefore, it is important for A to pay attention to the fact, 
with whom his syndication partners themselves co-invest with. The more they syndicate 
with A's partners, the worse for A (in terms of deal flow quantity). Such an example can, 
of course, also be found in the real VCs' syndication network. The ego-networks of 
VC#043 and VC#067 are presented below: 
 
                                              
739  If the simple measure of degree was applied in the present study, also a highly significant positive 
relationship between degree and deal flow quantity would result. However, since this measure does not 
capture the notion of tie strength of the individual relationships, the average degree has been applied as 
explained above. 
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Ego-network for VC#043 Ego-network forVC#067
VC#043
VC#100
VC#007
VC#187VC#389
VC#067
VC#195
VC#402
VC#004
VC#391
 
Figure 7.1: Effective size for ego-networks of VC#043 vs. VC#067740 
 
Considering the two ego-networks of VC#043 and of VC#067, the first thing to notice is 
that both have invested with four different other VC: VC#043 has invested with VC#100, 
VC#007, VC#187, and VC#389. VC#067 has invested with VC#195, VC#402, VC#004, 
and with VC#391. However, on the first view one can also see that in the ego-network of 
VC#043 fewer ties are actually present as compared to in the ego-network of VC#067. 
Actually, in the ego-network of VC#067, all VCs are connected to each other, i.e., all 
possible ties are also present.741 As to the effective size of the ego-networks, there is a 
great difference between the two focal VCs. Recall that the effective size is the degree 
minus the average degree of ego's alters. VC#043 has an effective size of 4 – (6/4) = 2.5. 
In contrast, VC#067 has an effective size of 4 – (12/4) = 1. Since effective size is a 
measure for the number of different sources of information that an actor has access to in 
his ego-network, the difference between the two VCs in the example becomes obvious. 
Because the other VCs in the ego-network of VC#067 are all connected to each other, the 
extent to which VC#067 has access to non-redundant information might be limited. The 
other VCs in the ego-network of VC#043 are not that densely connected with each other 
and therefore might be better sources for new information. Considering the focal VC's 
deal flow quantity, VC#043 has a value of 120 while VC#067 has 68. That is, from other 
VCs, VC#043 receives 120 investment opportunities on average per year, while VC#067 
only receives 68 investment opportunities from other VCs, which brings the importance 
                                              
740  Own calculations and illustration. 
741  In further multivariate regressions (not shown) it has been tested whether the ego-network density 
affects deal flow quantity. However, no statistically significant results could be observed. 
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of non-redundant contacts to daylight. In practice this means for the management of VCs 
that they need to pay attention with which other VCs their syndication partners co-invest 
on their side. That is, the less the own syndication partners co-invest with each other, the 
higher the deal flow quantity (investment opportunities received from other VCs) will be. 
These findings represent an extension of previous research because existing studies so far 
focused on the centrality of an actor’s network position while neglecting other important 
dimensions such as the effective size. 
 
Strikingly, model 1 is statistically not significant overall, while model 3 (p<0.05) is. 
Compared to a (statistically non-significant) R2 of 12.0% (adjusted 6.8%) in model 1, the 
R2 in model 3 is 16.6% (adjusted 10.6%). That is, overall, model 3 is able to explain 
16.6% (10.6%) of the variance of deal flow quantity received from other firms in the 
network. The additional explanatory power gained by adding 'effective size' equals 4.4 
percentage points. 
 
Examining model 4, which contains the ego-network measure 'constraint' as further 
independent variable, the results are even clearer. The overall R2 is 18.0% (p<0.05), the 
adjusted R2 is 12.1%. Comparing the latter to the base case (model 1), the explained part of 
the variance in deal flow quantity has roughly doubled (adjusted R2). Looking at the single 
variables in model 4, it becomes obvious that the variable 'constraint' has the strongest 
influence on deal flow quantity. The negative regression coefficient is statistically highly 
significant (p<0.01), supporting hypothesis HII 5, which stated that a higher constraint will 
negatively affect deal flow quantity. HII 5 is thereby strongly supported. The standardized 
regression coefficient (presented in brackets) is larger than it is for the other variables in 
model 4, indicating the relatively larger explanatory power of 'constraint'. 
Again, the implications for VCs, in a structural sense, are that they need to pay attention 
to the fact with whom they syndicate and with whom their syndication partners co-invest 
on their side. More concretely, as has been explained in the description of the measure 
and also in the derivation of hypothesis HII 5,742 the constraint that a VC B exerts on VC 
A very much depends on the effort that a VC C (to whom A is also connected) puts into 
                                              
742  Refer back to sections 3.4.5.1.2 and 4.2.1.3. 
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the relationship with VC B. Based on the algorithm and the formula for constraint, in the 
context of the VCs' syndication network this means that the constraint on A through B 
will decrease, the better C is connected to other VCs (D, E, F, etc.), to whom A is not 
directly connected.743  
Looking at the VCs' network structure, an example of two individual VCs' ego-network 
structure illustrates this point. In the following figure, the ego-networks of the VCs with 
VC#095 and VC#225 are presented: 
 
VC#095
VC#386
VC#407
VC#225
VC#145
VC#034
 
Figure 7.2: Ego-networks for VC#095 and VC#225744 
 
As can be seen, the ego-networks of VCs VC#095 and VC#225 look exactly the same. 
Both VCs have a degree of two. However, when calculating their constraint, VC#095 
shows a value of 0.55, while the one for VC#225 is 0.84. Given that the measure ranges 
between 0 and 1, this is a significant difference. The reason for this difference is to be 
found in the fact that the direct contacts of the two focal VCs are differently connected 
themselves: 
 
                                              
743  If these further VCs (D, E, F, etc.) were actors, to whom A is also connected, the measure 'constraint' 
will decline at a decreasing rate, which is due to the formula's set-up. See Burt (1992), pp. 57 f. 
744  Own calculation and illustration. 
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VC#095
VC#386
VC#407
 
Figure 7.3: Ego-network for VC#095 and ego-networks of its direct contacts745 
 
VC#225
VC#145
VC#034
 
Figure 7.4: Ego-network for VC#225 and ego-networks of its direct contacts746 
 
While both direct syndication contacts of VC#095 are very well-connected, VC#034, the 
direct contact of VC#225, is well-connected as well, but not to as many other VCs as the 
direct contacts of VC#095 are. In addition, VC#145, the other direct contact of VC#225, 
is not connected to any other VC. This is the effect that lets the measure constraint for 
VC#095 be significantly lower than for VC#225. This result simply implies that VCs 
should focus on being connected to well-connected other VCs in order to increase deal 
flow quantity. Since Burt’s measure for constraint has not been applied in network 
                                              
745  Own calculation and illustration. 
746  Own calculation and illustration. 
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studies on VCs and has not been interpreted in this way, these results represent an 
extension of current research. This interpretation also represents a potential answer to one 
question for future research Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2007)747 formulated, i.e., how 
VCs form relationships with influential VCs. The results for constraint indicate that the 
analysis of this measure in a VC’s ego-network makes possible the identification of 
influential VCs. Influential in the sense of potentially delivering information on many 
investment opportunities are those VCs that have many syndication contacts, to which the 
focal VC did not have access to before. From a theoretical viewpoint, this interpretation 
contributes to the discussion on how social capital inherent in network positions can 
explain the performance differences of individual actors. 
Looking at the results of models 3 and 4, also in comparison to model 1, the implications 
are clear. For VCs, the results imply that it might make sense to (a) focus on the structure 
of the syndication network, (b) analyze their network to examine, in a structural sense, 
whom they are connected to and to whom these others are connected to, and (c) 
strategically think about whom they would have to be connected to in order to optimize 
their deal flow quantity received from other VCs in the network. More concretely, the 
results indicate that it is important for VCs to have non-redundant syndication contacts 
and to have syndication relationships to those other firms, that do not constrain them in 
the sense of that they are themselves well-connected to many other VCs. That is, in terms 
of non-redundancy of syndication contacts and in order to increase deal flow quantity, 
VCs want to syndicate with those other VCs that do not co-invest with each other. In 
terms of constraint and in order to increase deal flow quantity, VCs want to syndicate 
with those other VCs that are themselves well-connected to many other VCs (the focal 
VC has not syndicated with yet). 
 
Overall, relating the results to the idea of social capital, it can be stated that differences in 
the amount of social capital (inherent in the VCs' network position) significantly affect the 
VCs' ability to generate deal flow quantity. The more social capital a VC has (in the sense 
of structural embeddedness in the ego-network) the higher the deal flow quantity. More 
                                              
747  See Hochberg/Ljungqvist/Lu (2007), p. 296. 
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precisely, the higher the effective size of a VC’s ego-network and the lower the VC’s 
constraint, the more social capital this VC has and the higher his deal flow quantity will be. 
Overall, these results complement current research and, as could be shown, carry 
important implications for the academic debate and for practitioners. 
 
7.1.2.2 Effect of Firm Attributes and Total Network Measures on Deal Flow Quantity 
As in the previous section, 'employees' shows statistical significance in both models 5 
and 6 (p<0.05). This again highlights the importance of the aspect that a larger number of 
employees goes along with more investment opportunities received from other VCs. 
While the regression coefficient for 'age' is negative in both models 5 and 6, the variable 
shows statistical significance in model 5 only (p<0.05). This result is in line with the one 
in the previous section, indicating that younger firms tend to have a quantitatively higher 
deal flow as compared to older firms. Potential explanations for this phenomenon have 
been discussed above and are therefore not repeated at this point. Both variables 'offices' 
and 'deal flow measurement' show positive regression coefficients, but are statistically 
insignificant at the conventional levels. These results are in line with previous ones 
discussed above, indicating that both, the number of offices and the fact whether VCs 
measure their deal flow systematically do not significantly affect deal flow quantity (in a 
statistical sense). Nevertheless, especially regarding the systematic measurement of deal 
flow, the general tendency of a positive association with deal flow quantity can be 
observed. That might indicate that a systematic measurement of deal flow generally 
supports the identification of investment opportunities. In this context, it will be 
interesting to take into account the results for this variable with respect to deal flow 
quality, which will be discussed further below. 
 
The first notable result regarding the total network measures is that, based on the 
embeddedness of VCs in the overall network structure, 'betweenness centrality' does not 
have any statistically significant effect on deal flow quantity. Based on the theoretical 
explanations it was expected that firms with high scores on betweenness centrality might 
have advantages in terms of information on potential investment opportunities. However, 
this does not seem to hold in the case of the analyzed syndication network of VCs in 
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Germany with regard to deal flow quantity. This implies that holding network positions, 
which yield the potential to broker contacts and control the information flow between two 
other VCs,748 does not increase the average number of investment opportunities received 
per year from other VCs. Although the regression coefficient for the variable ' 
betweenness centrality' is positive (in line with hypothesis HII 7), there is no statistical 
significance so that this result cannot be assumed to be safe. Therefore, hypothesis HII 7 
is not supported. In their study, Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2007) also use 
betweenness centrality as independent variable to explain the financial performance of 
VCs. The authors find a highly significant positive relationship between these 
variables.749 Of course, one potential explanation could be that the authors used a 
different dependent variable, i.e., financial performance measured by successful exits. 
However, taking these results one step further, this could mean that deal flow quantity 
and financial performance are not connected. Therefore, it will be interesting to see 
whether the result for betweenness centrality in this study is positive and statistically 
significant in the case of deal flow quality. If this was the case, this could be an indication 
that deal flow quality and financial performance might be positively connected. 
In contrast, and in line with theoretical predictions, higher scores in multiconnectivity 
have a positive effect on deal flow quantity. Recall that multiconnectivity is the point 
connectivity of an actor, and measures the number of nodes that would have to be 
removed in order for the focal actor to become disconnected from the network.750 The 
higher the score, the more nodes would have to be removed (on average) from the 
network in order for the focal firm to not be able to reach another firm. In other words, 
the measure indicates the extent to which a VC has multiple alternative options to receive 
information from other VCs, indicating that VCs with higher scores on multiconnectivity 
are less dependent on contacts to specific other VCs. The networks of those VCs are, 
                                              
748  The two other firms, of course, can still be connected by some path length, i.e., a path length greater 
than 2. The focus here though is on the notion of geodesic paths, i.e., the shortest connection between 
two nodes that go through the focal actor. 
749  See Hochberg/Ljungqvist/Lu (2007), p. 271. 
750  The measure is calculated for each actor in relation to each other actor, i.e., for the focal actor it is 
measured (vis-à-vis each other actor in the network), how many nodes would have to be removed for 
the focal actor not to be able to reach the other actor. The result of this algorithm is an actor-by-actor 
matrix. Taking the sum of each row then gives the sum of nodes that would have to be removed in order 
for one actor to become disconnected from the network. 
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overall, less vulnerable. The results for 'multiconnectivity' deliver support for hypothesis 
HII 9, which stated that higher scores in multiconnectivity will positively affect deal flow 
quantity. The absolute regression coefficient indicates that for a one unit increase in the 
multiconnectivity score, the average number of investment opportunities received from 
other firms in the network also increases by 14.986. While it is fairly difficult to assess 
what it means that one more node could be removed (this would be equal to a one unit 
increase),751 the standardized regression coefficient (0.255) shows that the explanatory 
power of 'multiconnectivity' is larger than that of any other variable.  
The concrete implication for VCs is that, in order to augment their multiconnectivity (and 
thereby their deal flow quantity), they need to syndicate, above all, with different other 
VCs. Also in light of the result that the tie strength does not affect deal flow quantity, it is 
beneficial for VCs to invest with different other VCs, rather than to invest multiple times 
with the same other VC. 
 
Looking at model 6 in comparison to model 1, the explained variance of deal flow 
quantity increased significantly from 12.0% (adjusted 6.8%) in model 1 to 18.3% 
(adjusted 12.4%) in model 6. Based on the adjusted R2, the explained part of the variance 
of deal flow quantity has roughly doubled. The implications of these results are the 
following: For VCs, as was the case for the ego-network measures, it might make sense 
to not only focus on the traditionally looked-at measures such as the number of 
employees (in order to increase deal flow quantity), but to strongly take into account their 
embeddedness in the overall network structure of VCs. 
 
Overall, when referring to the concept of social capital, also the overall embeddedness of 
a VC in the syndication network yields insights on the amount of social capital inherent 
in the network position. The higher the amount of social capital in the form of structural 
embeddedness in the overall network, the higher the deal flow quantity would be.  
 
                                              
751  That it is difficult to assess is due to the fact that a network with many actors is a quite complex graph 
(see also the figure showing the main component of the syndication network). Removing one node 
directly triggers a 'chain reaction' of nodes becoming disconnected from the network, and with them 
being disconnected also leaving again others disconnected. Therefore, a one unit increase or decrease in 
the score on multiconnectivity is difficult to evaluate.  
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7.1.2.3 Comparison of the Effects of the Independent Variables on Deal Flow 
Quantity 
Models of both groups of network measures (ego-network measures and total network 
measures) deliver a similar explanatory power, with model 6 explaining slightly more of 
the variance in deal flow quantity compared to model 4 (adjusted R2 of 12.4% in model 6 
compared to an adjusted R2 of 12.1% in model 4). In both models, 'employees' shows 
statistically and economically significant results. However, a significant increase of the 
explained part of the variance of deal flow quantity can be achieved by adding network 
measures to the model. Above all, having non-redundant syndication relationships, being 
connected (based on syndicated investments) to well-connected other VCs, and having 
invested with different other firms seem to be characteristics of a VC's network position, 
which is beneficial to generate deal flow quantity. 
 
What might be an important result for future research is that, in this case, it is possible to 
explain nearly the same part of the variance of the dependent variable based on ego-
network measures only. This implies that, it might not even be necessary to collect data 
on the entire network but that it might be sufficient to gather data on the ego-networks of 
the actors. This point, however, needs to be verified when looking at the explanatory 
power of ego-network measures vs. total network measures with respect to deal flow 
quality, following in the next sections. 
 
7.1.3 Connection between Independent Variables and Deal Flow Quality 
Analog to section 7.1.2, in this chapter, the effects of the firm attributes, of the ego-
network measures, as well as of the total network measures on deal flow quality are 
discussed. Multiple regression models have been used to detect the influences of each 
variable on the explained variance of deal flow quality. The results of the regression 
analyses that have been reported in chapter six will now be discussed and interpreted in 
detail. 
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7.1.3.1 Effect of Firm Attributes and Ego-Network Measures on Deal Flow Quality 
Examining the firm attributes, again, 'employees' is statistically significant in all models. 
The absolute regression coefficient, ranging between 0.100 (model 10) and 0.117 (model 8) 
is much lower compared to those in the regressions on deal flow quantity. However, this is 
due to the fact that deal flow quantity and quality are measured differently. While deal flow 
quantity is the absolute number of investment opportunities received from other firms in 
the network,752 deal flow quality is the same number but multiplied with the deal rate of the 
specific VC. The median of the deal flow quality measure is 0.9,753 which means that the 
typical number of investment opportunities received from other VCs and finally invested 
in, equals ~1. For a one unit increase in the number of employees (one more employee), the 
deal flow quality measure increases approximately by 0.1. In other words, one more 
employee leads to a ~10% increase in the number of high-quality investment opportunities 
received from other VCs, which is a significant economic impact. 
As to 'age', although the regression coefficients are statistically insignificant, they 
changed from showing a negative sign (in the regressions on deal flow quantity) to being 
slightly positive. That is, while in the case of deal flow quantity it seemed that the 
younger the firm, the more investment opportunities they receive (from other VCs), this 
does not seem to hold for deal flow quality anymore. For deal flow quality it seems that 
(if at all) the older the firm, the more high-quality deal proposals they receive. While it 
has to be kept in mind that (a) the results for 'age' are statistically not significant at the 
conventional levels, and that (b) the economic significance is fairly low, expressed by 
and absolute regression coefficient ranging between 0.01 (model 9) and 0.034 (model 
10), these results indicate a general tendency that gives rise to a need for future research. 
In further studies a focus could be to analyze the quantity and quality of deal flow of VCs 
in the German market as a function of their age or other indicators of a VC’s experience. 
In this context, also aspects such as the experience and professional background of the 
VC’s management team could be taken into account. What is noticeable though is the 
change of the sign in the light of the results that Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2007) 
have found. The authors found that a VC’s experience is positively related to its financial 
                                              
752  Referring to the investment stages 'early stage' to 'later stage', excluding buyouts. 
753  Refer back to section 6.3.1.2. 
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performance.754 While statistically not significant in the present study, this could indicate 
that deal flow quality and financial performance might be connected as well. Another 
indicator to answer this question will be the results for the regressions including 
betweenness centrality and deal flow quality, which are explained further below. 
The variable 'offices' is statistically not significant in any of the models. However, 
interesting to notice is that the sign changed from positive (in all models on deal flow 
quantity) to negative (in all models on deal flow quality). Although statistically not 
significant, this general tendency could be an indicator that, while it might be beneficial 
to have more offices to generate deal flow quantity, it seems that it could be 
advantageous to have less offices in order to receive high-quality investment 
opportunities. Potentially, it might be more valuable for a VC, to have offices in the 
'right' cities or regions, instead of just having more offices (for a higher deal flow 
quality). In future research it might therefore be worthwhile to look at the geographic 
distribution of the offices of the firms and to examine whether there are differences 
regarding deal flow quantity and deal flow quality.  
With respect to 'deal flow measurement', results are positive in all models 7-10, but 
statistically significant only in models 7 and 10. The statistical non-significance in 
models 8 and 9 is due to the slight correlation with the (in these models) added variables 
'tie strength' (model 8) and 'effective size' (model 9). Referring back to the correlation 
matrix, the correlation between 'deal flow measurement' and 'tie strength' and between 
'deal flow measurement' and 'effective size' is nearly the same (0.175 vs. 0.176). 
Nevertheless, the results clearly imply that putting effort into a systematic measurement 
and tracking of deal flow might be a valuable undertaking in order to increase the number 
of high-quality investment opportunities received from other VCs. 
 
Analyzing the ego-network measures, again, 'tie strength' does not show a statistically 
significant result. As was the case in the regressions on deal flow quantity, the regression 
coefficient is positive. In HII 2, it has been hypothesized, based on the theory on the 
strength of weak ties, that weak ties should also yield a higher deal flow quality. 
However, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed by the results. Quite the opposite, while 
                                              
754  See Hochberg/Ljungqvist/Lu (2007), p. 271. 
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not being statistically significant, the regression coefficient is positive, which weakly 
indicates a positive connection between tie strength and deal flow quality. That is, the 
theory on the benefits of weak ties does not seem to hold in the context of syndicated 
venture capital investments and deal flow. While the positive regression coefficient in 
both cases (deal flow quantity and quality) implies that it is rather the stronger ties that 
yield benefits in terms of deal flow quantity and quality, it remains to be seen whether the 
weakness/strength of ties at all is a good predictor when compared to the other 
independent variables.  
As regards model 9, 'effective size' has been added to the base case model. The regression 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant (p<0.05). This again implies that having 
non-redundant syndication relationships to other firms seems to convey a significant 
competitive advantage in terms of receiving information on high-quality investment 
opportunities from other VCs. A one unit increase in an ego-network's effective size 
leads to an increase in the number of high-quality deal proposals received from other VCs 
of 0.129 (the median increases from 0.90 to 1.03). The economic significance is 
comparable to the one for the variable 'employees' (see above). An example from the 
VCs' syndication network illustrates this point once more: 
 
u
VC#007
VC#297
VC#384
VC#052
VC#435 VC#265
VC#367
VC#126
VC#337
VC#374
Ego-network for VC#384 Ego-network for VC#265
 
Figure 7.5: Ego-network for VC#384 and VC#265755 
 
Both VCs, VC#384 and VC#265, have invested with four other VCs. However, the 
effective size of VC#384 is 4 – (2/4) = 3.5. Effective size for VC#265 is 4 – (12/4) = 1. 
The value for deal flow quality for VC#384 is 2.2, while it is only 0.6 for VC#265. The 
                                              
755  Own calculation and illustration. 
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reason for the difference in effective size, of course, is that VC#265's direct syndication 
partners are also syndicating with each other. The chance that new information about 
high-quality investment opportunities enters the network in the case of a densely coupled 
network (VC#265) is lower than in the case, in which VC#384 has access to non-
redundant other VCs that do not share investment relationships among each other.  
This shows fairly well the impact of adding non-redundant contacts to an ego-network. 
Based on the results, hypothesis HII 4 is strongly supported, which stated that a larger 
effective size will positively affect deal flow quality. Overall, adding 'effective size' to the 
base case model, increases the explained variance of deal flow quality from 15.5% 
(adjusted 10.4%) in model 7 to 21.7% (adjusted 16.1%) in model 9. Because it has 
already been explained for the case of deal flow quantity, it will not be repeated in detail 
that these results extend current research in the academic discussion on the syndication 
network of VCs as well as on the effects of social capital on individual performance.756 
As to model 10, in which 'constraint' has been added as independent variable, the results 
indicate that also 'constraint' affects the reception of high-quality investment 
opportunities. As expected, the regression coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant (p<0.05). That is, the higher the constraint that the relationship structure of the 
focal VC's direct contacts exerts on him, the lower the number of high-quality investment 
opportunities received from other VCs. The economic significance is difficult to assess 
only based on the absolute regression coefficient. However, the standardized coefficient 
indicates that the relative explanatory power of that variable is only slightly lower than 
the one for the variable 'employees' (see above). Since this is consistent with theoretical 
predictions and the derived hypothesis HII 6, this hypothesis is strongly confirmed. 
Since the result shows the same direction and significance as in the case with deal flow 
quantity, the interpretation stays the same: In order for VC A to be less constrained by 
VC B, VC C (to whom A is also connected) needs to be well-connected. The following 
examples, taken from the VCs' syndication network, illustrate this point. Again, both 
focal VCs that are shown, i.e., VC#095 and VC#071, have two direct syndication 
contacts, however they differ significantly regarding their measure for constraint and 
                                              
756  Refer to section 7.1.2.1. 
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their measure for deal flow quality. This is due to the fact that their syndication partners 
themselves are connected differently: 
 
VC#071
VC#073
VC#036
 
Figure 7.6: Ego-network for VC#071 and ego-networks of its direct contacts757 
 
VC#095
VC#386
VC#407
 
Figure 7.7: Ego-network for VC#095 and ego-networks of its direct contacts758 
 
The constraint for VC#071 is 0.72, the constraint for VC#095 is 0.55, which, as 
mentioned before, is a significant difference given that the measure ranges from 0 to 1. 
The deal flow quality for VC#071 is 0.2, while deal flow quality for VC#095 is 1.5. That 
                                              
757  Own calculations and illustration. 
758  Own calculations and illustration. 
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is, by being connected to well-connected others, a VC will benefit in terms of high-
quality investment opportunities. 
Again, as was the case for deal flow quantity, these results and the new interpretation of 
Burt’s measure are an extension of current research since they shed light on the question 
posed in the paper of Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2007), how VCs can form 
relationships with influential VCs.759 
 
The overall model 10 shows an R2 of 21.0% (adjusted 15.3%), which is slightly lower 
than the explanatory power of model 9 (including 'effective size'). But still, the results 
represent a 5.5 percentage point increase in the explained part of the variance of deal flow 
quality based on the R2. 
 
Overall, drawing on the concept of social capital, it becomes obvious that the amount of 
social capital inherent in the structural network position of VCs is a relevant predictor of 
the VCs' deal flow quality. The more social capital a VC has based on its network 
position (effective size, constraint), the higher its deal flow quality. Therefore, VCs 
should aim at increasing their amount of social capital by analyzing their individual 
network structure and the network structure of their syndication partners. By doing this, 
and in terms of deal flow quality, VCs enable themselves to strategically monitor and 
influence their network position and thereby increase the number of high-quality 
investment opportunities. 
 
7.1.3.2 Effect of Firm Attributes and Total Network Measures on Deal Flow Quality 
Examining the results for the firm attributes in models 11 and 12, an already known 
picture is drawn. While 'employees' positively affects deal flow quality (p<0.05), none of 
the other firm attributes show statistical significance at the conventional levels. Again, 
while 'age' is slightly positively associated with deal flow quality, the slightly negative 
regression coefficients for 'offices' are statistically not significant in both models. This 
supports the conclusions for future research on this aspect, as already discussed above. 
                                              
759 Refer to section 7.1.2.1. 
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The statistical insignificance of 'deal flow measurement' in models 11 and 12 can be 
explained by the slight correlations of this variable with 'betweenness centrality' (0.192) 
and 'multiconnectivity' (0.136).760  
As to model 11, it shows that adding 'betweenness centrality' to the model significantly 
increases the R2 from 15.5% (adjusted 10.4%) in model 7 to 20.9% (adjusted 15.1%; 
p<0.05). According to theoretical predictions, this result implies that the embeddedness 
of VCs in the overall network structure in terms of betweenness centrality is important 
with respect to the reception of high-quality investment opportunities from other VCs. 
Firms that more often lie on the geodesic path connecting two other firms, seem to be 
able to (maybe unconsciously) benefit from that structural position by receiving more 
high-quality deal proposals. Hypothesis HII 8, which exactly predicted the empirical 
finding, is therefore confirmed. The absolute regression coefficient indicates that for a 
one unit increase in 'betweenness centrality', the number of high-quality investment 
opportunities received from other VCs increases from the median of 0.90 to ~1.31. To 
make it more concrete, what this finding implies for VCs, an example is provided. 
However, since betweenness centrality is a total network measure, it is calculated based 
on all VCs in the network, i.e., for each VC, the algorithm counts the number of times 
that this VC lies on the geodesic path between any pair of two other VCs in the network. 
Since this cannot be made visible for the entire graph, a hypothetical example is chosen 
and it is only referred to the ego-network of the actors to illustrate the idea. 
Assume that VC A has previously invested one time each with firms B, C, D, and E (as in 
the example above). A is 'between' the pairs of actors that have not jointly invested, i.e., 
A is between (on the geodesic (shortest) path) BC and CD.761 That is, A's score on 
betweenness centrality is 2 (case 1): 
 
 
                                              
760  Refer back to the correlation matrix in section 6.3.2.3. 
761  Assuming an undirected network, i.e., since here the ties are assumed to be symmetric, the equivalent 
other pairs (CB, DC) are not counted. Also, since A is not alone on the geodesic path between B and E, 
this is not counted. 
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Figure 7.8: Examples on betweenness centrality762 
 
Now assume that A intends to jointly invest with firm F. Whether A's score on 
betweenness centrality increases through this joint investment, depends on the 
relationship structure F has with A's other direct contacts (B, C, D, E). If F has co-
invested with B, C, D, and E, adding F as a new syndication contact would not increase 
A's betweenness centrality (case 2).763 But if the adding of F to the contact network of A 
through a joint investment puts A in the position to (more often than before adding F) be 
'between' two other firms (case 3), then, as the regression results show, A will benefit 
from this position and will receive more high-quality investment opportunities from other 
VCs in the network. In case 3, adding contact F will put A between F and all other direct 
contacts of A, thereby increasing A's betweenness centrality from 2 to 6.  
On the level of the ego-network, as presented in these hypothetical examples, this would 
imply that a VC A should only invest with those other VCs that are not also investing 
with A's other syndication partners. That result is not different from the one found for 
effective size. The difference for betweenness centrality is that the measure is calculated 
for the entire network structure. That means, in the overall network structure, VC A is in 
an advantaged position, the more often he lies on the shortest path between two other 
VCs. More concretely, the more often VC A would be the connecting link between other 
firms, the higher A is betweenness centrality and the higher A's deal flow quality. 
Overall, based on a comparison of the values for R2 of models 11 and 7, it becomes 
obvious that the adding of 'betweenness centrality' significantly increases the explained 
                                              
762  Own examples and illustration. 
763  On the contrary, actually A's betweenness centrality would decrease from 2.0 to 1.17, since in case 2 
there are more geodesic paths between BC and CD. This is because F was added to the network and 
also builds a geodesic path between BC and CD (and therefore lies on that geodesic path). 
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part of the variance of deal flow quality (from 15.5% (adjusted 10.4%) to 20.9% 
(adjusted 15.1%)). This equals an increase of 5.4 (unadjusted) and 4.7 percentage points 
(adjusted) from model 7 to model 10.  
Also, this result is significant in another context: Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2007) 
found that a VC’s betweenness centrality and its financial performance are positively 
connected.764 Since deal flow can be seen as an important prerequisite for the business 
model of VCs to function and because betweenness centrality and deal flow quality as 
well as betweenness centrality and financial performance are positively connected, this 
could indicate that also deal flow quality and financial performance are positively 
connected. The results and these implications also show that the present study represents 
an important step towards a better understanding of the VCs’ syndication network on the 
one hand, and of the key success factors of a VC’s business model on the other. If the 
conclusions as explained above are correct, better networked VCs will have a higher deal 
flow quality and a better financial performance. However, in order to verify this 
conclusion, further research is necessary.  
 
Looking at model 12, the statistical and economic significance of adding 
'multiconnectivity' as explanatory variable is even higher. The regression coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant, as hypothesized in HII 10. Therefore, HII 10 is 
strongly confirmed. The results imply that having a syndication network, which is 
invulnerable to the removal of nodes (taking away actors from the network) is beneficial 
for the reception of high-quality investment opportunities. Consider the following 
examples, which again, as in the case with betweenness centrality, are based on the 
limited structure of the ego-networks. Although the measure is calculated based on the 
entire network structure, this is being done for reasons of clearness. Assume that A has 
jointly invested one time each with firms B, C, D, and E (case 1 of the figure below).  
 
                                              
764  See Hochberg/Ljungqvist/Lu (2007), p. 271. 
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Figure 7.9: Examples on multiconnectivity765 
 
Now suppose that firm D were removed from the network and compare what has changed 
for VCs A and B (case 2). A is still in direct contact with B, C, and D. Except for the fact 
that D is not part of the network anymore, A's network structure has not suffered. The 
situation is different for firm B. In case 1, for example, B could reach E via the contacts 
to A or via the contact to D. Now that D is not part of the network anymore, B can 
contact E only via A and is therefore fully dependent on A. B's network is therefore more 
vulnerable with respect to the removal of nodes than A's network is. Although this is a 
very simple example, for a larger and more complex network structure as that of the VCs' 
syndication network, the idea is the same. The results of the regression model therefore 
imply that syndication relationships should be established with different other firms 
(instead of the same ones again and again). However, as could be shown before,766 
syndicating with firms that have previously syndicated with all of the focal firm's other 
syndication partners (direct contacts), will reduce the ego-network's effective size. 
Therefore, in terms of multiconnectivity, it makes sense to syndicate with those other 
different firms that are well-connected to firms, the focal firm has not had previously 
invested with.  
Overall, model 12 can best explain the variance of deal flow quality, expressed by an R2 
of 23.2% (adjusted 17.6%), being statistically significant at the level of p<0.01. In 
comparison to model 7 (base case), this is an increase in terms of R2 of 7.7 (unadjusted) 
and 7.2 (adjusted) percentage points.  
 
                                              
765  Own examples and illustration. 
766  See the discussion of the results for 'effective size' on deal flow quality. 
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In summary, the models including total network measures can explain a significant part 
of the variance in deal flow quality. It became obvious that the embeddedness of a VC in 
the overall structure of the syndication network is important with respect to reception of 
high-quality investment opportunities. 
 
Again, when relating the results to the concept of social capital, it becomes obvious that 
more social capital (in the form of embeddedness in the overall network structure) 
enables VCs to generate a higher deal flow quality. More precisely, the higher the value 
for betweenness centrality and the higher the value for multiconnectivity, the more social 
capital a VC has and the higher his deal flow quality will be. This shows, that the idea of 
social capital with its underlying theories is a relevant concept to explain the economic 
outcomes of VCs in terms of deal flow quality.  
 
7.1.3.3 Comparison of the Effects of the Independent Variables on Deal Flow Quality 
The models containing the ego-network measures and the ones containing the total 
network measures do not differ significantly in their explanatory power. While 'tie 
strength' does not have an effect on deal flow quality, the other network measures 
(effective size, constraint, betweenness centrality, multiconnectivity) show statistically 
and economically significant effects on the dependent variable. The standardized 
regression coefficients of those variables are fairly equally distributed, ranging from 
0.239 to 0.283 (in absolute values).  
Combining the results for ego-network measures and total network measures, the 
implications for VCs are clear: In order to receive more high-quality investment 
opportunities from other VCs in the network, syndication relationships should be 
established with firms that (a) are non-redundant to the own ego-network and thereby 
increase the ego-networks effective size, (b) do not constrain the focal firm with the 
structure of their relationships in the sense of that they are themselves well-connected to 
other VCs, (c) put the focal VC into positions located between other firms, and (d) 
represent different firms (different from the firms that has been invested with before).  
For researchers, the results convey the following potential conclusions: While model 12, 
containing a total network measure, had the best fit (R2 of 23.2%), model 9, containing an 
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ego-network measure, was also able to explain 21.7% of the variance of deal flow 
quality. That means, based on measuring the ego-network alone, an already significant 
part of the explanatory power that total network measures have, could be explained. 
While it might always be better to have data on an entire network, this shows that it 
might be valid to also just survey the ego-networks of actors and thereby be able to derive 
valid statements on the benefits of individual actor's network positions. The advantage 
lies in the fact that surveys on ego-networks might require much less effort in terms of 
data collection. However, when doing this, certainly more enhanced statistical methods 
and sampling techniques would be required, which is a cutting-edge topic in today's 
research on social network analysis. 
 
7.1.4 Comparison of the Effects of the Independent Variables on Deal Flow 
Quantity and Quality 
Comparing the results of the regressions with respect to deal flow quantity and quality, 
several aspects deserve accentuation, which relate (a) to the importance of the firm 
attributes, (b) to the importance of the network measures used, and (c) to the overall 
explanatory power of the models. 
 
As to the firm attributes and as expected, the number of employees positively affects 
both, deal flow quantity and deal flow quality. While the age of the firms showed to be 
negatively associated with deal flow quantity, no statistically significant effect could be 
identified as regards deal flow quality. Nevertheless, the negative sign (as to deal flow 
quantity) disappeared in the regressions on deal flow quality, i.e., the regression 
coefficients turned slightly positive. This could be an indicator that, although younger 
firms might have more investment opportunities they can select from, it might be the 
older firms that have investment opportunities of higher quality.  
As regards the variable 'offices', in the regressions on deal flow quantity a statistically 
insignificant but positive relation occurred. The sign of the regression coefficients turned 
into negative ones in all regressions on deal flow quality (although also statistically not 
significant at the conventional levels). Nevertheless, this could indicate that, intuitively, 
while more offices lead to a higher deal flow quantity, fewer offices lead to a higher deal 
flow quality. A potential explanation for this phenomenon could be that having offices in 
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the 'right' places (cities or regions) might be better to identify high-quality investment 
opportunities compared to just having many offices. However, examining the effects of 
the geographic distribution of firm offices on the quantity and quality of deal flow would 
go beyond the scope of this study and therefore has to be left for future research. A 
possible approach for such a research effort would be to bring together data on the deal 
flow of VCs (quantity and quality) with data on where exactly the VC is located, i.e., in 
which cities the VC has offices.  
With respect to the variable 'deal flow measurement', although in all models (on deal flow 
quantity and quality), the regression coefficients were positive, they were statistically 
significant in only three models (1.7,10; p<0.05). While this is too weak of a proof to 
conclude that 'deal flow measurement' is a good predictor of deal flow quantity and quality, 
the constantly positive signs and the significances, which often were slightly above the 
conventional level of p<0.05 roughly indicate that measuring deal flow systematically and, 
for example, tracing back from which sources investment opportunities came, in which also 
finally has been invested in, might be a worthwhile effort.  
 
As to the ego-network measures and the total network measures, a very consistent picture 
is drawn when comparing their effects on deal flow quantity and quality.  
'Tie strength' did not show to be a statistically significant predictor, neither for deal flow 
quantity nor for deal flow quality. Quite the opposite, while it was expected that 'tie 
strength' would negatively affect deal flow quantity and quality, the variable turned out to 
show statistically insignificant positive effects in both cases. A potential explanation for 
the positive signs could be that stronger ties convey trust and that this is needed as basis 
for exchanging information on deal proposals. However, overall the results indicate that it 
is not the strength/weakness of ties that influences deal flow quantity and quality. Rather, 
structural measures of network position have a stronger influence: 
The variables 'effective size' and 'constraint' carry a clear message. When used, they 
showed to have statistically and economically significant effects on both, deal flow 
quantity and quality. The signs of the regression coefficients were as expected (positive 
for 'effective size', negative for 'constraint') so that no further comments on these 
variables are necessary at this point. 
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Of the total network measures, 'betweenness centrality' turned out to only affect deal flow 
quality. Nevertheless, the positive effect, especially on deal flow quality, was according 
to theoretical predictions. In contrast, 'multiconnectivity' showed the (expected) strong 
statistical and economical significance for deal flow quantity and quality. Also in this 
case, no further comments are required at this point. 
 
Regarding the overall models, in which network measures have been used, all models are 
statistically significant except for models 2 and 5. As presented above, the explained 
portion of the variances in deal flow quantity and quality could significantly be increased 
using network measures as independent variables (except for when using 'tie strength'). 
Compared to the base cases (models 1 and 7), which had an R2 of 12.0% (adjusted 6.8%) 
for deal flow quantity and of 15.5% (adjusted 10.4%) for deal flow quality, these values 
increased to 18.0% (adjusted 12.1%) for deal flow quantity and to 23.2% (adjusted 
17.6%) for deal flow quality, when network measures were included. 
 
7.1.5 Role Analysis 
In the following sections, it is referred to the results for the role analysis as presented in 
chapter 6.3.5. Several regression models have been calculated, including the variables 
'gatekeeper', 'consultant', and 'liaison'.  
7.1.5.1 Effect of Roles on Deal Flow Quantity 
Most strikingly, the only regression model that shows statistical significance overall, is 
model 13 which includes the variable 'gatekeeper'. Both other models that include 
'consultant' and 'liaison' do neither show statistical significance overall, nor for the 
individual network measures. Recall what the variables measure: 'Gatekeeper' measures 
the extent to which a VC has syndicated with a member of his own subgroup and a 
member from a different subgroup. 'Consultant' measures the extent which a VC has co-
invested with VCs that belong to one different subgroup and 'liaison' measures the extent 
to which a VC has syndication relationships with members from two different subgroups 
(himself belonging to a third different subgroup).  
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The results for 'consultant' and 'liaison' imply that only syndicating with members of too 
many other subgroups does not increase deal flow quantity. Rather, a VC benefits from 
syndicating with members of his own subgroup, while at the same time having 
syndication relationships with a member of another subgroup. To put that into an 
example, what situations (if occurring more often) that do not increase deal flow quantity 
of VC B are (focal VC is VC B, ellipses indicating subgroup membership): 
 
VC A
VC B
VC C
Consultant Liaison
co
-in
ve
st co-invest co
-in
ve
st co-invest
VC A
VC B
VC C
 
Figure 7.10: Roles not increasing deal flow quantity767 
 
In contrast, the more often the following constellation of syndication relationships occurs, 
the higher the deal flow quantity for VC B: 
 
VC A
VC B
VC C
Gatekeeper
co
-in
ve
st
co-invest
 
Figure 7.11: Role increasing deal flow quantity768 
 
Since the ellipses denote subgroup membership, and since the subgroups are set up based 
on the VCs' focus on industries and on investment stages, the results imply the following: 
Simply syndicating more often only with VCs from other subgroups (industry/stage 
                                              
767  Own illustration. 
768  Own illustration. 
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focus) does not increase deal flow quantity. But syndicating more often with VCs from 
the own subgroup and also syndicating with VCs from a different subgroup does increase 
deal flow quantity. That shows that, based on the categorization of the VCs, being 
positioned more often at the boundary of the own subgroup and having syndication 
relationships to the inside of the own subgroup and to other subgroups fosters the 
reception of information on investment opportunities. Based on these results, hypothesis 
HII 11 is confirmed, while HII 13 and HII 15 have to be rejected.  
 
Now, there is one factor that could potentially have influenced this result: The effect 
could have appeared because it might just be helpful for a VC to co-invest with members 
from his own subgroup, and that syndicating with VCs from a different subgroup does 
not deliver any additional benefit. That is, since the measure 'gatekeeper' (in contrast to 
the other two measures 'consultant' and 'liaison') includes syndication relationships with 
VCs of the same subgroup (in the figure above it is the contact of VC B to VC C), the 
effect could just be due to the contact to VC C. To account for that effect, another role 
measure is being included that only counts the number of times that a VC is mediating a 
relationship within its own subgroup. The measure 'coordinator' has been presented 
earlier (again, VC B is the focal actor):769 
 
A
B
C
Coordinator
 
Figure 7.12: Role of coordinator770 
 
By including both, 'coordinator' and 'gatekeeper' in the regression model, it is possible to 
detect whether the syndication relationships to VCs of other subgroups are still important 
                                              
769  Refer back to section 3.4.5.3. 
770  Own illustration. 
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for increasing deal flow quantity, or whether the positive effect is due to syndication 
contacts with members of the own subgroup alone.771 The results of the regression model 
are presented below: 
 
Model 16
Employees   2.389 (0.204)
Age -2.299 (-0.149)
Offices -1.161 (-0.013)
Deal flow measurement   9.562 (0.110)
Coordinator 23.965 (0.261)*
Gatekeeper 31.669 (0.246)*
Constant 22.115
R2 0.291**
Adjusted R2 0.231**
N 88
*      p <0.05; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
**    p <0.01; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
The standardized regression coefficient is presented in brackets  
Table 7.3: Regression model for 'coordinator' vs. 'gatekeeper' on deal flow quantity772 
 
The results show that, while the overall model is highly significant (p<0.01), both 
measures, i.e., 'coordinator' and 'gatekeeper' xare statistically significant (p<0.05). The 
overall model also shows a significant increase of the explanatory power with an R2 of 
29.1% (adjusted 23.1%) compared to the base case model (model 1) with a statistically 
insignificant R2 of 12.0% (adjusted 6.8%). Compared to all other models considered so 
far, model 13 is the one with the largest explanatory power. That is, the combination of 
being more often between two members within the own subgroup and at the same time 
syndicating with a member from a different subgroup should yield significant benefits in 
terms of deal flow quantity. 
 Probably one could say, more simply, that VCs should stick to co-investing with VCs 
that have the same foci (industry/stage), while at the same time they should also try to 
build links to other subgroups in order to receive new information on potential 
investment opportunities.  
                                              
771  The correlation between 'coordinator' and 'gatekeeper' is 0.434, so multicollinearity is not an issue and 
they can both be included in one regression model. Also, the collinearity between 'coordinator' and the 
firm attributes is low, ranging between 0.03 and 0.09. 
772  Own calculations and illustration. 
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Summarizing, the results show that a larger amount of social capital in the form of 
relationships that span structural holes is highly beneficial for VCs in terms of deal flow 
quantity. The larger the amount of social capital, the higher the deal flow quantity will be. 
 
7.1.5.2 Effect of Roles on Deal Flow Quality 
The results for deal flow quality are similar to those for deal flow quantity, while the 
additional explanatory power for deal flow quantity was slightly higher. But still, the 
results imply that those VCs receive more high-quality investment opportunities, that do 
both, syndicating with members of the same subgroup, while at the same time co-
investing with members of different subgroups. Analog to the analysis in the previous 
section, the additional effect of being in a gatekeeper position could also be due to simply 
more often syndicating with members of the own subgroup. To account for that effect 
and to determine whether it is more beneficial for a VC to build the link between 
members of the own subgroup (that is what 'coordinator' measures) or whether 
syndication contacts to members of other subgroups are more beneficial, both, 
'coordinator' and 'gatekeeper' are included in the following regression model: 
 
Model 20
Employees   0.092 (0.250)*
Age   0.037 (0.075)
Offices -0.218 (-0.078)
Deal flow measurement   0.407 (0.149)
Coordinator   0.044 (0.015)
Gatekeeper   1.012 (0.249)*
Constant -0.135
R2 0.214*
Adjusted R2 0.147*
N 88
*      p <0.05; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
**    p <0.01; test of significance based on 20,000 permutations
The standardized regression coefficient is presented in brackets  
Table 7.4: Regression model for 'coordinator' vs. 'gatekeeper' on deal flow quality773 
 
                                              
773  Own calculations and illustration. 
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As becomes obvious, the overall R2 does not increase (21.4% unadjusted), but the adjusted 
R2 decreases to 14.7% due to one more variable being included that has no additional 
explanatory effect, i.e., 'coordinator' statistically is not significant at the conventional 
levels. The variable 'gatekeeper' still is, which shows that, in order to increase deal flow 
quality, syndication contacts to members of other subgroups are vital. Simply spoken and 
analog to the implications for deal flow quantity: VCs should stick to syndicating with 
other VCs that belong to the same industry/stage subgroup, while at the same time it is vital 
to also co-invest with VCs that belong to a different subgroup, in order to increase the 
number of high-quality investment opportunities received. Based on these results, 
hypothesis HII 12 is confirmed, while HII 14 and HII 16 have to be rejected.  
Overall, again, the amount of social capital in the form of relationships that represent a link 
to another subgroup (together with relationships into the own subgroup) has an effect on 
the economic outcome for the VCs. That is, the larger the amount of social capital in the 
form of syndication relationships described above, the higher the deal flow quality will be. 
An overview of the hypothesis, together with the empirical findings is presented below: 
 
Tie strength
Effective size
Constraint
Betweenness
centrality
Multi-
connectivity
Ego-
network
measures
Total 
network
measures
Deal flow quantity Deal flow quality
Expected sign (hypothesis)
Deal flow quantity Deal flow quality
Observed sign (hypothesis), status
Independent variables
- (HII 1) - (HII 2)
+ (HII 3) + (HII 4)
- (HII 5) - (HII 6)
+ (HII 7) + (HII 8)
+ (HII 9) + (HII 10)
+ (HII 1) + (HII 2)
+ (HII 3)* + (HII 4)*
- (HII 5)** - (HII 6)*
+ (HII 7) + (HII 8)*
+ (HII 9)* + (HII 10)**
?
?
?
??
?
?
? = Hypothesis confirmed
Gatekeeper
Consultant
Liaison
Role
analysis
+ (HII 11) + (HII 12)
+ (HII 13) + (HII 14)
+ (HII 15) + (HII 16)
+ (HII 11)** + (HII 12)*
+ (HII 13) + (HII 14)
- (HII 15) + (HII 16)
? ?
 
Table 7.5: Hypotheses and results on network measures and deal flow774 
                                              
774  Own illustration. 
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7.2 Summary of the Results 
This study delivers valuable insights for the German venture capital market with respect 
to the VCs' contact network, their syndication network, and the generation of deal flow 
quantity and quality. In addition, the results and implications significantly contribute to 
the current academic discussions on the topics of syndicated venture capital investments, 
the deal flow quantity and quality as well as on the topic of social capital. In a theoretical 
sense, it became obvious that (a) social capital in the form of values and norms as 
underlying basis that makes exchange possible is prevalent in the VCs contact and 
syndication network, and that (b) social capital inherent in the network position of actors 
can explain differences in economic outcomes (deal flow quantity and quality). 
 
While the contact network accounts for a significant portion of all investment 
opportunities received, above all, it delivers the high-quality investment opportunities. 
Analogously, with respect to the single sources within the contact network, the 
relationships to other VCs not only deliver the most investment opportunities, but they 
most notably deliver those ones that VCs often invest in. 
 
With respect to the VCs' network position within the syndication network, several clear 
messages could be derived. 
In contrast to theory, the number of times that a VC invests with another VC (average tie 
strength) does neither affect deal flow quantity nor deal flow quality. That is, for the 
number of investment opportunities received and also with respect to their quality, it is 
irrelevant whether VCs, on average, invest multiple times with the same other VCs or 
only once. 
More important though is the VCs' embeddedness in the structure of syndication 
relationships in their direct neighborhood, and also their embeddedness in the overall 
network structure. 
 
Regarding the relationship structure in their direct neighborhood, it is vital for a VC to 
syndicate with those that do not also syndicate with its other syndication partners. These 
non-redundant syndication contacts deliver the benefit of receiving new information. 
While having non-redundant syndication contacts is important to generate deal flow 
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quantity, it also increases deal flow quality, i.e., non-redundant syndication partners 
deliver high-quality investment opportunities. 
Also, within the relationship structure, it is important for a VC to have contacts to those 
other VCs that are themselves well-connected. This well-connectedness of syndication 
partners delivers both, a high deal flow quantity and quality.775 
Bringing these two arguments together, the implication for VCs is that it is beneficial in 
terms of deal flow quantity and quality to invest with non-redundant contacts to other 
VCs that are themselves well-connected. 
 
With respect to the VCs' embeddedness in the overall network structure, being in a 
network position that represents the link between to other firms is beneficial. However, 
this is only the case regarding deal flow quality. It is difficult for a VC to directly and 
consciously manage his betweenness in the overall network. A thorough analysis of an 
individual VC's position in the network would have to be performed in order to identify 
those other VCs that the focal VC would have to syndicate with in order to increase his 
betweenness and thereby augment his deal flow quality. Also, since in a previous study 
betweenness centrality and financial performance of a VC were found to be positively 
connected, this could be an indicator for a potentially positive relation between deal flow 
quality and financial performance. However, certainly this question can only be answered 
in future research. 
In contrast, the message based on the results for multiconnectivity is clear: VCs need to 
invest with different other firms. This result supports the insignificance of the results for 
tie strength. It is not important how many times a VC invests with the same other VCs, 
but it is important to invest with different other VCs in order to get access to deal flow 
quantity and quality. The difference of this results as compared to the result regarding 
effective size is the following: The implication of the results for effective size are that it 
is beneficial in terms of deal flow to invest with those other VCs that do not invest with 
each other. In contrast, the notion of multiconnectivity neglects the idea whether the own 
syndication partners also syndicate with each other. Instead, the results for 
                                              
775  Refer to section 7.1.2.1. 
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multiconnectivity emphasize that it is more beneficial for VCs to syndicate with different 
other VCs rather than multiple times with the same VC. 
 
Additional insights could be derived by analyzing the different roles that VCs play with 
respect to subgroups based. Based on a classification regarding industry focus and focus 
on investment stages it could be shown that for both, deal flow quantity and quality, it is 
vital to be in a position that represents a link between members of the own subgroup and 
members of another subgroup.  
Thereby, VCs benefit in terms of information received on potential investment 
opportunities and they benefit from such structural positions because they receive more 
high-quality deals. 
 
7.3 Implications for the Management of Venture Capital Firms 
As could be shown in this study, the analysis of the VCs' syndication network delivers 
valuable insights on the ability of the firms to generate deal flow quantity and quality. 
Thereby, this study contributes to the current status of academic research on the 
syndication network of VCs. VCs need to be aware that the contact network (and also the 
syndication network) is of considerable importance for the identification of investment 
opportunities. However, besides several implications derived based on the results for the 
firm attributes, a general recommendation would be that VCs might want to put a 
stronger focus on the structural characteristics of their contact network, and especially on 
the question, how they are embedded in the local (ego-network) and the overall network 
structure (based on total network measures). This study revealed that, in order to generate 
deal flow quantity and quality, it is important (in a structural sense), (a) to whom the 
firms are connected to (based on syndicated investments), and (b) with whom the firms 
they have invested with, are themselves connected to (based on syndicated investments). 
In the following, first, it is referred to implications derived based on the results for the 
general importance of the contact network. Then, concrete recommendations will be 
deduced based on the results for the firm attributes as well as for the network measures. 
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With respect to the number of investment opportunities that VCs receive from network 
contacts compared to those received unsolicited, it could be shown that both sources of 
deal flow approximately deliver 50%. That is, as regards deal flow quantity, there is no 
difference between the number of investment opportunities referred to the VC by a 
network contact and those received unsolicited. However, when taking deal flow quality 
into consideration, things are different. A much higher percentage of those investment 
opportunities gets financed that were received from a network contact (85%). For VCs, as 
discussed earlier, it is a trade-off decision between deal flow quantity and deal flow 
quality: On the one hand side, they need to have many investment opportunities so that 
they can select those ones that are most promising. On the other hand, a VC has limited 
capacity and resources to screen and evaluate investment opportunities for their quality. 
In the end though, considering both aspects, VCs should probably be more interested in 
increasing their deal flow quality because those deals are the ones they finally invest in. 
Bringing these thoughts together with the results referred to above, the implication for the 
management of VCs is clear: In order to increase deal flow quality, they should focus 
their resources on establishing and maintaining network contacts because they are the 
ones that deliver high-quality investment opportunities.  
When considering the various potential groups within the contact network, the results 
also convey a clear message: The group that delivers the most and, in a qualitative sense, 
the best deal opportunities, are other VCs. Consequently, when concentrating their 
resources and capacity on establishing and maintaining network contacts, VCs should 
focus on other VCs. By doing so, VCs will not only increase the mere number of 
investment opportunities they receive, but, and this is even more important, they will 
increase the number of high-quality investment opportunities they receive. 
 
With respect to the firm attributes, also several implications for the management of VCs 
can be derived. First, regarding the number of employees, the simple and clear message is 
that VCs need to hire more employees in order to increase their deal flow. This applies to 
both, deal flow quantity and quality. While this result is intuitive, the implication for VCs 
is significant: In contrast to, for example, marketing activities that only have an indirect 
impact on deal flow (VCs can control the marketing activities but not the actual reaction 
or response of potential founders and entrepreneurs to these activities), employing more 
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people that actively search for investment opportunities seems to be a much more direct 
approach to control and increase deal flow quantity and quality. 
Regarding the age of the VC, a striking result was found that gives rise to further 
research. While the age of the VC was negatively associated with deal flow quantity, the 
sign changed into positive for deal flow quality (although statistically not significant for 
deal flow quality). This general tendency, i.e., that younger firms tend to have a higher 
deal flow quantity while older firms tend to have a higher deal flow quality, also carries a 
clear message, especially for younger VCs: In order to increase deal flow quality, they 
need to get into contact with those older VCs that have a similar investment focus. By 
doing this, the younger firms can potentially benefit from offers to syndicate, given to 
them by the older firms. 
With respect to the number of offices, an interesting tendency could be observed: While 
statistically not significant at conventional levels, the sign of the regression coefficients 
changed from positive for deal flow quantity to negative for deal flow quality. This 
general tendency might indicate that, in order to generate deal flow quantity, it is 
beneficial to have many offices. In contrast, in order to increase deal flow quality, it 
might be beneficial to have less offices. The implication for the management of VCs 
could simply be that it is irrelevant in terms of deal flow quality, how many offices the 
VC has. Rather, it could be that it is much more important that the office(s) the VC has, 
need(s) to be in the 'right' locations. Again, however, in a statistical sense, these 
conclusions can only be assumed that need to be statistically verified in future research, 
analyzing the potential connection between the number and exact distribution of the 
offices of VCs and the respective deal flow quantity and quality. 
As to the systematic measurement of deal flow, also a clear recommendation for the 
management of VCs can be derived. While the regression coefficients for this variable 
are consistently positive in all models, they are statistically significant only in several 
models on deal flow quality. Still, the general message is that it is beneficial for VCs, 
above all in terms of deal flow quality, to systematically track (a) how many investment 
opportunities they receive, (b) from which sources they received these investment 
opportunities, and (c) from which sources they received those investment opportunities 
they finally invest in. Of course, the logical recommendation then is that VCs do not only 
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track these information, but that they try to optimize their deal flow generating activities 
based on their findings. 
 
On the level of the results for the network measures, several recommendations can be 
derived. First, in terms of ego-network measures, the strength of a syndication 
relationship, i.e., the number of times a VC syndicated with the same other VC, does not 
significantly affect the focal VC’s deal flow. While this applies to deal flow quantity and 
quality, the implication for the management of VCs is clear: When it comes to selecting 
syndication partners, and in order to increase deal flow quantity and quality, a VC’s focus 
should not be to co-invest with the same other VCs multiple times. Rather, a VC should 
focus on other structural characteristics, which will be referred to below. 
With respect to the effective size of a VC’s ego-network, the implication for the 
management of VCs is obvious: In order to increase both, deal flow quantity and quality, 
it is important for VCs to syndicate with firms that represent non-redundant contacts. The 
non-redundancy of a new syndication partner is higher, the fewer of the focal firm's 
previous syndication partners the new partner also has invested with. More simply 
spoken, the recommendation to VCs is the following: Syndicate with those VCs that do 
not also co-invest with your other syndication partners. The result of this strategy to 
select syndication partners will be that the VC receives more new information on 
potential investment opportunities. 
Another recommendation based on the ego-network measures is that joint investments 
should be entered with those firms, the relationship structure of which does not exert a 
constraint on the focal firm. More concretely, this means that it should ideally be 
syndicated with those firms that are themselves well-connected to many other VCs the 
focal firms has no syndication relationships with. The result of this strategy is that the focal 
VC is not constrained by single other VCs. In contrast, the chance that structural holes are 
spanned is higher, yielding benefits in terms of both, deal flow quantity and quality. 
 
With respect to the embeddedness of VCs in the overall network structure (total network 
measures), also several clear implications can be derived. First, based on the results for 
the network measure betweenness centrality, the results show that those VCs have 
advantages in deal flow quality that more often sit 'between' two other VCs. The 
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recommendation to the management of a VC is that, in order to increase his deal flow 
quality, he first needs to identify his specific network position. Then, he needs to check, 
with which other VCs he has to syndicate with in order to more often get into network 
positions 'between' two other VCs. By being more often in such positions, the VC would 
strategically optimize his network position with the result that he should more often hear 
of high-quality investment opportunities. 
As regards the multiconnectivity of a VC, it is important that he invests with different 
other VCs in order make himself independent of single other VCs within the network. 
Thereby, the VCs also makes himself invulnerable vis-à-vis the removal of nodes within 
the network, i.e., in other words, taking away syndication relationships does not severely 
affect the VC’s opportunities in terms of deal flow quantity and quality. 
 
In addition, from a subgroup perspective (industry-/investment stage-allocation), it is 
beneficial for VCs to syndicate with other VCs from the own subgroup. However, in 
order to increase deal flow quantity and quality, a large part of the added value comes 
from syndication relationships with those other VCs that belong to a different subgroup. 
Therefore, the recommendation for VCs is to analyze their syndication network and 
determine, to which VCs from other subgroups it would make sense to co-invest with. 
VCs from other subgroups that it would make sense to invest with would be those that 
most likely hear of investment opportunities that meet the own investment criteria but 
that do not (or not entirely) meet theirs. While this final recommendation based on 
subgroups lacks practical concreteness, it is as concrete as it can be in a general sense. In 
order to derive more practical recommendations for individual VCs, i.e., with which other 
VC it would make sense to syndicate with, a thorough analysis of their individual 
network position with respect to subgroups needs to be performed. 
 
7.4 Implications for Research 
In this section, two topics are addressed: First, it will be discussed how the present study 
fits into the stream of academic research. Also, it will be highlighted, which aspects of 
this study are equal to already existing research, which aspects are extensions, and what 
the learnings in a theoretical sense are. Second, it will be explained what the limitations 
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of the present study are and which potential questions can be identified for further 
research. 
 
As became obvious in this study, by the help of formal methods of social network analysis, 
i.e., the consideration of the structure of a social system, statements can be derived on 
economic outcomes of the actors. This shows once more that the application of network 
analysis in the area of economics is a worthwhile effort that delivers valuable insights, 
which could not have been achieved by the mere analysis of actor attributes alone.  
From a theoretical perspective, this study analyzes the benefits of network positions on 
the level of individual actors and is rooted in the argument that network openness (weak 
ties/structural holes) leads to advantages for the individual actors.776 Based on the 
typology of network studies developed in section 3.2.5.2, the analyses thereby clearly 
relate to explaining performance variation in the sense of deal flow quantity and quality. 
By focusing on the analysis of the structure of the syndication network and its connection 
to deal flow, the relational and the cognitive dimensions of social capital have largely 
been excluded.777 
When comparing this study to already existing research, several similarities can be found: 
Already in previous studies, the sources of deal flow have been analyzed. Also, however 
only in very few examples, the separation between deal flow quantity and quality has 
been addressed. While only in one study (Vater (2002)) this distinction is being clearly 
made (incl. partial measurement), in most studies (if at all) these dimensions are 
mentioned but not measured. In terms of network analysis, only few examples exist that 
examine the VCs’ syndication network. However, previous research focused on one or 
one group of network measures, namely centrality measures, but excluded other 
important dimensions of a network structure. 
                                              
776  Refer back to section 3.3.4. 
777  The relational dimension has partially and indirectly been covered in this study by analyzing the general 
importance of the contact network for the generation of deal flow quantity and quality. However, the 
relational as well as the cognitive dimension could certainly be examined in much more detail, then 
drawing on aspects such as various forms of trust, sanctions, expectations, and obligations that exist 
among VCs in the market. Furthermore, topics in the cognitive dimension such as shared languages, 
codes, and narratives could be analyzed. 
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Therefore, this study is unique in several dimensions, thereby delivering valuable 
extensions to the present academic discussion: First, in this work two sets of data have 
been brought together, i.e., data on the syndication network and data on the deal flow 
quantity and quality as well as on firm attributes. Second, a clear separation has been 
made between the quantity and quality of deal flow, and both dimensions have been 
measured. Third, not only one aspect of network structure has been analyzed. In contrast 
to existing research, the VCs’ network structure has comprehensively been analyzed by 
looking separately at ego-network measures and total network measures. Fourth, this 
study is based on a theoretical framework, which, in the context of syndicated venture 
capital investments and deal flow quantity and quality, has not been applied before. Fifth, 
the study contributes to answering a concrete question posed by previous research in this 
area. Sixth, a role analysis has been performed to derive additional insights on the 
potential advantages that come from contacts to different subgroups. 
In terms of learnings for theory and future research, various aspects deserve accentuation. 
First, as this study shows, it makes sense to distinguish between the quantity and quality 
of deal flow. This was indicated in previous research, however, only a few studies have 
attempted at all to measure both. Since quantity and quality of deal flow determine a 
VC's investments in portfolio companies, both dimensions have to be considered 
separately. As could be seen in this study, another reason for a necessary distinction is the 
fact that firm attributes as well as network measures yield differential effects for deal 
flow quantity and deal flow quality. Second, it obviously is reasonable to analyze ego-
network measures and total network measures separately since they capture different 
aspects of the network structure. While ego-network measures look at the local network 
structure, total network measures characterize the actor's embeddedness in the entire 
network. Third, based on this study's finding that the analysis of ego-network measures 
already could explain a fairly large part of the variance of the dependent variables, it has 
to be thought about whether it makes sense to not collect data on the entire network but to 
just survey the ego-networks of the actors. If it is possible to derive statements based on 
the ego-network structure that are also valid for the full network, studying ego-networks 
might imply significantly less data collection effort as compared to analyzing entire 
networks. However, following this approach would certainly entail to make use of more 
sophisticated statistical methods, referring to sampling and modeling techniques.  
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Based on the present study, several limitations have to be mentioned. First, this study 
focuses on the German venture capital market only. This selection has been made for two 
reasons: First, the data available on investments in portfolio companies does not allow for 
an individual matching of VCs and portfolio companies, as explained in section 5.1.1.2.1. 
Second, from the authors perspective, since the field of social capital research is 
developing rapidly, it is better to sharply focus the study on a certain geographic area to 
exclude unobservable effects due to international differences. Based on this argument, 
derived conclusions gain in objectivity and impact. Second, this study focuses on venture 
capital investments only. While this is certainly a limitation, other investment types such 
as buyout investments needed to be excluded because the deal flow generation process is 
supposedly different from the one with regard to venture capital investments. Third, the 
time period considered ranges from 1998-2005. During this time, the German venture 
capital market has experienced a fairly volatile development. However, due to several 
reasons, this selection had to be made and represents a valid basis for analysis: In order to 
derive valid conclusions based on a network analysis, a long enough time period needs to 
be considered. In addition, the German venture capital market took up speed especially 
from 1998 onwards. Before that time, venture capital investments in Germany lagged 
behind those in other regions such as the UK or the US.  
Another limitation is that the study does not measure the relationships between VCs on 
the level of individuals. However, it appeared that there is no systematic way how to 
capture the personal relationships in the venture capital industry.778 This certainly 
represents an area for future research. 
 
With respect to future research, several concrete questions can be derived that might deliver 
further valuable insights. One question relates to the relationship between the VCs' age and 
its deal flow quantity and quality. Although statistically only partially significant in this 
study, the results indicate the tendency that age might be negatively associated with deal 
flow quantity, and positively related to deal flow quality. Future research could take up this 
aspect and try to examine the exact determinants of this relationship.  
                                              
778  Hochberg/Ljungqvist/Lu (2007) faced the same challenge and chose the same approach as applied in 
the present paper. 
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Another question refers to the number of offices and the relation of this variable to deal 
flow quantity and quality. The results of this study show the tendency that, while having 
more offices leads to a higher deal flow quantity, having fewer offices leads to a higher 
deal flow quality. In future research this contradictory phenomenon might be explored in 
more detail. In addition to the mere number of offices, it could be analyzed from a 
geographical perspective, whether their location is associated with the VCs’ deal flow 
quantity and quality.  
Furthermore, another field of research in the given context could be an even more 
detailed analysis of the subgroups of VCs. Here, aspects such as hierarchies within a 
network structure or the belonging to certain cliques could be approaches that might 
deliver valuable insights on deal flow quantity and quality. However, since this topic 
actually is an own and extensive area within social network analysis, only one aspect of 
this interesting field has been covered in the present study.  
 
There are also more general research questions that can be derived as basis for future 
research. In this study it could be shown that the position of VCs in the syndication 
network can explain a certain portion of the variance in deal flow quantity and quality. 
Logical next questions include the following: First, it might be asked what efforts and 
activities are being performed by VCs that bring them into the network position they 
hold. The actual question being asked in this context would be with which activities VCs 
actually try to 'invest' in their social capital and whether these investments lead to 
advantageous positions within the syndication network. Also relevant in this context 
would be the question what the optimal size of a VC’s ego-network would be, since 
establishing and maintaining a contact network also implies costs. 
 Second, it could be interesting to analyze, to what extent and in what dimensions VCs, 
which hold comparable network positions, are similar. This would be classical study in 
the research area of homophily. Relevant questions in this context could be whether VCs 
that focus on the same industries are also similar in terms of network measures (for 
example betweenness centrality). Another example would be whether VCs, the offices of 
which are located in the same city or region also tend to invest with each other. Third, it 
could be examined, whether and to what extent network measures are also able to explain 
the economic success of VCs. A challenge in this context would certainly be the 
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collection of reliable data on the economic success of the firms because, understandably, 
VCs are fairly hesitant in disclosing such information. Fourth, since the relational 
(partially) and the cognitive dimension of social capital have been excluded within the 
present study, these could be aspects to be highlighted in future research. In this context, 
for example the aspects of shared languages, codes, and narratives could be the basis for 
analyses. Fifth, research effort could be spent on developing a standardized 'tool' that 
allows the systematic identification of VCs, the contact to whom would improve the focal 
firm's network position with respect to deal flow quantity and quality. Sixth, since this 
study focuses on the German venture capital market, it would be interesting to analyze 
whether similar results can be found for other regions such as other European countries 
(for example the UK or France) or for the US. 
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8 Summary of the Study 
This dissertation represents a thorough empirical study on the importance of the VCs' 
contact and syndication network and of the VCs' network position for the generation of 
deal flow quantity and quality. The objective of the study was two-fold: (a) Evaluation of 
the importance of the general contact network and of the VCs' syndication network for 
the generation of deal flow quantity and quality. (b) Analysis of the individual VCs' 
network position within the syndication network, and determination of the effect of 
network position on the VCs' deal flow quantity and quality. 
 
In order to accomplish these goals, in chapter two an overview has been presented of the 
topics of venture capital and deal flow. It could be shown that there is a considerable 
stock of uninvested capital in the German venture capital market, and that one challenge 
for VCs to overcome is to identify promising investment opportunities.  
 
In chapter three, the theoretical foundation for this study has been laid out. In contrast to 
the theories commonly applied to financial markets, social network analysis and the 
concept of social capital including its underlying theories represent a sound basis to analyze 
the benefits of networks in general, and to examine the benefits of individual actor's 
network positions in specific. Based on the theories on the trust in the prevalence of norms, 
the theory on the strength of weak ties, and the theory on structural holes, theoretically 
founded implications for the importance of the VCs' network and network position could 
be derived. In the last section of this chapter, a research design has been set up, reflecting 
the two goals of the study as well as the theoretically derived implications. 
 
In chapter four, these theoretically derived implications have been formulated in specific 
hypotheses, which are categorized according to the two goals: Six hypotheses refer to 
goal (a), i.e., to the examination of the general contact network and of the VCs' 
syndication network for the generation of deal flow quantity and quality. 16 hypotheses 
relate to goal (b), i.e., the analysis of the individual VCs' position within the syndication 
network and its effects on deal flow quantity and quality. Within the 16 hypotheses, the 
last six refer to the potential benefits that VCs might have based on playing certain roles 
with respect to linking subgroups of VCs in the network. 
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Chapter five contains a description of the data used, the data collection process, as well as 
of the methods applied in this study. 
 
While in chapter six the descriptive statistics and the results of the regressions have been 
reported and described, in chapter seven these results have been discussed and 
interpreted. According to the two goals, first, the importance of the general contact 
network and of the VCs’ syndication network for the generation of deal flow quantity and 
quality has been evaluated. Second, the VCs’ network position within the syndication 
network has been thoroughly analyzed, and the effects of the network position on deal 
flow quantity and quality have been detected. Also, a role analysis with respect to 
subgroups of VCs has been performed. 
In addition, several concrete and practical implications for the management of VCs and 
for future research have been derived. In addition, the limitations of this study have been 
discussed. Based on the implications, (a) VCs are able to improve their deal flow quantity 
and, above all, their deal flow quality, and (b) scientists in the field of network analysis 
and entrepreneurial research are provided concrete ideas for future research. 
Based on existing work in this field, the present study significantly contributes to the 
research on syndicated venture capital investments, the topic of deal flow quantity and 
quality as well as to the discussion on the benefits of social capital inherent in social 
network structures. 
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Appendix 
Questionnaire of the empirical study 
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Hintergrund der Forschungsarbeit 
"Die Bedeutung des Kontaktnetzwerks für den Deal Flow von 
Beteiligungskapitalgesellschaften" 
Eine wesentliche Voraussetzung für die Geschäftstätigkeit von Beteiligungskapitalgesellschaften 
(BKG) ist die Schaffung eines stetigen Stroms qualitativ hochwertiger Beteiligungs-
gelegenheiten (Beteiligungsanträge bzw. Deal Flow).  
Beteiligungsanträge können BKG aus unterschiedlichen Quellen erreichen: Zum einen als 
Fremdzuschrift des Kapital suchenden Unternehmens, zum anderen durch eine Information oder 
Empfehlung eines Kontakts aus dem Netzwerk der BKG (beruflicher oder privater Kontakt). 
In zahlreichen wissenschaftlichen Studien und empirischen Umfragen wurde gezeigt, dass das 
Netzwerk der BKG eine wichtige Rolle für die Generierung von Deal Flow, d.h. die 
Identifikation von Beteiligungsanträgen spielt.  
Ziel dieser Forschungsarbeit (Dissertation) ist es daher, den Zusammenhang zwischen dem 
Netzwerk und dem Deal Flow der BKG zu untersuchen. Die Netzwerkanalyse wurde bereits 
durchgeführt. Mit dem folgenden Fragebogen sollen nun, neben einigen generellen Angaben, 
Informationen zum Deal Flow Ihrer Gesellschaft erhoben werden.  
 
Hinweise zum Inhalt und zum Ausfüllen des Fragebogens 
¶ Das Ausfüllen dieses Fragebogens wird ca. 15 Minuten Ihrer Zeit beanspruchen. Als Dank 
für Ihre Mithilfe können Sie die Ergebnisse dieser Studie erhalten (siehe Felder am Ende des 
Fragebogens). 
¶ Der Fragebogen besteht aus zwei Teilen: 
- Teil 1 betrifft Angaben zum Deal Flow Ihrer Gesellschaft 
- Teil 2 betrifft generelle Angaben zu Ihrer Gesellschaft 
¶ Beziehen Sie sich bei Ihren Antworten bitte auf den deutschen Markt bzw. auf Aktivitäten 
Ihrer Gesellschaft in Deutschland.  
¶ Bitte beantworten Sie möglichst alle Fragen. Die Vollständigkeit Ihrer Antworten ist für 
uns und diese empirische Untersuchung von höchster Wichtigkeit. 
¶ Bitte füllen Sie die Fragen soweit wie möglich aus. Wenn Sie sich über die genaue Antwort 
nicht ganz sicher sind, tragen Sie bitte Schätzwerte als Antwort ein. 
¶ Selbstverständlich werden wir Ihre Angaben streng vertraulich behandeln. In der Arbeit 
wird weder Ihr Name noch der Name Ihrer Gesellschaft genannt, d.h. die Daten werden 
anonymisiert. 
¶ Bei Rückfragen steht Ihnen Dipl.-Kfm. Ingo Böhner als Ansprechpartner gerne zur 
Verfügung. Er ist telefonisch unter +49 175 318 7190 erreichbar. 
¶ Bitte senden Sie den ausgefüllten Fragebogen per Fax an +49 221 208 7191 oder per Post 
an: Prof. Malte Brettel (z. Hd. Ingo Böhner), RWTH Aachen, Lehrstuhl WIN, Templergraben 
64, 52062 Aachen 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Unterstützung! 
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Teil 1: Angaben zum Deal Flow Ihrer Gesellschaft  
Deal Flow: Strom an Investitions- bzw. Beteiligungsgelegenheiten. Beteiligungsanträge von Kapital 
suchenden Personen oder Unternehmen.  
"Alle" Investitionsgelegenheiten: Anzahl aller Beteiligungsanträge, die Ihre Gesellschaft initial zur 
Auswahl hat, bevor eine Selektion oder Beurteilung (Due Diligence) stattfindet. 
Fremdzuschriften: Beteiligungsanträge, die Ihnen von Kapital suchenden Firmen unaufgefordert 
zugesandt werden bzw. die Sie nicht über einen Kontakt aus Ihrem Netzwerk identifiziert haben. 
Netzwerk: Gesamtheit der Kontakte, d.h. private Kontakte wie z.B. Familie oder Freunde und berufliche 
Kontakte wie z.B. Kontakte zu anderen BKG, Banken, Rechtsanwälten, Steuerberatern, etc. 
1a. Durchschnittliche Anzahl aller Investitionsgelegenheiten bzw.
Beteiligungsanträge, die an Ihre Gesellschaft pro Jahr herangetragen wurden
1b. Von dieser Anzahl (nicht Volumen) entfielen im Durchschnitt auf… 
-…Early Stage, Expansion, Later Stage (inkl. Seed, Start-up, First-Third Stage)
-…Buyouts (inkl. MBO, MBI, LBO)
2. Welchen Anteil aller Beteiligungsanträge, die an Ihre Gesellschaft herangetragen
wurden, erhielten Sie ursprünglich…
-…über einen Kontakt aus Ihrem Netzwerk (z.B. Information von anderen BKG
oder Geschäftsfreunden, Angebote zur Syndizierung, etc.)?
-…als Fremdzuschrift (unaufgefordert durch das Kapital suchende Unternehmen)
3. Die Beteiligungsanträge, die über einen Kontakt aus Ihrem Netzwerk an Ihre Gesellschaft
herangetragen wurden, stammten aus folgenden Quellen:
- Andere BKG (Geschäftsfreunde in anderen VC- bzw. PE-Gesellschaften)*
- Universitäten/Forschungseinrichtungen
- Banken/Investmentbanken
- Private Kontakte (ausschl. privat (Familie/Freunde), keine sog. ‚Geschäftsfreunde‘)
- Sonstige Kontakte (bitte spezifizieren):
_______________________________________________
* Inkl. erhaltener Einladungen zur Syndizierung (Co-Investition)
1998-2005
Ø/Jahr ca.
ca. %
ca. %
%100Σ
ca. %
%100Σ
ca. %
ca. %
ca. %
ca. %
ca. %
%100Σ
ca. %
4. In wieviel Prozent aller Investitionsgelegenheiten bzw. Beteiligungsanträge, die
an Ihre Gesellschaft herangetragen wurden, …
4a. …waren Ihre grundsätzlichen Anforderungen für Investitionen
hinsichtlich Branchen-, Finanzierungsphasen und geographischem Fokus erfüllt?
4b. …hat Ihre Gesellschaft ein Investitionsangebot gemacht (d.h. Kriterien aus Frage
4a sowie alle weiteren (Qualitäts-)Anforderungen an Investitionen waren erfüllt)?
4c. …hat Ihre Gesellschaft letztlich tatsächlich investiert?
ca. %
ca. %
ca. %
 
5. Von den Investitionsgelegenheiten, in die Ihre Gesellschaft tatsächlich investiert
hat, entfielen im Durchschnitt auf…
-…Early Stage, Expansion, Later Stage (inkl. Seed, Start-up, First-Third Stage)
-…Buyouts (inkl. MBO, MBI, LBO)
ca. %
ca. %
%100Σ
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7. Welchen Anteil der Beteiligungsanträge, in die Ihre Gesellschaft tatsächlich
investierte, erhielten Sie ursprünglich…
- …über einen Kontakt aus Ihrem Netzwerk (z.B. Informationen von anderen BKG
oder Geschäftsfreunden, Angebote zur Syndizierung, etc.)
- …als Fremdzuschrift (unaufgefordert durch das Kapital suchende Unternehmen)
8. Die Beteiligungsanträge, die über einen Kontakt aus Ihrem Netzwerk an Ihre Gesellschaft
herangetragen wurden und in die sie tatsächlich investierte, stammten aus folgenden Quellen:
- Andere BKG (z.B. Geschäftsfreunde in anderen VC- bzw. PE-Gesellschaften)*
- Universitäten/Forschungseinrichtungen
- Banken/Investmentbanken 
- Private Kontakte (ausschl. privat (Familie/Freunde, keine sog. Geschäftsfreunde)
- Sonstige Kontakte (bitte spezifizieren):
______________________________________________
* Inkl. erhaltener Einladungen zur Syndizierung (Co-Investition)
1998-2005
ca. %
ca. %
%100Σ
ca. %
%100Σ
ca. %
ca. %
ca. %
6. In wieviel Prozent der Investitionsgelegenheiten, in die Ihre Gesellschaft tatsächlich
investiert hat, war Ihre Gesellschaft…
- …alleiniger Investor (keine Syndizierung)
- …Lead- oder Co-Investor (syndiziertes Investment)
ca. %
ca. %
%100Σ
ca. %
 
9. Existiert in Ihrer Gesellschaft eine systematische bzw.standardisierte Erfassung des
Deal Flow?
9a. Erfassung der Anzahl der Investitionsgelegenheiten, die an Ihre Gesellschaft
herangetragen werden
9b. Zuordnung aller erhaltenen Investitionsgelegenheiten bzw. Beteiligungsanträge
zu ihren ursprünglichen Deal Flow Quellen
9c. Zuordnung der letztlich getätigten Investitionen zu ihren ursprünglichen Deal Flow
Quellen
Ja Nein
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Teil 2: Generelle Angaben zu Ihrer Gesellschaft  
10. Bitte geben Sie das Gründungsjahr Ihrer Gesellschaft an.
11. Bitte geben Sie die durchschnittliche Anzahl der Mitarbeiter Ihrer 
Gesellschaft an (nur Deutschland, nur Professionals, kein Support).
12. Bitte geben Sie an, wie die durchschnittliche Nettorendite für Ihre Investoren (IRR) in etwa
ausfiel. 
<5% 5-10% 10-15% 15-20% 20-25% >25%
1998-2005
1998-2005
im Ø ca.
(Format: JJJJ)
 
13. In wie viel Prozent aller syndizierten Investitionen (Co-Investitionen), an denen Ihre Gesellschaft
beteiligt war, hat Ihre Gesellschaft…
- …die „Einladung“ zur Syndizierung an andere BKG ausgegeben
- …die „Einladung“ zur Syndizierung von anderen BKG erhalten
%100Σ
ca. %
ca. %
1998-2005
14. In wie viel Prozent aller syndizierten Investitionen (Co-Investitionen), an denen Ihre Gesellschaft
beteiligt war, war Ihre Gesellschaft…
- …Lead-Investor
- …Co-Investor
%100Σ
ca. %
ca. %
1998-2005
 
15. Bitte geben Sie folgende Größen an.
15a. Durchschnittliches Fondsvolumen (insgesamt zur Verfügung
stehendes Kapital, in Mio. EUR)
15b. Durchschnittlich investiertes Kapital (in Mio. EUR)
15c. Durchschnittliche Anzahl Portfoliounternehmen
15d. Anzahl Büros in Deutschland
1998-2005
ca.
ca.
ca.
16. Bitte geben Sie an, auf welche Finanzierungsphase sich Ihre Gesellschaft fokussiert.
(Zutreffendes bitte ankreuzen)
Seed/ First Expansion/ Later Stage/ MBO/MBI/ Turnaround/
Start-up Stage Second Stage Bridge LBO Replacement
Unsere Gesellschaft strebt keinen Schwerpunkt in einer bestimmten
Finanzierungsphase an
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17. Bitte geben Sie an, auf welche Branche sich Ihre Gesellschaft fokussiert.
(Zutreffendes bitte ankreuzen)
Maschinen-/ Chemie/ Computer- Kommunik.- Bio- Nahrung/ Verkehr/
Anlagenbau Werkstoffe related technologien technologie Medizin Logistik
Handel/ Elektro- Finanz-
Konsumgüter technik dienstleist. Sonstige
Unsere Gesellschaft strebt keinen Schwerpunkt in einer bestimmten
Branche an
 
18. Bitte geben Sie an, welcher Anteil des investierten Kapitals Ihrer Gesellschaft…
- …in deutsche Portfoliounternehmen investiert wurde
- …in ausländische Portfoliounternehmen investiert wurde
%100Σ
ca. %
ca. %
1998-2005
19. Wie zufrieden sind Sie hinsichtlich der Entwicklung des wirtschaftlichen Erfolgs Ihrer
Gesellschaft im Zeitraum 1998-2005 gegenüber…
1= 7=
Gar nicht Sehr
zufrieden   2          3          4         5 6    zufrieden
19a. …Ihren Erwartungen
19b. …der Entwicklung von Wettbewerbern
 
 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Unterstützung! 
 
Sofern Sie an den Ergebnissen dieser Studie interessiert sind, geben Sie bitte hier Ihren Namen, Ihre 
E-Mail Adresse und Ihre Telefonnummer an:  
 
Vorname:    Nachname:  
E-mail Adresse: 
Telefon-Nr.: 
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